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INTRODUCTION. 
I t i s a main aim of economic a c t i v i t y i n 
underdeveloped countries t o r a i s e per capita income which i s 
t y p i c a l l y desperately low. The s p e c i f i c manifestation of t h i s 
f e e l i n g can be found i n the various development programmes 
sponsored by the p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s i n the shape of Five Year 
Plans. While the r o l e of a g r i c u l t u r a l development has been 
recognised, there i s increasing evidence t h a t i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n 
has assumed greater importance i n the development processes of 
developing c o u n t r i e s . 
The s t r u c t u r e of most of the developing economies 
i s dominated by a massive and t r a d i t i o n a l sector such as 
a g r i c u l t u r e , generally c o n t r i b u t i n g something of the order of 
50 t o 60 p.c. t o Gross National Product. I n such a context, i t 
i s commonly f e l t by the planners and development economists 
t h a t f o r an accelerated growth rate i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i s an 
inescapable necessity. As Meier has pointed out, " i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n 
o f f e r s s u b s t a n t i a l b e n e f i t s of a dynamic character t h a t are 
important f o r changing the t r a d i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of the econo,my". ^''"^  
The s t r u c t u r a l change i n the economy can, t h e r e f o r e , be 
(1) Meier, SerRi;iii M;., Leading Issues i n Development Economics 
Selected Materials and Commentary (Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1964), p.285. 
XV 
v i s u a l i z e d as on i n v o l v i n g the t r a n s f e r of resources froiil 
the t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l sector and quickening the pace 
of i n d u s t r i a l growth. I t has been f u r t h e r observed t h a t 
" i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i s an inescapable p a r t of the process of 
change accompanying a gradual improvement i n per capita 
(2) 
income". The advocacy of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n on the above 
l i n e s i s convincing due t o the f a c t t h a t primary exports 
are susceptible t o wider f l u c t u a t i o n s so f a r as the f o r e i g n 
demand i s concerned. 
Like many a developing n a t i o n , Pakistan, a f t e r 
being created i n 1947, found i t s e l f faced w i t h a predominantly 
t r a d i t i o n a l economy and i t s accompanying problems such as low 
income per c a p i t a , balance of payment d i f f i c u l t i e s and, 
unemplojmient and underemployment. Given such conditions the 
Government found i t necessary t o accord a high p r i o r i t y t o 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n so as t o strengthen the economy w i t h regard 
to employment, income, saving, and earning of f o r e i g n exchange. 
I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e , an attempt t o transform the 
economy t o a t t a i n a higher and yet higher growth r a t e . I t may, 
however, be pointed out t h a t i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n Pakistan has 
not been given p r i o r i t y t o such an extent as to weaken the 
c o n t r i b u t i o n the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector can make. Since the beginning 
(2) I b i d . p.286. 
x v x 
of the planning era, almost equal stress and importance has 
been accorded t o both production sectors, even i n the a l l o c a t i o n 
of resources. Despite t h i s , however, planners, r e f l e c t i n g the 
current t h i n k i n g of the Government, have made i t c l e a r t h a t 
"whatever may be the s h i f t s of emphasis between a g r i c u l t u r e and 
manufacturing on the short run, the long run o b j e c t i v e of the 
development p o l i c y must be i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n both as a means of 
increasing per c a p i t a income t o a s a t i s f a c t o r y l e v e l and as a 
(3) 
f i e l d of employment". 
Having gone through the process of the planned 
development over a decade and a h a l f , the Pakistan economy has 
now reached what, i n an Asian context, i s a s e m i - i n d u s t r i a l 
stage. The country has now a t h r i v i n g c a p i t a l i s t sector, side 
by side w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l sector. To t h i s 
process of transformation of the economy, the manufacturing sector 
has made a s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n . The share of a g r i c u l t u r e 
t o Gross National Product declined t o 49 p.c. i n 1965 compared 
w i t h 60 p.c. i n 1950 w h i l e t h a t of the manufacturing sector rose 
t o 12 p.c. as against 6 p.c. i n 1949. 
I t would appear t h a t i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n Pakistan 
has not been i n the d i r e c t i o n of merely emulating the examples 
of other developed or developing countries; rather i t was 
(3) National Planning Board, The F i r s t Five Year Plan 1955-60, 
(Government of Pakistan, December 1967), p.395. 
XVXl 
s t r o n g l y guided by the n e c e s s i t y for making the economic 
s t r u c t u r e more v i a b l e from the point of view of r a i s i n g per 
(4) 
c a p i t a income, which i s one of the lowest i n the world. 
S t a r t i n g as an import"<fed economy ( i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n being 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t ) the economy of Paki s t a n has made tremendous 
s t r i d e s to enable the country to be s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n a 
number of consumer as w e l l as intermediary goods. 
With the launching of the F i v e Year Plans s i n c e 
1955, the requirements of f o r e i g n exchange have i n c r e a s e d 
a p p r e c i a b l y to meet the f o r e i g n exchange components of development 
(5) 
p r o j e c t s , P a k i s t a n , because of i t s balance of payments 
d i f f i c u l t i e s could hardly f i n a n c e i t s development imports out 
of i t s own res o u r c e s without f o r e i g n a i d and loans. Therefore, 
the development plans have included the aim of making the 
country l e s s dependent on f o r e i g n a s s i s t a n c e i n f u t u r e . An 
e s s e n t i a l s t r a t e g y of t h i s p o l i c y i s evidenced i n developing 
i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i n g and export-'orientated i n d u s t r i e s . 
I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n was v i t a l l y important i n a 
populous country l i k e P a k i s t a n to reduce the pressure on land. 
The lan d , per c a p i t a , works out to be l e s s than one a c r e i n 
(4) Rs 311 i n 1949-50. 
(5) For example, f o r e i g n exchange components of the F i r s t and 
Second P l a n s ' o u t l a y were 47 and 38 p.c. r e s p e c t i v e l y . The 
f o r e i g n exchange requirements of the T h i r d F i v e Year Plan 
are estimated to be 32 p.c. of the Plan outlay. 
x v i i i 
(6) 
E a s t P a k i s t a n and a l i t t l e more than one acre i n West Pakistan, 
The d i s g u i s e d unemployment f o r the country as a whole has been 
(7 ) 
estimated a t 20 to 25 p.Ce of the labour f o r c e . The surplus 
labour i s r e q u i r e d to be s u c c e s s i v e l y withdrawn from the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l to the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r by providing g a i n f u l 
employment. During the l a s t decade and a h a l f there has been a 
s h i f t of labour from the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r but i t has not been 
q u i t e as evident as otherwise i t would have been because of a 
higher population growth r a t e . 
The i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r i n P a k i s t a n has r e g i s t e r e d an 
annual growth r a t e of n e a r l y 13 p.c. over the period under study. 
T h i s growth r a t e might be regarded as q u i t e high by any standard; 
i t must seem p a r t i c u l a r l y so when viewed i n the p e r s p e c t i v e of 
the underdeveloped c o n d i t i o n of the economy. 
The process of i n d u s t r i a l growth r e q u i r e d an 
adequate supply of funds, e s p e c i a l l y long-term c a p i t a l . 
Adequate a v a i l a b i l i t y of c a p i t a l i s a b a s i c requirement f o r the 
development of i n d u s t r y . Economists of a l l types have 
recognised the f a c t t h a t economic development r e s t s g e n e r a l l y 
on the establishment of those conditions that encourage the 
growth of c a p i t a l . A l l new and e x i s t i n g i n d u s t r i a l establishments 
(6) C e n t r a l S t a t i s t i c a l O f f i c e , S t a t i s t i c a l Pocket-Book of P a k i s t a n 
1967, (Government of P a k i s t a n ) j pp, 62,52 and 53, 
(7) Haq, Mahbubul., The Strategy of Economic Planning : A case study 
of P a k i s t a n , (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , K a r a c h i , 1966), p.248. 
x i x 
r e q u i r e funds f o r t h e i r continuing p r o s p e r i t y . For t h i s reason 
the problem of c a p i t a l supply has come to the f o r e f r o n t i n 
economic d i s c u s s i o n s i n c e the achievement of P a k i s t a n . 
I t i s g e n e r a l l y contended that i n d u s t r i a l growth i s 
accompanied by a s t r u c t u r a l change i n the c a p i t a l market as w e l l . 
The change i s i n e v i t a b l e i n the sense that demand f o r long-term 
funds i n c r e a s e s p a r i passu w i t h i n d u s t r i a l development. To 
meet t h i s demand the c a p i t a l market tends to expand w i t h 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l change c o n s i s t e n t with the aims of the Government, 
or w i t h the flow of funds or both. But unfortunately, there 
seems to have been a wide gap between the demand f o r and the 
supply of c a p i t a l . S i n c e the announcement of i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y 
i n 1949, the demand f o r long-term c a p i t a l i n P a k i s t a n by the 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r , f o r i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c i n g , has i n c r e a s e d 
c o n s i d e r a b l y . To meet the demand e f f e c t i v e l y , the Government, 
i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e has developed a number 
of i n s t i t u t i o n s to strengthen the c a p i t a l market i n the 
country. 
The c a p i t a l market i n Pakis t a n i n c l u d e s the 
I n d u s t r i a l Development Bank of Paki s t a n , the P a k i s t a n I n d u s t r i a l 
C r e d i t and investment Corporation , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n v e s t o r s such 
as insurance companies, the National Investment T r u s t and the 
r e c e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d Investment Corporation of P a k i s t a n . The 
Kar a c h i Stock Exchange and a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l e r exchange at 
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Dacca have provided the marketing f a c i l i t i e s of stocks i n the 
country. U n t i l 1966, there e x i s t e d no investment bank, although 
an underwriting f u n c t i o n , i n the l i m i t e d insurance sense of 
guaranteeing the absorption of unsold s t o c k s , has been performed 
to a c e r t a i n extent by the l a r g e r commercial banks, the 
P a k i s t a n I n d u s t r i a l C r e d i t and Investment Corporation and the 
National Investment T r u s t . Underwriting f a c i l i t i e s by these 
i n s t i t u t i o n s have however, proved to be inadequate. 
The problem of r a i s i n g the i n i t i a l c a p i t a l has been 
p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t s i n c e 1963 des p i t e the f a c t t h a t some new 
i s s u e s , a l l of which were f l o a t e d by well-known i n d u s t r i a l 
houses, were oversubscribed. T h i s s i t u a t i o n warranted a b e t t e r 
o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y of the Stock Exchange and e f f e c t i v e n e s s 
of the c a p i t a l market. I n c o n t r a s t , many i s s u e s f l o a t e d by 
comparatively imknown entrepreneurs were not f u l l y subscribed 
and i n some i n s t a n c e s remained g r o s s l y undersubscribed. Professor 
L o u i s Loss of Harvard U n i v e r s i t y was i n v i t e d by the Government 
to i n v e s t i g a t e the causes of t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s on the Stock 
Exchange. I n h i s report " S e c u r i t i e s Market i n P a k i s t a n " he 
pointed out t h a t the problem was the r e s u l t of the absence of 
i n s t i t u t i o n s performing investment banking functions i n P a k i s t a n . 
As a remedy, he suggested the establishment of an investment bank 
i n order to provide expert advice to the p u b l i c about the 
s e c u r i t i e s , and to a s s i s t the entrepreneurs to r a i s e c a p i t a l 
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through new i s s u e s , thereby s t i m u l a t i n g wider p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n equity investment. 
As regards o v e r s u b s c r i p t i o n of some i s s u e s . Professor Loss 
observed that "such o v e r s u b s c r i p t i o n o f t e n r e s u l t e d from the f a c t 
t h a t a r e l a t i v e l y small number of wealthy i n v e s t o r s was able 
to obtain bank c r e d i t to finance 90 p.c. of t h e i r s u b s c r i p t i o n . 
On the other hand, sm a l l i n v e s t o r s were unable to obtain bank 
c r e d i t on equal terms". 
The f i n d i n g s of Professor Loss were f u r t h e r 
examined by a committee of experts appointed by the Government. 
The Committee observed t h a t "the stock market l a c k s depth; and 
l i s t e d shares a r e c l o s e l y h e l d by a few persons. They f e l t 
t h a t there was a need to m o b i l i s e the savings of the growing 
middle c l a s s to help c o n s t r a i n i n f l a t i o n a r y pressure and to 
provide c a p i t a l to growing i n d u s t r i a l undertakings. The Committee 
p a r t i c u l a r l y emphasised the need for the p r o v i s i o n of equity 
c a p i t a l through the s t o c k market to medium-sized undertakings, 
h i t h e r t o excluded from acc e s s to the c a p i t a l market and to obtain 
the f u l l e s t u t i l i s a t i o n of e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l t a l e n t s i n the country. 
P l a n of the Study; 
The importance of long-term c a p i t a l f o r r a p i d 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i s s e l f - e v i d e n t . The importance of such c a p i t a l 
i s enormously g r e a t e r i n P a k i s t a n as i t r e q u i r e s l a r g e amounts of 
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f o r e i g n exchange to finance i t s developmental p r o j e c t s . There has 
been d i s c u s s i o n on the problem of i n d u s t r i a l finance a t d i f f e r e n t 
l e v e l s and r e c e n t depression i n the stock market has a t t r a c t e d 
c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n . But very l i t t l e has been done to analyse 
the workings of the c a p i t a l market i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r problems 
i n making investment i n i n d u s t r i a l s e c u r i t i e s as w e l l as problems 
of i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c e i n g e n e r a l . 
The present study w i l l be concerned w i t h the modes of 
i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c i n g i n P a k i s t a n both i n the p r i v a t e and p u b l i c 
s e c t o r s , w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to the nature and problems of 
f i n a n c i n g the long-term c a p i t a l requirements of the l a r g e - s c a l e 
i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . For t h i s purpose, the r o l e of the main 
f i n a n c i a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s and other sources of i n d u s t r i a l finance 
has been s t u d i e d . T h i s study i s necessary to evaluate the growth 
of i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c i n g f u n c t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d to the stages of 
development. 
The study w i l l be spread over eight chapters. To 
begin w i t h , we w i l l e v a l u a t e the development of the manufacturing 
s e c t o r i n P a k i s t a n . We w i l l then proceed to d i s c u s s the c a p i t a l 
s t r u c t u r e of s e l e c t e d companies l i s t e d on the Karachi Stock Exchange. 
(8) The 'Large-scale I n d u s t r y ' ( 1 ) r e f e r s to f a c t o r i e s and p l a n t s 
r e q u i r e d to r e g i s t e r under s e c t i o n 2 ( j ) of the F a c t o r i e s Act., 
1934, by v i r t u e of twenty or more employees and using 
power. 
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While studying the f i n a n c i a l aspect of t h e i r c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e 
we w i l l c o n s i d e r the uses of c a p i t a l funds as seen i n various 
types of f i n a n c i a l a s s e t s . The sources of c a p i t a l and t h e i r 
r e l a t i v e importance i n the c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e w i l l be dis c u s s e d 
i n terms of groups of i n d u s t r i e s and the s i z e of undertakings. 
The average c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e of P a k i s t a n i companies w i l l then be 
compared w i t h those of developed and developing c o u n t r i e s . 
I n the T h i r d Chapter we propose to d i s c u s s the r o l e 
of the Ka r a c h i Stock Exchange i n m o b i l i s i n g p r i v a t e savings in t o 
the corporate s e c t o r , w i t h p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on the problems 
of r a i s i n g long-term c a p i t a l through new i s s u e s . We s h a l l make 
an attempt to e x p l a i n the behaviour of the stock market i n the 
l i g h t of f i s c a l and monetary p o l i c i e s and i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n 
raising share c a p i t a l f o r i n d u s t r i a l concerns. 
Chapter Four can be regarded as a c o r o l l a r y to 
Chapter Three. I t w i l l seek to e x p l a i n the r o l e of i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
i n v e s t o r s i n pro v i d i n g equity c a p i t a l d i r e c t l y to i n d u s t r i a l 
undertakings as compared w i t h t h e i r r o l e s on the stock exchange. 
I n Chapter F i v e , e f f o r t s w i l l be made to make an 
assessment of the r o l e of fo r e i g n p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s as s u p p l i e r s 
of i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c e . 
The S i x t h Chapter w i l l deal w i t h some aspects of the 
long-term c r e d i t which i s provided by the s p e c i a l i s e d c r e d i t 
i n s t i t u t i o n s v i z . , the I n d u s t r i a l Development Bank of Pa k i s t a n and the 
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P a k i s t a n I n d u s t r i a l C r e d i t and Investment Corporation. The main 
purpose of these i n s t i t u t i o n s i s to meet the long-term c r e d i t 
requirements of i n d u s t r i e s i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
f o r e i g n exchange. I n t h i s connection, the general problems 
r e l a t i n g to i n s t i t u t i o n a l f i n a n c i n g and i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n 
p r o v i d i n g long-term c r e d i t w i l l be examined. 
I n Chapter Seven the techniques and instruments of 
m o b i l i s i n g p u b l i c funds i n t o the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r w i l l be 
d i s c u s s e d . The P r o v i n c i a l I n d u s t r i a l Development Corporations 
(formerly P a k i s t a n I n d u s t r i a l Development Corporation) are the 
main instruments of developing i n d u s t r i e s i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r . 
The o b j e c t i v e s , achievements and f a i l u r e s of these state-sponsored 
Corporations w i l l be analysed i n the l i g h t of t h e i r past 
performance. The f a i l u r e to achieve s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t s i n 
r e s p e c t of the disinvestment p o l i c y w i l l be examined at some 
leng t h . 
They w i l l then follow a chapter - Chapter Eight -
i n which such c o n c l u s i o n s as seem to be supported by t h i s study 
w i l l be summarised. I l l u s t r a t i v e and supporting d e t a i l has 
been s e t out i n v a r i o u s appendices. 
CHAPTER ONE. 
AN INTRODUCTORY OUTLINE OF THE MANUFACTURING 
SECTOR IN PAKISTAN. 
P a k i s t a n came i n t o e x i s t e n c e as an independent 
s t a t e i n 1947 w i t h a predominantly t r a d i t i o n a l economy. Li k e 
most other developing c o u n t r i e s , the composition of her n a t i o n a l 
income was such t h a t about 60 p.c. of the Gross National Product 
(G.N.P.) came from p r i m i t i v e a g r i c u l t u r e with manufacturing 
c o n t r i b u t i n g l e s s than 6 p.c. Due to low p r o d u c t i v i t y i n 
a g r i c u l t u r e , i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y , undeveloped 
c o n d i t i o n s of other s e c t o r s of the economy and the s i z e of her 
population, the average income was pnly 311 rupees per head.^''"^ 
According to the census of 1951, 90 p.c. of the t o t a l population 
(2) 
l i v e d i n r u r a l areas w i t h the remaining 10 p.c. i n urban a r e a s . 
On the p a r t i t i o n of B r i t i s h I n d i a , P a k i s t a n 
i n h e r i t e d a very modest manufacturing c a p a c i t y . Out of 14,569 
i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s i n B r i t i s h I n d i a , 1,406 u n i t s f e l l to the l o t of 
(1) M i n i s t r y of Finance, P a k i s t a n Economic Survey 1966-67, 
(Government of P a k i s t a n , Rawalpindi) S t a t i s t i c a l S e c t i o n , 
Table 1, pp.2-3. 
The per c a p i t a income has been shown at constant f a c t o r 
c o s t of 1959-60. 
(2) The F i r s t F i v e Year Plan, o p . c i t . , p.10. 
P a k i s t a n , Of t h e s e , 832 f a c t o r i e s were p e r e n n i a l and the 
remaining were seasonal i n nature. Amongst the 832 u n i t s , only 
35 were of any s i g n i f i c a n c e . These were 16 cotton t e x t i l e m i l l s , 
7 sugar f a c t o r i e s , 4 g l a s s f a c t o r i e s , 5 cement f a c t o r i e s , one 
(3) 
l a r g e shoe f a c t o r y , one chemical and one woollen f a c t o r y . The 
remaining u n i t s were very s m a l l , mainly engaged i n processing 
raw m a t e r i a l s f o r exports or converting food crops i n t o 
consumable form. I n a d d i t i o n , a few u n i t s of ore smelting, 
r e r o l l i n g m i l l s and p r i n t i n g presses were present i n the country. 
The r a t e d c a p a c i t y of these u n i t s was f a r below the t o t a l 
requirements of the country. T h i s i m p l i e d t h a t P a k i s t a n having 
25 p.c. of the population, 6,5 p.c. of c i v i l i a n labour force 
had got only 10 p.c. of the manufacturing c a p a c i t y of B r i t i s h 
(4) 
I n d i a . The country had not only to contend w i t h a meagre 
supply of f o r e i g n exchange, but a l s o w i t h the problem of a low 
r a t e of c a p i t a l formation s i n c e the region f a l l i n g to the l o t of 
P a k i s t a n was predominantly a g r i c u l t u r a l and under-developed. 
P a k i s t a n appeared to have a great p o t e n t i a l i n 
developing agro^taased i n d u s t r i e s i n view of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of raw 
m a t e r i a l s such a s , j u t e , cotton and wool f o r t e x t i l e i n d u s t r i e s ; 
bamboo, grass and straw f o r paper and board manufacturing; sugar 
( 3 ) I n d u s t r i a l Development i n P a k i s t a n : A brochure by the M i n i s t r y 
of Information and Broadcasting (Government of P a k i s t a n , 1965), 
P.2. 
(4) I b i d , p,4. 
- 3 -
cane and tobacco f o r sugar and c i g a r e t t e i n d u s t r i e s and limestone 
and c l a y f o r the manufacture of cement needed f o r p h y s i c a l 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . I n a d d i t i o n , c e r t a i n minerals l i k e gas and gypsum 
(5) 
were a l s o a v a i l a b l e f o r the production of f e r t i l i z e r s . The 
p o s s i b i l i t y of generating power from water a l s o looked promising. 
1. I n d u s t r i a l P o l i c y . 
I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n was considered d e s i r a b l e by the 
Government w i t h a view to u s i n g domestic raw m a t e r i a l s g a i n f u l l y , 
to meet the demand f o r the home market, to provide more 
employment and f i n a l l y to i n c r e a s e the standard of l i v i n g . 
Moreover, i t was expected t h a t i n d u s t r i e s would c o n t r i b u t e more 
to the G.NiP. and b r i n g l a r g e r foreign exchange b e n e f i t s per 
u n i t of investment. To achieve these o b j e c t i v e s , the Government 
decided i n the f i r s t i n d u s t r i a l conference h e l d i n December, 1947 
to develop 27 more u r g e n t l y needed i n d u s t r i e s and to provide the 
necessary a s s i s t a n c e f o r the promotion of i n d u s t r i a l growth 
through the p r o v i s i o n of t r a i n i n g , r e s e a r c h and c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s , 
p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f s , tax r e l i e f i n c e n t i v e s and generous 
(6) 
d e p r e c i a t i o n allowances. 
(5) Andrus, J.R. and Mohammed, A.F., The Economy of P a k i s t a n , 
(Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1958), p.166. 
(6) I n d u s t r i a l Development of P a k i s t a n , o p . c i t , , p.4. 
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The f i r s t i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y aiming a t providing 
general g u i d e l i n e s f o r i n d u s t r i a l development was announced i n 
(7) 
A p r i l 1948. According to t h i s , the C e n t r a l Government assumed 
the d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r planning the development of 27 
important i n d u s t r i e s w h i l e p r o v i n c i a l Governments were asked to 
be a s s o c i a t e d i n the formulation of development p l a n s . The 
p o l i c y emphasised the development of i n d u s t r i e s l i k e j u t e , cotton 
t e x t i l e , l e a t h e r , sugar, cement and paper f o r which raw m a t e r i a l s 
were a v a i l a b l e l o c a l l y . I t was c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d i n the p o l i c y 
t h a t the p r i v a t e s e c t o r would be allowed f r e e play and given 
n e c e s s a r y a s s i s t a n c e f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a l l types of i n d u s t r i e s w i t h 
the exception of a few which were reserved for the p u b l i c 
( 8 ) 
s e c t o r . 
The encouragement to be given to f o r e i g n p r i v a t e 
investment i n i n d u s t r y was another important f e a t u r e of the 
i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y . For t h i s purpose the Government guaranteed 
r e p a t r i a t i o n of c a p i t a l and remittance of p r o f i t without r e s t r i c t i o n . 
L i b e r a l tax concessions were a l s o granted to fo r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e . 
B a s i c a l l y , t h e r e has not been much change i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y of the Government over the past two decades, 
(7) Statement of I n d u s t r i a l P o l i c y , Government of P a k i s t a n , 1948. 
(8) The exceptions were: ( i ) arms and ammunitions of war. 
( i i ) generation of h y d r o - e l e c t r i c power and ( i i i ) manufacture 
of r a i l w a y wagons, telephone and telegraph equipments. 
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though i t has been supplemented by the a d d i t i o n of f u r t h e r 
(9) statements i n November 1948, November 1954 and February 1959. 
The supplementary statement i n 1954 s p e l t out i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l 
the p o l i c y of encouraging f o r e i g n c a p i t a l i n an attempt to 
i n c r e a s e the i n f l o w of f o r e i g n investment. Among other things, 
the statement made i t c l e a r t h a t f a i r compensation would be 
given i n the event of the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of any f o r e i g n 
e n t e r p r i s e . F u r t h e r , f o r e i g n c a p i t a l i n approved i n d u s t r i e s , s e t 
up a f t e r 1 s t September 1954, could be r e p a t r i a t e d a t any time to 
the extent of the o r i g i n a l investment. The ploughed back p r o f i t 
i n approved undertakings would a l s o be t r e a t e d as investment f o r 
(10) 
the purpose of r e p a t r i a t i o n . 
The t h i r d p o l i c y statement came i n February 1959. I n 
t h i s statement, the importance of medium, sm a l l and cottage i n d u s t r i e s 
was recognised and measures were taken to develop these s e c t o r s . 
F u r t h e r , the establishment of more s o p h i s t i c a t e d and heavy i n d u s t r i e s 
was considered most v i t a l f o r su s t a i n e d economic growth and 
henceforth the Government decided to give p r i o r i t y to the development 
of these i n d u s t r i e s . 
( 9 ) E.C.A.F.E., 'Regional Symposium on I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n f o r A s i a 
and F a r E a s t , 1965' Country Report, P a k i s t a n , (unpublished) 
p.2. 
(10) The Department of Investment Promotion and Supp l i e s , I n d u s t r i e s 
for F o r e i g n Investment i n Pakistan, (Government of P a k i s t a n , 
January, 1967) p.8. 
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The extension of the range of p o l i c y beyond t h i s 
was i n d i c a t e d by emphasising the aims of expanding production, 
g i v i n g maximum scope to p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e , paying s p e c i a l 
a t t e n t i o n to a c t i v i t i e s which would be l i k e l y e i t h e r to earn or 
t o save f o r e i g n exchange, and of e s t a b l i s h i n g i n d u s t r i e s i n l e s s 
developed a r e a s . I n t h i s statement, the C e n t r a l Government with 
c e r t a i n e x ceptions, s h i f t e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i n d u s t r i a l 
development to two p r o v i n c i a l Governments. The exceptions were, 
f i r s t , i n d u s t r i e s l o c a t e d i n the Federal Area of K a r a c h i ; second, 
i n d u s t r i a l undertakings owned p a r t l y or wholly by the C e n t r a l 
Government; and t h i r d , a group of a c t i v i t i e s covering minerals 
i n c l u d i n g o i l and gas, and marine f i s h e r i e s . ^ ^ 
To encourage p r i v a t e investment i n i n d u s t r y , the 
Government intended to e x e r c i s e minimum c o n t r o l over p r i v a t e l y 
owned and operated i n d u s t r y . The Government, however, reserved the 
r i g h t to e x e r c i s e i t s c o n t r o l i n f i x i n g t a r g e t s , s e l e c t i n g l o c a t i o n , 
a l l o c a t i n g m a t e r i a l s i n shor t supply and r e g u l a t i n g labour. The 
p o l i c y ensured a s s i s t a n c e to i n d u s t r i e s i n procurement of c a p i t a l 
goods, machinery, raw m a t e r i a l s , t e c h n i c a l know-how, s c i e n t i f i c 
r e s e a r c h , land, water, power e t c . At the same time, i t was decided 
to provide f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e by i n c r e a s i n g the sources of 
(11) E.C.A.F.E. - o p . c i t . , p.4, 
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long-terra c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s to the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . 
The announcement of i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y l e d to the 
formulation and execution of economic development plans i n which 
(12) 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n was assigned a s i g n i f i c a n t p l a c e . 
I n d u s t r i a l programming was based on p h y s i c a l t a r g e t s s e t i n the 
economic development p l a n s . However, the development plan for 
t h i s period v i z . , 1948 to 1951 could not achieve the d e s i r e d 
r e s u l t s due mostly, to an inadequate supply of human and m a t e r i a l 
r e s o u r c e s . 
A beginning towards comprehensive planning was made 
a f t e r 1951. Meanwhile, the Colombo Plan came i n t o being and i t s 
C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee was entrusted w i t h the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
surveying the needs of the region and a s s e s s i n g the resources and 
resources r e q u i r e d , so that i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation could be 
used to a s s i s t the c o u n t r i e s of the area i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e for a 
higher standard of l i v i n g . 
Under the p r o v i s i o n s of the Colombo Plan, a development 
board prepared a 6-Year Development P l a n (1951-57) f o r o v e r a l l 
(12) I n 1948, a Development Board and a Planning Advisory Board were 
s e t up. The c o s t of the schemes sanctioned by the Development 
Board d i d not exceed Rs 1,123 m i l l i o n . The Development Board 
was r e p l a c e d by the Planning Board i n 1953. Again i n June 1959, 
Government re-or g a n i s e d the Planning Board and re-designated i t 
as Planning Commission. The Commission was given a new c h a r t e r 
of a u t h o r i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to overcome c e r t a i n s h o r t -
comings t h a t arose i n co-ordinating planning and implementation. 
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development of the economy w i t h i n the framework of the Colombo 
Pl a n , The attempt by t h i s board was the f i r s t of i t s kind i n 
P a k i s t a n ; i t was designed to apply the planning techniques to 
the problem of r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n . F u r t h e r , i n order to 
avoid d i s s i p a t i o n of l i m i t e d resources and to make the country 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n r e s p e c t of her immediate needs. Government 
evolved, working w i t h i n t h i s 6-Year Plan, the 2-Year P r i o r i t y 
(13) 
Programme, 
The 6-Year P l a n was replaced by the F i r s t F i v e Year 
P l a n (1955-60) i n J u l y 1955, and t h i s was marked w i t h the 
beginning of the second phase of Economic Planning i n P a k i s t a n . 
I n 1960 the F i r s t P l a n was followed by the Second Pla n (1960-65). 
The second was followed by the T h i r d P l a n i n J u l y , 1965. i n 
a l l these p l a n s , s u b s t a n t i a l resources were a l l o c a t e d f o r the 
purpose of a c c e l e r a t i n g i n d u s t r i a l growth. The T h i r d Plan 
continues to give a prominent place to the development of producer 
goods i n d u s t r i e s . There i s indeed a s h i f t i n emphasis from 
consumer goods to c a p i t a l goods i n d u s t r i e s and export-orientated 
i n d u s t r i e s . The emphasis on c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i e s during 
the T h i r d P l a n i s r e f l e c t e d i n i t s o v e r a l l c a p i t a l output r a t i o . 
The c a p i t a l - o u t - p u t r a t i o during 1960-65 i s estimated as 2.5 
(13) F i r s t F i v e Year Plan, o p . c i t , , p.9, 
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(14) whereas i n the T h i r d Plan i t i s set down as 3,5, 
I n a d d i t i o n , the Government, e i t h e r alone or 
i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h others, has set up several developmental, 
f i n a n c i a l and promotional i n s t i t u t e s f o r encouraging r a p i d 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . Among these i n s t i t u t i o n s , the most 
important ones are the P,I,D.C. ( l a t e r b i f u r c a t e d i n t o 
E,P.I,D.C. and W.P.I.D.C.), the Pakistan I n d u s t r i a l Finance 
Corporation (now I.D.B.P.), the Pakistan I n d u s t r i a l Credit 
and Investment Corporation and the Investment Promotion 
Bureau. 
Over and above t h i s , the Government has from time 
to time, announced annual p o l i c i e s which, i n t e r - a l i a , make 
physic a l and monetary provisions f o r the i n d u s t r i a l sector. 
Simultaneously, the Government has also issued the I n d u s t r i a l 
Investment Schedules which s p e l l out the i n d u s t r i e s which are 
intended t o be developed i n the p r i v a t e sector, ^'''^^ The Schedules 
(14) Planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), 
(Government of Pakistan, June 1965), p.447. 
(15) The f i r s t Schedule announced by the Government i n 1960 was 
r e l a t e d t o the Second Five Year Plan, v i z . , from July 1960 
to June 1965, The Schedule set f o r t h c a p i t a l o utlay t a r g e t s , 
both i n l o c a l currency and f o r e i g n exchange, i n respect of 
107 items against which i n d u s t r i e s were t o be established. 
The Schedule provided f o r a t o t a l investment of Rs 2,840 
m i l l i o n i n c l u d i n g f o r e i g n exchange component of Rs 1,700 
m i l l i o n . The progress made i n the implementation of the 
Schedule during the f i r s t two years of the Second Plan 
period showed, t h a t as against a t o t a l p r o v i s i o n of Rs 2,840 
/continued on the f o l l o w i n g 
page:-" 
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also prescribe f i n a n c i a l resources i n terms of l o c a l currency 
and f o r e i g n exchange i n c a p i t a l outlay f o r various i n d u s t r i e s 
i n both the wings of Pakistan. 
2. A Review of the Manufacturing Sector w i t h some d e t a i l of 
i t s main c o n s t i t u e n t I n d u s t r i e s . 
W i t h i n the framework of these p o l i c i e s which were 
designed t o create a favourable atmosphere f o r i n d u s t r i a l 
development i n Pakistan, the Government succeeded i n channelling 
footnote (15) continued from previous page:-
, . . m i l l i o n , the actu a l sanctions issued by various sanctioning 
agencies amounted t o Rs 4,070 m i l l i o n . I n order t o keep up the 
buoyancy shown by the p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e , the Government announced 
a Revised I n d u s t r i a l Investment Schedule i n February 1963. The 
Revised Schedule provided an investment p r o v i s i o n of Rs 1,530 
m i l l i o n i n c l u s i v e of a f o r e i g n exchange component of Rs 890 
m i l l i o n . A l l i n a l l , against a t o t a l t a r g e t of Rs 4,370 m i l l i o n i n 
two Schedules, investments approved, aggregated t o Rs 6,590 
m i l l i o n . TiJ^s i n d i c a t e s t h a t the strategy of planning through the 
I n d u s t r i a l Investment Schedule has been very successful i n 
implementing the planned o b j e c t i v e s . 
The T h i r d Plan envisages an investment of 
Rs 12,880 m i l l i o n i n the i n d u s t r i a l sector of which Rs 8,300 
m i l l i o n have been earmarked f o r the p r i v a t e sector. The 
I n d u s t r i a l Investment Schedule f o r the Thi r d Plan has provided 
f o r an investment of Rs 10,880 m i l l i o n and included 200 items. 
( I n d u s t r i a l Investment Schedule f o r the T h i r d Plan). 
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p r i v a t e and p u b l i c investment t o the i n d u s t r i a l sector. For 
comparative study l e t us d i v i d e the period i n t o the Pre-Plan 
period (1947-55); the F i r s t Plan period (1955-60); and the 
Second Plan p e r i o d (1960-65). The f i r s t year of the T h i r d Five 
Year Plan (1965-70) i s also included i n the study. 
Pre-Plan i n d u s t r i a l growth was r a p i d i n the sense 
t h a t the r a t e of growth i n terms of value of production (Current 
Prices) was estimated t o be 16.4 per cent per annum. This 
conclusion i s not d i s t u r b e d even i f a c o r r e c t i o n i s applied t o 
allow f o r changes i n the value of money over the period. The 
growth r a t e would then come out at approximately 13 p.c. per 
annum which i s s t i l l h i gh. Rapid i n d u s t r i a l growth during the 
pre-plan period (1947-55) i s also shown by the index of 
i n d u s t r i a l production. The index of i n d u s t r i a l production rose 
from 38 i n 1950 t o 127 i n 1955 (1954 = 100) : t h i s i s shown i n 
Table 1.1 below. But due t o the absence of co-ordinated plans 
w i t h a perspective, the growth was not balanced since p r i v a t e 
investment seemed t o have gone i n t o those i n d u s t r i e s which 
assured the higher p r o f i t s i n the short run, the l e a s t 
o r g a n i s i o n a l e f f o r t , and, minimum investment. As a r e s u l t , 
(16) F i r s t Five Year Plan, o p . c i t . , pp.399 and 400. 
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investment i n the manufacturing sector was i n three categories 
of i n d u s t r i e s : a g r i c u l t u r a l raw materials processing, food 
(17) 
manufactures and t e x t i l e i n d u s t r i e s . This, however, led 
t o the emergence of an unbalanced i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e . To 
introduce balance, the Government had t o intervene d i r e c t l y 
i n i n d u s t r y . The Government d i d t h i s through the 
establishment of the Pakistan I n d u s t r i a l Development Corporation 
(P.I.D.C.) i n 1950, under the P.I.D.C. Act of 1950. The 
P.I.D.C. l a t e r was b i f u r c a t e d i n t o two r e g i o n a l u n i t s , the East 
Pakistan and the West Pakistan I n d u s t r i a l Development 
Corporations. The object of the P.I.D.C. was t o promote those 
i n d u s t r i e s which p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l i s t s were e i t h e r unable or 
u n w i l l i n g t o undertake. 
The F i r s t Plan placed more emphasis on the development 
of intermediate goods production than on consumers' goods 
(18) 
i n d u s t r i e s . The F i r s t Plan set a ta r g e t of 65 p.c. increase 
(17) These three groups of i n d u s t r i e s together accounted f o r 
production of value of about Rs 2,570 m i l l i o n out of a t o t a l 
large-scale i n d u s t r i a l production of about 3,410 m i l l i o n rupees 
or 75 p.c. of the whole. This i s an i n d i c a t i o n of the dependence 
of the country's i n d u s t r y on a g r i c u l t u r a l raw m a t e r i a l s . (See 
F.F.Y.P. o p . c i t . , p.402);}'i 
(18) For example, out of the proposed investment of Rs 3,000 m i l l i o n , 
about Rs 1,600 m i l l i o n was a l l o c a t e d t o producers' goods l i k e 
cement, heavy chemicals, f e r t i l i z e r s , newsprint and s h i p b u i l d i n g . 
This would r a i s e the share of investment i n producers' goods 
i n d u s t r i e s from around 40 p.c. at the beginning of the Plan p e r i o d 
t o 45 p.c. at the end. (See P.F.Y.P. o p . c i t . , p.416). 
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i n the production of large and, medium-scale i n d u s t r i e s . Despite 
the s h o r t f a l l i n f i n a n c i a l t a r g e t s i n the i n d u s t r i a l sector, the 
(19) 
t a r g e t f o r production was f u l l y r e a l i s e d . By 1960 the index 
of i n d u s t r i a l production stood at 192.4. A number of i n d u s t r i e s 
were developed, which were v i r t u a l l y non-existent i n the country, 
i n c l u d i n g c o t t o n spinning, j u t e manufactures, and the production 
of woollen and worsted goods, a r t - s i l k f a b r i c s , hydro-genated 
o i l , c i g a r e t t e s and matches, leather and rubber goods. I n the 
case of co t t o n and j u t e goods production the country not only 
a t t a i n e d near s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y but also was earning a s u b s t a n t i a l 
amount of f o r e i g n exchange through exports. Factories producing 
f e r t i l i z e r s , dyes, D.D.T., p e n i c i l l i n , paper and cardboard came 
i n t o production d u r i n g the l a t e r part of the Plan period. ^ '^^ ^ I n 
a d d i t i o n , s t e e l r e - r o l l i n g m i l l s and i n d u s t r i e s producing a 
great v a r i e t y of e l e c t r i c a l and engineering products were 
established. 
The large-scale i n d u s t r i a l sector a t t a i n e d a remarkable 
degree of progress and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n during the Second Plan 
period. By t h i s time the country almost replaced imports of a 
number of consumer and producer goods. The production l e v e l s of 
(19) Second Five Year Plan, o p . c i t . , p.221. 
(20) Planning Commission, The Second Five Year Plan (1960-65), 
(Government of Pakistan), p.220. 
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manufactured goods l i k e c o t t o n t e x t i l e s , j u t e manufactures, 
paper and newsprint, l e a t h e r goods and processed f i s h were 
r a i s e d t o such an extent as t o y i e l d an exportable surplus 
d u r i n g the Second Plan period. Moreover, a beginning was made 
towards the development of i n d u s t r i e s l i k e machine t o o l s and 
i r o n and s t e e l . The Plan t a r g e t of 60 p.c. increase i n the 
quantum of i n d u s t r i a l production was exceeded by a s u b s t a n t i a l 
margin. Taking 1959-60 as base year the quantum index of 
i n d u s t r i a l production rose t o 201.7, as i s i n d i c a t e d i n Table 
1.1 on the next page. 
During the f i r s t year of the Thi r d Plan the 
progress of i n d u s t r i a l development seemed t o have been w e l l 
maintained. The quantum index of i n d u s t r i a l production went up 
t o 214.2 i n 1965-66 from the l e v e l of 201.7 i n 1964-65. As 
adopted during the Second Plan period, the Government continued 
t o support i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n through the p o l i c y of l i b e r a l i s a t i o n 
of imports t o meet the growing needs of i n d u s t r y , g r a n t i n g of 
tax-holiday f a c i l i t i e s f o r p r o f i t and c a p i t a l remittances, 
measures f o r avoidance of double t a x a t i o n ( i n case of f o r e i g n 
investment) and l i b e r a l c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s both i n l o c a l and 
(21) 
forexgn currency. 
(21) Planning Commission, Evaluation of the F i r s t Year of the 
T h i r d Plan, (Government of Pakistan, May 1967), p.64. 
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Table 1.1. Index of I n d u s t r i a l Production (Manufacturing), 
1950 t o 1965-66. 
Base Period 1954 = 100. 
Year 
1950 
1955 
1960 
Quantum Index 
37.7 
126.9 
192.4 
Revised Quantum Index of I n d u s t r i a l Production 
1959-60 (July-June) = 100. 
(July-June) 
1959- 60 
1960- 61 
1961- 62 
1962- 63 
1963- 64 
1964- 65 
1965- 66 
Quantum Index 
100 
118.7 
138.8 
159.5 
181.3 
201.7 
214.2 
The index of i n d u s t r i a l production has since been revised as 
prev i o u s l y i t covered only production trends of 32 items. 
The revis e d index includes 200 items covering 94 p.c. of 
production as against 75 p.c. of e a r l i e r coverage. This gives 
an idea of i n d u s t r i a l expansion i n Pakistan. 
Source:- M i n i s t r y of Finance, Pakistan Economic Survey 1964-65, 
f o r f i g u r e s up t o 1960, p.392. Central S t a t i s t i c a l 
O f f i c e , S t a t i s t i c a l Year Book 1965-66, f o r Revised 
Index, p.115. 
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The growth of major i n d u s t r i e s i n terms of physical 
output from 1949 t o mid June 1966 can be seen from Table 2.2. 
below. 
Food Manufactures; 
The food-processing industry seems t o have made 
remarkable progress i n respect of a number of items during the 
period under review. The production of hydro-genated 
vegetable o i l rose from 2.5 thousand tons i n 1949 t o 100.0 
thousand tons i n 1965-66. I t can be seen from the ta b l e below 
t h a t the tobacco i n d u s t r y has made spectacular progress i n the 
sense t h a t the production of ci g a r e t t e s increased t o 26,450 
(22) 
m i l l i o n s i n 1965-66 from 2,410 m i l l i o n s i n 1949. This 
i n d u s t r y , p r i m a r i l y a post-independence development, ranked 8th 
i n terms of employment i n 1959-60, pr o v i d i n g employment t o 
4,108 persons i n 14 concerns located a l l over the country. As 
much as 25 p.c. of the Government excise revenue income i s 
(23) 
derived from the c i g a r e t t e and tobacco i n d u s t r y . By 1970 the 
annual production of c i g a r e t t e s i s expected t o be 30,000 m i l l i o n s . 
(22) U n i t = 1 c i g a r e t t e . 
(23) H a i d a r i , I . and Khan, A.H., StOQk Exchange Guide of Pakistan, 
(Economic and I n d u s t r i a l P u blications, Revised and Enlarged 
E d i t i o n , 1968), p.145. 
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Sugar; 
The production of white sugar was 445 thousand tons 
i n June 1966 as compared w i t h 38.6 thousand tons i n 1949. There 
were 10 sugar m i l l s w i t h production capacity of about 200 
thousand tons i n West Pakistan and 9 sugar m i l l s w i t h production 
(24) 
capacity of 107 thousand tons i n East Pakistan during 1964-65. 
During the f i r s t year of the T h i r d Plan three more sugar m i l l s 
have been set up and 6 sugar m i l l s were i n various stages of 
c o n s t r u c t i o n . With the establishment of a few more sugar m i l l s 
and the expansion of the e x i s t i n g ones, i t i s estimated t h a t 
sugar production by 1970 would be i n the v i c i n i t y of 685 thousand 
(25) 
tons as against the T h i r d Plan target of 640 thousand tons. 
I f t h i s i s done, i t i s expected that the country would reach near 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y as f a r as sugar i s concerned. 
T e x t i l e I n d u s t r i e s : 
Cotton T e x t i l e s : - The Cotton T e x t i l e i n d u s t r y 
occupies the f i r s t p o s i t i o n i n the whole of the manufacturing 
sector of the economy. T o t a l investment i n t h i s i n d u s t r y was 
estimated as Rs 1,500 m i l l i o n up t o June 1964, I t accounted f o r 
15 p.c. of the t o t a l investment i n the manufacturing sector. The 
(24) I b i d , p.145. 
(25) I b i d , p.145. 
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working force engaged i n t h i s industry was about 400,000. I t 
also accounted f o r 25 per cent of the i n d u s t r i a l sector's 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the G.N.P. and a s i g n i f i c a n t amount t o the 
n a t i o n a l exchequer as excise duty which amounted t o 17.3 per 
cent of t o t a l revenue c o l l e c t i o n s from excise duties during 
1963-64. 
At the time of independence, Pakistan had only 17 
t e x t i l e m i l l s w i t h a t o t a l i n s t a l l e d capacity of 177,418 spindles 
and 4,824 looms, which rose t o 1.68 m i l l i o n spindles and 26,000 
looms by 1954-55, j u s t before the beginning of the F i r s t Plan. 
During the F i r s t Plan period the i n s t a l l e d capacity f u r t h e r 
increased t o 1.95 m i l l i o n spindles and 30,000 looms. The Second 
Plan's t a r g e t was t o r a i s e the i n s t a l l e d capacity t o 2.50 m i l l i o n 
spindles and 40,000 looms against which r e a l i s a t i o n was t o the 
(27) 
extent of 2.58 m i l l i o n spindles and 35,767 looms. The 
T h i r d Plan's t a r g e t i s t o r a i s e the i n s t a l l e d capacity t o 4 
(28) 
m i l l i o n spindles and 70,000 looms r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
(26) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p.213. 
(27) Planning Commission, F i n a l Evaluation of the Second Plan 
(Govt, of Pakistan, December 1966), p.63. 
(28) Evaluation of the F i r s t Year of the T h i r d Plan, o p . c i t . , 
p.65. 
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A study of Table 1.2. indicates th a t the production 
of c o t t o n yarn has increased from 34 m i l l i o n pounds i n 1949 t o 
518 m i l l i o n pounds i n June 1965. During the same period, 
c o t t o n c l o t h production has r i s e n to 764 m i l l i o n yards. As a 
r e s u l t of t h i s development, present production capacity of c l o t h 
i n the large-scale i n d u s t r i a l sector i s capable of y i e l d i n g 
6,8 yards of c l o t h per head compared w i t h 1.4 yards per head i n 
1949. 
The production of a r t i f i c i a l s i l k and rayon c l o t h 
s t a r t e d i n 1955 and the annual production capacity has r i s e n t o 
35 m i l l i o n square yards by June 1966. U n t i l mid 1964 t h i s 
i n d u s t r y was dependent on imported raw materials, the shortage 
of which forced them t o operate below capacity l e v e l . As a 
r e s u l t , production was inadequate i n r e l a t i o n t o the domestic 
demand, r e s u l t i n g i n higher p r i c e s . With the establishment of 
the Viscose Rayon Plant at Kaptai i n East Pakistan and the 
Acetate Rayon Plant near Lahore i n West Pakistan, the problem of 
raw materials supply has l a r g e l y been solved. As t o woollens, 
the production of woollen worsted yarn has increased from 3.4 
m i l l i o n pounds i n 1954-55 t o 7 m i l l i o n pounds i n 1964-65 as i s 
shown i n Table 1.2. 
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Jute I n d u s t r y ; 
This i n d u s t r y has now emerged as the second largest 
i n the country, although, there was no j u t e m i l l i n Pakistan at 
the time of p a r t i t i o n . During the i n i t i a l years of independence 
t h i s i n d u s t r y d i d not receive much a t t e n t i o n from p r i v a t e 
investors because of the r e l a t i v e l y high establishment cost and 
longer g e s t a t i o n period involved. But Pakistan being one of the 
l a r g e s t producers of raw j u t e i n the world could not a f f o r d t o 
leave t h i s i n d u s t r y undeveloped f o r long. Therefore, the 
Government decided t o pioneer the s e t t i n g up of a j u t e industry 
and asked the P.I.D.C, i n 1952 t o take the i n i t i a t i v e t o promote 
t h i s i n d u s t r y . Meanwhile, the Adamjee Jute M i l l s L t d . , the 
f i r s t i n the country, was established w i t h the i n i t i a t i v e of 
Adamjee House and the Government. By the end of the Second Plan 
there were 20 j u t e m i l l s i n production and 11 more were i n 
various stages of c o n s t r u c t i o n . The number of i n s t a l l e d looms 
at the end of June, 1965 was 12,376 compared w i t h 8,000 looms 
during 1959-60, T h i r d Plan provides f o r an estimated investment 
of Rs 732 m i l l i o n i n c l u d i n g Rs 277 m i l l i o n on account of looms 
under implementation at the commencement of the Plan period. By 
1970 i t i s expected t h a t 25,000 looms w i l l be i n f u l l operation. 
I n a d d i t i o n , the t a r g e t f o r the s e t t i n g up of broad looms i s 
projected at 2,500 looms i n v o l v i n g an investment of Rs 400 m i l l i o n 
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(29) 
i n c l u d i n g Rs 140 m i l l i o n on account of looms under n e g o t i a t i o n . 
The production of j u t e goods increased from 
256,278 tons i n 1959-60 and i t rose t o 331,000 tons i n 1963-64, 
But production i n 1964-65 declined to 289,112 tons because of a 
s t r i k e by the workers. During 1965-66, production of j u t e goods 
reached a record l e v e l of 409 thousand tons. The export earnings 
from j u t e goods were estimated t o be Rs 290 m i l l i o n i n 1964-65 as 
against Rs 227 m i l l i o n i n 1959-60. I t has created g a i n f u l 
employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r not less than 100,000 workers.^^^^ 
Both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e sectors took p a r t a c t i v e l y 
i n the development of t h i s v i t a l i n d u s t r y . The Government 
through medium of the E.P.I.D.C, undertook t o finance the major 
cost of the j u t e m i l l s i n association w i t h groups o f . p r i v a t e 
i n v e s t o r s . 
Engineering and E l e c t r i c a l I n d u s t r i e s ; 
I n June 1955, there were only about 549 u n i t s of 
the engineering and e l e c t r i c a l i n d u s t r i e s : t h i s represented a 
(31) 
c a p i t a l investment of Rs 209.3 m i l l i o n . The F i r s t Plan 
(29) F i n a l Evaluation of the Second Five Year Plan, o p . c i t . , p.64. 
(30) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p,175. 
(31) F i r s t Five Year Plan, o p . c i t , , p.433. 
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investment t a r g e t was Rs 385.4 m i l l i o n w h i l e the Second Plan 
(32) 
a l l o c a t i o n was Rs 638 m i l l i o n , i n engineering and e l e c t r i c a l 
i n d u s t r i e s . By the c l o s i n g year of the F i r s t Plan, there 
were 969 u n i t s producing engineering and e l e c t r i c a l goods. 
During the Second Plan emphasis was placed on 
the development of c a p i t a l goods i n d u s t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y on th a t 
of s t e e l and machine t o o l i n d u s t r i e s . I n the absence of an i r o n 
and s t e e l i n d u s t r y the e n t i r e demand f o r s t e e l was met by 
imports. The l e v e l of import was progressively increasing 
u n t i l i t reached 830,000 tons during 1963-64. However, a 
beginning was made during the Second Plan f o r the establishment 
of two s t e e l m i l l s - one at Chittagong and the other i n Karachi, 
w i t h a r a t e d capacity of 150,000 and 450,000 tons of ingots per 
annum r e s p e c t i v e l y . The Chittagong Steel M i l l s t a r t e d production 
i n 1967, w h i l e the Karachi Steel M i l l i s scheduled t o be 
(33) 
aompleted by 1970. 
The Second Plan t a r g e t w i t h regard t o the development 
of engineering and e l e c t r i c a l i n d u s t r i e s was o v e r - f u l f i l l e d both 
i n terms of f i n a n c i a l t a r g e t and physical output. The export 
earnings of t h i s i n d u s t r y increased from Rs 13.9 m i l l i o n t o Rs 
26.1 m i l l i o n i n 1964-65.^^^^ 
(32) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p,119. 
(33) T h i r d Five Year Plan, o p , c i t . , p.476. 
(34) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p,119. 
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Cement; 
The production of cement, which was 422 thousand tons 
i n 1949, increased t o 1,690 thousand tons by the end of the 
(35) 
Second Plan as against the t o t a l demand of 3 m i l l i o n tons. 
I n c i d e n t a l l y , the Second Plan t a r g e t of production was 3 m i l l i o n 
tons. The d i f f e r e n c e between demand and domestic production was, 
however met by imports. The required amount of investment per 
ton i s estimated on the basis of the Second Plan experience at 
Rs 2,500. The T h i r d Plan makes a p r o v i s i o n of Rs 540 m i l l i o n t o 
r e a l i s e the plan production t a r g e t of 6 m i l l i o n tons i n 
1969-70, 
Paper, Board and Newsprints; 
Pakistan i s now almost s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n paper. 
The output of paper, i n c l u d i n g newsprint, has gone up t o 103.2 
thousand tons i n 1964-65 compared w i t h 19.2 thousand tons i n 
1954-55. The Second Plan t a r g e t was 105 thousand tons per 
(37) 
annum. Pakistan i s now i n a p o s i t i o n t o export 9 t o 15 
thousand tons of newsprint per annum. 
(35) T h i r d Five Year Plan, o p . c i t . , p.475. 
(36) I b i d , p.476, 
(37) F i n a l Evaluation of the Second Five Year Plan, o p . c i t , , p.64. 
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F e r t i l i z e r s ; 
The r a t e d capacity of f e r t i l i z e r production a t the 
end of the Second Plan was 550 thousand tons i n terms of 
ammonium sulphate, 21 per cent n u t r i e n t , and 18 thousand tons of 
s i n g l e superphosphate. Production rose t o 235 thousand tons at 
the end of 1965 from 43 thousand tons i n 1959-60. T o t a l demand 
f o r f e r t i l i z e r was estimated f o r 1965, the l a s t year of the 
Second Plan a t 889 thousand tons. 
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals; 
Pakistan had v i r t u a l l y no chemical i n d u s t r y a t the 
time of independence. The only chemical being produced i n the 
country was soda ash, at a ra t e d capacity of 18 thousand tons 
per annum. The progressive growth of t h i s i n d u s t r y has made 
the country s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n a number of items l i k e p a i n t s , 
mineral acids, sulphur, aluminium sulphate. The production of 
su l p h u r i c a c i d and soda ash was 11.6 thousand and 12.6 thousand 
(39) 
tons r e s p e c t i v e l y at the end of 1964-65. 
There were only 6 pharmaceutical u n i t s i n Pakistan 
i n 1947 and the number of u n i t s rose to 28 u n i t s producing goods 
(38) E.C.A.F.E., o p . c i t . , p.142. 
(39) Pakistan Economic Survey 1966-67, o p . c i t . , ( S t a t i s t i c a l 
S e c t i o n ) , pp. 18"19. 
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worth over Rs 1.4 m i l l i o r i o By the end of the Second Plan, 
production capacity had increased to an annual output value 
of over Rs 67»0 m i l l i o n . 
O i l and Gas; 
The o i l and gas i n d u s t r i e s have made a good 
progress over the l a s t two decades. Indigenous o i l production 
recorded an increase of over 560 per cent over the 1948 
production l e v e l . G a s production rose from 25,750 m i l l i o n 
cubic f e e t i n 1959-60 t o 62,896 m i l l i o n cubic f e e t i n 
(41) 
1965-66. The gas i n d u s t r y has enabled Pakistan t o save 
f o r e i g n exchange up t o as much as Rs 485 m i l l i o n during the 
(42) 
p e r i o d 1955 t o 1966. Pakistan i s now almost s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t 
i n i t s l u b r i c a t i n g o i l requirements. 
I n a d d i t i o n t o the i n d u s t r i e s mentioned above, a 
lar g e number of miscellaneous i n d u s t r i e s such as, b u i l d i n g 
m a t e r i a l s , i n d u s t r i a l waste conversion p l a n t , j u t e b a l i n g , cotton 
g i n n i n g , s u r g i c a l and other instrument making,, sports goods, 
se r v i c e s , glass and ceramics have also made considerable progress. 
(40) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p.197. 
(41) Pakistan Economic Survey 1966-67, ( S t a t i s t i c a l S e c t i on), o p . c i t . , 
P.24, 
(42) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p.199. 
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The o v e r a l l i n d u s t r i a l growth i n Pakistan has been 
s a t i s f a c t o r y i n the sense t h a t the country has become s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t i n a number of consumer goods besides making any 
exportable surplus i n some goods over the l a s t two decades. 
I n i t i a l l y , l i g h t i n d u s t r i e s comprising food processings, t e x t i l e s , 
matches and other, based on indigenous raw materials and 
i n v o l v i n g simpler technology were developed mainly by the 
p r i v a t e sector. However, the development of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e 
i n d u s t r i e s l i k e j u t e , sugar, cement, got underway w i t h the 
i n i t i a t i v e of the Government. The F i r s t Plan which was i n 
operation over the peri o d 1955-60 l a i d emphasis on the development 
of import s u b s t i t u t i o n i n d u s t r i e s while i n the Second Five Year 
Plan (1960-65), the emphasis was s h i f t e d t o the development of 
intermediary and c a p i t a l goods i n d u s t r i e s . 
3. Impact of I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n on the Economy. 
The o v e r a l l i n d u s t r i a l growth has brought c e r t a i n 
changes i n the economy of Pakistan. Table 1,3. gives the 
s t r u c t u r a l change i n the components of G.N.P. from 19.49-50 
t o 1964-65, 
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The i n d u s t r i a l sector on the whole has shown a 
change i n respect of the c o n t r i b u t i o n t o G.N,P. which has r i s e n 
from 5,9 p.c, i n 1949-50 t o 11.5 p.c. i n 1964='65. From 1949-50 
t o 1959-60, the c o n t r i b u t i o n increased by 3.4 p.c. whereas i t 
rose by 2.2 p.c. during the Second Plan ending June 1965. 
A s u b s t a n t i a l change i s also noticeable i n 
respect of the import composition of Pakistan. Table 1.4. 
below shows t h a t import of consumer goods has progressively 
declined. Taking i n t o account the other features of the 
general economic s i t u a t i o n t h i s may be taken as an i n d i c a t i o n 
t h a t genuine expansion has taken place i n the i n d u s t r i a l 
sector. The r e l a t i v e decline i n consumer goods import s i g n i f i e s 
the extent of import s u b s t i t u t i o n i n the country and goes 
some way t o i n d i c a t e the progress towards the o v e r a l l v i a b i l i t y 
of the economy. The import of c a p i t a l goods whose value was 
463 m i l l i o n i n 1954-55 has increased t o Rs 2,628 m i l l i o n i n 
1964-65, S i m i l a r l y , as f u r t h e r evidence of the changed s t r u c t u r e , 
the import of i n d u s t r i a l raw materials i s seen t o have achieved 
a manifold increase over 1954-55, The import of c a p i t a l goods 
and i n d u s t r i a l raw materials now account together f o r more than 
75 per cent of t o t a l imports, thus showing a movement of the 
economy towards greater d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . 
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Table 1.5. below gives the s t r u c t u r a l change i n 
Pakistan's f o r e i g n trade since 1954-55. 
Table 1.5. : Foreign Exchange Earnings. 
(1954-55 t o 1964-65). 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
As at the 
end of 
Primary 
goods 
Manufacturing 
goods 
Tota l 
( i n c l u d i n g 
others) 
Manufacturing 
as p.c. 
of t o t a l . 
1954-55 1125 37 1169 3 
1959-60 1315 526 2160 24 
1964-65 1507 964 3083 29 
Sources:- ( i ) Central S t a t i s t i c a l O f f i c e , S t a t i s t i c a l Year Book, 
1964, pp.194 and 195. 
( i i ) F i n a l Evaluation of the Second Five Year Plan, 
p.164. 
( i i i ) Pakistan Economic Survey 1965-66, p.78. 
I t can be seen from the t a b l e t h a t there has taken place a fundamental 
change i n the export base i n respect of manufactured goods. The 
manufactured goods which accounted f o r only 3 p.c. of the f o r e i g n 
exchange earnings i n 1954-55, came to c o n t r i b u t e 24 p.c. i n 1959-60 
and 29 p.c. i n 1964-65. The r e l a t i v e decline i n the export of 
primary goods has been f u l l y matched by the r e l a t i v e increase i n 
the export of manufactured goods. The volume of export trade has 
also undergone s u b s t a n t i a l change during the period under review. 
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T o t a l earnings, which stood at Rs 1,169 m i l l i o n i n 1954-55, 
increased t o Rs 3,083 m i l l i o n i n 1964-65 (net increase being 
164 per cent) over a decade. 
The impact of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n on employment seems 
to be s i g n i f i c a n t . Table 1,6. shows the t o t a l labour force 
employed and the numbers employed i n the manufacturing sector 
from 1950 t o 1960. 
Table 1.6. Employment i n Manufacturing Sector (1950 t o 1965), 
( I n M i l l i o n s ) . 
T o t a l 
Labour 
Employed 
Industry 5 as 
percentage 
of 2 
3 as 
percentag« 
of § Large Small Tot a l 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1950 20o3 0.1 1.2 1.3 6.4 7.7 
1955 21.7 0.3 1.4 1.7 7.8 1 7.6 
1960 22.9 0.4 1.7 2.1 9.2 19.1 
1965 25.5 0.6 2.0 2.6 10.2 23.1-
Source: Huq, M. Table A - 28, p.248. 
The above t a b l e reveals t h a t the t o t a l size of the 
labour force employed i n the large and small-scale i n d u s t r i e s 
increased t o 2.6 m i l l i o n i n 1965 from 1.3 m i l l i o n i n 1950, This 
means t h a t i n d u s t r i a l employment accounted f o r 10.2 p.c. of the 
t o t a l number employed i n 1965 as against 6.4 p.c. i n 1950. 
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Secondly, the t a b l e shows t h a t w i t h i n the i n d u s t r i a l sector 
i t s e l f , the large-scale sector accounted f or 2:3;)1 p. c. , i n 
1965 compared w i t h t f . ^ p.c. i n 1950. 
4, Investment i n the I n d u s t r i a l Sector. 
The above discussion has made i t clear t h a t the 
large-scale i n d u s t r i a l sector has made good progress over the 
p e r i o d under study. Investment up to June 1966, i n terms of 
(43) 
productive c a p i t a l employed i n large-scale i n d u s t r y amounted 
t o Rs 10,775 m i l l i o n , of which the f i x e d investment (gross) 
accounted f o r Rs 8,835 m i l l i o n which was more than f o u r - f i f t h s 
of the t o t a l investment. The remaining Rs 1,940 m i l l i o n was 
invested i n permanent net working c a p i t a l . Out of t h i s t o t a l 
o f Rs 10,775 m i l l i o n , Rs 2,828 m i l l i o n had been invested before 
J u l y 1955, i . e , before the s t a r t of the comprehensive planned 
development era i n Pakistan. 
The f i g u r e s i n the f o l l o w i n g Table 1,7. show the 
gross investment a t 1959-60 factor- cost i n the large-scale 
i n d u s t r i a l sector t o during the period 1947-66. 
(43) Productive c a p i t a l means f i x e d and net working c a p i t a l . The 
net working c a p i t a l i s defined as the excess of current 
assets over current l i a b i l i t i e s . (See Chapter Two). 
Table 1.7. 
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Investment i n Large-Scale I n d u s t r y , 
1947-1966. 
(1959-60 Prices ), 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Ca p i t a l Pre-Plan 
period 
(1947-55) 
F i r s t Plan 
period 
(1955-60) 
Second Plan 
period 
(1960-65) 
F i r s t year 
of the 
T h i r d Plan 
(1965-66) 
T o t a l 
A. Fixed 2319 1655 4021 840 8835 
B. Working 509 363 883 185 1940 
T o t a l (A+B) 2828 2018 4904 1025 10,775 
Annual 
Average '354 404 981 1025 599 
* The t o t a l expressed i n terms of current prices have been adjusted 
by the a p p l i c a t i o n of an appropriate index number of p r i c e s , w i t h 
base 1959-60 = 100. For f u r t h e r explanation see Appendix A. p.299. 
Sources:- Pre-Plan Period, F i r s t Five Year Plan, p.416. 
F i r s t and Second Plan Periods ( i ) T h i r d Five Year Plan, 
pp. 103-104. 
( i i ) Evaluation of the Second Plan, pp.189-190. 
F i r s t Year of the T h i r d Plan, Evaluation of the F i r s t 
Year of the T h i r d Plan, pp. 162-163. 
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Before the launching of the F i r s t Plan i n mid-1955, 
investment i n the i n d u s t r i a l sector was made on the basis of 
ad-hoc sanctioning of schemes by the Government. The approach 
was l a r g e l y on a p r o j e c t - b a s i s ; t h a t i s t o say, i n d i v i d u a l 
schemes were considered without t h e i r being looked a t as parts 
of a comprehensive plan. During t h i s period investment i n 
consumer goods was higher than i n producer goods; about 60 p.c. 
of the t o t a l investment c a r r i e d out over t h i s period was i n 
consumer goods as against 40 p.c, i n producer goods i n d u s t r i e s . 
As mentioned e a r l i e r , t h i s r e s u l t e d i n an unbalanced development 
w i t h i n the i n d u s t r i a l sector. 
However, the Government soon intended t o b r i n g about 
a balanced s t r u c t u r e of growth of the i n d u s t r i a l sector through 
the instrument of comprehensive development plans such as the 
curre n t series of the F i v r e Y e a r Plans. The F i r s t Plan, which was 
inaugurated i n J u l y 1955, envisaged an investment of Rs 3,2l5 
m i l l i o n i n the large-scale i n d u s t r i a l sector, t h i s being 24 p.c, 
pf the t o t a l plan o u t l a y . The r e a l i s e d investment was however 
l e s s , being of the order of Rs 2,018 m i l l i o n i n d i c a t i n g a s h o r t f a l l 
of 37 p.c, of the Plan p r o v i s i o n . The reasons f o r t h i s gap i n 
investment were f o r e i g n exchange stringency, p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y 
and r e c u r r e n t food shortages, which had t o be met by imports, 
However, the execution of the Second Plan t a r g e t was s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
As against an o r i g i n a l investment t a r g e t of Rs 4,468 m i l l i o n f o r 
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the e n t i r e plan p e r i o d , the actu a l investment was Rs 4,904 
m i l l i o n and t h i s shows t h a t the plan t a r g e t was exceeded by 
(44) 
10 p.c. During the f i r s t year of the Th i r d Plan 
(1965-70) a c t u a l investment has been estimated t o be Rs 1,025 
(45) 
m i l l i o n out of the pl a n p r o v i s i o n of Rs 10,444 m i l l i o n . 
The r e a l i s a t i o n of the T h i r d Plan target i n the i n i t i a l year 
was not f u l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y compared w i t h the t o t a l i n d u s t r i a l 
investment t a r g e t . That increase i n investment outlay i n t h i s 
(44) The Second Plan envisaged an investment i n f i x e d assets of 
Rs 2,578 m i l l i o n i n the p r i v a t e sector and Rs 1,015 i n the 
p u b l i c s e c t o r . These sums do not include the investment i n 
the Karachi O i l Refinery amounting t o Rs 113 m i l l i o n , which 
was sanctioned before J u l y 1960, and the investment i n 
Karachi Steel M i l l amounting to Rs 613 m i l l i o n which was 
o r i g i n a l l y proposed t o be set up i n the p u b l i c sector, but 
was l a t e r t r a n s f e r r e d t o the p r i v a t e sector. I n c l u d i n g these 
I two p r o j e c t s the Second Plan t a r g e t of f i x e d investment i n 
the p r i v a t e sector comes t o Rs 3,304 m i l l i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , 
there was a p r o v i s i o n of Rs 875 m i l l i o n investment i n 
working c a p i t a l (mostly p r i v a t e s e c t o r ) . By the end of the 
Second Plan, an amount of Rs 5,498 m i l l i o n was sanctioned i n 
the p r i v a t e sector of which u t i l i z a t i o n has been made t o the 
extent of Rs 3,185 m i l l i o n . On the other hand, p u b l i c sector 
investment was amounted t o Rs 844 m i l l i o n compared w i t h the 
Plan p r o v i s i o n of Rs 1,015 m i l l i o n . Assuming one hundred 
per cent r e a l i s a t i o n of the working c a p i t a l , a c t u a l 
investment amounted t o Rs 4,904 m i l l i o n , ( T h i r d Five Year 
Plan, pp.103, 108), 
(45) This amount does not include investment t a r g e t i n i n d u s t r i a l 
estates and small i n d u s t r i e s . 
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sector of the economy was, on the whole, w e l l maintained 
however i s i n d i c a t e d by the sequence of f i g u r e s which show 
the average amount of investment per annum. Expressed i n 
terms of constant p r i c e s an average annual outlay of 
approximately Rs 600 m i l l i o n f o r the whole of the period i s 
b u i l t up from an annual average of approximately Rs 350 
m i l l i o n f o r the Pre-Plan period t o an average of not f a r 
sh o r t of Rs 1000 m i l l i o n (Rs 981 m i l l i o n t o be precise) f o r 
the l a s t Second Plan p e r i o d . 
Fixed and Working C a p i t a l ; 
Neither i n the F i r s t nor i n the Second Plan was 
working c a p i t a l defined p r e c i s e l y . As commonly understood, 
net working c a p i t a l stands f o r the excess of current assets 
over current l i a b i l i t i e s and a s u b s t a n t i a l part of t h i s i s 
u s u a l l y met from long-term c a p i t a l resources ( e s p e c i a l l y f o r 
maintaining minimum i n v e n t o r i e s ) . I n the Second Plan, a 
p r o v i s i o n of Rs 875 m i l l i o n was made f o r working c a p i t a l . 
Assuming a hundred per cent r e a l i s a t i o n of the Plan p r o v i s i o n , 
i t i s possible t o c a l c u l a t e the pr o p o r t i o n of investment i n 
(46) 
working c a p i t a l t o t o t a l investment which comes t o about 18 p.c. 
(46) As i t was a p r o j e c t i o n . 
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Table 1,7. above shows the amount of working c a p i t a l i n t o t a l 
investment over the period on the basis of the above reckoning. 
The planners' estimate of working c a p i t a l was not, however 
q u i t e r e a l i s t i c i n the sense t h a t the requirement of working 
c a p i t a l of gross f i x e d investment, as i s shown i n Table 2,2. 
normally ranges from 24 t o 29 per cent. The assumption of the 
planners regarding the p r o v i s i o n of working c a p i t a l , was t h a t 
once an e n t e r p r i s e succeeded i n meeting i t s long-term c a p i t a l , 
i t should be able t o o b t a i n working c a p i t a l from the 
commercial banks. 
This assumption does not appear t o be j u s t i f i e d 
because, as we have seen, a p a r t of working c a p i t a l i s needed t o 
finance i n v e n t o r i e s which are of a long-term nature. The 
commercial banks do not provide c r e d i t f o r t h i s p a r t as can be 
seen from the balance sheet analysis. I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , 
necessary t o provide f o r a p a r t of the working c a p i t a l out of the 
sources of long-term investment. 
Investment i n P r i v a t e and Public Sectors. 
Both p r i v a t e and p u b l i c sectors have played an 
important r o l e i n the development of the large-scale i n d u s t r i e s 
i n Pakistan. The p r i v a t e sector has been l a r g e l y responsible 
f o r the impressive growth of i n d u s t r i a l development i n the country. 
This i s i n l i n e w i t h the i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y of the Government which 
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has placed the major r e l i a n c e on the p r i v a t e sector f o r the 
development of i n d u s t r i e s since the i n c e p t i o n of Pakistan. 
The s e c t o r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of investment has been shown i n 
Table 1.8. below. 
Table 1.8, Sectoral D i s t r i b u t i o n of Gross Investment i n 
Large-scale I n d u s t r i e s , 1947-1966, 
(1959-60) Prices. 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Sector Pre-plan 
(1947-55) 
F i r s t Plan 
(1955-60) 
Second Plan 
(1960-65) 
F i r s t Year 
of the 
Thi r d Plan 
(1965-66) 
Total 
(2+3+4+5) 
, 1 2 3 4 5 6 
A, P r i v a t e 2788 1268 4060 777 8893 
B. Public 40 750 844 248 1882 
T o t a l 
(A+B) 2828 2018 4904 1025 10,775 
Source: Same as Table 1,8, 
I t would be seen from the above t a b l e t h a t out of a 
t o t a l investment of Rs 10,775 m i l l i o n up t o June 1966, investment 
by the p r i v a t e sector accounted f o r Rs 8,893 m i l l i o n or 
approximately 83 per cent of the t o t a l investment. The balance of 
Rs 1,882 m i l l i o n (17 p.c,) was invested i n the p u b l i c sector mainly 
through the P.I.D.C, and subsequently the E.P.I,D,C. and the 
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W.P.I.D.C. During the Pre-Plan period investment i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l sector was mainly c a r r i e d out by p r i v a t e enterprise 
and the investment by the p u b l i c sector was r e l a t i v e l y small 
(1.4 p.c.) The F i r s t Plan a l l o c a t e d Rs 3,2.i;5 m i l l i o n f o r 
investment i n the i n d u s t r i a l sector of which Rs 1,735 m i l l i o n 
and Rs 1,480 m i l l i o n (47 p.c.) were i n the p r i v a t e and p u b l i c 
sectors r e s p e c t i v e l y . The ac t u a l investment i n the p r i v a t e 
(47) 
sector was of the order of Rs 1,268 m i l l i o n i n d i c a t i n g a 
s h o r t f a l l o f 27 p.c. I n the same period, investment i n the 
p u b l i c sector amounted t o Rs 750 m i l l i o n - i n d i c a t i n g about 
49 p.c. s h o r t f a l l i n the Plan p r o v i s i o n . The Second Five Year 
Plan contained proposals f o r an investment of Rs 5,13^ m i l l i o n 
i n the manufacturing sector, of which Rs 4,179 m i l l i o n 
was expected t o be i n the p r i v a t e sector. During t h i s period 
a c t u a l investment was t o the extent of Rs 4,060 m i l l i o n (Table 
1,8.). During the Second Plan period, out of a t o t a l a l l o c a t i o n 
of Rs IjOtS m i l l i o n i n the p u b l i c sector, an investment t o the 
value of Rs 844 m i l l i o n was a c t u a l l y undertaken. I n the f i r s t 
year of the T h i r d Plan, which i s c u r r e n t l y i n operation, t o t a l 
investment amounted t o Rs 1,025 m i l l i o n - Rs 777 m i l l i o n and 
(47) Second Five Year Plan, o p . c i t . , pp.220-221, 
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Rs 248 m i l l i o n i n t h e p r i v a t e and p u b l i c s e c t o r s r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
The T h i r d P l a n (1965-70) has a l l o c a t e d Rs 7,685 m i l l i o n 
(65 p«c,) t o t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r o u t o f a t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t 
o u t l a y o f Rs 11,824 m i l l i o n ^ ' ^ ^ ^ i n c l u d i n g i n d u s t r i a l e s t a t e s 
and s m a l l i n d u s t r i e s . T h i s a g a i n shows t h e s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e 
o f t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l development o f 
P a k i s t a n . The r o l e o f Government, b o t h a t t h e C e n t r a l and 
a t t h e P r o v i n c i a l l e v e l s , seems t o be designed t o promote 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e c l i m a t e and t h e 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e r e q u i r e d f o r i n v e s t m e n t i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
i n d u s t r i e s . T h i s shows f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Government has 
made c l e a r t h a t p u b l i c i n d u s t r i a l i n v e s t m e n t w i l l be u n d e r t a k e n 
o n l y i n t h o s e cases i n t o w h i c h p r i v a t e c a p i t a l may n o t 
v e n t u r e , o r where j o i n t v e n t u r e s cannot be o r g a n i s e d . 
( 4 8 ) T h i r d F i v e Year P l a n , o p . c i t , , p,458. 
CHAPTER TWO. 
ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF 
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES, 
The p r e c e d i n g Chapter has t r a c e d t h e development o f 
l a r g e - s c a l e m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r i e s i n P a k i s t a n , We have shown 
i n t h a t Chapter, t h e gross amount of f i x e d i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e 
i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r d u r i n g Pre-Plan and P l a n p e r i o d s . The main 
purpose o f t h i s Chapter i s t o show, t h e p a t t e r n o f c a p i t a l 
s t r u c t u r e o f i n d u s t r i a l u n d e r t a k i n g s l i s t e d on t h e Karachi, Stock 
Exchange (K.S.E,). A f t e r t h i s i s done, an e f f o r t w i l l be made 
t o e x p l a i n t h e reasons f o r changes w h i c h have t a k e n p l a c e i n t h e 
s t r u c t u r e o v e r t h e p e r i o d 1961-66. 
i ; Methodology. 
I n d u s t r i a l development i n P a k i s t a n was accompanied by 
th e g r o w t h o f a c o r p o r a t e s e c t o r . The number o f l i m i t e d companies 
l i s t e d on t h e K a r a c h i Stock Exchange i n c r e a s e d from 13 i n 1949 t o 
187 i n 1966. (See Chapter 3 ) . For t h e purposes o f our e m p i r i c a l 
s t u d y , we have s e l e c t e d 46 ( c o v e r i n g 56 p.c, o f t h e t o t a l p a i d 
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up c a p i t a l ) o u t o f 102 companies l i s t e d on t h e K.S.E. up t o 1963.^''"^ 
For t h e second p e r i o d , 1964-66, we have t a k e n 70 ( c o v e r i n g 62 p.c. 
( 2 ) 
o f t h e p a i d up c a p i t a l ) o u t o f 151 l i s t e d companies u n t i l 1966. 
B a s i c a l l y o ur main sources o f d a t a a r e t h e Stock 
( 3 ) 
Exchange Guide o f P a k i s t a n , and t h e balance sheets o f 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g concerns„ However, the summarised balance sheets 
p r e s e n t e d i n t h e St o c k Exchange Guide i n some i n s t a n c e s l a c k 
c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i n r e s p e c t o f l o n g - t e r m l o a n s . I n 
o r d e r t o make t h e s t u d y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , we have a d j u s t e d and 
c o r r e c t e d t h e d a t a on t h e b a s i s o f u n p u b l i s h e d i n f o r m a t i o n whenever 
p o s s i b l e , though we a r e aware t h a t d a t a o b t a i n e d by these methods 
may i n t r o d u c e a c e r t a i n m a r g i n o f e r r o r . D e s p i t e t h i s , however, 
i t has been p o s s i b l e t o assemble the d a t a i n a l o g i c a l o r d e r so t h a t 
c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s can be drawn r e g a r d i n g t h e c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e o f 
(4 ) 
i n d u s t r i a l u n d e r t a k i n g s i n P a k i s t a n , 
( 1 ) The i n d u s t r i e s i n c l u d e d i n t h e F i r s t P e r i o d : - 14 t e x t i l e s , 5 r a y o n 
s i l k and w o o l l e n , 4 J u t e , 6 food m a n u f a c t u r i n g , 5 e n g i n e e r i n g and 
c o n s t r u c t i o n , 2 c h e m i c a l , 4 f u e l and power and 6 m i s c e l l a n e o u s 
i n d u s t r i e s , 
( 2 ) The i n d u s t r i e s i n c l u d e d i n t h e Second P e r i o d : - 14 c o t t o n t e x t i l e s , 
7 s i l k and w o o l l e n , 7 J u t e , 9 food m a n u f a c t u r i n g , 6 sugar, 7 
e n g i n e e r i n g and c o n s t r u c t i o n , 5 c h e m i c a l , 4 f u e l and power and 11 
m i s c e l l a n e o u s i n d u s t r i e s . 
( 3 ) H a i d a r i , I , and Khan, A.H., c o - e d i t o r s o f t h e Stock Exchange 
Guide o f P a k i s t a n ' , have compiled f i n a n c i a l d a t a o f l i s t e d companies 
fr o m 1961 t o 1966 m a i n l y f r o m t h e Annual Reports o f t h e Companies. 
( 4 ) See Appendix B. p.302. 
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The s t u d y r e l a t e s t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f p u b l i c l i m i t e d 
companies and no a t t e m p t has been made t o i n d i c a t e t h e c a p i t a l 
s t r u c t u r e o f p r i v a t e l i m i t e d c o m p a n i e s . T h e f o r m e r companies 
a r e t h o s e w h i c h on g i v i n g n o t i c e o f i n t e n t i o n t o be l i s t e d on 
t h e K.S.E. have t o d i s c l o s e c e r t a i n f a c t s about t h e i r f i n a n c i a l 
p o s i t i o n o I n a d d i t i o n , t h e y have t o submit t h e i r annual balance 
s h e e t s t o t h e R e g i s t r a r o f J o i n t Stock Companies. From these, 
i t i s p o s s i b l e t o o b t a i n an i d e a about t h e sources o f funds and 
c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e o f these companies. I n c o n t r a s t , i n f o r m a t i o n 
r e g a r d i n g p r i v a t e l i m i t e d companies i s n o t a v a i l a b l e and t h i s i s 
t h e reason why we have had t o l i m i t o ur s t u d y t o p u b l i c l i m i t e d 
companies. I t may however, be added t h a t t h e c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e 
o f p r i v a t e l i m i t e d companies r e p r e s e n t s m o s t l y owners' e q u i t y and 
funds borrowed f r o m i n s t i t u t i o n a l sources. 
A l a r g e number o f companies l i s t e d on t h e K.S.E. were 
i n i t i a l l y p r i v a t e l i m i t e d companies. They were l a t e r c o n v e r t e d 
i n t o p u b l i c l i m i t e d companies t h r o u g h t h e p u b l i c o f f e r i n g o f 
sh a r e s . From t i m e t o t i m e t h e Government has a l s o shown a 
p r e f e r e n c e i n f a v o u r o f p u b l i c l i m i t e d companies i n t h e shape o f 
( 5 ) A p r i v a t e l i m i t e d company i s under no l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n e i t h e r 
t o p u b l i s h annual accounts o r t o submit them t o t h e R e g i s t r a r 
o f J o i n t Stock Companies. I t r e s t r i c t s t h e r i g h t t o t r a n s f e r 
s h a r e s , t h e i s s u e o f pr o s p e c t u s f o r p u b l i c s u b s c r i p t i o n and 
l i m i t s t h e membership t o 50 s h a r e h o l d e r s o n l y . 
- 45 -
p r o v i d i n g some i n c e n t i v e s such as t a x concessions and t a x 
h o l i d a y . I t may a l s o be r e l e v a n t t o n o t e t h a t f o r t h e 
a n a l y s i s we propose t o c a r r y o u t , t h e c o r p o r a t e s e c t o r i s most 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , s i n c e t h e p r i v a t e l i m i t e d companies seem t o be 
on t h e d e c l i n e . 
2. S t r u c t u r e o f C a p i t a l . 
The c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e o f p u b l i c l i m i t e d companies i n 
P a k i s t a n seems t o have been b u i l t up o u t o f share c a p i t a l , 
r e t a i n e d e a r n i n g s , l o n g t e r m l o a n s and debentures. Amongst 
t h e s e components t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f owners' e q u i t y has been the 
most i m p o r t a n t i t e m . However, i t w i l l be seen from T a b l e 2.1. 
below t h a t t h e r a t i o o f share c a p i t a l t o t o t a l c a p i t a l 
s t r u c t u r e i s g r a d u a l l y d e c l i n i n g . 
On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f l o n g t e r m l o a n 
has r i s e n . The share c a p i t a l and t h e r e t a i n e d e a r n i n g s t o g e t h e r 
formed 89 p.c. o f t h e t o t a l c a p i t a l d u r i n g 1961-63 b u t d u r i n g 
1964-66 t h e p r o p o r t i o n d e c l i n e d t o 78 p.c. The r a t e o f i n c r e a s e 
i n t h e r a t i o o f l o n g t e r m l o a n i n t h e o v e r a l l c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e 
( 6 ) The C a p i t a l I s s u e s C o n t r o l i s b e i n g used i n P a k i s t a n as an 
i n s t r u m e n t o f economic p o l i c y . Through t h i s C o n t r o l , companies 
h a v i n g c a p i t a l more t h a n Rs 2 m i l l i o n s were persuaded t o change 
t h e i r s t a t u s t o t h a t o f p u b l i c companies. I n persuance o f t h i s 
p o l i c y , most o f t h e l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l u n d e r t a k i n g s a r e o r g a n i s e d 
as P u b l i c L i m i t e d Companies. (See E.C.A.F.E., Regiona l 
Symposium o f I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n f o r A s i a and Far East, 1965, 
Country R e p o r t , P a k i s t a n , p .49). 
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s u g g e s t s , t h a t i n t h e p e r i o d under r e v i e w , t h e r e may have been 
a g r o w t h i n t h e p r o v i s i o n o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s 
i n P a k i s t a n . More evidence t h a n t h i s , c o v e r i n g a l o n g e r s e r i e s 
o f o b s e r v a t i o n s , w o u l d , i n t h e absence o f o t h e r s o r t s o f 
e v i d e n c e , be necessary b e f o r e a s t r o n g e r g e n e r a l i s a t i o n than 
t h i s c o u l d be made. But t h e s t a t i s t i c a l evidence a v a i l a b l e i s 
a t l e a s t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s presumption. 
C a p i t a l S t o c k ; 
The s t u d y r e v e a l s some i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e 
c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r i e s . F i r s t l y , t h e 
c a p i t a l s t o c k i s m a i n l y composed of o r d i n a r y s h a r e s , t h e 
c o n t r i b u t i o n o f p r e f e r e n c e shares b e i n g r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l . The 
h o l d e r s o f p r e f e r e n c e shares a r e guaranteed a p r i o r pcight t o 
d i v i d e n d o v e r e q u i t y h o l d e r s and do n o t c a r r y a r i g h t o f v o t e . Out 
o f t h e 70 companies, o n l y s i x have used p r e f e r e n c e shares f o r 
r a i s i n g l o n g - t e r m c a p i t a l . The o u t s t a n d i n g amount o f t h i s s t o c k 
t o t a l l e d Rs 41,5 m i l l i o n r e p r e s e n t i n g 3.1 p.c. o f t h e t o t a l p a i d 
( 7 ) 
up c a p i t a l i n 1966. W i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f one company these 
shares were i s s u e d w i t h a denomination o f Rs 100 per share. They 
c a r r i e d a f i x e d d i v i d e n d r a t e r a n g i n g from 6 t o 8 p.c. per annum. 
( 7 ) Face v a l u e was Rs 10 p e r share. 
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The i s s u e s were redeemable a t par and were c u m u l a t i v e i n n a t u r e 
t o be redeemed a f t e r a c e r t a i n p e r i o d a t t h e o p t i o n o f t h e 
company i t s e l f . These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s make t h e d i v i d e n d income 
on p r e f e r e n c e shares appear as i n t e r e s t . I t i s f o r t h i s reason 
t h a t p r e f e r e n c e shares a r e n o t p o p u l a r w i t h companies i n 
P a k i s t a n and t h e same i s t r u e o f d e b e n t u r e s . A n o t h e r p o s s i b l e 
reason f o r t h e u n p o p u l a r i t y o f p r e f e r e n c e shares i s t h a t t h e 
s u p p l i e r s and u s e r s o f i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c e o f t e n happened t o be 
t h e same persons o r f a m i l y groups. T h i s i s p o s s i b l e because 
t h e f a m i l y groups b e i n g t h e major s h a r e - h o l d e r s o f a company do 
n o t l i k e t o become committed t o any f i x e d d i v i d e n d payment. 
Moreover, t h e company i s g e n e r a l l y committed t o pay a f i x e d r a t e 
o f i n t e r e s t on t h e borrowed f u n d ( m o s t l y f o r e i g n exchange) 
w i t h o u t w h i c h t h e company c o u l d not be e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e p r e s e n t 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f P a k i s t a n . 
O r d i n a r y Shares; The major p a r t (about 97 p.c,) o f t h e share 
c a p i t a l c o n s i s t s o f o r d i n a r y s h a r e s . I t has been observed t h a t 
most o f t h e e n t e r p r i s e s have p r e f e r r e d t o i s s u e shares a t a 
f a c e v a l u e o f Rs 10 p e r share. Only a s m a l l number o f companies 
has i s s u e d shares w i t h a d e n o m i n a t i o n o f e i t h e r above o r below 
Rs 10 per s h a r e . The f a c e v a l u e of shares a t Rs 10 may be 
c o n s i d e r e d c o n v e n i e n t i n P a k i s t a n i n t h e sense t h a t i n v e s t o r s w i t h 
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s m a l l means may be encouraged t o i n v e s t i n i n d u s t r i a l shares. 
The companies h a v i n g f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n have a share 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f A and B, B c l a s s shares n o r m a l l y b e i n g 
i s s u e d t o f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
The s u b s c r i b e r s t o these shares a r e o r d i n a r y 
( 8 ) 
s h a r e h o l d e r s o r e q u i t y h o l d e r s . A s t u d y o f t h e base o f e q u i t y 
ownership o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r i e s r e v e a l s t h a t l i s t e d shares 
a r e c l o s e l y h e l d by a group o f f a m i l i e s who a r e g e n e r a l l y 
sponsors o f t h e company. Besides t h e sponsors, t h e g e n e r a l 
p u b l i c , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n v e s t o r s l i k e I n s u r a n c e Companies, N a t i o n a l 
I n v e s t m e n t T r u s t , I n v e s t m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n o f P a k i s t a n , P a k i s t a n 
I n d u s t r i a l C r e d i t and I n v e s t m e n t C o r p o r a t i o n , P r o v i n c i a l I n d u s t r i a l 
Development C o r p o r a t i o n s , and f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s h o l d shares i n t h e 
e q u i t y c a p i t a l o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g concerns. The t r u e ownership o f 
t h e company l i e s w i t h t h e e q u i t y h o l d e r s . They a r e r e s i d u a l 
c l a i m a n t s on e a r n i n g s and r e a l i s e proceeds on w i n d i n g up i n t h e 
sense t h a t t h e y can p a r t i c i p a t e i n e a r n i n g s o n l y when a l l c r e d i t o r s 
and o t h e r s u p p l i e r s o f funds have r e c e i v e d t h e i r i n t e r e s t payments. 
As such, e q u i t y funds a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e g r e a t e s t r i s k among a l l 
t y p e s o f c a p i t a l . Consequently e q u i t y funds a r e f o r t h c o m i n g o n l y 
when p r o f i t p r o s p e c t s seem s u f f i c i e n t l y a t t r a c t i v e t o compensate 
( 8 ) Owners' e q u i t y i s d e f i n e d as t h e sum o f share c a p i t a l p l u s 
r e t a i n e d e a r n i n e s . 
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(9) 
f o r t h e r i s k i n v o l v e d i n t h e i n v e s t m e n t . D u r i n g t h e l a s t 
decade and a h a l f , i n v e s t m e n t i n i n d u s t r i e s was h i g h l y 
p r o f i t a b l e w h i c h i n f l u e n c e d t h e sponsors t o d e s i g n t h e c a p i t a l 
s t r u c t u r e i n such a way as t o c o n s i s t p r e d o m i n a n t l y o f e q u i t y 
t y p e a s s e t s . ^ 
Any seven persons o r more can fo r m a p u b l i c l i m i t e d 
company under t h e Companies' A c t of P a k i s t a n , A c c o r d i n g t o t h e 
l i s t i n g r u l e s o f t h e K.S.E. a company w i s h i n g t o be l i s t e d on 
t h e Exchange i s r e q u i r e d t o o f f e r a minimum o f 60 p.c. i s s u e d 
shares ^ "'"'^ o^ t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c f o r s u b s c r i p t i o n . ^''""'•^  The 
spons o r s , t h e i r f r i e n d s and r e l a t i v e s g e n e r a l l y s u b s c r i b e 40 p.c. 
o f t h e share c a p i t a l . As can be seen from t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e 
Committee f o r t h e s e t t i n g up o f an in v e s t m e n t bank a f f i l i a t e , 
75 p.c. o f t h e l i s t e d shares were h e l d by t h e members b e l o n g i n g 
(12) 
t o a few f a m i l y groups. Such a l a r g e h o l d i n g i n t h e company 
was p o s s i b l e f o r t h e sponsors o f the company t h r o u g h t h e purchase 
o f shares i n t h e names o f f r i e n d s and r e l a t i v e s . 
( 9 ) M e r r e t , A,J. and Sykes, A l l e n , , The Finance and A n a l y s i s o f 
C a p i t a l P r o j e c t s , (Longmans, London, 1965) p,69, 
(10) For a l o n g t i m e l i s t i n g r u l e s o f t h e K.S.E. r e q u i r e d o n l y t o 
i s s u e 30 p.c. o f i s s u e d shares t o t h e p u b l i c . Only r e c e n t l y 
e f f o r t s have been made by t h e C o n t r o l l e r o f C a p i t a l I s s u e s t o 
i s s u e 60 p.c. o f t o t a l c a p i t a l i s s u e d t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c . 
( 1 1 ) For d e t a i l s see Chapter 3, 
(12) See Chapter 3. 
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F o r e i g n P a r t i c i p a t i o n ; Only 10 out o f 70 companies had f o r e i g n 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e q u i t i e s i n 1966. F o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t amounted 
t o Rs 93.2 m i l l i o n r e p r e s e n t i n g 37 p.c. o f t h e paid-up c a p i t a l 
o f companies h a v i n g f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and 7 p.c, o f t h e t o t a l 
c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d i n a l l t h e companies. These companies were 
sponsored under t h e j o i n t e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p o f l o c a l and f o r e i g n 
i n v e s t o r s . G e n e r a l l y shares were i s s u e d t o f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a n t s 
as pai^t payment o f t h e machinery s u p p l i e d by them, 
(13) 
S u b s i d i a r y Companies: There a r e s i x s u b s i d i a r y companies 
f a l l i n g w i t h i n our s t u d y , such as Glaxo L a b o r a t o r i e s L t d , , 
P a k i s t a n Tobacco Company,Ltd,, • P a k i s t a n S e r v i c e s L t d . , 
I m p e r i a l Chemical I n d u s t r i e s ( P a k i s t a n ) L t d . , A t t o c k O i l Company 
L t d . , and P a k i s t a n Oxygen L t d . The paid-up c a p i t a l o f these 
companies amounted t o Rs 173.7 m i l l i o n i n 1966. 
Re t a i n e d E a r n i n g s ; The n e x t i m p o r t a n t source o f i n d u s t r i a l 
( 1 4 ) 
f i n a n c e . i s t h e r e t a i n e d e a r n i n g s of t h e u n d e r t a k i n g s . Many concerns 
have met t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f f i n a n c e f o r expansion o u t o f t h e i r 
( 1 3 ) S u b s i d i a r i e s o f f o r e i g n based p a r e n t company. 
(1 4 ) See T a b l e 2.1. 
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r e t a i n e d e a r n i n g s as w e l l as i n v e s t i n g i n new e n t e r p r i s e s . 
Reinvestment o f e a r n i n g s p r o v i d e d over h a l f o f t h e c a p i t a l 
i n v e s t e d by p r i v a t e l o c a l e n t e r p r i s e d u r i n g t h e f i f t i e s . ^ ' ' " ^ ^ 
The i n v e s t m e n t c l i m a t e p r e v a i l i n g i n t h e c o u n t r y over t h a t 
p e r i o d was f a v o u r a b l e t o t h i s p r a c t i c e . F i r s t l y , i n v e s t m e n t 
i n i n d u s t r i a l u n d e r t a k i n g s was h i g h l y p r o f i t a b l e because o f a 
v a s t s h e l t e r e d d o m e s t i c market accompanied by p r i c e - r i s e . 
Secondly, t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l c l a s s , b e l o n g i n g t o a few f a m i l y 
groups, c o u l d have r e i n v e s t e d t h e e n t i r e e a r n i n g s f o r t h e reason 
t h a t t h e y h a r d l y r e q u i r e d c u r r e n t income f o r consumption 
purposes. The d e s i r e t o have c o n t r o l over a l a r g e number o f 
i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s and t o e a r n management commission encouraged 
them t o i n v e s t i n new i n d u s t r i e s . The system o f managing agency 
enabled them t o f u l f i l , t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s . T h i r d l y , t h e Government 
encouraged t h e r e i n v e s t m e n t o f p r o f i t s by p r o v i d i n g t a x concessions, 
( 1 5 ) Papanek, Gustav F., 'The Development o f E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p i n 
P a k i s t a n ' , American Economic J o u r n a l : V o l . L I I , i May 1962, 
Number 2, p.56. 
(16) For example, d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d f r o m 1947-48 t h r o u g h 1954-55, an 
i m p l i c i t r e b a t e was g r a n t e d t o t h e r e t a i n e d e a r n i n g s o f companies. 
An a d d i t i o n a l super t a x a t p r o g r e s s i v e r a t e s was l e v i e d on 
d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t s w h i c h exceeded 30 p.c. o f t o t a l p r o f i t s and a t 
t h e same t i m e exceeded an amount e q u i v a l e n t t o 5 p.c. o f t h e 
c a p i t a l o f t h e company. The a d d i t i o n a l super t a x w h i c h was 
a p p l i c a b l e o n l y t o l o c a l companies was i n t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o g r e s s i v e 
r a t e s : ( i ) 18.75 p,c, when d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t exceeded 30 p.c. b u t 
n o t more t h a n 40 p.c. o f t h e t o t a l income; ( i i ) 31.25 p.c. when 
d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t exceeded 40 p.c, b u t d i d n o t exceed 50 p.c, o f 
t h e t o t a l p r o f i t ; and ( i i i ) 43,75 p.c. when d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t 
exceeded 50 p.c. T h i s i m p l i c i t r e b a t e system was r e p l a c e d by a f l a t 
r a t e o f 6.25 p.c. i n 1955-56 and c o n t i n u e d u n t i l t h e year 1959. 
Since t h e n no r e b a t e i s g r a n t e d on r e t a i n e d p r o f i t s . (See Rab, 
Abdur., u n p u b l i s h e d Research Report S e r i e s No.45, Income T a x a t i o n 
i n P a k i s t a n , ( P a k i s t a n I n s t i t u t e o f Development Economics, Old S i n d 
Assembly B u i l d i n g s , Bunder Road, K a r a c h i , p . 5 4 ) . 
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and generous d e p r e c i a t i o n a l l o w a n c e s . F o u r t h l y , t h e s p e c i a l i z e d 
c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s have made a v a i l a b l e t h e f o r e i g n exchange 
component o f t h e c a p i t a l i f t h e l o c a l i n v e s t o r s c o u l d p r o v i d e t h e 
rupee component o f t h e c a p i t a l . The l i m i t e d number o f i n v e s t o r s 
had g a i n f u l l y u t i l i s e d t h e f a c i l i t i e s extended by t h e c r e d i t 
i n s t i t u t i o n s by making f r e s h i n v e s t m e n t . F i f t h l y , as t h e r e has 
n o t been any p r e s s u r e f r o m m i n o r i t y share h o l d e r s on t h e management 
t o d e c l a r e s a t i s f a c t o r y d i v i d e n d s , t h e management d i s t r i b u t e d o n l y 
a f r a c t i o n o f p r o f i t as d i v i d e n d . A l t e r n a t i v e l y t h e y t r a n s f e r r e d 
a major amount o f t h e p r o f i t t o t h e r e s e r v e f u n d . I n e x p l a i n i n g 
t h e h i g h r a t e o f i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h i n P a k i s t a n G.F.Papanek has 
r i g h t l y s a i d t h a t , " t h e h i g h r a t e o f i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h was 
s u s t a i n e d f r o m r e i n v e s t m e n t o f a very l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f a l l 
" ( 1 7 ) 
e a r n i n g s . F u r t h e r , he s a i d t h a t s u p p o r t f o r t h i s c o n t e n t i o n 
l i e s a t l e a s t p a r t l y , i n t h e h i g h r a t e o f r e t u r n s expected, and t h e 
l i m i t s p l a c e d on consumption by i m p o r t and o t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
The s l i g h t decrease i n the p r o p o r t i o n o f r e t a i n e d e a r n i n g s 
may perhaps be e x p l a i n e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e n t e r p r i s e s a r e 
s h i f t i n g f r o m t h o s e l i n e s o f p r o d u c t i o n w h i c h e n j o y a l o n g e r 
p e r i o d ( i . e , t a x h o l i d a y ) t o those h a v i n g r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t e r 
period," o f t a x exemption. Moreover, a l l e n t e r p r i s e s e n j o y i n g %he 
(17) Papanek, G>J^,.,r^Q^.ci%.}^j).53. 
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p r i v i l e g e o f t a x h o l i d a y s a r e now r e q u i r e d by law t o d i s t r i b u t e 
60 p.c. o f t h e p r o f i t a f t e r t a x . There was no such l e g a l 
r e q u i r e m e n t i n t h e e a r l i e r p e r i o d . The reason f o r t h i s l e g a l 
p r o v i s i o n seems t o be t h a t t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s o r t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c 
need encouragement f o r t h e purchase o f s t o c k s and shares; and 
u n l e s s d i v i d e n d r a t e s a r e i n c r e a s e d , t h i s may n o t happen. 
Long-Term Loan: 
B o r r o w i n g f r o m s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s , b o t h n a t i o n a l 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l , i s a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t source o f i n d u s t r i a l 
f i n a n c e i n P a k i s t a n . Sometimes l o n g - t e r m l o a n c a p i t a l i s a l s o 
advanced t o t h e company by t h e mana.ging agents (who a r e a p p o i n t e d 
by t h e company t o manage t h e a f f a i r s o f t h e company), o r by t h e 
p a r e n t company, i f t h e b o r r o w i n g concern i s a s u b s i d i a r y . W i t h 
t h e e x c e p t i o n o f s u b s i d i a r i e s o f f o r e i g n companies and t h e 
companies h a v i n g f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a l l o t h e r companies have 
t o a g r e a t e r o r l e s s e r e x t e n t , borrowed funds. The funds 
e s p e c i a l l y i n terms o f f o r e i g n exchange were necessary and w i l l 
c o n t i n u e t o be so, t o f i n a n c e t h e i m p o r t o f c a p i t a l goods f r o m 
a b road, e i t h e r f o r t h e s e t t i n g up o f a new concern o r t h e b a l a n c i n g 
and m o d e r n i s a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g u n i t s . The f i n a n c i n g o f such i m p o r t s 
i s p o s s i b l e t h r o u g h t h e c o u n t r y ' s own resources o r f o r e i g n a i d 
and l o a n s . As can be seen f r o m Table 2.1. t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f 
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l o n g - t e r m I'o^n t o t h e t o t a l c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e r o s e f r o m 11 p.c. 
i n 1961-63 t o 22 p.c. i n 1964-66, T h i s was p o s s i b l e because o f 
a more r e a l i s t i c i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y pursued i n m a t t e r s o f c r e d i t 
f a c i l i t i e s d u r i n g t h e l a t e r p e r i o d . I t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t every 
rupee o f i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r i s r e q u i r e d t o be 
matched by a u n i t o f f o r e i g n exchange i n v e s t m e n t . T h e r e f o r e , 
t o meet t h e i n c r e a s e d r a t i o o f f o r e i g n exchange component of 
i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c e , t h e f o r e i g n exchange r e s o u r c e s o f t h e 
s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e P.I.C.I.C., I,D,B,P. were 
s t r e n g t h e n e d . 
Debentures; The o t h e r i m p o r t a n t source o f meeting t h e l o n g - t e r m 
need o f i n d u s t r y i s t h e i s s u e o f debentures. I t appears t h a t 
t h e i s s u e o f debentures has n o t y e t become an i m p o r t a n t means o f 
r a i s i n g l o n g - t e r m c a p i t a l f o r m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r i e s i n 
P a k i s t a n . Amongst 70 companies, o n l y t h r e e , namely,Attock O i l 
Company L t d . , Adamjee I n d u s t r i e s L t d . , and Spencer and Company 
( P a k i s t a n ) L t d . , have had r e c o u r s e t o debenture i s s u e s f o r 
r a i s i n g f u n d s . O u t s t a n d i n g debentures i n 1966 amounted t o Rs 6.1 
m i l l i o n and r e p r e s e n t e d l e s s t h a n 1 p.c. o f t h e t o t a l c a p i t a l o f 
t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r i e s . Besides, i n d u s t r i e s h a v i n g a l r e a d y 
a h i g h g e a r i n g r a t i o cannot borrow f u r t h e r amounts w i t h o u t 
i m p r o v i n g t h e i r e q u i t y base. A bond market has y e t t o be 
( 1 8 ) G e a r i n g r a t i o s o f 70 s e l e c t e d companies b e i n g 2 1 , 25, 37 p.c, 
f o r 1964, 1965 and 1966 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
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developed i n P a k i s t a n . 
3, Use o f Funds; 
T a b l e 2,2, i n d i c a t e s t h e p r o p o r t i o n s o f v a r i o u s forms 
o f a s s e t s i n t h e t o t a l a s s e t h o l d i n g s o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r i e s 
d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d s 1961-65 and 1964-66. 
As i s w e l l known, t h e funds r e c e i v e d f r o m v a r i o u s 
c a p i t a l sources do n o t themselves ;;produce an end-product. What 
t h e y do i s t o g i v e e n t r e p r e n e u r s command over c e r t a i n a s s e t s t o 
be used f o r p r o d u c t i v e purposes. There i s a d i f f e r e n c e between 
t h e sources o f c a p i t a l funds and c a p i t a l f o r m a t i o n . The c a p i t a l 
f o r m a t i o n i s expressed i n r e a l terms w h i l e t h e sources o f c a p i t a l 
a r e expressed i n f i n a n c i a l t e r m s . The r e a l a s s e t s a c q u i r e d a re 
s u b j e c t t o change f r o m t i m e t o t i m e because o f l o s s i n t h e va l u e 
o f a s s e t s due t o d e p r e c i a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e a p r o v i s i o n f o r 
(19) 
d e p r e c i a t i o n i s made e v e r y y e a r t o a r r i v e a t book v a l u e i . e . 
t h e book v a l u e o f f i x e d a s s e t s l i k e p l a n t and machinery, b u i l d i n g s , 
f u r n i t u r e and f i x t u r e s minus d e p r e c i a t i o n . There i s an i m p l i c i t 
a ssumption t h a t l o n g - t e r m c a p i t a l ought t o match r o u g h l y t h e l o n g -
t e r m i n v e s t m e n t i n f i x e d a s s e t s . ^ ^ ^ ^ As a g e n e r a l business p r a c t i c e 
(19) The r a t i o s o f d e p r e c i a t i o n t o gross f i x e d a s s e t s work o u t a t 
40 p.c. i n 1961-63 and 34 p.c. i n 1964-66. I t seems t h a t t h e 
r a t e o f a c c u m u l a t i o n o f d e p r e c i a t i o n i s d e c l i n i n g . 
( 20) Tew, B r i a n and Henderson, R.F. ( e d ) . . S t u d i e s i n Company 
Fin a n c e , (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ) , 1959, p.64. 
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fixed investment i s normally required to be financed out of long-
term c a p i t a l funds. 
The current assets or short-term capital include both 
l i q u i d and c i r c u l a t i n g assets. There are two characteristics of 
current assets. F i r s t l y , they must be readily convertible into 
cash or i t s equivalent without significant loss in value. Secondly, 
the management must intend to convert the assets into cash in the 
ordinary course of business. Assets satisfying the f i r s t condition, 
are cash i n hand and bank-deposits, government and corporate 
c e r t i f i c a t e s , and savings-banks and unit trust c e r t i f i c a t e s . The 
short-term ca p i t a l i s also called working ca p i t a l . Normally the 
demand for working capital i s met by short-term borrowing from 
commercial banks. However, a part of the working c a p i t a l , namely 
(21) 
net working capital , remains blocked for a long time i n the 
form of minimum inventories, and this part of the investment i s 
required to be financed from long-term resources. 
I t could be seen from Table 2.2 that net fixed 
assets including investment have constituted 76 p.c. of the total 
assets in 1964-66 as against 71 p.c, in 1961-63. The proportion of 
working c a p i t a l has declined by 5 p.c. in the l a t e r period compared 
with the previous period, although no•significant change in the 
components of assets i s revealed over the two periods compared with 
the change i n the capital structure shown in Table 2,1, 
(21) In ascertaining the net working capital we have assumed that an 
amount of current assets i s cancelled out with the equivalent 
amount of current l i a b i l i t i e s . 
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4, Comparison of Capital Structure of Pakistani Companies with 
those i n India and the U.S.A. 
The c a p i t a l structure of Pakistani companies i s similar 
to the ca p i t a l structure of companies i n India but di f f e r s 
considerably from that of the UoS.A, The following table gives 
the comparative r a t i o s of sources to total c a p i t a l . 
Table 2.3. : Comparison of Capital Structure of Pakistani 
Companies with those in Indja and the U.S.A. 
(In Percentages) 
Share 
Capital 
Retained 
Earnings 
Long-term 
Loans 
Pakistan (1964-66) 
India (1962) 
'U.S.A. (1960) 
51 
45 
25 
27 
33 
48 
22 
22 
27 
Source: Pakistani Companies, Table B' 
India and U.S.A. : Corporate 
by Dr. M. Uzair. 
-2 in Appendii 
Finance - (ur 
c B. 
ipublished study) 
I t may be seen from the table that capital structure of Pakistani 
and Indian companies does not d i f f e r much. The rati o of retained 
earnings to c a p i t a l i s a t i o n i s 27 p.c. i n Pakistani companies as 
against 33 p.c, i n India, The owners' equity comprising share 
c a p i t a l and retained earnings constitutes 78 p.c, of the capital i n 
Pakistan and India, The reasons for the larger retained 
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earnings of Indian companies seem to be that these companies were 
older than Pakistani companies and were able to accumulate larger 
amounts of undistributed p r o f i t s . The equal proportion of long-
term loans suggests that credit f a c i l i t i e s available i n both India 
and Pakistan are more or le s s the same. This comparison may not 
be very accurate however, i n the sense that there i s a difference 
of some years between the relevant dates i n the table. I t 
indicates, however, that the capital structure of Pakistani 
companies which i s taking shape i s similar to the capital structure 
of Indian companies. The ca,pital structure of Pakistani and 
Indian companies sharply contrasts with the capital structure 
of the U.S.A. companies. In the U.S.A. share capital constitutes 
a l e s s e r share i n the total c a p i t a l structure whereas the r a t i o 
of retained earnings to cap i t a l i s a t i o n i s highest. The ratios of 
share c a p i t a l , retained earnings and long-term loans are 25 p.c., 
48 P.O., and 27 p.c. respectively in the capital structure of 
the U.S,A. companies in 1962. 
5, Capital Structure by Group of Industries. 
Table 2.4, shows the capital structure of various 
groups of industries during the periods 1961-63 and 1964-"66. 
Table 2.4, 
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Capital Structure of Selected Public Limited 
Companies by Group of Industries, 
1961-63 and 1964-66. 
(In Percentage). 
Group of 
Industries 
1961«63 
Paid up 
capital 
Retained 
earnings 
Long 
term 
loan 
1964-66 
Paid up 
capital 
Retained 
earnings 
Long 
term 
loan 
1. Textiles Ex-cluding Jute 
2. Jute 
3. Food Products 
4. Sugar and 
A l l i e d Produclls 
5. Engineering & 
Construction. 
6. Chemical and 
Pharmaceutical 
7. Fuel & Power 
8. Miscellaneous 
53 
68 
57 
90 
70 
64 
56 
66 
40 
18 
39 
7 
14 
4 
24 
36 
12 
29 
32 
5 
42 
50 
55 
53 
49 
49 
58 
57 
31 
29 
40 
21 
25 
38 
16 
22 
27 
21 
5 
26 
26 
13 
26 
21 
A l l Industries 65 28 52 26 21 
Source: Tables B - 1 and 2 in Appendix B. 
Note : Discrepancies between this table and Table 2.1. are 
due to rounding off. 
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The Te x t i l e Industries excluding Jute; 
Their c a p i t a l structure indicates that a substantial 
amount of profit from business was retained. The rati o of 
retained earnings was 40 p.c. in the period 1961-63, f a l l i n g to 
31 p.c. in 1964-66, On the other hand, the share of long-term 
loanarose over the f u l l period from 7 p.c. to 27 p.c. The 
t e x t i l e industry, p a r t i c u l a r l y cotton t e x t i l e s , was very 
considerably renovated during the later part of the Second Plan 
by importing new plant and machinery from abroad which was mainly 
financed by i n s t i t u t i o n a l credit. 
Cotton T e x t i l e s ; Of the t e x t i l e industries, cotton i s the largest 
and the oldest industry in the country. I t s capital structure has 
been shown in a separate table given below. 
Table 2,5. : Capital Structure of Cotton Textile 
Undertakings, 1961 to 1966. 
(In Percentages) 
Year Share Capital Retained Long-term Total 
Earnings Loan 
1961 54 41 5 100 
1962 51 43 6 100 
1963 48 44 8 100 
1964 44 45 11 100 
1965 42 45 13 100 
1966 41 44 15 100 
Average 47 43 10 100 
Source: Computed from Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan. 
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I t appears from Table 2.5, that substantial amounts 
of pr o f i t retained i n the business either for the expansion of 
existing units or the setting up of new ones. The proportion 
of retained earnings to total capital rose from 41 p.c. in 
1961 to 45 p.c. i n 1964. I t i s interesting to note that from 
1964 onwards retained earnings have provided more funds than 
the share c a p i t a l . In 1966 retained earnings constituted 
44 p.c. of tota l capital as against 41 p.c. capital stock and 
15 p.c. long-term loan. 
Jute; 
Jute i s the second largest industry i n Pakistan. Out 
of the in d u s t r i a l sector.^s contribution to the G.N.P. this 
industry accounts for 15 per cent. The ratios of share capital, 
retained earnings and long-term loans to capitalisation were 
68, 18 and 14 per cent respectively during the period 1961-63. 
During the l a t e r period 1964-66, these ratios stood at 50, 29 
and 21 per cent respectively. The significance of these changes 
i s that this industry with the passage of time i s relying more 
on retained earnings and long-term loans for financing 
long-term investment. 
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The Food Industries: Study of Table 2.2. reveals that the food 
industries require more funds for financing working capital 
r e l a t i v e to t o t a l c a p i t a l than i s generally the case in industry. 
This industry i s p a r t i c u l a r l y dependent on share capital and 
retained earnings compared with other types of industries. The 
r a t i o of long-term loan to to t a l capital i s increased by only 
one p.c. over the two periods of the study. I t i s also interesting 
to note that there has not been any sign i f i c a n t change in the 
capital structure. 
Sugar and A l l i e d Products: This industry generally requires 
large amounts of capital and incurs large foreign exchange costs. 
But investors have been reluctant to provide the capital to the 
required extent. The development of the sugar industry has 
remained r e l a t i v e l y slow up to 1962-63, but l a t e r , with the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of foreign exchange loans from the P.I.C.I.C. and 
relaxation in the control of sugar prices, i t has gained some 
momentum. The capital structure of the sugar industry as seen in 
Table 2.4. mainly consists of share capital (90 p.c.), while* 
retained earnings and long-term loan account for only 7 and 3 p.c. 
respectively i n 1962-63. However, the ra t i o of share capital to 
t o t a l capital has sharply declined to 53 p.c. in 1964-66. On the 
other hand,the proportion of retained earnings rose from 7 p.c. 
in 1961-63 to 21 p.c. i n the l a t e r period. This s i g n i f i e s the 
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subsequent development in ,the sugar industry and indicates i t s 
capacity to earn profit and appropriate substantial amounts to 
reserve funds. The r i s e in the proportion of long-term loans 
from 7 p.c. in 1961-63 to 26 p.c. in 1964-66 indicates that this 
inidustry was benefited from large long term credit f a c i l i t i e s 
from institutions such as the P.I.C.I.C. during the l a t e r period. 
Engineering and Construction; The engineering and construction 
industry has largely flourished with the pace of economic 
development. The paid-up c a p i t a l , which was 70 p.c. in the total 
c a p i t a l declined subsequently,to 49 p.c. with the increase in 
long-term loans which were made available to this subsector 
through the specialised credit institutions. The retained earnings 
however, do not show any significant variation over the twoj 
periods. 
Chemical and Pharmaceuticals; This industry i s distinguished by 
the fact that i t had no loan capital during the f i r s t period of 
our study. This was so because undertakings under this sub sector 
were subsidiaries of foreign companies and, therefore, their 
foreign exchange requirements were met by foreign equity investors. 
However, with the establishment of some local enterprises such as 
(22) 
Indus Chemical and A l k a l i s Ltd., and Ferozsons Laboratories Ltd., 
(22) Indus Chemical and A l k a l i s Ltd has foreign participation to 
the extent of 25 p.c. in the total share c a p i t a l . 
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the capital structure has changed si g n i f i c a n t l y during the later 
period under review. I t w i l l be seen from Table 2.4. that the 
share cap i t a l was largely counter-balanced by an increase i n 
retained earnings (13 p.c.) and long-term loans. 
Fuel and Power: A si g n i f i c a n t progress has been made i n the 
development of the fuel and power industry i n Pakistan. The use 
of natural gas as fu e l , and chemical raw materials, has brought 
about s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s by way of foreign exchange savings. 
From 1955, when gas was put to use for the f i r s t time, t i l l the 
end of 1966, i t has helped to save Rs 485 million foreign 
exchange equivalent which would otherwise have been spent on 
(23) 
imported fuels . 
A study of the capital structure of the fuel and power 
industries shows that, contrary to the situation in a l l other 
industries l i s t e d i n Table 2.4. i t s paid-up capital has gone up 
during the l a t e r period under review. The reason for this increase 
i n paid-up c a p i t a l i s foreign participation at a later stage 
which was also responsible for the subsequent decline in the long 
term loan i n the t o t a l capital structure. The industry i s 
progressing i n the sense that i t s retained earnings have increased 
by 4 p.c. i n 1964-66 over the period 1961-63. 
(23) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, op.cit., p.197. 
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(24) 
Miscellaneous Industries ; The structure of capital shows 
more or l e s s the same trend as we have noticed in respect of 
other industries - a decline in paid-up capital associated with 
an increase i n long-term loan (from 5 p.c. to 21 p.c.). 
Before concluding the analysis of capital structure i t 
may be relevant to point out that after 1963 i n s t i t u t i o n a l credit 
financing has assumed a very important role in i n d u s t r i a l 
investment. The r a t i o of long-term loan to total capital has 
been doubled during 1964-66. 
6. Capital Structure by Size; 
The concerns included in our study are large-scale 
concerns only. Large-scale concerns include a l l those with fixed 
assets amounting to Rs one million and above. Enterprises 
within the large-scale sector may further be c l a s s i f i e d into 
small, medium and large. Although there are no definite c r i t e r i a 
to c l a s s i f y concerns in the above manner yet some basis may be 
taken as a c r i t e r i o n for this purpose. Such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s 
useful for the purpose of planning and identifying problems 
re l a t i n g to a particular concern. The amount of fixed assets, 
the number of persons employed, the volume of turnover or any 
other device may be taken as a basis for grouping concerns 
according to s i z e . 
(24) This group of industries include t e x t i l e , cold storage, paper 
and board, tanneries,glass and services industries. 
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Of a l l these devices, fixed assets and labour employed 
seem to be the most popular. The fixed assets c r i t e r i o n has been 
used in many countries for cl a s s i f y i n g concerns in accordance with 
s i z e . For example, in India, concerns having fixed assets within 
the range of Rs 0.5 million and 2.0 million, and concerns having 
fixed assets over Rs 2 million, are considered as medium and large 
respectively. In Japan, small and medium enterprises are defined 
on the basis of the number of employees under the Law on Formation 
of Small and Medium Business Organisations and Law on Incorporation 
of Small and Medium Enterprises. The Small and Medium Enterprise 
Credit Insurance Law i n Japan defines the small and medium 
enterprises i n terms of number of persons and capital employed. 
Moreover, the fixed assets c r i t e r i o n as applied to industry groups 
may also vary from country to country. A medium concern in one 
country may be considered as a la^ge concern i n another country. 
For instance, concerns having fixed assets within the range of Rs 
0.10 to 1.00 million are included in medium-sized concerns in 
Pakistan while i n India concerns having total fixed assets between 
Rs 0,50 million and Rs 2 million are included in the medium . 
(25) 
category. 
The Credit Enquiry Commission of Pakistan has c l a s s i f i e d 
the s i z e of concerns according to the borrowing capacity of each 
(25) Govt, of Pakistan, Credit Enquiry Commission,Re#03?t.» ,iTh.e Manager 
of Publications, Karachi 1960), pp.121-122, 
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enterprise. Industrial undertakings requiring loans between rupees 
one million and above and between Rs 50,000 and Rs 1 million were 
considered as of large and medium size respectively. A l l other 
enterprises having borrowing capacity of l e s s than Rs 50,000 were 
(26) 
c l a s s i f i e d as small. This definition i s subjective in nature 
because the borrowing capacity of an enterprise depends on a 
number of factors. F i r s t l y , the capacity to borrow to a certain 
l i m i t or the credit worthiness depends on the financial soundness, 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y and sound management of the firm. A considerable 
time i s taken by a new indust r i a l unit to acquire basic 
pre-requisites for commanding financial s t a b i l i t y . Secondly, some 
credit institutions i n Pakistan demand personal guarantee from 
directors or a bank apart from securities deposited before loans 
are granted. Thirdly, demand for a larger loan has become 
inevitable i n recent years due to the r i s i n g prices of capital 
goods. Consequently, a concern which i s medium today may be 
treated as large tomorrow. F i n a l l y , credit i n s t i t u t i o n s prefer to 
grant large-sized'loans rather than medium or small-sized loans. 
The administrative cost of large-sized loans i s comparatively less 
than that of small loans. 
The main purpose underlying the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of concerns 
in s i z e i s to show whether the capital structure varies on account 
of the s i z e of the concern or not. Here we propose to group 
enterprises on the basis of gross fixed assets, as under; 
(26) Ibid, p.122. 
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1. Small :- those with fixed assets of a value of 
less than Rs 10 million. 
2. Medium ;- those having assets of a value of Rs 
10 million but less than Rs 30 million. 
3. Large :- those with fixed assets of Rs 30 
million and over. 
This c l a s s i f i c a t i o n has been made on the basis of fixed assets 
as available from the balance sheetsof the companies concerned 
i n 1966. A comparison of the structure of capital between 1964 
and 1966 i s given in Table 2.6, The scope of this study has, 
however, been limited within this period due to the non-
a v a i l a b i l i t y of information for a similar number of companies 
beyond this period. Therefore,we have taken into consideration 
only 70 companies for purposes of the proposed analysis. 
I t appears from the table below, that the si z e of a 
concern may not be without some influence on i t s capital structure. 
Small firms tend to rely more on share capital in comparison with 
the medium and large concerns. The ratios of share capital in 1964 
to c a p i t a l i s a t i o n were 65 p.c, for small concerns, 53 p.c. for 
medium and 54 p,c. for large concerns. In the same period, retained 
earnings were an important source of capital for a l l types of 
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undertakings. But the extent of retained earnings to 
ca p i t a l i s a t i o n was comparatively less i n the case of small 
firms (21 p«c,) than medium (30 p,c.) and large (29 p,c.). 
Long-term loans constituted 14 p.c, of the capital i n small and 
17 p.c. i n medium and large undertakings in the year 1964, In 
fa c t , owners' equity has provided 86 p.c, of capital i n the case 
of small concerns in contrast, with 83 p,c, for large and medium 
concerns. But the difference i s not si g n i f i c a n t l y large and no 
very strong generalisation would seem to be suggested by the 
figures. I t i s interesting to note here that the capital structure 
of medium and large concerns was identical i n 1964, 
There has been a change in capital structure i n 1966 
compared with 1964. I t w i l l be observed from Table 2,6. that the 
paid-up c a p i t a l i n respect of a l l concerns ( c l a s s i f i e d ) has declined 
i n 1966. But the extent of decline i s greater i n the case of 
large-sized concerns, followed by " ^ a l l -sized. The reason for 
th i s decline; i s largely the increase i n retained earnings in small 
and medium concerns and augmented long-term loans in large-sized 
concerns. However, a 3 p.c. decline i n retained earnings in the 
large-sized concerns was mainly due to better distribution of 
dividend i n the l a t e r period. The r i s e i n the proportion of long-term 
loans suggests that larger firms have comparatively greater borrowing 
capacity than concerns of small and medium s i z e . This seems to 
be quite consistent with the findings of the Credit Enquiry 
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Commission that "the credit f a c i l i t i e s available i n the country 
were available to the undertakings which were called large 
(27) 
industries, and small and medium-sized industries were 
/no \ 
deprived of due f a c i l i t i e s provided by the credit i n s t i t u t i o n s " . 
Having discussed the capital structure of quoted 
companies we shall now examine the credit worthiness of these 
companies on the basis of financial r a t i o s . Table 2.7. shows 
some sign i f i c a n t ratios i n the quoted companies under study. 
Table 2.7. Some sign i f i c a n t Ratios i n the Quoted 
Companies, 1964--1966. 
(I n Percentage) 
1964 1965 1966 Average 
1. Long term debt to Net worth 
2. " " " " Net assets 
3. Current Assets/Current 
L i a b i l i t i e s . * 
4. Pre-tax p r o f i t to Paid-up 
Capital„ 
5. Net p r o f i t to Paid-up Capital 
6. Net p r o f i t to Net worth 
7. Dividend to paid-up capital 
8. Depreciations to Gross Ejj&eteyAisset 
20.8 
17.1 
1.5 
29.6 
16,7 
10.8 
7,1 
34.7 
24.8 
19.9 
1.4 
24.2 
14.8 
9.6 
8.5 
34.2 
37.0 
27.0 
1,5 
26.6 
17.6 
11.0 
9.2 
34.0 
27.5 
21.3 
1.5 
26.8 
16.4 
10.5 
8.3 
34.3 
Source: Table B 10 i n Appendix B. * Not i n Percentage. 
(27) This i s the term used i n the Credit Enquiry Commission Report. 
(28) Credit Enquiry Commission Report, op.cit., p.133. 
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The c r i t e r i o n for measuring these standards i s generally-
expressed i n terms of financial ratios. Naturally, industrial 
undertakings have to maintain a certain level of acceptable ratios 
so that t h e i r credit worthiness i s not prejudiced with regard to 
future borrowing. Moreover, these ratios indicate the extent of 
the borrowing capacity of the individual firm. 
1. Ratio of long-term debt to Net worth;- Generally the amount 
of long-term loan that a firm can raise i s restric t e d to 30 to 35 
per cent of i t s net worth. But i t may vary from country to 
country and industry to industry. I t would appear from Table 2.7. 
that i n the case of Pakistan the annual average r a t i o comes to 
27.5 per cent, which i s quite good relative to the general rule. 
The long-term debt to net worth r a t i o has been gradually r i s i n g 
from 20,8 per cent i n 1964 to 37.0 per cent i n 1966. The relevance 
of t h i s r a t i o i s that i t i s an indication of the extent to which 
the assets of a company could f a i l to realise their book value i n 
the event of l i q u i d a t i o n but s t i l l realise i n aggregate, s u f f i c i e n t 
funds to meet outstanding debt.^^^^ 
The debt/equity r a t i o i s higher i n Pakistan especially 
i n the case of newly established concerns. The reason for t h i s 
high r a t i o (approximately 50:50) i s the credit financing i n foreign 
exchange for the import of capital goods. The credit i n s t i t u t i o n s 
(29) Merret and Sykes, op.cit., p.11. 
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usually care to see 50 per cent of share capital to loan capital 
before granting loans. In a country l i k e Pakistan where foreign 
exchange i s a scarce factor the t r a d i t i o n a l debt/equity r a t i o 
can hardly be maintained either by the borrowing concern or by 
the credit i n s t i t u t i o n s . However, once a company i s established 
with loan capital i t s capacity to borrow further comes to a halt 
because of the higher debt/equity r a t i o . A newly established 
company however, i s not expected to embark upon long-term loans 
during the f i r s t few years of i t s operation. Even though the 
i n i t i a l debt/equity r a t i o may be quite high the borrowing 
enterprise may not be concerned as the debt/equity r a t i o w i l l go 
down gradually with the repayment of loans at half yearly 
instalments.^^^^ A higher debt/equity r a t i o i n later stages 
suggests that many concerns financed by long-term credit have just 
started to repay the loans and some old concerns may have 
borrowed fresh funds for balancing and modernisation of the worn 
out equipment. By and large, specialised credit i n s t i t u t i o n s 
operate i n Pakistan i n pursuance of the national policy and make 
advances to a project i n the l i g h t of i t s f e a s i b i l i t y and 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y while overlooking the s t r i c t principles of debt/equity 
r a t i o . 
(30) The loans obtained from specialised credit i n s t i t u t i o n s are 
generally repaid at half yearly equal instalments. 
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2. Current Ratio : The current r a t i o of an undertaking indicates 
i t s short-term borrowing capacity from commercial banks. A 
current r a t i o acceptable to the lender i s 1.5 which implies that Rs 
2 of short term loans could be raised for every Rs 3 of current 
assets but s t r i c t adherence to this rule may not always be 
possible. Prom Table 2.7. i t i s seen, however,that the average 
current r a t i o corresponds with the conventionally acceptable 
current r a t i o of 1.5. The practical significance of adhering to 
t h i s convention concerning the r a t i o i s that i t serves to indicate 
that concerns which sat i s f y the rule have the required credit 
worthiness for borrowing short-term credit from the commercial 
banks of the country. 
CHAPTER THREE. 
ROLE OP THE STOCK EXCHANGE IN 
PAKISTAN. 
I t has been found i n the las t Chapter that the 
capital structure of the public limited companies i n Pakistan is 
formed of stocks, retained p r o f i t s and long-term loans. Of 
these three components, the proportion of share capital has been 
found to be the highest. I n t h i s Chapter we shall turn to the 
consideration of the question of raising share capital i n the 
country. As i s well known, one of the ways by which such capital 
can be raised i s the offering of shares to the public through the 
stock exchange. The purpose of the present Chapter i s to provide 
such an examination with a particular reference to the role of the 
Karachi Stock Exchange (K.S.E,), which i s the biggest of i t s 
kind i n the country. Later an attempt w i l l be made to explain 
the market conditions resulting from di f f e r e n t f i s c a l and monetary 
measures as adopted by the Government from time to time. 
1, Relevance of a Stock Exchange to the Economic Position i n 
Pakistan. 
In a country l i k e Pakistan where there is evidence of 
imbalance the stock exchange i s one of the instruments for equating 
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the supply and demand of investible funds. The t o t a l potential 
supply of investible funds i n a developing economy does not easily 
come f o r t h , partly due to a low rate of capital formation, income 
inequality and par t l y due to the unorganised nature of capital 
market. This i s a natural consequence of the persistence of the 
t r a d i t i o n a l society which has dominated the economic scene for a 
very long time. T i l l recently very few people knew anything about 
corporate financing and i t s p r o f i t a b i l i t y . The small savers knew 
very l i t t l e about how to put t h e i r savings into productive uses 
yielding r e l a t i v e l y higher p r o f i t or dividend. 
The low rate of saving and i t s r e s t r i c t e d mobilisation 
have necessitated the creation of i n s t i t u t i o n s which could mobilise 
small savings for productive investment. The country i s passing 
through a period of t r a n s i t i o n and this t r a n s i t i o n i s positive i n 
the sense that the economy (mainly after the introduction of planned 
development ) has manifested successive increases i n the growth 
rate. With the rapid growth of the economy, in d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y is 
expected to expand further and require more capital. The services 
of a well-organised Stock exchange to help maintain investment 
a c t i v i t y are a necessary and indispensible requisite i n the context 
of the growth of the Pakistan economy. 
2. Growth and Development of the Karachi Stock Exchange. 
At the time of independence, Pakistan had v i r t u a l l y no 
stock Exchange since the two Stock Exchanges functioning i n West 
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Pakistan closed down as a result of the exodus of their non-Muslim 
members to India. The present Karachi Stock Exchange was organised 
i n September 1948 with an i n i t i a l membership of 72.^ "''^  Since then 
the membership and business transactions of the K.ScE. have 
multiplied and the companies l i s t e d at the end of June 1966 numbered 
187, Later a smaller Stock Exchange was established at Dacca i n 
(2) 
1954 but i t started functioning properly only from 1958. The 
number of companies l i s t e d on the Exchange rose from 45 i n 1962 to 
122 i n 1966. However, the volume of business traded on the Dacca 
Stock Exchange i s very low and the market i s s t i l l very much i n the 
early stage of development. 
The Karachi Stock Exchange i s the main centre of 
financial a c t i v i t y where almost a l l Government securities, shares 
and debentures of important industrial concerns and financial 
i n s t i t u t i o n s are traded. The corporate shares include both fixed 
dividend and variable dividend shares. The dealings i n preference 
shares and corporate bonds are not significant i n the sense that 
' out of a t o t a l paid-up capital of Rs 2433 m i l l i o n of the l i s t e d 
companies at the end of 1966, the share of preference capital 
.\ a (outstanding) came to only Rs 44 m i l l i o n , or 1.8 p.c. of the paid 
up c a p i t a l . The value of outstanding debentures issued by four 
companies added up to Rs 7 m i l l i o n . 
(1) Meenai, S,A., Money and Banking i n Pakistan, ( A l l i u s Book 
Corporation, Karachi, 1966), p.131. 
(2) Due to lack of technical s t a f f and investors' response the Exchange 
did not function u n t i l 1958. 
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Apart from the corporate stocks, central and 
provincial government securities are also traded on the K.S.E. 
The municipal bonds or the bonds issued by the p'ublic corporations 
are also transacted i n the market, (the Local Bodies' bonds are 
l i m i t e d only to Karachi Municipal Corporation). Over and above 
these, bonus vouchers, N.I.T, units are transacted on the K.S.E. 
Stocks are sold as public issues on the Stock 
Exchange including private limited companies' stocks not l i s t e d as 
"over the counter transactions". Under the provision of the 
Companies Act of Pakistan only public limited companies are 
authorised to make public issues i n conformity with the rules and 
(3) 
regulations of the Stock Exchange. The Board of Directors of 
the Exchange reserves the r i g h t to accept or reject any application 
for dealing i n shares i n the market. 
Before a company i s granted enlistment, the Board of 
Directors must be s a t i s f i e d that a company has a minimum issued and 
paid-up capital of Rs 1 m i l l i o n , that i t s stocks are held at least 
by 250 outside shareholders (previously 200); that a minimum ©0 p.c. 
of the t o t a l issued capital be offered to the general public for 
subscription i n equal proportion as to the class and kind and the 
(3) The K.S.E, i s organised and managed by a Board of Directors 
consisting of fourteen members. The members are elected by the 
members of the Exchange, The Board of Directors appoint several 
Committees to look after d i f f e r e n t aspects of i t s business. 
The day to day a c t i v i t i e s are generally performed by the 
Secretary. 
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shares w i l l be allocated f a i r l y and unconditionally. L i s t i n g rules 
also require that a prospectus with application forms should be 
published i n a Karachi newspaper at least 15 days before the company 
intends to receive applications for shares. The promoters or the 
managing agents, directors and officers of the company shall not 
subscribe for any shares offered to the general public. Moreover, 
the company must supply adequate information about the company's 
a f f a i r s to the Board for enlistment of i t s shares on the Exchange. 
Table 3.1. Number of Companies Listed and their Paid-up 
Capital, 1949 to 1966. 
Year 
Number of l i s t e d 
Companies 
Paid-up Capital 
(Rs m i l l i o n ) 6 as 
Total Manufac-
turing 
Others Total Manufac-
turing 
Others percent of 5 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1949 13 6 7 108 19 89 18 
1955 44 31 13 466 341 125 73 
1960 81 55 26 1008 761 247 75 
1965 182 146 36 2310 1899 411 82 
1966 187 151 36 2433 1968 465 81 
Source: The Karachi Stock Exchange Limited, 1968 (Diary) 
pp, 3 to 6. 
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The table shows a small volume of paid-up capital of 
in d u s t r i a l enterprise i n 1949. But as in d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n gained 
momentum, as the necessary infrastructure was b u i l t up during the 
F i r s t Plan period(1955-60 ) the paid-up capital l i s t e d on the Stock 
Exchange for manufacturing companies rose to 75 p.c. of the t o t a l 
paid up cap i t a l . This tremendous increase was due to an accelerated 
rate of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n over the i n i t i a l years of independence 
and to the fact that i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n started from scratch. I t w i l l 
be seen later that during the Second Plan period the extent of 
paid-up capital of l i s t e d companies was i n the neighbourhood of 
7 p.c. over 1960. During the f i r s t half of the Second Plan period the 
Stock Exchange made good progress i n respect of turnover and the 
l i s t i n g of companies but l a t e r the situation became less favourable 
because of the introduction of credit control and f i s c a l measures 
which w i l l be discussed i n greater detail l a t e r i n the Chapter. The 
need for financing large enterprise through the issues of shares has 
substantially increased as the capital intensity of industrial 
undertakings has increased s i g n i f i c a n t l y with the s h i f t i n g of emphasis 
towards the development of heavy industrial complex. In the Third 
Plan with an emphasis on the development of iron and steel, machine 
tools and f e r t i l i z e r industries the capital intensity has become 
(4) 
higher than i n the previous two plans. 
(4) See Chapter One. pp.8-9. 
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The shares floated on the Exchange by public limited 
companies seem to have met a rather mixed response from the 
general public as can be seen i n Table 3.2. which gives a break-up 
of the response to new shares offered on the K.S.E. during the 
period 1955-67. 
Table 3.2. Response to New Shares offered on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange 1955-59 to 
1966-67. ( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Period 
Capital 
Invited 
Capital 
subscribed 
Capital 
over/under 
subscribed 
Capital 
actually 
raised 
1955-59 
y 
s 
1960-65 
1965- 66 
1966- 67 
230 
454 
49 
80 
100 
1919 
204 
18 
- 130 _ yi^ 
+1465 t, l l 1> 
+ 155 
- 62 
100 
454 
49 
18 
Total 813 2241 621 
Sources: Por 1955-59 Second Five Year Plan, p.74. 
Por 1960-65 Pinal Evaluation of the Second Plan, p.20. 
Por 1965-66 and 1966-67 The Karachi Stock Exchange. 
I t would appear from the table that new f l o t a t i o n of 
shares during 1955-59 did not meet with any marked degree of response 
from the general public but the overall response during the Second 
» 8^ » 
Plan period was quite encouraging. Then during the Second Plan 
period a t o t a l subscription of Rs 454 m i l l i o n was invited through 
the K.S.E. and these issues were oversubscribed to the extent of 
Rs 1465 m i l l i o n . However, the extent of oversubscription during 
the l a s t two years of the Second Plan declined to one-sixth of 
what i t was i n the Mid-Plan period. In the f i r s t year of the 
Third Plan the issues were oversubscribed considerably. But this 
trend of oversubscription does not r e f l e c t the general behaviour 
of the market. I t i s interesting to point out that the issues of 
Kohinoor Chemical Limited were oversubscribed to the extent of Rs 
167 m i l l i o n against the issues of Rs 23 m i l l i o n . On the other hand, 
the rest of the issues to the value of Rs 26 m i l l i o n remained 
under subscribed to the extent of Rs 12 m i l l i o n . The reason for 
oversubscription i n the case of Kohinoor Limited was that this 
enterprise was organised by the highly reputable Saigol Brothers group. 
Another reason for such oversubscription seems to have been the 
fact that a r e l a t i v e l y small number of wealthy investors were able 
to obtain bank credit to finance 90 p.c. of th e i r subscriptions. 
During the year 1966-67 new issues remained heavily 
undersubscribed. Thus, out of the t o t a l issues of Rs 80 m i l l i o n , 
(5) Information obtained from the Karachi Stock Exchange. 
(6) Professor Louis Loss of Harvard University reported this 
p o s s i b i l i t y i n his report on the 'Securities Market of Pakistan', 
dated July l§t, 1964. 
only 18 m i l l i o n were subscribed by the general public including 
(7) the N.I.T. N.I.T.'s absorptions were however, quite i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 
The r a t i o of non-corporate savings i n corporate shares declined 
from 32 p.c. i n 1961-62 to 5 p.c. in the year 1965-66.^^^ The 
volume of turnover of shares on the Karachi Stock Exchange 
(9) 
represented only 0.07 p.c. of the t o t a l number of l i s t e d shares. 
This state of a f f a i r s on the Stock Exchange clearly shows the 
i n a b i l i t y of the Stock Exchange to mobilise private savings for 
the corporate sector or to create a favourable investment 
climate helpful to meet the ever increasing demand for industrial 
finance. 
The depressing market a c t i v i t y and declining trend 
of the K.S.E. are also seen i n the general index of share prices. 
Table 3.3. below gives the indices of share and security prices. 
Looking at 'the general index of share prices, i t 
appears that the market reached i t s peak level of 123 by the end 
of June 1963, After that date the index has been continuously 
declining and i n June 1967 i t stood at 105. These tendencies clearly 
(7) See p. 152. 
(8) This information i s obtained from Investment Corporation of 
Pakistan. 
(9) The date refer to the quarter ending September 1966. 
Table 3,3, General Index Number of Share Prices and 
* 
Security . 
Base: 1959-60 = 100 
End of General index Securities 
number of shares Index Number 
July 1960 92.62 99.87 
June 1961 95.33 99,80 
" 1962 108.43 99.94 
" 1963 123.23 100,07 
" 1964 115.14 100,13 
" 1965 109.85 100.23 
" 1966 108.68 100.22 
" 1967 104.71 100,33 
Source: Department of S t a t i s t i c s , Index Numbers of Stock Exchange 
Securities State Bank of Pakistan. 
* 
Index for e a r l i e r period i s not available. 
seem to point to the fact that market conditions, especially those 
r e l a t i n g to corporate dealings, have remained r e l a t i v e l y depressed 
since 1963; they have shown no general improvement, the exception 
being occasional improvements i n the prices of some selected 
(10) 
scrips. 
(10) Por example share prices of concern managed by reputed big 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s went up for some points specially after the 
declaration of handsome dividends. However, this did not 
improve the overall prices of the ordinary stocks. 
The index of Government securities was not affected 
much by the unfavourable conditions of the share market; government 
securities are rarely purchased by the general public. Moreover, 
the return on securities i s fixed. 
3. Factors influencing the Stock Market. 
Having outlined the general conditions of the K.S.E, 
we may now analyse the imderlying reasons for the declining trend 
of the market. The expansion of the share market largely depends 
on the level of capital formation, per capita income and increasing 
i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y i n the country. But despite a r i s e i n per 
capita income and saving i n the economy, the flow of funds to the 
capital market has been s i g n i f i c a n t l y smaller since 1963.^ '''"''^  A 
study of market a c t i v i t i e s would reveal that a number of factors 
l i k e f i s c a l policy, credit control measures of the Qovernment on the 
one hand, and the c o n f l i c t of interests between small and big investors 
on the other, are largely responsible for this situation. For 
analysis we shall divide the entire period into two phases - the 
period 1949-63 witnessing steady progress, and the period 1963-67 
showing the declining trend of the market. 
(11) The investment and savings as proportions of G,N,P. work out at 
15.8 and 9.5 p,c. i n 1964-65 as against 10.8 and 5,9 p,c. i n 
1959"60. (Reference T.P.Y.P. p.7, 1959-60 prices). The ratios 
stood at 13.3 and 9.0 p,c. (Current prices) as at 1966-67, 
During the period between 1951 and 1963 market 
a c t i v i t y increased progressively and was marked by a record 
increase i n the l i s t i n g of public limited companies on the Stock 
Exchange. I n the same period steady appreciation of equity values 
was also registered. The share market responded ( i n terms of 
price change) quickly to the change i n the money market conditions 
prevailing i n the country. Credit-control measures r e s t r i c t i n g 
bank advances and related industrial and commercial policies usually 
create unfavourable conditions for the capital market. I t has been 
observed that whenever import policy i s libe r a l i s e d , more funds are 
absorbed by the trade sector; the opposite happens i f import policy 
i s r e s t r i c t e d . The K,S,E. has reacted ever since i t started 
operation to changes i n the money market conditions. The business 
a c t i v i t y of the Exchange up to the middle of June 1952 was r e l a t i v e l y 
(12) 
weak mainly because, due to liberalised import policy , the trade 
sector had dominated the economic scene. As a resu l t , share market 
a c t i v i t y witnessed a bearish tendency during this period. But after 
the declaration of import policy by lat e June 1952 the volume of 
business was increased appreciably. Due to the r e s t r i c t e d import 
policy a sizeable fund had been b u i l t up i n the hands of traders 
available for investment i n the in d u s t r i a l sector. 
(12) Report of the Central Board of Directors for the year ended 
30th June, 1951. (State Bank of Pakistan), p.28. 
The Korean War boom enabled Pakistan t o earn a large 
amount of hard currency through the export of raw mater i a l s . At 
(13) 
the same time the Government l i b e r a l i s e d the import p o l i c y f o r 
c a p i t a l goods w i t h a view t o accel e r a t i n g i n d u s t r i a l development. 
The Korean boom was, however, s h o r t - l i v e d , so t h a t when i t was over, 
demand f o r raw mat e r i a l s f e l l sharply and necessitated the 
r e s t r i c t i o n of imports. By the l a t e r period of 1952 imports under 
Open General License were altogether suspended and t h i s ended the 
(14) 
l i b e r a l import p o l i c y era of Pakistan. The r e s t r i c t i v e import 
p o l i c y gave an impetus t o the development of domestic i n d u s t r y . 
However, the Government continued t o give p r i o r i t y t o importing 
c a p i t a l goods w i t h i n the framework of a r e s t r i c t i v e import p o l i c y . 
Consequently i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y increased s u b s t a n t i a l l y ; the stock 
market reacted favourably and showed a greater promise i n prov i d i n g 
s t r e n g t h t o the c a p i t a l market. The t r a d i n g i n stocks remained 
a c t i v e throughout 1953-54. 
During t h i s period the market received strong buying 
support from investors and dealers; t e x t i l e shares p a r t i c u l a r l y , 
(15) 
r e g i s t e r e d l a r g e gains. Several new f l o t a t i o n s were oversubscribed 
(13) The import p o l i c y f o r the l a s t s i x months of 1952 allowed 85 p.c. 
of the t o t a l p r i v a t e imports under Open General License, 
(14) Andrus and Mohammed, The Economy of Pakistan, o p , c i t . , p.26. 
(15) Annual Report of the State Bank of Pakistan, 1951, p,20. 
and s u b s t a n t i a l c a p i t a l gains were r e a l i s e d . A t t r a c t e d by the 
prospect of earning l a r g e r dividends i n share investment, a 
considerable fund was d i v e r t e d from other f i e l d s t o the stock 
market. Dealings f o r speculative purposes r e s u l t e d however i n an 
unhealthy boom i n the market. The pressure of these dealings 
reached such a l e v e l t h a t i t was necessary to close the market f o r 
9 days i n November 1953 t o avoid f u r t h e r speculative dealings. By 
the l a t e r p a r t of 1953-54, export trade a c t i v i t y rose i n the country 
and the traders gradually mobilised t h e i r funds i n the trade sector. 
Buying support f o r shares on the Stock market was inadequate and 
share p r i c e s began t o d e c l i n e . Meanwhile,some i n d u s t r i a l 
undertakings i n c u r r e d heavy losses r e s u l t i n g from a f u r t h e r decline 
i n share p r i c e s . By the middle o f 1954, share values s t a r t e d t o 
s e t t l e down a t a more r e a l i s t i c l e v e l . The devaluation of the 
P a k i s t a n i rupee i n 1955 provided a s t i m u l a t i n g fervour i n the share 
(17) 
market. I n a d d i t i o n , w i t h prospects of earning high p r o f i t s by 
i n d u s t r i a l undertakings, due t o the r i s e i n domestic p r i c e s , share 
dealings again went up. The c h e e r f u l a c t i v i t y of the market 
continued up t o January 1958, 
(16) Andrus, J Russel, and Mohammed, A z i z a l i F, Trade, Finance and 
Development i n Pakistan, (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, Karachi, 1966) 
p.177. 
(17) The devaluation of P a k i s t a n i currency r e s u l t e d i n l a r g e r exports 
and an increase i n f o r e i g n exchange earning. Consequently 
i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y rose considerably. 
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The share market again became bearish i n February 1958 
p a r t l y due t o the r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by the State Bank of Pakistan 
on advances against shares of the companies and p a r t l y due t o 
budgetary u n c e r t a i n t i e s . I t has been observed t h a t before the 
pr e s e n t a t i o n of annual budgets a c e r t a i n amount of sluggishness 
p r e v a i l s on the stock market. This r e s u l t s from the fear t h a t 
a d d i t i o n a l taxes may be imposed on corporate p r o f i t s leading t o a 
f a l l i n share p r i c e s . Another reason i s t h a t operators i n the 
market r e q u i r e some funds t o hold shares during the lean period. 
Normally they expect t o meet t h i s demand by borrowing from commercial 
banks so the r e s t r i c t i o n on loans against shares l a r g e l y a f f e c t e d 
the market a c t i v i t y . Subsequently, w i t h the removal of r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on advances, share prices s t a r t e d to improve again. 
The market showed temporary weakness i n October 1958 
when M a r t i a l Law was promulgated i n the country. The reasons f o r a 
p e r c e p t i b l e depression i n the stock market were some of the s t r i n g e n t 
c o n t r o l and measures taken by the M a r t i a l Law Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n . These 
included compulsory d e c l a r a t i o n of hidden wealth and f o r e i g n exchange 
held by Pakist a n i c i t i z e n abroad. These measures thus brought a 
sudden change i n the investment atmosphere and generally speaking, a 
sense of fear and i n s e c u r i t y f o r an appreciable time. The new regime 
however, took a number of economic measures f o r a c c e l e r a t i n g the 
growth of the economy. The main measures were the i n t r o d u c t i o n of an 
export bonus scheme and l i b e r a l i s a t i o n of the import of e s s e n t i a l 
consumers goods, i n d u s t r i a l raw materials and spares. The bonus 
scheme, p a r t i c u l a r l y , a s s i s ted the export-based j u t e manufacturing 
i n d u s t r i e s t o increase t h e i r earnings through the sale of bonus 
vouchers i n the open market. Other i n d u s t r i e s were also benefited ^ 
through the increase i n t h e i r earnings and they were encouraged t o 
c a r r y out balancing, modernisation and expansion through the 
u t i l i z a t i o n of bonus voucher • earnings. These measures r e s u l t e d i n 
i n c r e a s i n g investment and production i n the i n d u s t r i a l sector. 
This subsequently l e d t o increased market a c t i v i t y on the K.S.E. 
The 1959-60 budget introduced a few f i s c a l measures 
f o r the encouragement of more investment i n the p r i v a t e sector. One 
of these was the a b o l i t i o n of the business p r o f i t s tax : t h i s 
induced a s i g n i f i c a n t buoyancy on the stock market. I n a d d i t i o n , 
the budget reduced the corpor a t i o n tax from 55 p,c. t o 45 p.c. and 
(18) 
r a i s e d the minimum taxable l i m i t of income from 5000 t o 6000 rupees. 
With r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e market conditions during 
1960-61 the market a c t i v i t y showed s i g n i f i c a n t buoyancy during 
the f o l l o w i n g two years 1961-63. A f t e r t h a t , dealings i n share 
market began t o decline and t h i s t r e n d has pe r s i s t e d i n varying 
degrees up t o the present day. The budget f o r 1960-61 contained 
several measures which had a d i s i n c e n t i v e e f f e c t on the general 
growth of investment. The long-held p r a c t i c e of the grossing up of 
(18) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p<,9. 
(19) dividend income was abolished and dividend income i n the hands 
of shareholders, beyond the exemption l i m i t , was brought 
under income t a x . As a r e s u l t , the share market a c t i v i t y developed 
a bearish tendency. Apart from t h i s , the bearish tendency was 
accentuated by the d i v e r s i o n of large funds i n t o the import sector 
due t o l i b e r a l i s e d imports. Later, a f i r m e r trend i n the a c t i v i t y 
was observed from November 1960 when the Government l i f t e d the 
p r i c e and d i s t r i b u t i o n c o n t r o l s from cotton t e x t i l e s and yarn and a 
f u r t h e r 29 items. This tendency remained unabated t i l l A p r i l 1960 
when market a c t i v i t y again became subdued and remained so up t o 
August, Subsequently, however, f o r various reasons, a recovery i n 
market conditions set i n . F i r s t , an amendment was made i n the 
Insurance Act, 1938, i n e a r l y August, broadening the scope of 
investment of l i f e insurance funds i n "approved investment" from 
40 p.c. t o 60 p.c. Further amendment was made i n the Insurance Act 
i n October 1961, a l l o w i n g the investment of insurance funds i n the 
e q u i t i e s of those companies which declared dividends 5 out of 7 
(19) Grossing up dividend income:- Under the Income Tax Act, the 
company i s supposed t o pay income tax on behalf of the 
shareholders. Under the grossing up procedure, the income 
tax p a i d on i t s d i s t r i b u t e d p r o f i t s by the company was 
added t o the dividend income accruing t o the shareholder 
and the gross amount so worked out, was added t o the income 
of the shareholder from other sources. The d i f f e r e n c e between 
the gross and ac t u a l amount of dividend was the tax already 
paid by the company on behalf of the shareholder and t h i s 
d i f f e r e n c e was o f f e r e d t o the shareholder as tax c r e d i t i n h i s 
assessment. The greatest b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the grossing up 
procedure were the shareholders whose income was so low that they 
d i d not q u a l i f y as income-tax payers at a l l and could claim refund 
of tax dividend. This provided inducement t o invest by small 
income groups who had lesser chances of assuming entrepreneurial 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 
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( f o r m e r l y 7 out of 9) years. Second, the State Bank withdrew the 
c r e d i t r e s t r i c t i o n during the same month which had l i m i t e d bank 
advances against shares of e x i s t i n g companies t o 60 p.c, of t h e i r 
market value. T h i r d , the companies declared handsome dividends. 
A l l these f a c t o r s provided a d i s t i n c t stimulus t o the market leading 
t o very high p r i c e s f o r some s c r i p s . 
The b u l l i s h tendency of the market was maintained f o r 
most of the period 1962-63, I t was stimulated by several f a c t o r s . 
F i r s t l y , the budget f o r 1962-63 extended the exemption l i m i t t o 
cover 20 p.c, of dividend income over and above Rs 1000. A few 
months l a t e r , t h i s technique of assessing dividend income f o r tax 
purposes was withdrawn and the exemption l i m i t was r a i s e d t o Rs 
2000, Secondly, the emergence of the N,I,T. at the end of 1962 
provided encouragement t o market sentiment as i t was believed t h a t 
by t h e presence of N,I.T. on the investment scene stock market 
a c t i v i t y would not be l i k e l y t o go down f o r lack of buying support. 
T h i r d l y , the d e c l a r a t i o n of good working r e s u l t s by some enterprises 
encouraged the i n f l o w of p r i v a t e savings i n t o the stock market.^^^^ 
I n a d d i t i o n t o these, the d e c l a r a t i o n of more shares 
as "approved investment" by the Government presumably a t t r a c t e d 
more l i f e insurance funds onto the stock market. There was also 
(20) Finance and I n d u s t r y : 'Price Trends on the Stock Exchange During 
Second Plan', Finance and Industry, vol.5, No.5,( May 1966,) 
pp.29-33. 
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l a r g e r investment support t o new share f l o t a t i o n s declared e l i g i b l e 
f o r investment allowance under Section 15-C of the Income Tax Act. 
Buoyancy p r e v a i l e d up t o A p r i l 1963 when share prices of some 
.undertakings rose remarkably high. The State Bank general index 
rose t o an a l l - t i m e high l e v e l of 127.97 i n A p r i l 1963 compared 
w i t h 108.43 i n June, 1962. A f t e r t h a t , market a c t i v i t y declined mainly 
due t o ( i ) opinion t h a t the increase i n the prices of shares had 
gone higher than was warranted by t h e i r i n t r i n s i c value or y i e l d s , 
( i i ) the d i v e r s i o n of some funds t o new f l o t a t i o n s , and ( i i i ) pre-
budget u n c e r t a i n t y . 
A f t e r the presentation of the budget f o r 1963-64, stock 
market a c t i v i t y declined f u r t h e r . The depression began w i t h a 
re d u c t i o n i n the p r o p o r t i o n of over-subscription (Table 3,3,) 
and then i n the shape of under-subscription of newly f l o a t e d shares. 
The volume of business declined and many scrips incurred c a p i t a l 
losses. This induced apathy towards corporate investment amongst 
i n v e s t o r s , and, as a r e s u l t the m o b i l i s a t i o n of p r i v a t e savings 
diminished. The budget f o r 1963-64 introduced c e r t a i n f i s c a l devices 
aiming at d i f f u s i n g e quity ownership and preventing the concentration 
of wealth i n few hands. Among the measures the most important were 
( i ) the r e - d e f i n i t i o n of " p u b l i c company" f o r tax purposes; ( i i ) 
compulsory d e c l a r a t i o n of dividend by p r i v a t e companies and ( i i i ) the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of a wealth tax, a c a p i t a l gains tax, and a tax on 
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bonus shares.^^•'"^ 
The new d e f i n i t i o n of "public company" i n the budget 
f o r 1963-64 was e f f e c t e d by amending section 23-A of the Income Tax 
Act. Under t h i s amendment, a "public company" was defined as the 
company i n which a minimum of 50 p.c. of paid-up c a p i t a l should be 
held by the general p u b l i c . Moreover, the a f f a i r s of the company 
should not be under the c o n t r o l of less than 20 persons nor should 
such persons hold more than 50 p.c. of the v o t i n g r i g h t s i n the 
company. I t was im p l i e d t h a t the l i s t e d companies not f u l f i l l i n g 
the above conditions would be tr e a t e d as p r i v a t e companies and would 
be l i a b l e t o pay 5 p.c. higher corporate tax than the "public company" 
w i t h i n the meaning of s e c t i o n 23-A of the Income Tax Act. I n a d d i t i o n , 
the p r i v a t e companies would be obliged, under the new law, t o declare 
60 p.c. of t h e i r net p r o f i t as dividend. 
The impact of these measures on the Stock Exchange was 
serious i n the sense t h a t many of the l i s t e d companies were thus 
converted i n t o " p r i v a t e companies" and subjected t o higher tax. I n 
persuance of t h i s law some closely-held companies made an attempt t o 
convert themselves i n t o " p u b l i c companies" by means of the unloading of 
the shares which were he l d i n excess of 50 p.c. On the other hand, 
small investors r e l y i n g on the impression t h a t share prices would go 
(22) 
down f u r t h e r , began t o dispose of t h e i r holdings also. The e f f e c t 
(21) I b i d . 
(22) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p.10. 
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was a sharp f a l l i n share prices and loss of c a p i t a l values 
e s p e c i a l l y f o r the small i n v e s t o r s . As a r e s u l t , t h e market s t a r t e d 
t o move i n t o d e c l i n e from the middle of 1963. Thus the Government 
obj e c t i v e s a l l e g e d l y designed t o strengthen the depth of the 
c a p i t a l market through the d i f f u s i o n of equity ownership had 
produced q u i t e the reverse e f f e c t . 
The 1963-64 budget imposed a wealth tax f o r the 
f i r s t time on p r i v a t e companies. Tax was l e v i e d a t the r a t e of 
1.5 p.c. per annum on the slab of net wealth exceeding Rs 3.4 m i l l i o n 
subject t o a maximum of 15 p.c. of t o t a l income. This levy 
discouraged investment i n several ways. F i r s t , the b i g investors who 
p a i d t a x on t h e i r personal wealth could receive a rebate of the 
wealth t a x payment made by p r i v a t e companies i n which they held shares. 
Small i n v e s t o r s were not e n t i t l e d t o such a rebate since t h e i r 
wealth d i d not normally come w i t h i n the purview of rebate e n t i t l e m e n t . 
As a r e s u l t , t h i s levy amounted t o a deduction of dividend income f o r 
small i n v e s t o r s . Second, the v a l u a t i o n of shares f o r wealth tax 
purposes was o r i g i n a l l y proposed t o be based on break-up values i n the 
case of shares not quoted on the exchange and on c l o s i n g prices i n the 
case of quoted shares. The v a l u a t i o n of shares at the c l o s i n g 
p r i c e s q u o t a t i o n could have motivated the management of the company 
who h e l d major shares i n the e n t e r p r i s e t o keep the p r i c e down t o 
avoid a c e r t a i n amount of the wealth tax. A r i s i n g from t h i s p r a c t i c e , 
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there was the d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t small investors might be 
involved i n c a p i t a l l o s s . 
The i l l e f f e c t s of the wealth tax on the a c t i v i t y of 
the stock market were, however, r e a l i s e d very soon and c e r t a i n 
amendments were subsequently made. The f i r s t amendment made i n 
November 1963,exempted p r i v a t e companies from wealth tax provided 
the e n t e r p r i s e concerned gave an undertaking t o the Government 
t h a t i t would convert i t s e l f i n t o a "public company" by June 1964. 
The time l i m i t f o r conversion was l a t e r extended t o June 1967. 
Later i n the budget f o r 1964-65, the Government provided f u r t h e r 
(23) 
concessions t o investors i n respect of the wealth tax. The 
concessions were ( i ) the withdrawal of wealth tax on p r i v a t e 
companies,^^^^ ( i i ) the v a l u a t i o n of shares of a l l companies on the 
basis of break-up value. I n the same budget the Government extended 
the Tax Holiday period t i l l the end of the T h i r d Plan period. 
Despite these measures, the market continued to r e t a i n a bearish 
tendency during the major p a r t of 1964-65. This was mainly a t t r i b u t e d 
t o lack of p u b l i c confidence i n the maintenance of market a c t i v i t y and 
was mainly derived from the f i s c a l measures of the Government. 
Further depression was induced by the t i g h t e n i n g up of quota 
r e s t r i c t i o n s by the State Bank of Pakistan i n January 1965. 
(23) The r a t e of Wealth Tax on i n d i v i d u a l s had been raised from 1.5 p.c. 
t o 2 p.c. i n respect of assets valued at over Rs 3.4 m i l l i o n t o 
compensate f o r the loss of revenue r e s u l t i n g from the exemption 
of p r i v a t e companies, 
(24) During the l a t e r p a r t of 1964-65, maximum c e i l i n g of wealth tax 
15 p.c. of t o t a l income was withdrawn i n pursuance of the 
recommendations of the Commission on Tax and T a r i f f . 
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Apart from these, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of tax on bonus 
shares and c a p i t a l gains tax was also p a r t l y responsible f o r the 
worsening s i t u a t i o n of the stock market. Bonus shares issued by 
a company t o i t s e x i s t i n g shareholders were subject t o a tax of 
12,5 p.c. Companies enjoying the p r i v i l e g e of a tax holiday were 
(25) 
however, declared t o be exempted from t h i s tax u n t i l 1964-65. 
Although the r a t e of t h i s tax was moderate, yet i t was believed t h a t 
i t discouraged the progressive plough-back of p r o f i t s . S i m i l a r l y 
the tax on c a p i t a l gains was thought to provide a d i s i n c e n t i v e e f f e c t 
on the flow of p r i v a t e savings i n t o the stock market because many 
in v e s t o r s approached investment i n shares l a r g e l y i n order t o make 
c a p i t a l gains. 
The 1965-66 budget contained a d d i t i o n a l f i s c a l measures 
which were received w i t h mixed f e e l i n g s on the market, A new tax 
was imposed on bonus shares issued by the companies enjoying a tax 
ho l i d a y . I n the same budget the exemption l i m i t f o r dividend income 
(26 ) 
was r a i s e d t o Rs 3000. Although t h i s measure d i d not a f f e c t small 
shareholders seeing t h a t the exemption l i m i t of dividend income was 
ra i s e d , l a r g e shareholders, p a r t i c u l a r l y managing agents, were a f f e c t e d 
(27) 
adversely.^ ' 
(25) Rab, Abdur, o p . c i t , , pp,30-31, 
(26) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t , , p.10. 
(27) 'Survey of F i s c a l Measures A f f e c t i n g Stock Market'. 
Finance and Indu s t r y , Vol,5, No,5. ("May 1966), pp.45-50, 
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The combined e f f e c t s of a l l these measures produced a 
renewed bearish a c t i v i t y on the stock market and induced an 
unfavourable investment climate i n the country. There d i d not seem 
any improvement i n the market a c t i v i t y i n s p i t e of some measures 
undertaken by the Government intended t o be c o r r e c t i v e . The 
Indo-Pakistan War i n September 1965 depressed the stock market 
f u r t h e r . The depression could have been much la r g e r i f share prices 
had not been kept l i m i t e d w i t h i n pre-war values by means of a 
self-imposed curb on tr a n s a c t i o n s . This f u r t h e r added t o the 
nervousness of small and medium in v e s t o r s . I n view of the s i t u a t i o n , 
the Government, immediately a f t e r the cea s e - f i r e , f e l t the urgency 
of reviewing the f i s c a l measures a f f e c t i n g the stock market 
adversely. The r e v i s e d p o l i c y announced i n mid-October 1965 
(28) 
introduced the f o l l o w i n g changes. 
1. The compulsory d i s t r i b u t i o n of dividend at 60 p.c. 
by p r i v a t e companies was suspended t i l l June 1970. 
2. The super-tax payable by the p r i v a t e companies was 
reduced by 5 p.c. provided the companies concerned gave an undertaking 
t o the Government before 31st December 1965 t h a t they would convert 
themselves i n t o "public companies*before 30th June 1970. I f they 
f a i l e d t o f u l f i l ! , the undertakings, the unpaid tax equivalent t o 5 p.c, 
of t o t a l net p r o f i t would be recovered w i t h r e t r o s p e c t i v e e f f e c t . 
(28) 'Survey of F i s c a l Measures A f f e c t i n g Stock Market', Finance and 
In d u s t r y , v o l . 5 . No.5,,May 1966), pp«45-50. 
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These amendments, however, d i d not improve the 
s i t u a t i o n as the measures proposed were a c t u a l l y held i n abeyance. 
The c a p i t a l market, being extremely s e n s i t i v e , could hardly react 
favourably i n face of these u n c e r t a i n t i e s . Thus, f o r a number of 
years, a series of i r r a t i o n a l f i s c a l measures i n respect of d i r e c t 
taxes l a y at the heart of an unprecedented depression i n the stock 
market-. 
The y i e l d of investment i n terms of dividend per 
share has remained comparatively lower since 1963-64, More than 
50 p.c. of the l i s t e d companies on the K.S.E, d i d not declare a 
dividend at a l l . Out of a t o t a l of 182 l i s t e d companies i n 1965 
(29) 
only 87 companies declared dividend. Our study of seventy l i s t e d 
companies reveals t h a t the annual average rates of dividend from 1964 
t o 1966 were w i t h i n the range of 7 t o 9 p.c,^^^^ Considering the 
extent of the r i s k involved i n share investment and the p r e v a i l i n g 
market r a t e of i n t e r e s t , such rates of y i e l d would appear t o be 
very u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . Since dividend i s the main i n c e n t i v e f o r 
investment i n shares, the shyness of the p u b l i c towards shares can 
e a s i l y be understood. This shows that despite the incentives 
introduced by the Government, the r a t e of r e t u r n i n Pakistan i s not 
yet a t t r a c t i v e enough f o r the i n v e s t o r s , 
(29) ThaCKarachi Stock Exchange, 1968 ( D i a r y ) . 
(30) See footnote 33 below. 
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The reasons f o r a lower r a t e of dividend are 
a t t r i b u t e d t o the conservative dividend p o l i c y of the companies 
and the c r e a t i o n of large reserves out of unappropriated p r o f i t s . 
The growing tendency among companies to plough back large portions 
of t h e i r unappropriated p r o f i t s means t h a t e i t h e r they pay small 
or no dividends t o the shareholders. There was no check on t h i s 
except the market q u o t a t i o n of these scrips f o r which p r o f i t was 
low, which would tend t o be correspondingly low. Moreover, the 
Government's f i s c a l measures encouraged the t r a n s f e r of more p r o f i t s 
t o the reserve fund as discussed i n Chapter Two (p. 51 ) , There are 
other reasons f o r the conservative dividend p o l i c y of the companies. 
The dividend income i n the hands of shareholders i s taxable w i t h 
(31) 
the exception of the exemption l i m i t . The managing agents, 
being p o t e n t i a l holders of large amounts of dividend have been 
i n h i b i t e d from d e c l a r i n g handsome dividends as they are thereby 
involved i n paying more tax. The managing agents are less concerned 
t o share large dividends as they receive s u b s t a n t i a l amounts from 
various companies which are managed by them i n the form of management 
commission. Instead of paying large dividends they p r e f e r t o 
re-employ the unappropriated p r o f i t i n another concern so as t o earn 
(31) I n 1960-61 budget, dividend income i n excess of Rs 1000 exemption 
l e v e l was brought under income tax. The exemption l i m i t was 
extended t o cover 20 p.c. of dividend income i n a d d i t i o n t o f i r s t 
Rs 1000 i n 1962-63. But l a t e r on i t was withdrawn and the 
exemption l i m i t was l i m i t e d t o Rs 2000 and then t o Rs 3000 i n 
1965-66. 
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more commission. Even i f dividend i s declared, a considerable 
delay may be involved i n d i s t r i b u t i o n . Meanwhile, the d i v i s i b l e 
fund i s used f o r meeting working-capital needs. A l l these f a c t o r s 
produced a d i s i n c e n t i v e e f f e c t w i t h respect t o the investment 
c l i m a t e i n the country. 
Recently, the Government has introduced a new set of 
measures w i t h a view t o encouraging d i s t r i b u t i o n of dividend at a 
more a t t r a c t i v e r a t e and t o the issuing of bonus shares. The 
measures are expected t o exert a b e n e f i c i a l impact on the stock 
(32) 
market. The measures are: 
1. : An e x t r a income-tax of 10 p.c, w i l l be l e v i e d on 
such po r t i o n s of f r e e reserves exceeding the paid-up 
c a p i t a l of the company, 
2. An a d d i t i o n a l tax of 5 p.c. i s t o be imposed on 
u n d i s t r i b u t e d income while d i s t r i b u t a b l e income i s 
o f f e r e d a rebate of 15 p.c, 
3. Tax-holiday companies are henceforth t o be required 
t o d i s t r i b u t e as dividend 60 p.c. of t h e i r net p r o f i t and 
could carry 40 p.c. t o a special reserve fund. The 
p o s i t i o n had p r e v i o u s l y been the reverse of t h i s . 
I t can be observed t h a t i n the immediate past, from about 1964, say, 
(33) 
there has been a tendency f o r dividends t o r i s e . 
(32) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t , , p.lO. 
(33) Ratios of Net P r o f i t and Dividends t o Paid-up c a p i t a l f o r 
70 companies:- ... continued 
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As we have stat e d e a r l i e r , the c r e d i t p o l i c y of 
the State Bank has considerable impact on the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
stock exchange. The a v a i l a b i l i t y of c r e d i t against shares 
enables the market operators and the small investors t o hold shares 
du r i n g the lean p e r i o d of the market. The State Bank r e s t r i c t e d ' 
the borrowing of the scheduled banks by i n t r o d u c i n g a quota system 
(34) 
i n J u l y 1963. This r e s t r i c t i o n r a i s e d the r a t e of i n t e r e s t on 
bank c r e d i t t o 8.5 p.c. 
Generally, bank c r e d i t was not a v a i l a b l e against 
shares and even i f a v a i l a b l e , i t was at a r e l a t i v e l y high i n t e r e s t 
(35) 
r a t e of 8.5 p.c. 
(33) - footnote continued from previous page: 
Year Average 
1964 1965 1966 
Net p r o f i t 
t o paid-up 
c a p i t a l . 
16.7 14.8 17.6 16.4 
Dividend t o 
paid-up 
c a p i t a l . 
7.1 8.5 9.2 8.3 
Source: Table B'^ IO in,Appendix B. 
(34) The State Bank of Pakistan introduced some q u a n t i t i v e c r e d i t 
r e s t r a i n t s . Each scheduled bank was assigned a quota t o h a l f of i t s 
reserve requirement. Borrowings up t o the quota would be at bank 
r a t e . I n excess of the higher rates were applied i n a four t i e r e d 
s t r u c t u r e reaching a maximum of 2 p.c. over the bank r a t e f o r amounts 
exceeding s i x times the quota. (Andrus and Mohammed, Trade, Finance 
and Development i n Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p.99). 
(35) Chamber of Commerce and I n d u s t r y , Karachi - Annual Reports,1965-66, 
p.160. 
Moreover, i t was not g a i n f u l borrowing when the average y i e l d of 
dividend was so low. Although the quota system was abolished i n 
October 1965, the market d i d not show any improvement whatever. 
The bank r a t e was r a i s e d t o 5 p„c. i n 1965~66 (budget) which 
f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t e d bank c r e d i t f o r the market operators and other 
(36) 
small i n v e s t o r s . 
(37) 
4. Stock Exchange and the Managing Agency System. 
Some observers of the c a p i t a l market i n Pakistan are 
i n c l i n e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t the Managing Agents' are l a r g e l y responsible 
f o r the present u n c e r t a i n s t a t e of the stock market. I t i s argued tha,t 
they manipulate the a f f a i r s of the company to t h e i r best advantage 
(36) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p.10. 
(37) The Managing Agency, a unique or g a n i s a t i o n a l p a t t e r n , has been 
c l o s e l y associated w i t h i n d u s t r i a l development of In d i a and 
Pakistan. I t i s generally a w e l l established management f i r m , 
the support of which i s v i t a l l y important f o r securing funds 
from banks and i n v e s t o r s . For providing management services t o 
the company i t receives commission on the basis of minimum 
percentage of p r o f i t or a f l a t sum or both. Since the day t o day 
management of the company i s vested on the managing agent i t 
receives a strong representation on the Board of Directors of 
the relevant company. 
For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s on the Managing Agency System see 
Appendix C, page 317. 
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w h i l e overlooking the r i g h t s of m i n o r i t y shareholders. Recently, 
there has been some severe c r i t i c i s m against t h i s system and some 
c r i t i c s have advocated an e a r l y a b o l i t i o n of the managing agency 
system. The Government also blamed the system f o r not supporting 
the market at the time of depressed conditions. While addressing 
the representatives of the Karachi Stock Exchange i n December 1965, 
the then Finance M i n i s t e r of Pakistan remarked t h a t , "there was no 
need f o r managing agencies i f they could not support the market 
( 38 ) 
du r i n g the lean p e r i o d " . He asked the Stock Exchange t o f i n d 
out whether there was any j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r having a managing agency 
i n the country. This statement seems t o be c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n the 
sense t h a t the system was l e g a l l y p r o h i b i t e d from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n 
shares beyond the prescribed l i m i t s . I n the absence of a s u f f i c i e n t 
number of inve s t o r s i n the market the managing agents were 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y able t o avert wide f l u c t u a t i o n s i n share prices which 
would have otherwise a r i s e n ; success i n t h i s respect would, however, 
depend upon them p r o v i d i n g support at the required time. 
There are reasons t o believe however, t h a t managing 
agents can declare a minimum dividend, delay the p u b l i c a t i o n of 
annual r e p o r t s and cause undue delay i n d i s t r i b u t i n g dividend. But 
the f a c t remains t h a t whatever fund i s a v a i l a b l e i n the hands of the 
agency, i t w i l l tend t o be put back f o r employment i n productive 
(38) The Dawn, December 21, 1965. 
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purposes. The managing agency system has provided u s e f u l 
e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l services f o r a r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and c a p i t a l 
formation i n the country. The i n d u s t r i a l growth of the country 
has been p a r t l y financed by the reinvestment of p r o f i t s . While 
small investors are i n d i f f e r e n t t o the a f f a i r s of company 
management, the u t i l i t y of specialised groups l i k e the managing 
agency cannot be ignored even today. A p r o f e s s i o n a l management 
class has not yet developed i n the country and under these 
conditions hasty measures to abolish the system may not be much 
good t o the country. 
As share ownership widens the managing agency system 
would lose much of i t s v a l i d i t y . The Government has not been able 
t o make a c l e a r - c u t decision whether the system should continue or 
not. The system has been allowed a r e s p i t e f o r f i v e years which 
has now been extended f o r another f i v e years. 
The l a c k of any clear-cut p o l i c y regarding the managing 
agency system has not only created confusion i n the minds of the 
people but also i t has made the managing agency groups h o s t i l e 
towards Government p o l i c i e s . Managing agents are a powerful 
element i n the market and, as such, they do not always conform t o 
Government p o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y one which goes against t h e i r i n t e r e s t . 
While there can be no question of the Government y i e l d i n g t o t h i s 
element, i t remains a question which needs a c a r e f u l consideration. 
I t may be pointed out however, t h a t since the i n t r o d u c t i o n of f i s c a l 
measures i n 1963-64, and subsequently, the desired improvement i n 
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share market a c t i v i t y d i d not i n f a c t come about. 
The above considerations suggest t h a t u n t i l an 
a l t e r n a t i v e system i s developed, i t would not be wise t o abolish 
t h i s system. Instead some modifications might be made.in the 
op e r a t i o n a l functions of the system t o check the malpractices of 
the managing agents i n so f a r as these may be defined. The 
Government has already introduced some measures i n t h i s respect. 
Some of the r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by the Government are as f o l l o w s : 
1. The managing agency commission has been r e s t r i c t e d 
t o 5 p.Co of the net p r o f i t , ^ ^ ^ ^ and i t should not 
exceed the r a t e of dividend declared by the company i n 
a p a r t i c u l a r year, 
2. The managing agent s h a l l not be allowed t o act as 
the sale or purchase of the managed companies nor s h a l l 
they receive any remuneration f o r sales and purchases 
made on behalf of the company. 
3. The managing agent s h a l l nominate only one D i r e c t o r 
on the Board of D i r e c t o r s of the managed company. 
4. On a premature t e r m i n a t i o n of the managing agency 
agreement the company s h a l l be l i a b l e t o pay 
compensation equal t o one year's average remuneration 
(received i n previous years) f o r every four years of 
unexpired period. 
(39) Previously managing agency commission was at 7.5 p.c. of the 
_ , net p r o f i t per annum. Further, the managing agent s h a l l not be 
e n t i t l e d t o any commission at a l l f o r a year i n which dividend 
i s not declared. 
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5. During the tenure of the managing agency agreement 
the company s h a l l not appoint any c h i e f executive on 
remuneration and a f t e r the e x p i r a t i o n of the tenure, 
the c h i e f executive s h a l l be appointed subject t o the 
approval of the Gontroller of the Capital Isisues. 
I n a d d i t i o n , i t i s l a i d down tha t the appointment of managing agents 
and the terms and conditions of t h e i r agreements s h a l l be subjected 
t o the approval of the C o n t r o l l e r of Gapital Issues. 
I n so f a r as these p o l i c i e s p r i m a r i l y aim at p r o v i d i n g 
p r o t e c t i o n t o the i n t e r e s t of the small i n v e s t o r s , they are l i k e l y 
t o improve the investment atmosphere i n the country. The c e i l i n g 
f i x e d on managing agency commission i s expected t o increase the 
r a t e of dividend declared by the companies. At present Pakistan has 
no equivalent of the U.S. S e c u r i t i e s Exchange Act w i t h i t s 
enforcement commission. A s i m i l a r form of Government r e g u l a t i o n to 
c o n t r o l the stock market would no doubt help t o b u i l d up p u b l i c 
confidence i n the stock market. 
5. I n s t i t u t i o n a l Investors and the Stock Exchange; 
The c a p i t a l market i n Pakistan lacks the support of an 
adequate number of i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors such as normally play an 
important r o l e i n i n d u s t r i a l l y developed countries i n m o b i l i s i n g 
p r i v a t e savings i n t p the corporate sector through the stock eixchange. 
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The main i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n v e s t o r s of importance t o the Stock Exchange 
i n Pakistan are the Insurance Companies, the Na,tional Investment 
Trust and the Investment Corporation of Pakistan. T o t a l investment 
i n i n d u s t r i a l stocks by these i n s t i t u t i o n s i s estimated t o be Rs 200 
m i l l i o n ^ ^ ^ ^ c o n s t i t u t i n g about 10.5 p.c. of the t o t a l paid-up 
c a p i t a l of manufacturing concerns l i s t e d on the K.S.E. up t o 1966. 
The insurance companies are the oldest of these, although they have 
not yet developed t o a stage where they can play an important r o l e 
i n c a p i t a l formation. As a r e s u l t , t h e i r influence on the general 
business a c t i v i t y of the Karachi Stock Exchange seems to be 
r e l a t i v e l y less s i g n i f i c a n t . 
The National Investment Trust was set up at the end of 
1962 w i t h a view t o m o b i l i s i n g p r i v a t e saving i n t o corporate 
investment through the Stock Exchange. I t was generally f e l t t h a t 
the presence of the N.I.T. i n the stock market would provide buying 
support when market turns subdued due t o lack of demand f o r shares 
i n the market. The establishment of the Investment Corporation of 
Pakistan, an investment bank, e a r l y i n 1966, provided an encouraging 
spurt t o market sentiment since i t was hoped t h a t i t w i l l 
i n c r e a s i n g l y lend support t o the market. However, l i m i t e d resources 
(40) The break down of Rs 200 m i l l i o n i s as f o l l o w s : 
1. Insurance Companies Rs 50 m i l l i o n (up t o 31st Dec 1965) 
2. N.I.T. Rs 90 m i l l i o n (up t o 30th June 1967) 
3. I.CP. Rs 60 m i l l i o n (up t o 30th June 1967) 
Rs 200 m i l l i o n 
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at t h e i r disposal seem to have set an upper l i m i t t o what they can 
do by way of p r o v i d i n g equity finance t o the new i n d u s t r i a l 
p r o j e c t s which are being set up i n Pakistan on the one hand, and 
supporting the market on the other. 
Before the establishment of the I.CP. Pakistan d i d 
not have any issue market s i m i l a r t o t h a t i n Great B r i t a i n . The 
i n d u s t r i a l entrepreneurs had been facing d i f f i c u l t i e s i n formulating 
f i n a n c i a l plan, and designing the best form of c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e 
f o r t h e i r undertakings due t o lack of proper guidance from a 
s p e c i a l i s t investment banker. The slow growth of a c a p i t a l market 
i n Pakistan i s also a t t r i b u t e d t o the f a c t t h a t adequate f a c i l i t i e s 
f o r u n d e r - w r i t i n g of new issues i n the market have been la c k i n g . 
However, the underwriting f u n c t i o n of investment banks 
i n the l i m i t e d insurance sense of guaranteeing the purchase of 
unsold stocks (which excludes merchandising stocks) has been 
performed, t o a l i m i t e d extent, by the large coiranercial banks, 
P.I.e.I.e. and N.I.T. The commercial banks, because of the short-
term character of t h e i r l i a b i l i t i e s , invest very l i m i t e d funds i n 
stocks. The P.I.e.I.e.'s underwriting f u n c t i o n i s mostly concentrated 
on r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e and successful lenterp-rises.. i t s underwriting 
a c t i v i t y i s done p r i m a r i l y w i t h the object of obtaining an equity 
p o s i t i o n i n the p r o j e c t s t o which i t has granted long-term loans so 
t h a t i t can secure i t s loan c a p i t a l . The P.I.C.I.C.'s d i r e c t 
investments i n stock c o n s t i t u t e about 6 p.c. of i t s assets. 
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The N.I.T. which performed an u n d e r w r i t i n g fu n c t i o n 
by e x e r c i s i n g i t s o p t i o n of subscribing 20 p.c. f o r every new 
issue has v i r t u a l l y become inoperative i n t h i s f i e l d i n view of 
i t s anxiety t o earn a reasonable r e t u r n f o r i t s u n i t holders; and 
new p r o j e c t s do not o f f e r assurance of t h i s f o r some years. 
Although authorised t o act as underwriters, the insurance 
companies play a very l i m i t e d r o l e i n t h i s f i e l d . 
The I.CoP. i s performing u n d e r w r i t i n g as i t s primary 
f u n c t i o n but i t s a b i l i t y t o meet the equity gap i s dependent on i t s 
own resources. The u n d e r w r i t i n g take-ups of the Gorporation 
suggest t h a t 80-90 p.c, of new c a p i t a l issues have p r a c t i c a l l y t o 
be financed out of a Corporation's own resources. These i n d i c a t e 
l i m i t e d u n d e r w r i t i n g f a c i l i t i e s i n Pakistan and without these at 
the r e q u i s i t e l e v e l , the development of a sound c a p i t a l market i s 
bound t o be held back. 
Apart from the f a c t o r s discussed above, the operators 
and the members of the Stock Exchange do not seem to have 
discharged t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n developing sound stock market. 
I t has been observed t h a t some of the stock brokers p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n the market transactions mainly t o serve the i n t e r e s t of vested 
interest-groups r a t h e r than l o o k i n g i n t o the i n t e r e s t of the 
m i n o r i t y shareholders who a t t a c h so much importance t o them. They 
need t o pay more a t t e n t i o n on accruing long-term b e n e f i t s r a t h e r 
than l o o k i n g f o r short-term gains from speculative dealings. 
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I t has also been observed t h a t w i t h the exception of 
a few d i s t i n g u i s h e d brokers, others l a r g e l y depend on outdated 
methods of i n f o r m a t i o n and rumours, and advise t h e i r c l i e n t s 
(41) 
accordingly. The consequence of such i l l founded advice may 
b r i n g disastrous e f f e c t i n the sentiment of the market a c t i v i t y . 
Thus, there i s an urgent need t o develop a professional i n t e g r i t y 
i n the brokers class. Their advice t o the c l i e n t s should be based 
on f a c t s . The brokers community by t h e i r honest and r a t i o n a l 
a c t i v i t i e s can, t h e r e f o r e , make an outstanding c o n t r i b u t i o n towards 
the development of a sound Stock Exchange. 
The members and d i r e c t o r s of the Stock Exchange who 
have had a f a r reaching i n f l u e n c e on the development of the stock 
market, have not yet made enough e f f o r t s t o educate the pub l i c 
about the advantages of corporate investment. I n a d d i t i o n , the 
management has not been able t o get r i d of the market from the hands 
of manipulators where small investors could p a r t i c i p a t e i n equity 
of an e n t e r p r i s e s a f e l y and share the b e n e f i t s of 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . The organisers of the K.S.E. have f a i l e d 
t o create a p u b l i c image of complete i m p a r t i a l i t y which i s so 
(42) 
e s s e n t i a l f o r a successful and growing stock market. The general 
(41) Jafarey, N.A. 'What Government Cannot do f o r Stock Market', 
Finance and In d u s t r y , Vol.6, No.4, A p r i l 1967, pp.23-25. 
(42) I b i d . 
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investors have t o be convinced and re-assured again, t h a t the 
management of the Stock Exchange i s completely f r e e from a l l 
influences emanating from those whose stocks are traded on the 
exchange. Therefore, e f f o r t s should be made by the Stock 
Exchange i n order t o b r i n g back the pub l i c confidence on the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the stock market. 
6. Summary: 
I n summing up the discussion so f a r , i t would seem 
t h a t the K.S.E. enjoyed a smoothly increasing business a c t i v i t y 
u n t i l A p r i l 1963 but t h a t i t s a c t i v i t i e s have shown a c e r t a i n 
sensitiveness of response t o f i s c a l and monetary measures and the 
general investment climate i n the country. The period commencing 
from May 1963 can be described as the d e c l i n i n g period of the 
K,S«E, The evidence of the study seems to be th a t the behaviour 
of the market has mainly r e f l e c t e d the Government's f i s c a l 
p o l i c i e s which have been adopted from time t o time. This may seem 
to be a sweeping statement, as i t i s d . i f f i c u l t to separate one 
s i n g l e f a c t o r from a large number of f a c t o r s which r u l e the stock 
market, but the tren d of the share prices i s so cl o s e l y l i n k e d 
w i t h the presentation of the budgets t h a t t h i s conclusion appears 
inescapable. The a c t i v i t y of the Exchange has shown weakness on 
almost every occasion when import p o l i c y has been l i b e r a l i s e d and 
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t i g h t c r e d i t c o n t r o l p o l i c y has been pursued. Pre—budget uncertainty 
has moved market a c t i v i t y e i t h e r t h i s way or t h a t way, depending on 
circumstances. 
The pace of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n the country during 
the f i f t i e s , the dismantling of p r i c e and d i s t r i b u t i o n c ontrols i n 
the e a r l y s i x t i e s , r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of corporate tax s t r u c t u r e , the 
g r a n t i n g of f i s c a l concessions t o corporate enterprises and t o 
i n v e s t o r s , investment allowances, a l l had a h i g h l y favourable impact 
on market a c t i v i t y . On the other hand, premature withdrawal of 
c e r t a i n concessions l i k e the a b o l i t i o n of grossing up of dividends, 
the i n t r o d u c t i o n of c e r t a i n f i s c a l devices t o broaden share 
ownership and the i m p o s i t i o n of new taxes, l i k e the wealth tax and 
the c a p i t a l gains tax and the tax on bonus shares, a l l had a strong 
b e a r i s h impact on market a c t i v i t y . Another f a c t o r which p a r t l y 
c o n t r i b u t e d t o the depressing tre n d of the market was the conservative 
dividend p o l i c y of c e r t a i n i n d u s t r i a l undertakings. 
The f i s c a l devices adopted i n the budget f o r 1963-64 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the new d e f i n i t i o n of " p u b l i c company" have harmed the 
market a c t i v i t y t o such an extent t h a t the market has not since 
r e v i v e d t o a s a t i s f a c t o r y l e v e l . The counter measures f o r saving the 
market have f a i l e d t o b r i n g about a change i n investment atmosphere, 
as these f a i l e d t o be understood by investors. The postponement 
of the provisions of Section 23"A has increased the u n c e r t a i n t i e s 
instead of e l i m i n a t i n g them. I t would seem t h e r e f o r e , the 
proper t h i n g t o do i s t o devise such a f i s c a l p o l i c y as would help 
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the growth of the stock market. Further depression may be even 
greater i f the hope of low t a x a t i o n encourages the p r i v a t e 
companies t o be converted i n t o "public companies I' One way t o 
prevent t h i s would be t o apply the new d e f i n i t i o n of " p u b l i c 
companies" t o new companies only. 
The strong i n v e s t i n g class has yet t o be developed i n 
Pakistan. Moreover, i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s f o r m o b i l i s i n g 
p r i v a t e savings i n t o corporate shares are not adequate. I n such 
a s i t u a t i o n , the a b o l i t i o n of the managing agency system seems to 
be u n j u s t i f i e d . The a c t i v e co-operation of the managing agents 
could be us e f u l i n r e v i v i n g stock market a c t i v i t y . Moreover, the 
insurance companies, the N.I.T. and the r e c e n t l y formed I.e.?. 
have provided very l i m i t e d service i n t h i s respect. They do not 
have s u f f i c i e n t resources a t t h e i r command t o support the market 
during the lean period. This suggests t h a t the a c t i v i t i e s of 
these i n s t i t u t i o n s need t o be widened and t h e i r resources 
strengthened, since, w i t h s u f f i c i e n t resources they would be able 
t o buy shares on the K.S.E. The I.C.P. being an investment bank 
can r e e e l l the shares purchased on the K.S.E. on the Dacca Stock 
Exchange where dealings are too l i m i t e d f o r lack of shares. I n t h i s 
way the Dacca Exchange could be given more e f f e c t i v e support f o r 
development. 
There i s a great need f o r i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Pakistan t o 
deial i n shares on a wider scale. This could be done by allowing 
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the formation of investment companies i n the p r i v a t e sector, and 
so f a r t h i s has not been done. The apprehension of the Government 
i s t h a t i t would again lead t o the concentration of shares i n few 
hands. The chances of such concentration can be reduced, however, 
by i n t r o d u c i n g a s u i t a b l e system of safeguards. There should be 
healthy competition between o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l investment 
companies i n order t o increase the operational e f f i c i e n c y of the 
Government sponsored corporations. 
Despite the f a c t t h a t the K.S.E. has provided marketing 
f a c i l i t i e s f o r stocks over the period under study, i t has not been 
able t o create a healthy investment atmosphere i n the country. For 
one reason or another the K.S.E. has not been able t o safeguard the 
i n t e r e s t s of the m i n o r i t y shareholders who have invested i n the 
stocks of the l i s t e d companies. The Exchange has no power t o 
guarantee t o shareholders t h a t l i s t e d companies w i l l operate f o r the 
i n t e r e s t of both m a j o r i t y and m i n o r i t y shareholders. I t has been 
observed t h a t the Stock Exchange can i n e f f e c t do nothing when the 
management of an undertaking declares low dividend i n s p i t e of the 
la r g e p r o f i t a v a i l a b l e f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
I n the absence of an investment bank i n the country, the 
Exchange has had t o grant enlistment t o a company based on 
in f o r m a t i o n supplied by the e n t e r p r i s e concerned. Enlistment without 
proper appraisal of the concern's f i n a n c i a l and economic 
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p o t e n t i a l i t y has produced some adverse repercussions on the 
investment climate of the country. Non-declaration of dividend 
by some of the undertakings i n the time promised i n the prospectus 
has made small investors and i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors r e l u c t a n t t o 
subscribe t o any new issue without d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The Exchange has 
no research department able t o analyse the f i n a n c i a l soundness of 
the undertakings proposed t o be l i s t e d . Thus the K.S.E. should 
have a research department so t h a t i t i s possible t o evaluate the 
p o t e n t i a l i t y of a p r o j e c t both from the y i e l d and economic points 
of view before enlistment i s granted. 
The standard of accounting system i n Pakistan i s not yet 
up t o the mark. The annual and f i n a n c i a l statements do not supply 
t h a t amount of i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t needs t o be made a v a i l a b l e t o the 
p u b l i c f o r a co r r e c t appraisal of companies' a f f a i r s . I t would 
also be d e s i r a b l e t o improve the standard of accounting and 
a u d i t i n g p r a c t i c e : at times c r i t i c i s m has been expressed of the e x i s t i n g 
standards i n both. 
However, since there are many f a c t o r s relevant t o the 
e f f i c i e n t operation of a stock market, one should consider the 
t o t a l i t y of the s i t u a t i o n along w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l f a c t o r s , i f a l l 
round improvement i s desired. An a l l - o u t e f f o r t needs t o be made t o 
evoke the necessary confidence and awareness among in v e s t o r s . 
Once the people begin t o r e a l i s e the p r o f i t a b i l i t y and importance 
of corporate investment, the a c t i v i t i e s of the share market could 
hardly f a i l t o be stimulated. 
CHAPTER POUR 
A STUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS. 
I t has been seen i n the l a s t Chapter t h a t there are 
three i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors on the Karachi Stock Exchange, the 
insurance companies, the National Investment Trust and the 
Investment Corporation of Pakistan. So f a r , t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
i n d u s t r i a l finance and t h e i r r o l e on the Stock Exchange have tended 
t o remain s l i g h t as compared w i t h the c o n t r i b u t i o n - o f s i m i l a r 
i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the developed cou n t r i e s . I n so f a r as the 
development of a sound stock market i s dependent upon the growth of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n v e s t o r s , i t i s most desirable that the p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors on the Stock Exchange should increase, 
The continuously unstable conditions of the K.S.E. have been 
a t t r i b u t e d t o the r a t h e r u n c e r t a i n support from i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
i n v e s t o r s . I n t h i s Chapter we propose t o discuss the growth and 
development of i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors paying a p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n 
t o t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s , p o l i c i e s , achievements and f a i l u r e s . We s h a l l 
f i r s t discuss the insurance companies and the N.I.T. which w i l l be 
follpwed by a discussion on the I.C.P. 
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A. Insurance Companies. 
1, I n t r o d u c t i o n ; 
The insurance companies play an important r o l e i n the 
economic development of a country by means of c o l l e c t i n g savings 
from i n d i v i d u a l s and c a n a l i s i n g them i n t o productive investments. 
The main o b j e c t i v e of an insurance i s coverage of r i s k and t h i s i s 
done by c o l l e c t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s or premiums from many and paying 
the losses t o a few as the cases a r i s e . There are two types of 
insurance - general insurance covering the r i s k of losses t o 
property and l i f e insurance dealing w i t h l i f e . General insurance, 
by a f f o r d i n g p r o t e c t i o n against the losses of property a r i s i n g out 
of f i r e , f l o o d and storm, embezzlement, for g e r y , b u r g l a r y , t h e f t 
and accident provides valuable services t o the commercial and 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations. But general insurance i s l e f t w i t h only 
a small fund out of i t s premium income a f t e r meeting the claims of 
losses and paying premiums f o r re-insurance purposes. As a r e s u l t , 
the r o l e of general insurance compared w i t h l i f e insurance i s 
r e l a t i v e l y unimportant i n the process of c a p i t a l formation. 
L i f e insurance companies accumulate funds from the 
c o n t r i b u t i o n of po l i c y - h o l d e r s w i t h a promise t o pay a f i x e d amount 
t o the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the insured persons i n the event of h is 
death or t o the persons themselves on mat u r i t y . There i s a time-lag 
between the r e c e i p t and the payment of the amount during which the 
fund i s p r o f i t a b l y invested by the insurance companies. 
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I n Pakistan ^the number of insurance companies operating by the 
end of 1965 was 73. Of these,40 were Pakista n i and 33 were 
Foreign feompanies. I t may be noted t h a t 32 of the indigenous 
and 4 of the f o r e i g n companies were doing l i f e business e i t h e r 
e x c l u s i v e l y or along w i t h other forms of business«^ "'"^  The t o t a l 
(2) 
l i f e funds accumulated i n Pakistan a t the end of December 
1965, was Rs 538.62 m i l l i o n of which the share of l o c a l insurers 
was Rs 289,24 m i l l i o n (53.7 p.c.) and t h a t of f o r e i g n insurers 
was Rs 249.38 m i l l i o n (46.3 p.c.). 
2. Review of A c t i v i t i e s , 
(a) T o t a l Investments; 
y The asset holdings of the insurance companies 
amounted t o Rs 463.6 m i l l i o n as against l i f e funds of Rs 538.6 
m i l l i o n i n December,1965. Table 4,1. shows the t o t a l asset 
holdings i n various forms by the year ending 1965. 
(1) Government of Pakistan, The Pakistan Insurance Year Book ,1966, 
(The Manager of P u b l i c a t i o n s , Karachi 1967), pp.1-12, 
(2) Excludes p o s t a l l i f e Insurance Funds and Pension Funds which 
are exempted from the provisions of the Insurance Act,1938. 
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Table 4,1. : S t r u c t u r e of L i f e Fund Assets of the 
Insurance Companies. 
As on 31st December, 1965. 
Form of Assets M i l l i o n Rs Per Cent 
1. Central Government S e c u r i t i e s 
2. P r o v i n c i a l " " 
3. Debentures of S t a t u t o r y Corporation 
4. Shares and Debentures of J o i n t Stock 
Company. 
5. Loans on Mortgages of Property ( a ) . 
6. Real Estate ( b ) . 
7. Cash Deposits other than Current A/c. 
8. Loans on Ins u r e r s ' P o l i c i e s w i t h i n t h e i r 
surrender value. 
144.9 
73.5 
75.6 
69.5 
36.0 
25.4 
15.4 
23.3 
31.2 
15.9 
16.3 
15.0 
7.8 
5.5 
3.3 
5.0 
T o t a l 463.6 100.0 
Source: The Pakistan Insurance Year Book, 1966. pp.16-18. 
* Face value of the s e c u r i t i e s . 
(a) Loans outstanding as on 31.12.65. 
(b) Construction cost. 
The t a b l e above shows t h a t c e n t r a l and p r o v i n c i a l government 
s e c u r i t i e s together accounted f o r 47 p.c. of the t o t a l investment 
w h i l e another 16 p.c. was invested i n debentures of s t a t u t o r y 
corporations. The shares and debentures of j o i n t stock companies 
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c o n s t i t u t e d 15 p.c. of the t o t a l l i f e fund assets. The remaining 
21,6 p.c. was held i n loans on mortgages (7.8 p.c.), r e a l estate 
(5.5 p . c ) , cash deposits other than current account (3.3 p.c.) 
and loans on i n s u r e r s ' p o l i c i e s w i t h i n t h e i r surrender value 
(5.0 p . c . ) . The r e s i d u a l (Rs 538.6 m i l l i o n - Rs 463.6 m i l l i o n ) 
amount of Rs 75.0 m i l l i o n was deposited i n current accounts. 
(b) Investments i n I n d u s t r i a l Stocks; 
I t can be seen from the t a b l e ©feav© that u n t i l the end 
of 1965 investment i n the shares and debentures of j o i n t stock 
companies was Rs 69.5 m i l l i o n out of a t o t a l investment of Rs 
463.6 m i l l i o n . These holdings were d i s t r i b u t e d i n four groups of 
j o i n t stock eompanies - i n d u s t r i a l enterprises i n c l u d i n g f u e l and 
power (Rs 50.43 m i l l i o n ) , banking (Rs 12,51 m i l l i o n ) , N.I.T. Units 
(Rs 2.86 m i l l i o n ) and tran s p o r t and communications (Rs 3.72 
m i l l i o n ) . I n d u s t r i a l holdings amounted t o Rs 50.43 m i l l i o n or 
72.54 p.c. out of a t o t a l holdings of Rs 69.52 m i l l i o n . Table 4.2, 
provides a break-down of the i n d u s t r i a l holdings of insurance 
companies on 31st December, 1965. 
About 71 p.c. of i n d u s t r i a l holdings were concentrated 
i n f o u r groups of i n d u s t r i e s - e l e c t r i c power, i n c l u d i n g f u e l . 
Jute t e x t i l e s , c otton t e x t i l e s and miscellaneous. The miscellaneous 
group included a v a r i e t y of i n d u s t r i e s such as services, paper, 
tobacco, tea, glass and f r u i t canning. This group alone accounted 
f o r 23.64 p.c, of the i n d u s t r i a l holdings. Fuel and power i n c l u d i n g 
Table 4.2. 
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Holdings of the Insurance Companies i n 
I n d u s t r i a l Stocks on 31st 
December, 1965. 
Insurance Companies Total Paid 
Industry holdings up Capital 
Rs i n % Rs i n 2 as % m i l l i o n s m i l l i o n s of 4 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Cotton T e x t i l e s 5.31 10.52 201.57 2.63 
2. Synthetic Rayon and 
T e x t i l e s . 1.85 3,66 87.89 2.10 
3. Jute 5.74 11.38 220.46 2.60 
4. Sugar and A l l i e d . 4.93 9.78 208.93 2.36 
5. Cement 3.61 7.16 102.54 3.52 
6. Engineering 3.00 5.94 79.12 3.79 
7. Chemical and 
Pharmaceutical. 1.41 2.80 82.75 1.70 
8. Fuel and Power. 8.93 17.71 282.99 3.16 
9. E l e c t r i c a l - (Karachi 
and Rawalpindi). 3.73 7.40 47.05 7.93 
10. Miscellaneous. 11.92 23.64 366.17 3.25 
T o t a l 50.43 100.00 1679.47 3.00 
Source: The Pakistan Insurance Book 1966, pp.289-311. 
e l e c t r i c , cotton t e x t i l e s and j u t e t e x t i l e s accounted f o r 25.11, 11,38 
and 10.52 p.c. r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n a d d i t i o n , investments i n sugar and 
a l l i e d a c t i v i t i e s , cement, and engineering i n d u s t r i e s were also 
- 125 -
s i g n i f i c a n t . On the whole, the insurance companies p a r t i c i p a t e d 
i n the e q u i t y c a p i t a l of 100 manufacturing concerns by pr o v i d i n g 
(3) 
3 p.c. of the paid-up c a p i t a l of those concerns. From Column 
5 i n Table 4.2, i t may be observed t h a t the r a t i o of share 
c a p i t a l subscribed by the insurance companies i n each group of 
i n d u s t r i e s t o the t o t a l paid-up c a p i t a l of t h a t group does not 
reveal any marked degree of preference f o r the stocks of one group 
over another, w i t h the exception of e l e c t r i c power supplying 
concerns, where the r a t i o was 7.93 p.c. The r a t i o s i n the cases 
of the sugar and a l l i e d , cement, engineering, f u e l and power and 
miscellaneous i n d u s t r i e s were w i t h i n the range of 3.16 t o 3.79 p.c. 
whereas i n other cases the r a t i o s were below that range but not 
lower than 1.70 p.c. On the whole, however, the r o l e of insurance 
companies i n Pakistan as a s u p p l i e r of i n d u s t r i a l finance has 
remained very poor compared w i t h India where such i n s t i t u t i o n s had 
provided at l e a s t 12 p.c. of the paid-up c a p i t a l of 16 i n d u s t r i e s 
i n 1957-58.^^^ 
The form of the i n d u s t r i a l holdings was mainly 
ordinary shares. Investments i n preference shares and debentures 
were very small. Out of a t o t a l i n d u s t r i a l holdings of Rs 50.43 
(3) The paid-up c a p i t a l of 100 manufacturing concerns amounted to 
Rs 1679,47 m i l l i o n . However, the t o t a l paid-up c a p i t a l of a l l 
i n d u s t r i a l undertakings l i s t e d on the Karachi Stock Exchange was 
s l i g h t l y higher amounting t o Rs 1791.15 m i l l i o n and the 
c o n t r i b u t i o n of insurance companies was estimated at 2.80 p.c. 
(4) Rosen, G., o p . c i t . , p.75. 
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m i l l i o n the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of preference shares and debentures were 
Rs 2.12 and Rs 3.65 m i l l i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y . Such lower r a t i o i n 
these s e c u r i t i e s r e f l e c t s the p a t t e r n of c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e i n 
manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s i n the country which i s predominantly 
based on ordinary share c a p i t a l . 
(c ) Investment P o l i c y and A p p r a i s a l ; 
The investment p o l i c y of an insurance company i s 
guided by c e r t a i n s t a t u t o r y provisions which prescribe the general 
p r i n c i p l e s of investment. I n Pakistan, s e c t i o n 27 of the 
Insurance Act of 1938 prescribes a minimum amount of adjusted 
l i a b i l i t i e s t h a t must be covered by investment from each 
insurance company i n some approved s e c u r i t i e s of the Government. 
The Act was amended from time t o time w i t h a view t o a f f o r d i n g 
p r o t e c t i o n f o r the p o l i c y holders' money and t o channel funds i n t o 
the d i r e c t i o n where i t was thought t o be most needed. The insurance 
companies i n Pakistan are now required t o maintain 40 p.c. of t h e i r 
assets ( p r e v i o u s l y 60 p.c.) i n Government bonds. The remaining 
(5) Adjusted l i a b i l i t i e s as defined under section 27 of the Act are the 
sum of the amount of the l i a b i l i t i e s of an insurance company t o the 
holders of l i f e insurance p o l i c i e s i n Pakistan on account of matured 
claims and the amount required t o meet the l i a b i l i t y on p o l i c i e s 
maturing f o r payment i n Pakistan less ( i ) the amount of any s t a t u t o r y 
deposit made under s e c t i o n 7 i n respect of l i f e insurance business 
( i i ) any amount due t o the insurance company f o r loans against 
surrender value of p o l i c i e s , (Andrus and Mohammed, Trade, Finance and 
Development i n Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p.163.) 
(6) The amendment was made i n 1961. Under t h i s amendment 30 p.c. of assets 
should be kept i n Government s e c u r i t i e s , which means c e n t r a l and 
p r o v i n c i a l Government loans, defence bonds, income tax bonds issued i n 
connection w i t h refundable surcharge etc, and another 10 p.c, i n 
/continued: 
" 127 -
60 p.c. may be invested i n approved s e c u r i t i e s or approved 
investments. Approved investments may include ordinary shares, 
preference shares and debentures of public companies, mortgages 
and r e a l estates. Under the same ordinance of the amendment, 
the Government has also assumed power t o declare any issue of 
both new and e x i s t i n g i n d u s t r i a l undertakings t o be an approved 
investment. This has been done t o d i v e r t more funds i n t o 
sectors such as i n d u s t r y . 
As a r e s u l t of these measures, the Government expected 
t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of insurance funds would be d i v e r t e d t o 
the i n d u s t r i a l sector, but the r e s u l t d i d not appear t o have matched 
the expectation. This may be seen from the f a c t t h a t during the 
p e r i o d 1956-60 annual average investment i n Government and approved 
(7) 
s e c u r i t i e s was 36 p.c, more than the s t i p u l a t e d l e v e l of investment. 
The extent of the excess was 68 p.c. during the period 1961«65. The 
higher average during the l a t e r period was i n f a c t , due t o the reduction 
of the l e g a l l i m i t by 20 p.c. However, i f we assume t h a t 60 p.c. of 
the adjusted l i a b i l i t i e s was l e g a l l y necessary t o invest i n Government 
and approved s e c u r i t i e s i n the l a t e r period also, and compare the 
a c t u a l p a t t e r n of investment, we may be able t o v i s u a l i s e the r e a l 
f o o t n o t e (6) continued from previous page:-
,,, approved s e c u r i t i e s - means Government s e c u r i t i e s and any other 
s e c u r i t i e s charged on the revenues of the c e n t r a l and p r o v i n c i a l 
Governments, or guaranteed f u l l y as regards p r i n c i p a l and i n t e r e s t 
by the c e n t r a l of a p r o v i n c i a l Government. 
(7) The minimum required investment was 60 p.c. i n Government and 
approved s e c u r i t i e s during the period 1956-60, 
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impact of the change of investment p r i o r i t i e s . On t h i s basis, 
we f i n d t h a t an average excess of actual investment over the 
re q u i r e d investment was 17 p.c. during the period 1960-65. 
This suggests t h a t there has been a growing tendency on the part 
of the insurance companies t o inv e s t more i n Government s e c u r i t i e s 
than i n other forms of investments. I n f a c t , t h i s p o l i c y was 
pursued not only because these s e c u r i t i e s were safe investment 
o u t l e t s but also f o r the reason t h a t there was an inadequate 
supply of reasonably secured i n d u s t r i a l stocks i n the market. I t 
i s also revealed from the study t h a t i n recent years, a change i n 
investment p o l i c y has been t a k i n g place and the trend of investment 
i n Government s e c u r i t i e s i s gradually d e c l i n i n g . 
When s e l e c t i n g investment p o r t f o l i o s the management of 
an insurance company has t o take i n t o account c e r t a i n considerations 
which are deemed t o be important f o r the safety of the investment. 
The i n t e n t i o n of such investment i s always t o r e a l i s e maximum 
possible income on the one hand, and t o avoid any undue r i s k i n 
respect of the investment on the other. Obviously, a d e t a i l e d 
analysis o f a p a r t i c u l a r s e c u r i t y i s e s s e n t i a l from the p o i n t of view 
of both y i e l d and r i s k before any f i n a l decision i s made f o r 
investment i n t h a t s e c u r i t y . From the insurance companies' poi n t of 
view. Government s e c u r i t i e s are the most protected investment although 
they are not l u c r a t i v e as f a r as income i s concerned. Since the 
scope f o r investment i n the corporate stocks was l i m i t e d , the 
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insurance companies have remained s a t i s f i e d by employing l a r g e r 
funds i n Government s e c u r i t i e s . The r a t e of i n t e r e s t on the 
s e c u r i t i e s has also increased i n recent years. I n 1965 the 
average r a t e of i n t e r e s t was 4.5 p.c. 
Insurance companies have been provided through the 
s t a t u t o r y provisions w i t h ample opportu n i t i e s f o r investment i n 
approved corporate s e c u r i t i e s . The Insurance Act allows the 
Government t o declare any issue of e x i s t i n g and new companies as 
approved s e c u r i t y provided i t f u l f i l s c e r t a i n p r e - r e q u i s i t i e s 
f o r approved investment. Amongst the corporate stocks, the f i x e d 
r e t u r n preference shares and debentures are the most f a v o u r i t e 
t o the insurance companies. But w i t h the exception of a few 
manufacturing concerns the paid-up c a p i t a l of the i n d u s t r i a l 
(8) 
undertakings i s i n ordinary shares. Although investment i n 
ord i n a r y shares i s protected through l e g a l measures yet there i s , 
f o r reasons mentioned below, l i t t l e scope f o r i n v e s t i n g p o l i c y 
holders' money i n those v a r i a b l e y i e l d shares. 
I n the f i r s t place, insurance companies are r e s t r i c t e d 
through s t a t u t o r y provisions from i n v e s t i n g i n such companies which 
are not l i s t e d on the stock exchange. Even i f , the companies are 
l i s t e d , insurance compani,es do not have confidence i n the issues of 
newly f l o a t e d i n d u s t r i a l undertakings. Past experience shows t h a t 
(8) For d e t a i l s see Chapter 2, 
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a l a r g e number of new enterprises are not i n a p o s i t i o n t o declare 
dividends i n due time as envisaged i n the prospectus issued t o the 
p u b l i c f o r s u b s c r i p t i o n . This s i t u a t i o n not only undermines the 
i n v e s t o r s ' hope f o r earning p r o f i t but also encounters possible 
c a p i t a l loss due t o f a l l i n share prices i n the market. Many new 
i n d u s t r i a l undertakings i n Pakistan are now being organised by new 
entrepreneurs who are entering i n t o t h i s f i e l d f o r the f i r s t time. 
The insurance companies are p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l u c t a n t t o subscribe t o 
the issues o f f e r e d by the less known entrepreneurs. However, i f 
shares are o f f e r e d t o the p u b l i c by a reputed b i g i n d u s t r i a l group, 
there i s a record of over-subscription and i n such a case shares 
(9) 
are a l l o t t e d on a reduced p r o p o r t i o n of shares than applied f o r . 
Insurance companies may increase t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l 
holdings by purchasing more shares of the e x i s t i n g i n d u s t r i a l 
undertakings. The shares of e x i s t i n g successful companies are 
a v a i l a b l e at high premium r a t e s . I t may be observed from the f a c t 
t h a t the Habib T e x t i l e M i l l s L t d , i n 1962, o f f e r e d 270,000 shares of 
Rs 10.00 each t o the general p u b l i c f o r s u b s c r i p t i o n at an 
(10) 
enhanced share value of Rs 15.50 each. The issue was over-subscribed. 
(9) Shares t o the general p u b l i c are now a l l o t e d on the f o l l o w i n g 
basis : ( i ) 50 p.c. t o the applicants of up t o 100 shares. 
( i i ) The remainder of the shares on a f l a t r a t e basis 
amongst applicants who apply f o r more than 100 
shares. 
(10) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p.234. 
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The company declared dividend at the r a t e of 10 p,c. i n 1963 which 
was i n e f f e c t 6,5 p.c. r e t u r n t o those who purchased shares at 
premium p r i c e . The Olympia T e x t i l e M i l l s L t d , made a s i m i l a r o f f e r 
at an appreciated value of Rs 6.00 per ten rupee shares^'''"'•^n 1961, 
which was again over-subscribed. But t h i s company d i d not pay any 
dividend u n t i l 1966 when i t declared a maiden dividend at 5 p,c. 
S i m i l a r instances are not r a r e i n corporate sector of the economy 
of Pakistan, This shows t h a t notwithstanding u n c e r t a i n t y , the 
insurance companies f e e l more confident i n i n v e s t i n g i n the shares 
of e x i s t i n g companies. But t h i s means t h a t the wi d t h of the market 
i s small and pr i c e s consequently high, a f a c t which r e s i s t s the 
purchase of i n d u s t r i a l stocks. 
Insurance companies are not investment banks and they 
are not expected t o have the f a c i l i t i e s of the special f i n a n c i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s t o evaluate and judge i n d u s t r i a l investment. What 
they are expected t o do i s t o keep under close observation the 
a c t i v i t i e s of other i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors and the share market 
conditions i n the country, and f i n a l l y come t o a decision on the 
investment by applying t h e i r own judgement. As discussed i n the 
chapter on the stock market, the share market has remained prone t o 
frequent f l u c t u a t i o n s throughout the period since 1963-64, Unstable 
market conditions have been a serious problem t o the insurance 
companies i n i n v e s t i n g i n corporate shares. I n a d d i t i o n , u n c e r t a i n t y 
(11) I b i d , p.244, 
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i n the flow of income from ordinary shares, inadequate information 
about companies' f i n a n c i a l matters, d e c l a r a t i o n of poor dividends 
by e x i s t i n g companies, delay i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of dividends have 
impeded the flow of insurance funds i n t o the corporate sector 
considerably. 
Since preference shares and debentures provide an 
assured f i x e d r e t u r n on investment, the insurance companies prefer 
t o i n v e s t i n s e c u r i t i e s of t h i s type. However, these s e c u r i t i e s 
c o n s t i t u t e an i n s i g n i f i c a n t proportion of the long-term c a p i t a l of 
the manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s . The preference shares and debentures 
have provided only 3.1 p.c. and 1 p.c. r e s p e c t i v e l y of the t o t a l 
(12) 
c a p i t a l of 70 selected i n d u s t r i e s i n Pakistan. Investment i n 
preference shares and debentures by nine insurance companies stood 
(13) 
a t Rs 3.65 and Rs 2.12 m i l l i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y by the end of 1965.^ ^ 
A s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t of l i f e business i s s t i l l held by 
f o r e i g n companies. The share of for e i g n companies i n the t o t a l 
l i f e funds at the end of December 1965 was Rs 249.4 m i l l i o n , ( i . e . 
46.4 p.c. of the t o t a l l i f e funds). As f a r as investment i s 
concerned f o r e i g n and l o c a l companies have invested 88 and 85 p.c. of 
(12) See Chapter 2, pp.47, 48 and 55. 
(13) Nine Companies:- Adamjee Insurance Company L t d . , Eastern Federal 
Union Insurance Company L t d . , Ideal L i f e Insurance Company L t d . , 
Mercantile Mutual Insurance Company of Pakistan L t d . , Muslim 
Insurance Company L t d . , Premier Insurance Company of Pakistan L t d . , 
Habita Insurance Company L t d . , Prudential Assurance Company Lt d . , 
American L i f e Insurance Company L t d . , 
- 133 -
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e l i f e funds at the close of the year 1965. As 
regards the nature of inv e s t m e n t , i t appears t h a t f o r e i g n insurance 
companies p e r s i s t i n the p r a c t i c e of i n v e s t i n g more i n Government 
s e c u r i t i e s compared w i t h l o c a l (insurance) companies. The f o r e i g n 
companies' holdings of Qovernment s e c u r i t i e s t o t a l l e d Rs 111.0 
m i l l i o n , which was 15 p.c, higher than investment made by l o c a l 
companies i n Qovernment s e c u r i t i e s i n 1965.^"''^^ On the other hand, 
l o c a l companies have a more balanced investment p o r t f o l i o i n the 
sense t h a t they have also invested r e l a t i v e l y more funds i n 
e q u i t i e s and land mortgage. By the end of 1965, i n the case of 
f o r e i g n companies, approximately 11 p.c, of the holdings were of 
preference and ordinary shares, 5 p.c. were of debentures whereas 
i n the case of l o c a l companies 24 p,c, of the assets were of 
preference and ordinary shares and 2 p.c. were of debentures. These 
f a c t s reveal t h a t l o c a l insurance companies are more i n c l i n e d to 
inve s t i n the stocks of j o i n t stock Companies than are t h e i r f o r e i g n 
counterparts i n Pakistan. 
To sum up t h i s discussion, investment i n the shares and 
debentures of j o i n t stock companies formed only 15 p.c. of the t o t a l 
asset holdings of the insurance companies at the close of the year 
1965, and they were 13 p.c. of the t o t a l l i f e funds. Investment i n 
the stocks of i n d u s t r i a l concerns was Rs 50.43 m i l l i o n (71 p.c.) out 
(14) Insurance Year Book 1966, o p . c i t . , pp.13-36. 
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of a t o t a l investment of Rs 69,52 m i l l i o n i n the s e c u r i t i e s of 
(15) 
j o i n t s tock companies. We have also seen t h a t the scope 
f o r d i r e c t investment i n i n d u s t r i a l s e c u r i t i e s i s l i m i t e d owing 
t o a number of f a c t o r s such as u n c e r t a i n t y i n earning income from 
v a r i a b l e y i e l d shares, absence of adequate preference shares and 
debentures issued by i n d u s t r i a l concerns, unstable share market 
c o n d i t i o n s , and an inadequate supply of good shares i n the market. 
However, insurance companies, p a r t i c u l a r l y l o c a l insurance 
companies, appear t o be prepared t o invest more i n the s e c u r i t i e s 
o f the i n d u s t r i a l undertakings i f they are reasonably secured and 
p r o f i t a b l e . More l i f e funds might conceivably be d i r e c t e d towards 
the i n d u s t r i a l sector i f c e r t a i n improvements could be introduced. 
F i r s t of a l l the wide f l u c t u a t i o n s of share prices i n 
the e x i s t i n g share market should be eliminated as f a r as possible. 
The t i m e l y d i s t r i b u t i o n of reasonable dividend should be a regular 
f e a t u r e r a t h e r than an exception. I n d u s t r i e s i n Pakistan have a good 
record of p r o f i t which has not been brought t o the n o t i c e of outside 
inv e s t o r s l i k e i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors and small investors i n the 
country. The conservative dividend p o l i c y of the management of a 
company has continuously discouraged the general p u b l i c from i n v e s t i n g 
i n i n d u s t r i a l shares. Although the Government has already taken some 
steps i n these d i r e c t i o n s yet f u r t h e r measures would seem t o be 
(15) Table 4,2. 
(16) See Chapter 3. 
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necessary t o evaluate and consolidate the effectiveness of these 
measures. 
Secondly, the corporate sector i n Pakistan i s dominated 
by p r i v a t e l i m i t e d companies i n which, because of l e g a l 
r e s t r i c t i o n s , insurance companies cannot invest t h e i r funds. 
E v i d e n t l y , t h e scope f o r i n c l u d i n g more shares as "approved 
investments" i s l i m i t e d . I n recent years, the Government has adopted 
a number of measures i n order t o encourage the conversion of 
p r i v a t e l i m i t e d companies i n t o p u b l i c companies. These measures 
are expected t o enable the Government t o approve more shares. But 
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e approval of i n d u s t r i a l shares might b r i n g i n a more 
disastrous e f f e c t on the investment atmosphere than even e x i s t s 
today. So precautionary measures should be taken so t h a t only safe 
and p r o f i t a b l e i n d u s t r i a l s e c u r i t i e s are approved f o r investment. 
I t may be possible f o r the insurance companies t o 
provide more finance t o i n d u s t r i e s i f the c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e of the 
i n d u s t r i a l concerns consists of preference shares and debentures. 
The expansion of e x i s t i n g u n i t s can e a s i l y be financed by i s s u i n g 
debentures. On the other hand, new undertakings may r a i s e a p a r t of 
t h e i r c a p i t a l fund by i s s u i n g f i x e d r e t u r n preference shares. I f 
these issues are approved by the Government a f t e r considering the 
merits and demerits of an i n d i v i d u a l issue, then insurance companies 
might f e e l a sense of growing confidence i n i n v e s t i n g funds i n these 
stocks. I f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n v e s t o r s invest a sizeable p o r t i o n of 
t h e i r funds i n i n d u s t r i a l stocks, some amount may be a v a i l a b l e i n the 
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hands of promoters t o invest i n new i n d u s t r i e s . 
The insurance companies i n Pakistan invest t h e i r funds 
i n l a r g e - s i z e d i n d u s t r i e s and investment i n small and medium-sized 
i n d u s t r i e s i s almost non e x i s t e n t . There i s some scope f o r 
investment i n these i n d u s t r i e s i n some i n d i r e c t ways. There are 
a few w e l l organised f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e I.D.B.P., 
P.I.e.I.e., I.CP., and Small I n d u s t r i e s Corporations i n two wings 
of the country, which provide long and medium-term funds to large, 
medium and small-scale i n d u s t r i e s . These i n s t i t u t i o n s faced 
shortage of rupee resources several times i n the past. Normally 
they borrow from the Government t o meet t h e i r requirements of 
rupee resources. Since a considerable funds are provided by the 
State Bank, they tend t o be i n f l a t i o n a r y . Instead of borrowing 
d i r e c t l y from the Government, sp e c i a l i s e d f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s may 
r a i s e funds by i s s u i n g debentures i n the market. A l t e r n a t i v e l y 
they can borrow a c e r t a i n amount from the insurance companies when 
funds are r e q u i r e d . Insurance 'Companies may be prepared t o buy 
t h e i r debentures or provide loans to them up t o a c e r t a i n 
p r o p o r t i o n of l i f e funds. I f these s e c u r i t i e s are guaranteed by 
the i P r o v i n c i a l or Central ^Government, they may be regarded as safe 
investment by the insurance companies and hence they might be 
considered as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d "Spvernment s e c u r i t i e s . 
There i s another possible way through which insurance 
companies might be able t o supply more funds t o i n d u s t r y . Both 
e x i s t i n g and new i n d u s t r i a l concerns have to spend a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t 
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of t h e i r capital fund i n providing housing accommodation for their 
employees. Insurance companies may finance s o c i a l overhead 
capit a l requirements l i k e housing via mortgage debt. This debt 
can be paid off safely and quickly over a period of time from the 
collection of rents irrespective of the company's earning any 
pr o f i t . 
Insurance companies grant loans against the l i f e policy 
for constructing houses and laying conveyances but no loan i s 
allowed for startin g new business or buying shares and debentures 
of jo i n t stock companies. A provision for loans against l i f e policy 
to s t a r t a new business could possibly be a very important step 
(17) 
towards the growth of small-scale industries i n Pakistan. 
The measures suggested w i l l not be effective unless 
l i f e insurance i s expanded considerably so that more l i f e funds 
are available for investment. Both from the point of view of 
s o c i a l j u s t i c e which envisages some kind of security against hazards 
and from the purely economic point of view expansion of insurance 
i s of utmost importance as i t i s a great mobilizer of savings which 
eventually can be channelled into productive investment and 
therefore can constitute an important source of ca p i t a l . That there 
i s enough scope for the expansion of the insurance industry can be 
seen from the fact that per capita insurance (being Rs 24) and the 
proportion of insurance to national income (being 6.4 p.c.) are of 
(17) Rosen, G., op.cit,, pp.81-82. 
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the lowest in the world. ^ -^ ^^  The annual per capita premium paid 
comes to Rs 1,3 and l i f e insurance covers only 0.3 p.c. of the 
population as on June 1965. Insurance funds work out to be 1.18 p.c. 
of the gross domestic savings during the F i r s t Plan period and 
(19) 
2,73 p.c, during the Second Plan period. These figures indicate 
the poor state of the insurance industry in Pakistan. Because of 
the low base increase i n the growth should be possible at a much 
fast e r rate for some years to come. 
Among many d i f f i c u l t i e s that the insurance industry 
faces today, the most important ones are a low lev e l of per capita 
income, d i f f i c u l t i e s i n extending business in rural areas, hostile 
attitude because of the high lapses ratio, high management 
expenditure, a lack of e f f i c i e n t and technically qualified 
insurance personnel and high premium rates. In order to encourage 
l i f e insurance,the Government has provided income tax benefits to 
the extent of 10 p.c. of sums invested i n l i f e insurance and 
permitted u t i l i z a t i o n of the contribution to the provident fund to 
finance l i f e insurance p o l i c i e s . Income-tax r e l i e f benefits only 
the higher income group. The lower income groups in many instances 
withdraw 90 p.c. of the provident fund for meeting temporary 
expenses. Provident fund rules may be amended in such a manner that 
(18) The per capita insurance and the proportion of insurance to 
national income have been estimated on the basis of sum insured 
in force as on June 1965. (The Pakistan Insurance Year Book, 
1966, p.6). 
(19) Third Five Year Plan, op.cit., p.7. 
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the employers' portion of the fund must be u t i l i z e d to finance the 
insurance policy and thinking that i t should be made compulsory. 
At present insurance covers only a limited section of 
the urban population and rur a l areas are completely ignored. 
Efforts should therefore be made to provide insurance f a c i l i t i e s 
to the rur a l population. But i t may be argued that the rur a l areas 
are not linked with the c i t i e s through better means of communication 
and any effort by an individual insurance company to bring the 
areas under insurance coverage may not be economically feasible. 
A safeguard might be for a l l l i f e insurance companies to form 'a 
consortium' to procure and administer the business of specified 
r u r a l areas on the pattern of the existing National Co-insurance 
Scheme. In order to increase the l i f e insurance fund i t i s 
imdoubtedly re q u i s i t e that the ru r a l areas should be brought 
under insurance schemes. 
B. The National Investment Trust (N.T.T.) Ltd. 
(1) A Short H i s t o r i c a l Background; 
The role of trust companies in mobilising private 
savings into the investment of the corporate sector has been 
impressive in western countries. The unit trust movement became 
pa r t i c u l a r l y popular i n most of the Asian and European countries 
after the Second World War. I t greatly contributed to the post war 
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economic reconstruction of countries l i k e Japan and Germany.^^^^ 
There were 648 unit trust companies (including one i n Pakistan) 
i n 32 countries of the world up to the 30th September 1967, The 
t o t a l net assets of these companies amounted to 'S$ 41,110 
mil l i o n . ^ "^'•^  
In most of these countries, unit trust companies 
have been developed by the private sector while the N.I,T. of 
Pakistan has been organised by the Government i n association with 
leading banks, i n d u s t r i a l finance institutions and a few prominent 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . This was done i n order, mainly, to make i t more 
acceptable to the common people and to avoid competition with 
i n s t i t u t i o n s during the early stages of i t s growth. However, i t has 
not l o s t private business characteristics altogether, since private 
i n s t i t u t i o n s are associated with i t . 
The N.I.T, was set up i n December 1962 by the Government 
i n collaboration with leading indu s t r i a l and financial institutions 
of the country. I t aims at encouraging savings and investment by 
people of modest means. The N.I.T. accumulates investors* funds 
through the sale of i t s own s e c u r i t i e s (Trust Units) which i t 
reinvests in stocks and bonds of l i s t e d companies on the stock market. 
The successful operation of t h i s institution i s expected to lead to 
(20) Qarni, M.A.H., Five Years of National Investment Trust. (National 
Investment Trust Ltd., Dacca 1968), p.l ~ 
(21) Jafarey, N.A., 'Unit Trust - The Saving Media for the Masses.' 
Finance and Industry. Vol 5, No.l {January 1967', p.24. 
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a broadening of corporate share ownership which, so far, has been 
concentrated i n the hands of a small number of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . 
2. Review of A c t i v i t i e s ; 
The N.I.To completed four and a half years of operation 
on June 30th 1967 and the tot a l fund collected from the sale of 
units by that time amounted to Rs 107o4 million. Out of t h i s , a sum 
of Rs 91,87 million was invested i n the stocks of 105 enterprises. 
Investment i n i n d u s t r i a l shares, covering 94 issues, aggregated to 
Rs 78,69 million and accounted for 85.65 p.c, of the tot a l investment 
of the Trust. The remaining amount of Rs 13,18 million was invested 
i n 4 commercial banks (Rs 6,98 m i l l i o n ) , 5 transport and communication 
enterprises (Rs 4,26 m i l l i o n ) , 1 debenture (Rs 0,50 million) and in 
Government s e c u r i t i e s (Rs 5,20 m i l l i o n ) . Thus the average annual 
volume of fund accumulation and investment worked out at Rs 23,90 
million and Rs 20.40 million respectively. This achievement may not 
appear remarkable but considering the investment atmosphere in 
Pakistan, especially the base of equity ownership, the progress i s 
encouraging. Table 4.3, shows the N.I.T.'s progress from year to 
year i n respect of fund accumulation and investment from 1st January 
to 30th June 1967 . 
* The data used i n this page i s taken from Five Years of N,I.T. and 
N.I.T,Annual Report 1967, 
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Table 4,3, : N.I.T.'s Operation from 1963 to 1967. 
(Million rupees) 
1 
Number of No of Unit Sale Marginal Investment 
units i n Unit Proceeds amount of in million As on millions Holders in million units sale. Rs 
Rs, 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dec 1963 4,09 6.392 40.80 -
Dec 1964 6.65 10.148 69.80 29.00 68.01 
June 1966 8.37 19.736 89.30 19,50 89.93 
June 1967 10,01 24,275 107.40 18,10 91.87 
Source: Five Years of N,I,T, " A brochure, p.13. 
The tot a l investment of Rs 78.69 million i n industrial 
shares up to the middle of 1967 was distributed among industries 
as shown in Table 4.4. below. 
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Table 4.4, Statement of N.I.T.'s Investment as on 
30th June, 1967. 
(Million rupees) 
Industry Market Value of 
shares 
Percent age 
1 2 3 
1. Cotton T e x t i l e . 9.24 11.74 
2. Woollen Te x t i l e . 0.58 0.74 
3. Synthetic Rayon T e x t i l e . 7.55 9.59 
4. Jute. 14.94 18.98 
5. Chemical and 
Pharmaceutical. 2.68 3.40 
6. Sugar and A l l i e d . 4.58 5.82 
7. Paper and Board, 1.75 2.22 
8. Vegetable and A l l i e d . 0.61 0.78 
9. Cement. 5.55 7.05 
10. Tobacco. 3.16 4.01 
11. Fuel and Power. 15.91 20.22 
12. Engineering and 
Construction. 2.94 3.74 
13. Miscellaneous, 9.20 11.69 
Total Rs 78.69 100.00 
Source: Annual Report of N.I.T., 1966-67. 
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The Trust investment portfolio included a l l groups of 
i n d u s t r i a l companies l i s t e d on the Karachi Stock Exchange. Out of 
a t o t a l investment of Rs 78.69 million, fuel and power accounted 
for Rs 15,91 million (20.22 p.c.) followed by jute for Rs 14.94 
million (18,98 p.c,) cotton t e x t i l e s for Rs 9.24 million (11.74 p.c.) 
and miscellaneous for Rs 9.20 million (11.69 p.c.) and so on. On 
the whole the N.I.T, has provided 4,65 p.c, of the t o t a l paid-up 
(22) 
c a p i t a l of a l l these indu s t r i a l undertakings. This proportion 
presents, i t must b© admitted, a somewhat unimpressive picture of 
the progress of the Trust's a c t i v i t i e s over the period under study. 
A close study of the Trust's potential resources for investment or 
i t s a b i l i t y to accumulate funds and the capital market condition 
i n which i t has to work reveals certain interesting facts. I t may 
appear paradoxical that the N.I.T, i n recent years has abstained 
from subscribing 20 p.c, of each public issue which generally i s 
(23) 
kept reserved for the Trust and from underwriting any new issue. 
This has been mainly due to inadequate resources. 
In the f i r s t place, the resources of the Trust are too 
inadequate to pursue an aggressive investment policy. The primary ^ 
source of i t s funds i s sale proceeds of units. There i s small amount 
(22) Total paid up capital of companies i n which N.I.T. has investment 
amounted to Rs 2031.36 million. With the exception of Rs 0.52 
million entire investment was in ordinary shares. 
(23) The N,I,T. undeiwrites very limited issues. 
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of undistributed income, namely, that generating from price 
d i f f e r e n t i a l s between sale and repurchase prices of the units. 
Such income has l i t t l e significance to N.I.T. as i t i s s t i l l in 
the early stages of development. 
I t has therefore to depend on the sale proceeds of 
units for making any further investment. The performance of the 
Trust i n mobilising private savings through the sale of units 
has not been satisfactory during the period under review inspite of 
the fact that i t stepped up i t s sales promotion campaign. I t i s 
interesting to note that the marginal amount of unit sales has 
declined since 1966 instead of increasing. The to t a l sale of units 
amounted to Rs 18.10 million during the period 1966-67 while i t was 
Rs 29.00 million during the period 1963-64 as shown i n Table 4.3, 
This kind of situation requires an examination of the 
investors' attitude towards unit investment on the one hand and 
the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the units on the other. An investor, while 
choosing the investment media, would f i r s t consider security of 
the c a p i t a l and second, the p r o f i t a b i l i t y and l i q u i d i t y of the 
investment. In Pakistan per capita income i s so low that a vast 
majority of the population can hardly save. Even i f there i s a 
saving, i t i s usually invested i n gold, land, houses, rather than in 
corporate shares. A few of the recent studies on the saving and 
investment habits of the people of East Pakistan have brought out 
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several interesting points on t h i s . F i r s t l y , the rate of net 
c a p i t a l formation per capita i n the rural areas varies from 2 
(24) 
to 22 p.c. of the per capita income. About 3 to 5 p.c. of 
the saving i s kept in gold and an equivalent proportion goes 
into other forms of investment, A similar study on the investment 
habits of the urban population shows that people's preference for 
investment i n buildings and land property i s higher than for 
investment i n shares and bonds of the corporate sector. However, 
the studies have also revealed that i f profitable investment 
opportunities were made available to them, they might save more and 
(25) 
invest i n shares. 
The N.I.T. has provided opportunities to the common 
people for investing their savings in industrial shares with a 
f a i r sense of security and some hope of pr o f i t . Investment i n N.I.T, 
units seems to be f a i r l y secured both as to capital and as to 
l i q u i d i t y and dividend. The Trust invests i t s fund in f i r s t class 
stocks of jo i n t stock companies l i s t e d on the stock e^xchange. The 
IVust i s very selective in choosing shares for investment and for 
t h i s purpose there i s a nucleus of qualified research s t a f f to 
undertake fina n c i a l analysis of the companies in which N.I.T. has 
(24) Habibullah, M., Rural capital formation in East Pakistan, 
(Bureau of Economic Research, Dacca University 1963) p.74. 
(25) Habibullah, M., Pattern of Urban savings, (Bureau of Economic 
Research, Dacca University, 1964), p.89. 
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larger interests or substantial investments. The Trust, in order 
to avoid fluctuations i n earning capacity, pursues a d i v e r s i f i e d 
investment policyo Moreover, the Trust being a Government 
sponsored i n s t i t u t i o n has been able to ensure greater safety of 
the 'unit holders' funds. 
As regards p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the units, i t appears 
that they are not yet very attractive. The Trust for the 
f i r s t time distributed income at 0,50 rupee per unit in 1965 
and 0,75 rupee per unit i n 1966 (for eighteen months). In the 
period ending June 1967 the Trust further distributed income 
at 0,70 rupee per unit. The rate of income distributed during 
the period 1966-67 i s 40 p.c, higher than that of the previous 
(26) 
year. The figures in Table 4,5. indicate the earnings from 
investment over the period under review, 
A study of the table below indicates that the 
t o t a l income of the Trust has r i s e n by 70 p.c. during the period 
1966«67 over the previous year. The y i e l d from the investment 
should be viewed with the proviso that about one fourth of the 
t o t a l investment did not provide any income since these 
investments were made in new issues. Considering the income 
(26) N.I,T, Annual Report for 1966-67, p.2. 
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Table 4,5. ; N.I.T.'s Income. 1963-67. 
(Million Rupees) 
Period Yearly Income Income Income Unit 4 as 
Amount Growth 
in 
P.c, 
a v a i l -
able 
for 
d i s t r -
ibution 
Dis-
tribu 
ted. 
Sale 
Pro-
ceeds 
P.c, 
of 
6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1.1.1963-1.12.1963 1,32 ~ 1.32 40.80 3,23 
1.1.1964«1,12,1964 2,87 117 4.19 3.33 69.80 6,00 
1.1.1965-30.6.1966 6,01 39 6.85 6.27 89.30 7,67 
1.7.1966-30.6.1967 6,81 70 7.39 7.00 107.40 6,88 
Notes on Table; ( i ) Columns 3 indicates yearly growth, 
( i i ) Column 4 shows income including interest and 
element of income. 
Source• N.I.T. Annual Report for 1966/67. 
earning capacity of the N.I.T, units, from another angle, i t may 
be noted that the rates of return on units, for instance, 3.23 p.c. 
i n 1963, 6 p.c. i n 1964 and 7,67 p.c. i n 1966 are not discouraging. 
A s l i g h t decline in the rate of return on units during 1966-67 was 
due to investments in new issues. 
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As far as l i q u i d i t y i s concerned N.I.T. units are 
e a s i l y encashable. Since units are re-purchased by the Trust 
i t s e l f , they can be disinvested at any time during the working 
hours of the inst i t u t i o n s dealing with units. 
Although the income distributed per unit so far does 
not indicate a high return on the investment, the p o s s i b i l i t y i s 
there for better return in future. Even at the present rate of 
return, the N.I.T. units provide a higher yield of income compared 
with the returns accruing from Postal Fixed Deposits and Defence 
Savings C e r t i f i c a t e s . From an equal amount of investment, N.I.T,'s 
«wil Rs 221.60'• 
income was higher by Rs 73.74^as compared with Defence Savings 
(27) 
C e r t i f i c a t e s and Postal Deposit Schemes respectively. Of course, i t 
i s true that investment in such schemes i s well secured as far as 
c a p i t a l i s concerned, yet they are a l i t t l e insecure economically i f the 
index of prices goes up. In contrast, investment i n the shares of 
f i r s t class i n d u s t r i a l concerns i s not affected by such changes i n 
the sense that a r i s e i n prices would tend, considered generally, to 
lead to a corresponding r i s e i n profit and share prices. Over and 
above, there i s a chance of capital appreciation i f the amount i s 
invested i n the units. Inspite of i t s attractiveness in terms of 
earning potential, a large number of investors could not be attracted 
to investment i n units. These circumstances remind us of the Trust's 
i n a b i l i t y to s e l l substantial number of units in East Pakistan. 
(27) For example an investment of Rs 1000 for ten years would provide 
return on the following basis. Postal Fixed Deposits Rs 1652.14, 
Defence Savings C e r t i f i c a t e s Rs 1800, N.I.T. Units Rs 1873.74 
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In t h i s context, i t may be observed that so far only 12.2 p.c. 
investment i n units has come from East Pakistan and 87.8 p.c. 
(28) 
from West Pakistan. This r e f l e c t s the lower per capita income 
i n the eastern part of the country. But in view of the stepping 
up of the growth of the province i n recent years, there may now 
be better prospects for the sale of N.I.T. units there. 
I t may also be noted that despite the fact that the 
overall investment i n units has been quite low in East Pakistan, 
the resale and transfer of units have not been so frequent as in 
West Pakistan. I t may be due to the fact that general consumption 
i s not very broad-based in East Pakistan, as compared with West 
Pakistan where disinvestment i s a frequent occurrence. The other 
reason for disinvestment i n West Pakistan arises from the 
propensity to transfer fimds to the channel where maximum profit 
i s attainable. In East Pakistan the channel of investment i s not 
very wide. So, i n view of the low tendency of disinvestment in 
East Pakistan N.I.T. may yet mobilise larger savings from this area. 
Efforts therefore, should be made to popularise N.I.T. units more 
widely i n East Pakisitan, 
3. National Investment Trust and the Capital Market; 
We have pointed out e a r l i e r that the N.I.T. invests i t s 
fund i n the shares and bonds of Joint stock companies l i s t e d on the 
(28) The data r e l a t e to the period ending January 1968, Five Years 
of N.I.T. op.cit., p.40. 
- lar -
Karachi Stock Exchange. The primary objectives have been such 
that i t would encourage small investors to invest i n industrial 
shares who have hitherto not taken a great deal of interest in 
equity investment. This would lead to the r e a l i s a t i o n of the 
policy of broadening the base of industrial ownership on the one 
hand and the promotion of a sound capital market i n the country on 
the other. I t was also believed that the indirect benefit from 
N.I.T.'s operation i . e . , of creating investment consciousness in 
the small income group, would be even greater. 
The beginning of N.I.T,'s operations i n January 1963, 
coincided with the depression on the Karachi stock market. This 
depression continued to exist with i t s inevitable impact on the 
prices of shares throughout the l a t e r period of our study. The 
bearish tendency reached i t s lowest point at the beginning of J\me 
1967. The index of share prices which stood at 127.54 in April 
1963 went down to the l e v e l of 102.97 on 7.6.67. and thereafter 
s l i g h t l y improved i by the end of June 1967, the index was at 
104.71.^^^^ As a r e s u l t of this long depression the N.I.T.'s net 
loss and depreciation i n book value in terms of the market prices 
of the investments amounted to Rs 1.62 million during the period 
1966/67, However, th i s was much less than the loss and depreciation 
incurred in 1965-66 when the figure for the same was Rs 5.80 million. 
(29) Department of S t a t i s t i c s , Index Number of Stock Exchange 
Securities, (State Bank of Pakistan, December 1967), p,17. 
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This i s an indication of the improved stock market conditions 
during 1966-67. By far the largest amount of the Trust funds 
has been invested i n the shares of larger industrial concerns. 
Since the large-sized and better established concerns suffered 
much more than the smaller concerns from the long depression in 
the stock market, the Trust's investment portfolio has been under 
a constant s t r a i n ever since i t started operation. 
The Trust was experiencing the same kind of d i f f i c u l t i e s 
which were faced by the insurance companies i n selecting stocks 
for investment. Unlike insurance companies the N.I.T. was given 
option (under the laws governing the Control of Capital Issues) to 
subscribe 20 p.c, of each public issue. By exercising t h i s option 
for every new issue, the N,I,T. also performed underwriting function. 
I n i t i a l l y , the Trust made considera:ble investment i n new issues by 
exercising the right of option. In the case of new issues the 
promoters of the company used to promise that they would declare a 
maiden dividend within a year or two, after the commencement of the 
undertaking's operation, which did not always materialise. As a 
result, the N.I.T, has changed i t s policy of subscribing to new 
issues without discrimination. This means that i t has how refrained 
from exercising i t s right of option, leading to a temporary 
suspension of i t s underwriting a c t i v i t y . ^ "^ ^^  Needless to say, the 
(30) Out of a tota l shares offered to N.I.T. during the periods 
1964-65, 1965-66 and 1966-67 i t has subscribed only 54 and 
9 p.c. respectively. (Information supplied by the Karachi 
Stock Exchange). 
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p a r t i e s , who are l i k e l y t o be adversely a f f e c t e d by t h i s decision 
are the prospective entrants the encouragement of whom i s a part 
of the p u b l i c i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y . 
The present unwillingness of the N.I.T. to subscribe 
t o new issues i n the stock exchange has produced a m i l d depression 
i n the investment climate of the country: f o r the small investors' 
a t t i t u d e t o new issues seems t o have been influenced by the p o l i c y 
of the N.I.T. This seems t o be confirmed by the s t a t e of the 
market i n 1966-67 when most of the new issues remained heavily 
(31) 
undersubscribed, 
As resources of the N.I.T. are l i m i t e d , i t s success i n 
r e a l i s i n g i t s o b j e c t i v e s i s p r i m a r i l y dependent upon i t s a b i l i t y 
t o c o l l e c t more funds through the sale of u n i t s . I t can obtain 
more funds only by ensuring t h a t the u n i t s are s u f f i c i e n t l y 
a t t r a c t i v e both as regards p r o f i t and c a p i t a l appreciation. The 
a b i l i t y of the Trust t o pay more r e t u r n on u n i t s , i s l i n k e d w i t h 
the extent of dividend paid by the concerns i n which i t holds stocks. 
As s t a t e d i n Chapter 3, (page 101 ) , the i n d u s t r i a l undertakings i n 
Pakistan have been f o l l o w i n g a r a t h e r conservative dividend p o l i c y 
f o r one reason or another. Most of the companies have p e r s i s t e n t l y 
d i s t r i b u t e d low dividends despite the f a c t they have earned q u i t e 
high p r o f i t s , t r a n s f e r r i n g the balance t o a reserve fund which i n 
(31) See Chapter 3, page 83. 
- 154 -
(32) some cases exceed the share c a p i t a l . The conservative dividend 
p o l i c y of the i n d u s t r i e s has acted as a d i s i n c e n t i v e f o r the 
general p u b l i c so f a r as purchasing share i s concerned. The 
holdings of m i n o r i t y shareholders i n a company are u s u a l l y very 
s m a l l , and as such they cannot influence the a c t i v i t i e s of a company 
even i t s a f f a i r s are conducted against t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . I n the 
present Company Law there i s no p r o v i s i o n f o r representation of the 
m i n o r i t y shareholders through the appointment of a member i n the 
Board of D i r e c t o r s of a company. 
The N.I.T. being the largest s i n g l e outside investor i n 
the corporate sector has been l a r g e l y a f f e c t e d by the conservative 
dividend p o l i c y of the companies. This i s because i t must show that 
the u n i t s , which i t wants the members of the p u b l i c t o take up, are 
p r o f i t a b l e i n view of what has been mentioned e a r l i e r on. Yet 
because of the low dividend p o l i c y of the concerns i n which i t has 
a f i n a n c i a l stake, the N.I.T. cannot pay dividends on the u n i t s held 
by the members of the p u b l i c . As a r e s u l t , the flow of funds i n t o 
the c o f f e r s of the N.I.T. has been r e l a t i v e l y small. But being a 
m i n o r i t y shareholder, i t cannot c o n t r o l the dividend p o l i c y of a 
concern. Unless the r e l e v a n t clause of the Companies Act i s changed 
so as t o include a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the m i n o r i t y shareholders on the 
board, there seems very l i t t l e t h a t the N.I.T. can do about the 
(32) For example the reserve fund of Burewala T e x t i l e M i l l s L t d . , 
was more than double of i t s paid-up c a p i t a l i n 1966. 
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dividend p o l i c y . I n t h i s respect the N.I.T.'s p o s i t i o n i s no 
b e t t e r than an i n d i v i d u a l shareholder. 
Bearing i n mind t h a t there i s low saving, lack of 
share-consciousness among small and medium savers i n the country, 
the N.I.T. can play a v i t a l r o l e i n m o b i l i s i n g small savings both 
from r u r a l and urban areas. For t h i s purpose programmes f o r 
p o p u l a r i s a t i o n of u n i t s should be launched through the banking 
channels and r u r a l organisations such as union co u n c i l s . The 
N.I.T.'s present u n i t s sale promotion campaign through newspapers, 
l e a f l e t s , r a d i o and t e l e v i s i o n should be widened. At the same time, 
measures should be taken t o improve the earning capacity of the 
u n i t s , a f t e r a l l p r o f i t a b i l i t y i s the main c r i t e r i o n f o r investment. 
More important i s t o get people t o understand t h a t , considered 
g e n e r a l l y they can earn reasonably steady income from the investment 
i n N.I.T. u n i t s . 
Under a P r e s i d e n t i a l Ordinance i n 1965, u n i t s have 
been included i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f " t r u s t s e c u r i t i e s " thus making i t 
possible f o r provident funds and other f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t o 
inv e s t i n u n i t s . Investment i n u n i t s and income derived from u n i t s 
t o the extent of Rs 5000 have been made tax f r e e . These are no doubt 
steps i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n towards encouraging investment i n u n i t s . 
But u n f o r t u n a t e l y , no such i n s t i t u t i o n has come forward v o l u n t a r i l y 
t o i n v e s t i n N.I.T. u n i t s . Therefore, i t may be suggested t h a t 
under some s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n the Government may allow s a l a r i e d 
people l i k e the p u b l i c servants, to invest a part of t h e i r provident 
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fund i n N.I.T. u n i t s . 
(c) Investment Corporation of Pakistan ; (l.C.P.) 
1. Establishment; 
The I.CP. was established under a P r e s i d e n t i a l 
Ordinance i n February 1966 w i t h a paid-up c a p i t a l of Rs 50 m i l l i o n 
subscribed by f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e insurance companies 
i n c l u d i n g the Pakistan Insurance Corporation and commercial banks 
i n c l u d i n g the I n d u s t r i a l Development Bank of Pakistan. I n a d d i t i o n 
t o i t s paid-up c a p i t a l the Corporation obtained a loan of Rs 100 
m i l l i o n ( i n t e r e s t bearing) from the Government repayable over ten 
years. 
2. Objectives and Functions; 
The o b j e c t i v e s of the Corporation are t o e l i m i n a t e any 
monopolistic tendency i n the c o n t r o l of i n d u s t r i e s ; t o encourage 
and broaden the base of equity investment and t o develop the c a p i t a l 
market by p r o v i d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s and thereby enabling the 
people t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the economic development of the country. 
The I.CP. i s the f i r s t i n s t i t u t i o n of i t s kind established i n Pakistan 
and i t was necessary i n view of the low depth of the c a p i t a l market. 
* Th^ f i g u r e s i n t h i s discussion are based on I.C.P.'s F i r s t Annual 
Report, 1966-67, unless otherwise stated. 
- 157 -
There was no investment banking i n s t i t u t i o n p r i o r t o the 
establishment of the I.C.P., although an u n d e r w r i t i n g f u n c t i o n i n 
t h e l i m i t e d insurance sense of guaranteeing the purchase of 
unsubscribed shares was performed to a l i m i t e d extent by some 
business houses, l a r g e r commercial banks, P.I.C.I.C and N.I.T. 
Their operation as underwriters was very l i m i t e d because 
u n d e r w r i t i n g was an a n c i l l a r y f u n c t i o n o f these i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
During the l a t e r p a r t of the Second Five Year Plan 
i n v e s t o r s ' enthusiasm t o subscribe to new issues declined 
p r o g r e s s i v e l y and a t the beginning of the T h i r d Plan the problem 
of r a i s i n g e quity c a p i t a l had become serious. E a r l i e r , i n a r e p o r t 
(32) 
on the " S e c u r i t i e s Market of Pakistan" Professor Loss observed 
the absence of i n s t i t u t i o n s performing an investment banking 
f u n c t i o n i n Pakistan and suggested, "the establishment of an 
investment i n s t i t u t i o n t o advise the public about s e c u r i t i e s and t o 
encourage the p u b l i c i n equity investment. This organisation would 
underwrite p u b l i c issues i n a l l senses of the term". 
(32) Professor Louis Loss of Harvard U n i v e r s i t y was i n v i t e d by the 
Government of Pakistan through the courtesy of I.B.R.D. t o 
i n v e s t i g a t e the causes of the lack of depth of c a p i t a l market 
i n Pakistan. He submitted the Report on 1st July 1964. 
Professor Loss's proposal was examined by a Committee 
appointed by the Government of Pakistan i n the middle of 1965. 
The Committee observed t h a t the e x i s t i n g p a t t e r n of shareholding 
was such t h a t 75 p.c. of the e q u i t i e s of the most of the 
companies l i s t e d on the Stock Exchange was held by 19 or fewer 
persons as defined i n Section 23-A of the Income Tax Act, 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors i n c l u d i n g N.I.T. held 20 p.c. and the 
remaining 5 p.c. held by small i n v e s t o r s . 
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Further i n v e s t i g a t i o n s was made by the Government and 
i t was found t h a t the stock market was operating on a t h i n f r o n t 
and was vulnerable t o f l u c t u a t i o n s i n share values. The 
u n d e r w r i t i n g f u n c t i o n s performed by the e x i s t i n g c o n s t i t u e n t s of 
the c a p i t a l market were found t o be inadequate compared w i t h the 
demand f o r equity c a p i t a l i n the country. A l l t h i s pointed t o a 
need f o r an i n s t i t u t i o n l i k e the I.CP. 
I t may be added t h a t i n d u s t r i a l growth i n Pakistan 
has l e d t o a monopolistic tendency i n so f a r as corporate f i n a n c i n g 
i s concerned. An image has been created i n the minds of investors 
i n terms of b i g , and experienced, i n d u s t r i a l groups and small and 
r e l a t i v e l y unknown groups, and f o r t h i s reason the issues o f f e r e d 
by the l a t t e r group d i d not receive s u f f i c i e n t response from the 
general p u b l i c . For a successful f l o t a t i o n of new issues, a b i g 
name was needed i n order t o a t t r a c t investment from the p u b l i c . 
Functions; The I.CP. was established t o perform the f o l l o w i n g 
f u n c t i o n s : 
i ) To underwrite new issues which i t w i l l d i s t r i b u t e 
l a t e r . I t w i l l c a r r y out t h i s f u n c t i o n by organising 
u n d e r w r i t i n g consortium' of commercial banks and 
insurance companies. 
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i i ) The Corporation was t o open and maintain investors' 
accounts, make advances f o r the purchase of shares, 
buy and s e l l shares f o r the account holders over 
the counter and provide professional advices to 
issuers and investors. 
(33) 
i i i ) The Corporation was t o help c l o s e l y - h e l d companies, 
as defined under Section 23-A of the Income Tax Act, 
t o become p u b l i c by l i q u i d a t i n g t h e i r excess holdings. 
This was intended t o broaden the base of share 
ownership and save the market from the pressure of 
heavy l i q u i d a t i o n of excess holdings, 
i v ) The Corporation was also empowered to deal i n stocks 
and s e c u r i t i e s t o s t a b i l i s e stock p r i c e s and then 
b r i n g about a depth i n the market. 
3. Review of A c t i v i t i e s ; 
(a) Underwritings; 
The Corporation s t a r t e d operation immediately a f t e r i t s 
establishment i n February, / 1966. During the f i r s t period of i t s 
operation ending June 1967, the Corporation received 85 a p p l i c a t i o n s 
f o r u n d e r w r i t i n g - 68 f o r shares, and 17 f o r debentures valued at Rs 
330 m i l l i o n and Rs 72 m i l l i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y . The iCorporation, however. 
(33) : : A Company i s considered as c l o s e l y - h e l d when a 
minimum of 50 p.c. of i t s shares are not subscribed by the general 
p u b l i c . This o f t e n means the ownership of the Company i s concentrated 
m a few hands, i t s members mostly belonging t o a f a m i l y group. I n 
c o n t r a s t , i n the case of a "public company" at l e a s t 50 p.c. of the 
shares, are held by the general p u b l i c (see page 96). 
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approved 28 a p p l i c a t i o n s , deferred 33 and r e j e c t e d 24 a p p l i c a t i o n s . 
Of the 28 approved ap p l i c a t i o n s , 2 1 were concerned w i t h p u b l i c issues 
and 7 were connected w i t h the placement of debentures. The amount 
involved i n the u n d e r w r i t i n g commitment was Rs 175.43 m i l l i o n of 
which I.C.P.'s share was Rs 72.53 m i l l i o n , 41 p.c. of the t o t a l 
u n d e r w r i t i n g commitments. The remaining amount of Rs 102,90 m i l l i o n 
(34) 
was underwritten by associate i n s t i t u t i o n s . Of the t o t a l , 21 
p u b l i c issues were u n d e r w r i t t e n , 13 had been o f f e r e d t o the p u b l i c 
f o r s u b s c r i p t i o n by 30th June 1967. 
The p u b l i c response t o these issues was i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 
The t a b l e below gives d e t a i l s of the public response and 
underwriters' a c q u i s i t i o n s during the period under review. 
I t would appear from Table 4.6 t h a t the general p u b l i c 
subscribed only t o the extent of Rs 9.714 m i l l i o n (11.78 p.c.) out 
of t o t a l issues of Rs 82.430 m i l l i o n . This i s i n d i c a t i v e of the 
thinness of the stock market i n Pakistan. The underwriters had t o 
take up 88 p.c. of those issues. The I.CP. alone took 35.66 p.c. 
of the issues i n v o l v i n g a sum of Rs 29.394 m i l l i o n and the r e s t of 
Rs 43.322 m i l l i o n was taken by other i n s t i t u t i o n s . The I.CP.'s 
r o l e was even more important as a managing underwriter. Had there 
(34) Associate Underwriters were: (1) Habib Bank Limit e d . , United 
Bank L t d . , Commerce Bank L t d . , Muslim Commercial Bank L t d . , 
P.I.C.I.C. and N.I.T. 
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Table 4.6. Performance of Underwritten Public Issues 
Offered on the Market from February 
1966 up t o June 1967. 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
I n d u s t r y 
No of Subscribed by ^ . 
issues Public I.CP. Other Under 
writeajs 
Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Jute 
T e x t i l e s 2 1,406 4.443 9.951 15.800 
2. Cotton 
T e x t i l e s 1 0.005 1.496 0.599 2,100 
3. Paper 1 0.019 1.789 1.192 3,000 
4. Sugar 4 3,650 15,146 23,205 42,001 
5. Glass and 
Ceramics. 1 0 .173 1,175 0 .452 1,800 
6. Chemical 
& Pharm. 1 0.066 l - 349 0 .385 1,800 
7. Engineer-
i n g . 1 0 .736 0.344 1,080 
8. Construc-
t i o n . 1 0.004 1.048 1.048 2.100 
9. O i l and 
Gas. 1 3.655 2.604 6.490 12,749 
T o t a l 13 9.714 29.394 43322 82.430 
Source: F i r s t Annual Report as at 30th June 1967. 
Investment Corporation of Pakistan. 
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been no I.C.P, these i n d u s t r i e s would have faced serious 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n o f f e r i n g t h e i r shares f o r p u b l i c s u b s c r i p t i o n . 
The Corporation examines the soundness of the pr o j e c t s under 
c e r t a i n r i g i d c r i t e r i a , before an under w r i t i n g commitment 
i s granted. The observance of these conditions r e s u l t e d i n the 
r e j e c t i o n of 24 p r o j e c t s on grounds of bad management, unsound 
f i n a n c i a l planning, impaired stocks, low p r o f i t a b i l i t y or 
unacceptable corporate set up. I t was expected t h a t i f a government 
co r p o r a t i o n l i k e I,CP, i s seen t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n unde r w r i t i n g 
f u n c t i o n s , p u b l i c confidence might be i n s t i l l e d i n the issues and 
out of t h i s confidence the p u b l i c might be induced t o buy more 
shares. 
The un d e r w r i t i n g f a c i l i t i e s provided by the Corporation 
were expected t o r e a l i s e a t o t a l investment of Rs 545 m i l l i o n . 
(b) Investments; During the short span of i t s operation the 
Corporation has made an investment of Rs 56.64 m i l l i o n on i t s own 
account and another of Rs 2.72 m i l l i o n on in v e s t o r s ' accounts. The 
Corporation performs i t s investment operation i n the stock market 
w i t h the f o l l o w i n g o b j e c t i v e s : 
i ) To o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n normally a v a i l a b l e t o common 
shareholders i t would r e g i s t e r i t s e l f as a nominal 
(35) The conditions are being good management, f i n a n c i a l soundness, 
acceptable corporate set up. 
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shareholder of a company l i s t e d on the Stock 
Exchange. 
i i ) To support a f a l l i n g market i t would b u i l d up i t s 
investment p o r t f o l i o s w i t h good scrips of d i v e r s i f i e d 
i n d u s t r i e s , 
i i i ) To create depth i n the c a p i t a l market i t would 
subsequently d i s t r i b u t e i t s holdings t o medium and 
small i n v e s t o r s . 
The Corporation, however, does not s e l l shares on the 
Stock Exchange mainly t o avoid depression i n the market. The major 
r e c i p i e n t s of the Corporation's fund were the sugar and a l l i e d 
i n d u s t r y which accounted f o r 43 p.c. of i t s t o t a l investment. Such 
a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of investment i n one i n d u s t r y was, i n f a c t due 
t o a l a r g e r a c q u i s i t i o n of sugar shares because such shares were 
not r e a d i l y absorbed by the i n v e s t i n g p u b l i c . Jute t e x t i l e s , paper 
and board, f u e l and power accounted f o r 10.3., 9.6 and 9,6 p.c. 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . The Corporation has adopted the p o l i c y of c a r e f u l 
s e l e c t i o n , reasonable d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , s t a b i l i t y of y i e l d and growth 
prospects i n managing investment p o r t f o l i o s . 
(c) Investors* Scheme: With a view to developing shares 
consciousness amongst savers and t o promote investment a c t i v i t y on 
the c a p i t a l market, the Corporation introduced an Investors', Scheme 
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on January 25th 1967. Under t h i s Scheme a person w i t h a modest 
income could open e i t h e r f i x e d income or f l e x i b l e income accounts 
w i t h the ^ r p o r a t i o n . The Qbrporation would provide loan 
f a c i l i t i e s t o the account holders at concessional i n t e r e s t rates 
( t h e upper l i m i t on loans being 3 times the deposits) i n order to 
strengthen the depositors' fund f o r investment i n shares. I n 
a d d i t i o n , the Corporation would provide f r e e professional services 
f o r managing i n v e s t o r s ' p o r t f o l i o . During the f i v e months of i t s 
operation ending June 1967, I.C.P. was successful i n opening 328 
accounts i n t o which a sum of Rs 2.08 m i l l i o n was deposited. On 
the other hand, an amount of Rs 2.83 m i l l i o n was granted as loan 
t o the depositors by the Corporation, the deposit/loan r a t i o being 
1:1.36. The low deposit/loan r a t i o was a t t r i b u t e d t o the low 
absorbing capacity of the borrowers. 
(d) Closed End Mutual Fund: The f l o t a t i o n of the F i r s t I.C.P, 
Mutual Fund on June 15th 1966 was another important step i n 
m o b i l i s i n g savings i n t o i n d u s t r i a l shares. The response from the 
p u b l i c was very encouraging as the o f f e r was oversubscribed t o the 
extent of e i g h t times the value of the o f f e r of Rs 5 m i l l i o n . 
Stocks against t h i s fund are c a r e f u l l y selected i n advance keeping i n 
view t h e i r income p o t e n t i a l i t y . I n the i n i t i a l operation of the 
Mutual Fund the Gbrporation issued fund c e r t i f i c a t e s a t a loss of 
RsO.26 m i l l i o n . 
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The f i g u r e s r e l a t i n g t o I.CP. operations cover 
only a year, hence i t i s not possible t o evaluate i t s working 
e f f i c i e n c y and effectiveness i n p r o v i d i n g underwriting f a c i l i t i e s 
and finance f o r the f u t u r e . However, i t may be surmised t h a t 
f u t u r e effectiveness and operating e f f i c i e n c y w i l l l a r g e l y 
depend on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of funds at i t s disposal. I t jnay be 
observed t h a t d u r i n g the i n i t i a l year of operation i t has committed 
i t s e l f t o an investment of Rs 56.64 m i l l i o n . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s , 
Rs 2.82 m i l l i o n have been provided as loans t o depositors. Thus 
t o t a l investment up t o June 30th 1967 amounted t o Rs 59,46 m i l l i o n 
which came t o nearly 39 p.c, of the t o t a l i n i t i a l resources of 
Rs 150 m i l l i o n . 
The Corporation's resources might be supplemented i n 
f u t u r e by the income derived from investments. But the prospect 
of earning s i g n i f i c a n t dividends i s not very b r i g h t because of the 
f a c t t h a t the investment has been concentrated mainly i n the new 
issues. I n the l i g h t of the experience of N.I.T. such investment 
has proved very d i s a p p o i n t i n g as f a r as income earning i s concerned. 
There i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o l l e c t i n g more funds through the more 
vigorous operation of the Investors' Scheme. The progress of N.I.T. 
i n c o l l e c t i n g funds through the sale of u n i t s does not show a good 
record. Therefore, i t may be sa i d t h a t unless the f i n a n c i a l resources 
of the I.CP, are strengthened i t w i l l face greater d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 
u n d e r w r i t i n g new issues due t o inadequacy of funds. The s o l u t i o n t o 
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the problem i s not t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l investment should be 
provided but what i s more important, t h a t savings f o r 
corporate f i n a n c i n g should be mobilised. The actual p u b l i c 
response t o new issues was very weak during the i n i t i a l year 
of I.CP.'s operation and from t h i s i t i s apprehended that i f 
the same s t a t e of a f f a i r s continues, the under w r i t i n g f u n c t i o n 
of I.CP. w i l l come t o a h a l t . I t i s the r e f o r e suggested, t h a t 
some budgetary a l l o c a t i o n s should be made by the Government t o 
the I.CP. of the type granted f o r a long time i n the case of 
the P.I.D.C. The aim needs t o be to provide s u f f i c i e n t funds 
t o the Corporation t o underwrite new issues on a s e l e c t i v e 
b a sis, keeping i n view the prospect of the p r o j e c t from the 
standpoints of both income and growth. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
IN PAKISTAN. 
The discussion of the previous Chapters has been 
centred round the question of r a i s i n g equity c a p i t a l through 
the medium of the Stock Exchange. The discussion has thrown 
some l i g h t on the problems of r a i s i n g long-term c a p i t a l on 
the one hand, and the d i f f i c u l t i e s faced by the i n d i v i d u a l as 
w e l l as i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors i n making investment decisions 
on corporate shares on the other. The purpose of the present 
Chapter i s t o have a look at another group of i n v e s t o r s , 
namely, the f o r e i g n p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s , 
1. Flow of Foreign P r i v a t e Investment. 
The t o t a l volume of f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment i n 
Pakistan does not seem t o be very large compared w i t h the t o t a l 
volume of investment i n the manufacturing sector. Table 5.1. 
below shows the proportions of f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment i n 
the t o t a l , and the aggregate p r i v a t e investment i n the 
manufacturing sector during the F i r s t and Second Plan periods. 
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Table 5,1. : Investment i n the Manufacturing Sector, Local 
and Foreign P r i v a t e Investment during the F i r s t 
and Second Plan Period. 
Period T o t a l Private Investment 4 as 4 as 
Investment Local Foreign percentage percentage 
of 2 of 3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
F i r s t Plan 
(1955-60) 2018 1268 100 5.0 7.9 
Second Plan 
(1960-65) 5198 4309 219 4.2 5.1 
T o t a l 7216 5577 319 4.4 5.7 
Note on Table; 
Sources; 
I t i s recognised that the changes i n the value of 
money as between one date and another w i l l s t r i c t l y , 
not make d i r e c t comparison possible between dates, but 
the p o i n t of Table 5.1. as w e l l as Table 5.2. i s t o 
show what changes have taken place i n the r a t i o s of 
c e r t a i n t o t a l s expressed i n money: what i s being 
compared i s the change i n the r a t i o s over the years 
i n d i c a t e d and f o r a c a l c u l a t i o n of t h i s s o r t the change 
i n the value of money does not introduce a d i s t o r t i o n . 
Column 2 and 3, T h i r d Five Year Plan, pp.l03-='105 
Column 4 ( i ) 
( i i ) 
Balance Sheets of J o i n t Stock Companies 
Having Foreign P a r t i c i p a t i o n , pp.18-19, 
Table 5.2. 
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The t a b l e above shows th a t out of the r e a l i z e d 
t o t a l of Rs 2018 i n the manufacturing sector, the c o n t r i b u t i o n 
of f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment was Rs 100 m i l l i o n during 
the F i r s t Five Year Plan (1955-60), thus amounting t o no 
more than 5 p.c. of the aggregate. The corresponding f i g u r e s 
f o r the Second Five Year Plan period were Rs 5198 m i l l i o n s 
and Rs 219 m i l l i o n s r e s p e c t i v e l y . This shows t h a t although 
there has been a more than 100 p.c. increase i n f o r e i g n p r i v a t e 
investment i n absolute terms, i t s proportion i n the t o t a l 
has been less than i n the e a r l i e r period (being o f the order 
of 4.2 p.c.). With regard t o the p o s i t i o n of aggregate p r i v a t e 
investment i n i n d u s t r i e s , the table shows a greater r e l a t i v e 
r e d u c t i o n f o r f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment f o r the Second Plan 
perio d as compared w i t h the e a r l i e r one. The f o r e i g n p r i v a t e 
investment accounted f o r 5,1 p.c, of the p r i v a t e investment 
du r i n g the Second Plan period as against 7.9 p.c. during the 
F i r s t Plan period. 
The t a b l e below shows the flow of f o r e i g n p r i v a t e 
investment and the p r o p o r t i o n going i n t o the manufacturing 
sector f o r the period 1957-65 (both the years i n c l u s i v e ) . 
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Table 5.2. Foreign P r i v a t e Investment i n 
Pakistan, 1957-65. 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Year T o t a l Manufacturing 
i n c l u d i n g 
c o n s t r y c t i o n . 
Others 2 as .p.c. 
of 1. 
1 2 ,.3... 4 
1957 89.7 23.9 65.8 26.6 
1958 67.5 16.1 51.4 23.9 
1959 86.4 8.4 78,0 1.0 
1960 76.6 27.1 49.5 35.4 
1961 90.6 39.6 51.0 43.7 
1962 70.6 38.6 32.0 54.7 
1963 76.7 26.9 49.8 35.1 
1964 134.2 82.3 51.9 61.3 
1965 86.7 31.6 55.1 36.1 
T o t a l 779.0 294.5 484.5 
Yearly 
Average 86.6 32.7 53.8 35.2 
Source: Department of S t a t i s t i c s , Foreign L i a b i l i t i e s and 
Assets and Foreign Investment i n Pakistan ; 1957-60, 
1959-62, 1960-63 and 1963-65. (State Bank of Pakistan). 
Notes on Table: 
( i ) 90 p.c. of the f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment i s i n the form 
of e q u i t y c a p i t a l . The remaining 10 p.c. i s i n the form 
of other long-term o b l i g a t i o n s such as c r e d i t o r s 
c a p i t a l . 
( i i ) I n case of manufacturing i n c l u d i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n the 
share of equity i s about 97 p.c. 
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I t may be seen from Table 5.2. t h a t during a period of 
nine years from 1957 t o 1965, t o t a l f o r e i g n investment i n 
Pakistan was Rs 779 m i l l i o n . Of t h i s t o t a l , the manufacturing 
sector accounted f o r Rs 294,5 m i l l i o n or 35.2 p.c. Although the 
f i g u r e s do not show any r e g u l a r i t y , i t i s possible t o discern a 
long term t r e n d i n the flow of f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment i n the 
country. As can be seen from the f o l l o w i n g graphs, despite the 
i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , the flow of f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment d i d show 
an upward trend over the period of observation. A trend l i n e 
has been f i t t e d on the data by the method of l e a s t squares. I t 
shows t h a t the annual r a t e of growth of f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment 
or the trend of investment has been Rs 2.8 m i l l i o n i n the case of 
t o t a l investment and Rs 4,6 m i l l i o n i n the case of the manufacturing 
s e c t o r . The drop i n the flow of f o r e i g n investment i n 1965 from 
the peak l e v e l of 1964 can be explained by the abnormal 
s i t u a t i o n created by the Indo-Pak war of 1965, 
Foreign investment i n Pakistan generally seems to have 
been a v a i l a b l e mainly i n three forms :- ( i ) cash brought i n , 
( i i ) c a p i t a l equipment brought i n , and ( i i i ) re-investment of 
business p r o f i t s . ^'''^  I n a d d i t i o n to d i r e c t investment, f o r e i g n 
(1) Department of S t a t i s t i c s , Foreign L i a b i l i t i e s and Assets and 
Foreign Investments i n Pakistan, 1963-65. (State Bank of 
Pakistan), pp.12-13. 
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p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e brings w i t h i t a number of usef u l side e f f e c t s 
and by-products, such as t e c h n i c a l know-how, managerial s k i l l , 
education f a c i l i t i e s and employment. Of the three forms of 
investment, cash component and c a p i t a l equipment account f o r 22.4 
and 38.1 !pi,c. r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
The p o l i c y of the Government of Pakistan i n t h i s f i e l d 
has been t o welcome f o r e i g n investment from any country of the 
world. By 1965 Pakistan had received f o r e i g n investment from as 
many as 32 co u n t r i e s . However, the major p a r t of the investment 
came from countries l i k e the U.K., U.S.A. and West Germany. A 
country wise d i s t r i b u t i o n of investment i s given i n Table 5.3. f o r 
the period 1957-60 and 1961-65. 
Table 5.3. Flow of Investment i n terms of countries 
of o r i g i n . 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
1957 -60 1961-65 Tota l 
Country Amount % Amount , % Amount % 
U.K. 214.2 66.9 223.9 48.9 438.1 56,3 
U.S.A. 31.8 9.9 132.0 28.8 163.8 21.0 
Others 74.2 23.2 102.4 22.3 176.6 22.7 
Tota l 320.2 100.0 458.3 100.0 778.5 100.0 
Source: Same as Table 5.2. 
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A study of Table 5.3. reveals t h a t the U.K. i s the 
l a r g e s t s i n g l e i n v e s t o r i n Pakistan w i t h an aggregate investment 
of Rs 438.1 m i l l i o n d uring the period 1957-65. I t s holdings 
represent 56.3 p.c. of the t o t a l investment. Of the remainder, 
the U.S.A, and other countries accounted f o r 21 p,c, and 
22.7 p.c. r e s p e c t i v e l y . The predominance of the U.K. seems t o 
be the r e s u l t of t r a d i t i o n a l channels e x i s t i n g since pre«» 
independence days. However, the table suggests t h a t B r i t a i n ' s 
stake i n Pakistan i s now d e c l i n i n g while t h a t of the U.S.A. i s 
r i s i n g . Investment by the U.S.A. invest o r s , which was Rs 31.8 
m i l l i o n during 1957-60, rose t o Rs 132.0 m i l l i o n during 1961-65, 
representing an increase of Rs 100,2 m i l l i o n over the l a s t period. 
At the same time, investment by the U.K. inve s t o r s increased by 
only Rs 9.7 m i l l i o n . I n other words, the p r o p o r t i o n of 
investment by the U.S,A. increased from 9,9 p.c. i n 1957-60 t o 
28.8 p.c. i n 1961-65 w h i l e t h a t of the U.K. declined from 66.9 p.c. 
t o 48.9 p.c. over the previous period. 
I t may seem strange t h a t B r i t i s h i nvestors should be 
l o s i n g i n t e r e s t i n Pakistan. I t may possibly be explained by 
the f a c t t h a t Pakistan has no 'investment Guarantee Agreement' 
w i t h the U,K, as i s the case w i t h the U.S.A. and the Republic of 
Germany. Under t h i s agreement the Governments of the U.S.A. and 
Germany guarantee the p r i v a t e investors against losses a r i s i n g 
from investment i n Pakistan - the kind of losses which might a r i s e 
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from f u t u r e devaluation of the rupee or n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , 
Another reason f o r the r e l a t i v e decline i n B r i t i s h investment 
i n the P a k i s t a n i market appears t o be the aggressive p o l i c y 
of American and German investors as f a r as investment i n 
Pakistan i s concerned. 
2, A Review of I n d u s t r i e s Developed i n Collaboration w i t h 
Foreign P r i v a t e Mvestors. 
While no completely published data are a v a i l a b l e on 
how much f o r e i g n investment there i s i n each i n d u s t r y , yet i t 
i s possible from the i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to make a general 
review of the i n d u s t r i e s developed i n association w i t h f o r e i g n 
p a r t i c i p a n t s . By the end of 1962,there were 313 Joint-Stock 
companies i n Pakistan having f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Their t o t a l 
assets amounted to Rs 3964 m i l l i o n i n which the manufacturing 
sector's share was Rs 2395 m i l l i o n . Out of t h i s amount the 
c o n t r i b u t i o n of the f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t o r was Rs 214 m i l l i o n or 
9.0 p.c.^^^ 
O i l and Gas; Most of the o i l and gas undertakings i n Pakistan 
have f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the equity. These i n d u s t r i e s 
(2) The Department of Investment Promotion and Supplies, Guide to 
Investment i n Pakistan^ (Govt, of Pakistan, Karachi), pp.5-6. 
(3) Department of S t a t i s t i c s , Balance SheetsAnalysis of J o i n t Stock 
Companies Having Foreign P a r t i c i p a t i o n , (State Bank of Pakistan, 
Karachi), pp.18-19, 
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i n v o l v e l a r g e r c a p i t a l , a complicated process and specialised 
knowledge i n the operation. For these reasons, f o r e i g n 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n was d e s i r a b l e . By 1966 investment f o r 
e x p l o i t a t i o n and gas p u r i f i c a t i o n was estimated at Rs 1000 
m i l l i o n , besides a s u b s t a n t i a l amount invested i n d i s t r i b u t i o n 
undertakings. The f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n varies from company to 
company. For instance, the A.ttock O i l Company L t d , has f o r e i g n 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n t o the extent of 70 p.c. as g a i n s t 46 p.c. i n 
(4) 
• Sui Gas Transmission Co.Ltd. 
As a c o r r o l a r y t o the o i l and gas i n d u s t r y a 
petro^chemical i n d u s t r y i s also being developed. This in d u s t r y 
also requires l a r g e investment, sop h i s t i c a t e d t e c h n i c a l know-how 
and h i g h l y s k i l l e d operators. Again, f o r e i g n c o l l a b o r a t i o n i s 
v i t a l l y needed i n t h i s f i e l d . E f f o r t s t o associate f o r e i g n 
p r i v a t e investors i n the p r o j e c t s of the petro-chemical in d u s t r y 
have been made by i n d u s t r i a l development agencies i n Pakistan, 
Foreign investors have also p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the marketing and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n a c t i v i t i e s of undertakings i n Pakistan, 
At present there are two companies i n the country, 
manufacturing i n d u s t r i a l gases,of which one has f o r e i g n 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Of the two concerns producing welding electrodes, 
one has been set up i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investors, 
(4) Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, o p . c i t . , pp.198 and 208. 
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E l e c t r i c a l and E l e c t r o n i c I n d u s t r i e s : 
These i n d u s t r i e s have been developed i n Pakistan mainly 
w i t h the a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s . A large 
number of i n d u s t r i e s such as Alcan Asia L t d , Associated 
E l e c t r i c a l I n d u s t r i e s (Pakistan) L t d , B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i a l 
Callender's Cables L t d , English E l e c t r i c L t d , General E l e c t r i c a l 
L t d , Greaves Crompton (Pakistan) L t d , Johnson and P h i l i p s 
(Pakistan) L t d , Pakistan Cables Ltd , and Siemens Pakistan 
Engineering Co.Ltd, have been established i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h 
f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s . These are a l l subsidiaries and branches of 
f o r e i g n companies. I n a l l these cases however, a sizeable amount 
of c a p i t a l has been subscribed by the l o c a l i n v e s t o r s . 
The e l e c t r o n i c s i n d u s t r y has gained ground i n Pakistan 
on the basis of the expertise and f i n a n c i a l resources provided by 
f o r e i g n p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s . I n 1955 there were only seven 
manufacturing u n i t s i n the country:by 1966 t h i s had increased to 
25 u n i t s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y famous companies l i k e P h i l i p s of 
Holland, Telefunken of Germany and E.M.I, of the U.K. have j o i n e d 
w i t h l o c a l investors t o set up l o c a l u n i t s . I n a d d i t i o n t o 
these, a number of f o r e i g n brands such as Pye, Murphy, Grundig, 
Sanyo, National are marketed i n the country without i n v o l v i n g 
f o r e i g n investment. Foreign p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the equity of j o i n t 
(5) 
ventures ranges from 20 t o 80 p.c. 
(5) Trade and Industry 'The Dynamic Role of Foreign P r i v a t e 
Investment i n the E l e c t r i c Industry'. (Trade and Industry 
P u b l i c a t i o n s , Karachi, September 1967), pp.879-880, 
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Starch I n d u s t r y ; 
The growth of the Starch Industry i n Pakistan owes a 
great deal t o f o r e i g n p r i v a t e enterprises. I n 1962 the Rafhan 
Maize Product Co, L t d , has been established i n L y a l l p u r i n 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h Knorr Zurich A,G. and a Swiss subsidiary of 
the Corn Products Company of New York. Another e n t e r p r i s e , 
Glaxo Laboratories (Pakistan) Limited, has s u b s t a n t i a l f o r e i g n 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the e q u i t y . 
Pharmaceutical I n d u s t r y : 
This i n d u s t r y has been p r i m a r i l y organised i n Pakistan 
as a subsidiary u n i t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y known enterprises of 
pharmaceutical products. Out of a t o t a l of nineteen u n i t s 
presently operating i n Pakistan, eight are B r i t i s h , seven are 
American, two are German and two are Swiss. The t o t a l c a p i t a l 
i n terms of paid-up c a p i t a l and reserve amounted to Rs 865 m i l l i o n 
at the end of 1966, This i n d u s t r i a l group has been successful 
i n a t t a i n i n g s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y i n a number of pharmaceutical 
products. 
Tobacco I n d u s t r y ; 
Amongst the four major tobacco concerns, two have 
f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The Pakistan Tobacco Company, established 
(6) Trade and I n d u s t r y , (Foreign Private Investment Supplement, 
September 1967), p.886. 
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i n 1949, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the World wide B r i t i s h -
American Tobacco Company Limited. Later, i n 1955, the Company 
had associated l o c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n by o f f e r i n g shares t o the 
general p u b l i c . Foreign i n v e s t o r s now hold 35 p.c. of the t o t a l 
paid-up c a p i t a l of Rs 88 m i l l i o n . The other concern which has 
f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s the Premier Tobacco Company Ltd* 
Godfrey P h i l i p s of London has provided 36 p.c. of the equity 
c a p i t a l of Rs 5 m i l l i o n , besides providing t e c h n i c a l know-how 
and assistance. 
Over and above these, there are other u n i t s l i k e Habib 
Sugar, Indus Chemical, Steel Corporation of Pakistan, Kohinoor 
Rayon L t d , which have a small amount of f o r e i g n investment. On 
a casual look at the general nature of i n d u s t r i e s one would f i n d 
t h a t f o r e i g n investment has been mostly concentrated on consumer 
goods i n d u s t r i e s such as c i g a r e t t e s , e l e c t r i c a l goods, 
pharmaceutical goods, s t a r c h i n d u s t r i e s , o i l and gas ind u s t r y : 
basic type i n d u s t r i e s have remained completely neglected. I t 
also appears t h a t so f a r only the big i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y known 
undertakings have come forward t o invest i n Pakistan. These 
undertakings, having a market f o r t h e i r products i n Pakistan, were 
i n s p i r e d t o set up t h e i r s u b s i d i a r i e s presumably due t o ( i ) fear 
of l o s i n g the market, ( i i ) the p o s s i b i l i t y of producing product 
a t a lower cost and ( i i i ) prospect of enjoying the b e n e f i t s of 
incen t i v e s provided by the Government of Pakistan. As we s h a l l see 
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l a t e r , the investment climate i n Pakistan, e s p e c i a l l y f o r 
f o r e i g n investment, i s reasonably good compared w i t h other 
developing c o u n t r i e s . 
3. P o l i c i e s and Problems: 
Going back t o Table 5,2, one can see t h a t the 
manufacturing sector has been able t o a t t r a c t more f o r e i g n 
investment since 1961, But the o v e r a l l p i c t u r e i s c e r t a i n l y 
not s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r i t c o n s t i t u t e d only 4.2 p.c. of the 
p r i v a t e investment during the Second Plan period as against 
5 p.c, during the F i r s t Plan period. I n view of t h i s lower 
flow of f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment, we s h a l l now t u r n t o the 
discussion of the i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y of the Government as regards 
f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment and the problems r e l a t i n g t o i t . 
The general p o l i c y f o r encouraging f o r e i g n p r i v a t e 
investment i n Pakistan has on the whole been s a t i s f a c t o r y . For 
example, except f o r a few years, there has been p o l i t i c a l 
s t a b i l i t y i n the country. Secondly, the Government has provided 
time and again assurance against n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . I n t h i s 
connection, i t may be pointed out t h a t i n d u s t r i a l growth i n 
Pakistan i s based more or less on a c a p i t a l i s t i c model by 
p r o v i d i n g maximum freedom, reasonable tax concessions t o p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e e t c . The fear of n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , even i n the d i s t a n t 
f u t u r e i s a matter t o be seen i n context t o p o l i t i c a l development, 
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However, i n the event of n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n under any s p e c i a l 
circumstances, the Government has given an assurance th a t 
(8) 
f a i r and j u s t compensation w i l l be paid. 
Further, the Government has made i t clear t h a t f o r e i g n 
c a p i t a l invested i n approved i n d u s t r i e s a f t e r September 1st, 1954 
may be r e p a t r i a t e d at any time, t o the extent of the o r i g i n a l 
investment, t o the country from which the investment came. 
Any p a r t of the p r o f i t reinvested i n approved p r o j e c t s and also 
a p p r e c i a t i o n of c a p i t a l investment would be considered f o r 
r e p a t r i a t i o n purposes. The current p r o f i t s from investment can 
be t r a n s f e r r e d t o the country of o r i g i n of the c a p i t a l without 
(9) 
any r e s t r i c t i o n . 
P r a c t i c a l l y the whole range of i n d u s t r i e s , w i t h few 
exceptions, i s open f o r investment f o r l o c a l and f o r e i g n p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e . But f o r e i g n investment i s p a r t i c u l a r l y welcomed i n 
t e c h n i c a l l y complex and s o p h i s t i c a t e d i n d u s t r i e s such as special 
t o o l s , s t a t i o n a r y and marine die s e l engine, t e x t i l e machinery 
and spares, machine t o o l s , manufacture of miscellaneous machinery, 
heavy chemicals, basic manufacture of drugs and pharmaceuticals, 
and i n s e c t i c i d e s and p e s t i c i d e s , o i l and gas prospecting and 
development and n a t u r a l gas transmission and d i s t r i b u t i o n . There 
i s no hard and f a s t r u l e as t o the p r o p o r t i o n of l o c a l equity 
(8) and (9) Buide to Investment i n Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p.5. 
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p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n j o i n t ventures : i t i s accepted t h a t a f o r e i g n 
i n v e s t o r may have c o n t r o l of h i s investment and 60 p,c. of 
f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s o f t e n considered acceptable. Foreign 
i n v e s t o r s are even allowed t o e s t a b l i s h wholly-owned i n d u s t r y , 
but they are generally welcomed as partners f o r l o c a l i n v e s t o r s , 
whom they may a s s i s t w i t h finance, equipment and t e c h n i c a l and 
managerial know-how. As can be understood, know-how may oft e n 
be more important than f inance, ^"'"'^^ 
I n order t o a s s i s t f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investors the 
Government of Pakistan has established an Investment Promotion Wing 
i n the Department of Investment Promotion and Supplies under the 
M i n i s t r y of I n d u s t r i e s . The Department on request by the f o r e i g n 
e n t e r p r i s e provides a l l sorts of help i n c l u d i n g e f f e c t i n g contact 
w i t h s u i t a b l e l o c a l p a r t n e r s , and the determination of the terms of 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r s e t t i n g up j o i n t - v e n t u r e s i n Pakistan. The 
services rendered by the Department have enabled f o r e i g n investors 
t o set up i n d u s t r i e s w i t h less d i f f i c u l t y than might otherwise have 
been encountered. 
Secondly, i n Pakistan labour management r e l a t i o n s are 
ge n e r a l l y good. Trade unions are weak and wages are low. 
However, i t i s argued t h a t labour p r o d u c t i v i t y i s very low and 
there i s s c a r c i t y of s k i l l e d labour. As regards p r o d u c t i v i t y of 
labour i t i s t o be viewed i n the context of wages which are very 
low, which more than o f f s e t the p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n t i a l between 
P a k i s t a n i labour and i t s f o r e i g n counterpart. 
(10) Federation of B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i e s , Pakistan " An Investment Survey 
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I n Pakistan t a x a t i o n law does not make any 
d i s t i n c t i o n between f o r e i g n and l o c a l i n v e s t o r s . Foreign 
e n t e r p r i s e enjoys the same p r i v i l e g e s as are enjoyed by l o c a l 
i n v e s t o r s . Corporate income i s subject t o income tax at 30 p.c. 
and another 30 p.c. as super tax. However, a corporate body, 
i f i t s a t i s f i e s conditions discussed i n chapter three, i s 
e n t i t l e d t o a 15 p.c. rebate on super tax. Thus, i n e f f e c t , 
an undertaking may be required t o pay 45 p.c. corporate tax. 
Bonus shares declared by a company t o i t s e x i s t i n g shareholders 
which r e s u l t i n an increase i n paid-up c a p i t a l are taxed at the 
iCHte of 12,5 p.c. But t h i s i s not taxable i n the hands of the 
shareholders. 
I n t e r - c o r p o r a t e p r o f i t i s now taxed at the r a t e of 
15 p.c. i f the r e c i p i e n t concern i s a "pu b l i c company"^'''''"^within 
the meaning of sec t i o n 23-A of the Income Tax Act. I n a l l other 
cases, the r a t e of tax i s 20 p.c. At present the Government has 
agreement f o r the avoidance of double t a x a t i o n , w i t h the U.S.A., 
the U.K., West Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and Denmark 
(12) 
and I n d i a . S i m i l a r agreement may be made w i t h other c a p i t a l 
exporting countries i n order t o encourage investment from these 
(11) See f o r d e t a i l s Chapter 3^ , p.96. 
(12) Guide t o Investment i n Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p.6, 
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c o u n t r i e s . Foreign technicians employed i n an i n d u s t r i a l 
e n t e r p r i s e under a contract approved by the Central Government 
are also exempted from income tax. The Government r e a l i s e s 
t h a t tax concessions provide an i n c e n t i v e t o f o r e i g n investors 
and i t intends t o continue a tax concession p o l i c y i n the 
f u t u r e . The newly established undertakings are e l i g i b l e f o r 
tax holiday ranging from 2 t o 8 years depending on t h e i r 
l o c a t i o n and nature. 
The p r o v i s i o n f o r depreciation allowances i s most 
l i b e r a l i n Pakistan. The normal rates of depreciation f o r most 
machinery range from 7 t o 15 p.c. I n a d d i t i o n to the normal 
de p r e c i a t i o n allowance, an i n i t i a l d e p r e c i a t i o n allowance of 
25 p.c. i s provided on p l a n t and machinery not previously used 
i n Pakistan. Double the normal rates of depreciation are 
allowed on p l a n t and machinery i n s t a l l e d before 30th June 1970, 
An extra allowance of 50 p.c. i s allowed f o r double s h i f t and 
100 p.c. f o r t r i p l e s h i f t working. Over and above, t a r i f f 
(13) 
p r o t e c t i o n i s granted according t o the nature of the i n d u s t r y . 
The r a t e of r e t u r n on investment i n Pakistan i s 
moderate i n the sense t h a t the average r a t e of net p r o f i t t o 
paid-up c a p i t a l works out at 16.6 p.c. f o r 70 selected companies 
over the period 1964-66. There i s the p o s s i b i l i t y t o earn 
(13) I b i d , p.10. 
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higher p r o f i t through the running of the p r o j e c t at f u l l 
capacity and so increasing the operating e f f i c i e n c y . The 
vast p o t e n t i a l domestic market should keep the demand f o r 
products at an increasing l e v e l . 
As f a r as c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s are concerned, there are 
two well-organised s p e c i a l i s e d c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the 
country f o r meeting the long-term c r e d i t requirements of 
i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e . They grant loans t o the i n d u s t r y both 
i n terms of l o c a l and f o r e i g n currencies. The commercial 
banks are s u f f i c i e n t l y developed t o meet the working c a p i t a l 
needs of i n d u s t r i e s . Besides, l o c a l investors are prepared to 
supply the rupee components of the c a p i t a l as equity i f the 
p r o j e c t i s i n i t i a t e d as a j o i n t venture. 
Although the climate f o r f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment 
i n Pakistan seems to be favourable, yet exchange c o n t r o l r e g u l a t i o n 
(14) 
the l e v e l of corporate tax and import r e s t r i c t i o n s are thought 
t o be r e s t r a i n t s f o r the f r e e flow of f o r e i g n c a p i t a l i n the 
country. But by examining c l o s e l y the economic features of the 
country and the problems of a developing economy faced w i t h such 
c o n t r o l l e d measures would appear a l i t t l e j u s t i f i e d f o r a l l o c a t i n g 
scarce f a c t o r s - e s s e n t i a l l y needed f o r developmental purposes. 
(14) The l e v e l of corporate tax i s considered high by some of the 
f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s . Frequent changes i n tax rates give r i s e t o 
apprehension about long-term tax i n s t a b i l i t y . 
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The Government of Pakistan has t o f o l l o w a 
r e s t r i c t e d import p o l i c y due t o balance of payment d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
yet i n d u s t r i e s established based on imported raw m a t e r i a l s , 
semi-finished product and spare parts w i l l genuinely be 
handicapped i f import r e s t r i c t i o n s do not allow them t o 
import these items. I t has been observed t h a t many i n d u s t r i a l 
undertakings had t o run, i n the past, below capacity 
l e v e l , due t o n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y of s u f f i c i e n t licences t o 
import these i n p u t s . Further, genuine d i f f i c u l t i e s have been 
encountered by the manufacturer when he i s granted a 
lic e n c e against a t i e d loan; f o r instance, a f i r m r e q u i r i n g t o 
import B r i t i s h components or materials might be issued w i t h a 
li c e n c e t o import from other sources which may w e l l be unable 
t o supply what i s r e q u i r e d . Foreign investors are also a f r a i d 
t h a t the Government's p o l i c y of sanctioning more u n i t s of 
s i m i l a r i n d u s t r i e s t o promote competition may create f u r t h e r 
d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the established i n d u s t r i e s i n acquiring the 
(15) 
r e q u i r e d import l i c e n c e s . I n t h i s connection what i s needed 
i s the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of import p o l i c y and some standing 
p r o v i s i o n designed t o a l l o c a t e f o r e i g n exchange t o already 
established i n d u s t r i e s w i t h f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
(15) Pakistan - An Investment Survey, o p . c i t . , pp. 3, 6, and 7. 
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Furthermore, i t has been maintained t h a t the 
Government has ensured the i n t e r e s t of the f o r e i g n investors 
through the provisions of Executive Ordinances, there i s as 
yet no s t a t u t o r y provisions t o safeguard t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . As 
a r e s u l t , f o r e i g n investors f e e l , that there ought t o be 
l e g a l l e g i s l a t i o n t o p r o t e c t t h e i r r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s . 
Despite c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s , the terms and conditions 
on which f o r e i g n investment are admitted i n t o the country seem 
s u f f i c i e n t l y a t t r a c t i v e . Even so, the flow of c a p i t a l does not 
appear t o be s a t i s f a c t o r y as one would have thought. This may 
be a t t r i b u t e d t o the f a c t t h a t the developed countries p r e f e r 
t o i n v e s t i n developed countries under d i f f e r e n t agreements 
l i k e common market arrangements. Secondly, the formation of 
c o n t r o l s i n these co u n t r i e s , through the amalgamation and 
mergers of b i g i n d u s t r i e s , has required vast i n v e s t i b l e funds t o 
i n i t i a t e r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n programmes. I n the western countries, 
amalgamation of i n d u s t r i a l undertakings i s ta k i n g place on 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l s . I n some cases investment i s more p r o f i t a b l e 
i n the c a p i t a l exporting coun-tries than over-seas. 
However, the Government recognises the need f o r 
f o r e i g n p r i v a t e investment t o give the necessary f i l l i p 
t o i n d u s t r i a l development i n Pakistan and as such l i b e r a l p o l i c y 
has been adopted towards f o r e i g n p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s , who can 
s t a r t any of the approved i n d u s t r i e s i n the prlvste sector. 
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These days Pakistan i s p u t t i n g emphasis on heavy 
complex i n d u s t r i e s w i t h high c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y and the r e f o r e , 
i t w i l l r e q u i r e much l a r g e r investment and would be g r e a t l y 
r e l i e v e d i f such investment came i n the form of f o r e i g n 
p r i v a t e investment. 
CHAPTER SIX. 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF SPECIALISED CREDIT 
INSTITUTIONS TO CAPITAL FORMATION 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR. 
The importance of specialised f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r 
supplying i n d u s t r i a l finance has been w e l l recognised i n both 
developed and developing c o u n t r i e s . They play a p a r t i c u l a r l y v i t a l 
r o l e i n developing countries where the c a p i t a l market i s not 
organised. As a matter of f a c t , the need f o r sp e c i a l i s e d 
i n s t i t u t i o n s as a source of long-term c a p i t a l , e s p e c i a l l y f o r 
i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c i n g , was r e a l i s e d i n 1919, when an enormous amount 
of c a p i t a l was needed f o r the rec o n s t r u c t i o n and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of 
the war-damaged economy. Following the end of World War I several 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s were set up i n the European countries such 
as C r e d i t National of France i n 1919, and the I n d u s t r i a l Mortgage 
Bank of Finland i n 1924. S i m i l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s came i n t o operation 
f o l l o w i n g the great depression of 1930, namely, A.B. I n d u s t r i a l Credit 
of Sweden i n 1934 and the Norwegian Bank f o r Industry i n 1936. ^ "''^  
S i m i l a r l y , when, at the end of World War I I , a huge 
amount of long-term c a p i t a l was needed t o r e h a b i l i t a t e the economies 
(1) U q u a i l i , N.M., 'Development Banks and Special Finance Corporations' 
i n Dr. Baquai, M., Abstract of SEANZA Lectures 1964, (State Bank 
of Pakistan), p.71. 
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of war-damaged c o u n t r i e s , there was an expansion of e x i s t i n g 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as w e l l as the c r e a t i o n of new ones to 
cope w i t h the problem. I n d i r e c t response t o t h i s need, the 
governments of the a f f e c t e d countries took the i n i t i a t i v e i n 
e s t a b l i s h i n g such i n s t i t u t i o n s . The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank f o r 
Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.) was set up i n 1944 
w i t h a view t o p r o v i d i n g assistance t o under-developed countries 
f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e i r war-damaged economies. Other 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , established w i t h i d e n t i c a l purposes, were the 
Herstelbank i n Netherland and the I n d u s t r i a l and Commercial 
Finance Corporation (I.C.F.C.) i n the United Kingdom i n 1945, 
the State Bank f o r Industry of Indonesia i n 1948, and K r e d i t a n s t a l t 
Wiederrauban (K.F.W.) of West Germany i n 1948. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Finance Corporation (I.F.C.) was established i n 1956 t o provide 
assistance mainly t o p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l e nterprises. Other 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h i s kind include Agency f o r 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development (A.I.D,), Commonwealth Development 
Corporation, the Investment Bank f o r s i x Western European Countries, 
and the Asian Economic Co-operative Fund f o r a s s i s t i n g i n the 
(2) 
economic development of the Asian countries and so on. 
The r o l e of sp e c i a l i s e d f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y important i n developing countries as most of these 
countries s u f f e r from paucity of c a p i t a l , more so because many of 
(2) I b i d , p.72. 
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these countries i n Asia and A f r i c a , a f t e r achieving independence, 
made e f f o r t s t o impart an i n d u s t r i a l bias t o t h e i r developmental 
p o l i c y . The s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s were found t o be e f f e c t i v e 
i n promoting i n d u s t r i a l development and strengthening the c a p i t a l 
(3) 
market. Since 1945 a number of such i n s t i t u t i o n s were created 
(4) 
and established i n I n d i a , I r a n , Turkey, Ceylon and Pakistan. 
I t was seen i n Chapter Two t h a t one of the major 
elements of i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i n Pakistan has been long-term 
c r e d i t . The emergence of t h i s phenomenon appears t o have been 
l a r g e l y due t o the growth and development of Government-sponsored 
s p e c i a l i s e d c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s , designed t o supply long-terra 
finance t o the p r i v a t e entrepreneurs i n the manufacturing sector of 
the country. I n t h i s ©lapter we propose t o discuss the r o l e of 
these i n s t i t u t i o n s i n p r o v i d i n g i n d u s t r i a l finance t o the p r i v a t e 
sector. At present there are two such i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the country, 
namely, the I n d u s t r i a l Development Bank of Pakistan and the Pakistan 
I n d u s t r i a l Credit and Investment Corporation. 
(3) This type of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n has appeared i n developing 
nations apart from, and not competitive w i t h , t r a d i t i o n a l banking 
systems to provide long-term c r e d i t . They serve also as channels 
f o r f o r e i g n c a p i t a l and may i n a d d i t i o n provide t e c h n i c a l assistance 
t o p r i v a t e companies. Cf. Benedick, R.E., I n d u s t r i a l Finance i n 
I r a n (Graduate School of Business A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Harvard U n i v e r s i t y , 
Boston, 1964) p.6. 
(4) For example:- The I n d u s t r i a l Finance Corporation of India i n 1948, 
the I n d u s t r i a l Credit Bank of Iran i n 1953. I.B.R.D. has estimated 
t h a t there are at l e a s t 80 developmental banks, i n a d d i t i o n t o many 
governmental i n d u s t r i a l loan fund operations not formerly chartered 
as banking i n s t i t u t i o n s . Cf. W i l l i a m Diamond, Development Banks, 
(Washington ; Economic Development Institute,I.B.R.D, 1957). 
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A. I n d u s t r i a l Development Bank of Pakistan (I.D.B.P.) 
1, A Short H i s t o r i c a l Background; 
The I n d u s t r i a l Development Bank of Pakistan was 
established i n August 1961, r e p l a c i n g the former Pakistan 
I n d u s t r i a l Finance Corporation (P.I.F.C.O.), set up i n 1949. 
The r e o r g a n i s a t i o n of the P.IoF.C.O, as the I.D.B.P. was made i n 
accordance w i t h the recommendations of the Credit Enquiry 
(5) 
Commission set up by the Government i n February 1959 t o examine 
the scope and workings of the agencies which provided c r e d i t 
f a c i l i t i e s t o a g r i c u l t u r e , business and i n d u s t r y and t o suggest 
remedies i n view of the f i n d i n g s of the Commission. The Commission 
on examining the p r o v i s i o n of i n d u s t r i a l c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s i n the 
country and p a r t i c u l a r l y the operations of the P.I.F.C.O, made the 
f o l l o w i n g observations:-' 
1. That the P.I.F.C.O. concentrated i t s assistance 
mainly on large-sized loans i n s p i t e of the f a c t that 
there was s u b s t a n t i a l demand f o r medium-sized loans. 
The average siz e of loans sanctioned u n t i l June 1958 was 
approximately Rs 1 m i l l i o n and t h i s meant a neglect 
of the needs of medium-'sized enterprises. 
(5) The Credit Enquiry Commission was appointed by the Government of 
Pakistan under N o t i f i c a t i o n No.3(2) - Fl/59, dated the 24th 
February 1959 of the M i n i s t r y of Finance, The Commission examined 
the e x i s t i n g c r e d i t s t r u c t u r e at length and submitted the report 
t o the Government suggesting measures on the 8th September 1959. 
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2. The operation of the P.I.C.I.C. from 1957, a 
s i m i l a r i n s t i t u t i o n j r e s u l t e d i n d u p l i c a t i o n of 
a c t i v i t i e s by these two i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
3. The terms and conditions of the P.I,P.CO. loans 
f o r medium«sized enterprises were much s t i f f e r 
than f o r large i n d u s t r i a l undertakings. The 
s e c u r i t i e s demanded by the Corporation against loans 
and assistance were i n the form of a pledge, mortgage, 
hypothecation or assignment of movable and immovable 
property. I n many cases the medium-sized undertakings 
could not provide the s e c u r i t i e s demanded by the 
Corporation, Moreover, the Corporation was r e s t r i c t e d 
t o accepting prospective assets as s e c u r i t i e s and to 
pr o v i d i n g loans t o new entrants i n t o the i n d u s t r i a l 
f i e l d . The lending procedure was also cumbersome. 
4. The Corporation had very l i m i t e d contact w i t h the 
medium-sized ent e r p r i s e s located i n small towns on 
account of the Corporations headquarters being i n Karachi 
and other branches being s i t u a t e d at Chittagong and 
Lahore. 
The s i t u a t i o n as such was f a r from s a t i s f a c t o r y 
considering t h a t the aim was t o b u i l d up the manufacturing sector 
of the economy by development plans having t h a t end i n view. I n 
the l i g h t of the circumstances, the Credit Enquiry Commission 
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recommended the f o l l o w i n g measures:-
( i ) the P.I.F.CoO, should be reorganised as the I.D.B.P, and aim 
at concentrating i t s a c t i v i t i e s only on medium-sized 
undertakings. This would enable the Bank t o avoid undue 
overlapping w i t h the P.I.C.I.C. 
( i i ) w i t h the exception of mining and i n l a n d water transport the 
lending l i m i t should not exceed Rs 1 m i l l i o n , 
( i i i ) the Bank should be allowed to lend against prospective assets 
and t o provide short"term c r e d i t t o those i n d u s t r i e s w i t h 
which i t has dealings, 
( i v ) t o supplement i t s resources and t o reduce the dependence on 
borrowings i t might accept deposits from the general p u b l i c , 
(v) the Bank should set up branches i n d i f f e r e n t centres so th a t 
medium-scale i n d u s t r i e s could get access t o the f a c i l i t i e s 
of the Bank. I n a d d i t i o n , two operational o f f i c e s should 
be set up - one at Dacca and the other at Lahore, w i t h 
well-'defined powers t o sanction loan a p p l i c a t i o n s without 
r e f e r r i n g t o the Head O f f i c e , 
( v i ) the Bank should s i m p l i f y the loan piocedure as f a r as 
possible and negotiate a l i n e of c r e d i t . f r o m the P.I.C.I.C. 
and, 
( v i i ) the Bank should b© declared a scheduled bank and be under the 
c o n t r o l of the State Bank of Pakistan i n matters of c r e d i t 
p o l i c i e s . 
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Thus i n pursuance of the recommendations of the 
Credit Enquiry Commission, the I n d u s t r i a l Development Bank of 
Pakistan came i n t o existence under the I n d u s t r i a l Development 
Bank Ordinance, 1961. The Bank has an authorised and paid-up 
c a p i t a l of Rs 30 m i l l i o n . 
The general a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the I.D.B.P. l i e s i n a 
Board of D i r e c t o r s c o n s i s t i n g of 11 members. The Board discharges 
i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n accordance w i t h the i n s t r u c t i o n s of the 
Government and on commercial considerations w i t h due regard t o 
the i n t e r e s t s of i n d u s t r y and commerce and t o the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t 
g e n e r a l l y . The I.D.B.P, has organised i t s e l f i n a manner best 
s u i t e d f o r the o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y of an organisation charged 
w i t h such d u t i e s . I n order t o encourage the development of 
medium-sized e n t e r p r i s e s , the Bank has organised a team of w e l l -
q u a l i f i e d t e c h n i c a l s t a f f capable of analysing and evaluating the 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the e n t e r p r i s e t o be assisted. Apart from t h i s , 
the Bank has arrangements w i t h the I.B.R.D., I.F.C., the 
I n d u s t r i a l Development Bank of Turkey, the I n d u s t r i a l Development 
Bank of Japan t o provide advanced t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s t o o f f i c e r s 
of the Bank: i n a d d i t i o n , technical advisory services can ]De made 
a v a i l a b l e t o the Bank by the United Nations from time to time. 
(6) M i n i s t r y of Finance, F i n a n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n s - National and 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l , (Govt, of Pakistan, May, 1964), p.46. 
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The I.D.B.P. has three regional o f f i c e s , at Karachi, 
Lahore and Dacca, each under a chief manager. I n a d d i t i o n , 
branches have been established at Chittagong, Bogra, Khulna, 
Peshawar, ,Rawalpindi, Gujranwala and Hyderabad. The Bank has 
also undertaken a branch expansion programme w i t h a view t o 
p r o v i d i n g l a r g e r f a c i l i t i e s t o the investors of remote areas of 
the country. 
2, Objectives, Functions, C r i t e r i a and P r i o r i t i e s i n lending 
of the Bank. 
Objectives and Functions; 
The primary purpose of t h i s f u l l - f l e d g e d development 
bank was t o provide medium and long-term credits both i n l o c a l 
and f o r e i g n currencies t o the new and e x i s t i n g medium and 
small-scale i n d u s t r i e s . I n a d d i t i o n , i t was intended t h a t the 
Bank should encourage a large number of new entrants i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d by p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l assistance, t e c h n i c a l 
advice, and economic evaluation of p r o j e c t s . The f o l l o w i n g may 
be described as the main functions of the I.D.B.P. ;-
( i ) t o a s s i s t both the new and the e x i s t i n g medium and 
small-scale undertakings by pr o v i d i n g loan and opening 
cash c r e d i t accounts i n favour of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s t o the 
f o r e i g n s u p p l i e r of c a p i t a l goods under a deferred 
payment system. 
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( i i ) t o issue guarantees against loans, debts and c r e d i t s , 
r a i s e d or incurred by or granted t o an i n d u s t r i a l 
e n t e r p r i s e repayable w i t h i n a period not exceeding 20 
years, 
( i i i ) t o c a r r y out surveys on untapped resources,to determine 
the p o t e n t i a l of new investment p r o j e c t s by economic 
a n a l y s i s , t o advise middle class investors and t o 
maintain s t a t i s t i c s r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o , 
( i v ) t o undertake the market research f o r a proposed product 
and t o determine i t s p r o f i t p o t e n t i a l i t y and also t o 
examine i t s importance from the standpoint of the national, 
i n t e r e s t , 
(v) t o administer the f o r e i g n exchange loan obtained through 
d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n by the Government^ a^ nd 
( v i ) t o pay s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o the under-developed areas w i t h 
a view t o maintaining r e g i o n a l balance i n i n d u s t r i a l 
development. 
Apart from these f u n c t i o n s , the Bank was authorised t o 
undertake the f u n c t i o n s of ordinary commercial banks by drawing, 
accepting, d i s c o u n t i n g , buying and s e l l i n g of b i l l s of exchange 
and other negotiable instruments and borrowing money f o r the 
purposes of i t s expanded loan operations. 
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C r i t e r i a and P r i o r i t i e s i n Lending; 
Normally the Bank provides assistance t o i n d u s t r i e s 
(7) 
covered by the I n d u s t r i a l Investment Schedule. I t intends t o 
provide loans and other assistance p a r t i c u l a r l y t o the medium 
and small entrepreneurs who were neglected e a r l i e r . The objectives 
of the Bank are t o ensure a broad-based i n d u s t r i a l ownership 
r e s u l t i n g i n wider d i f f u s i o n of wealth and income on the one hand 
and t o s t i m u l a t e aptitudes f o r investment amongst a l a r g e r section 
of the community on the other. As regards p r i o r i t y i n choosing 
an i n d u s t r y f o r f i n a n c i a l assistance the Bank i s guided by the 
Government i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y according t o which emphasis i s given 
f o r the development of import s u b s t i t u t i n g , e x p o r t-orientated and 
indigenous raw materials based i n d u s t r i e s . 
The Bank i s authorised t o grant loans f o r a maximum 
per i o d of twenty years, but i t has been observed t h a t most of the 
loans are u s u a l l y sanctioned f o r a period ranging from seven t o 
t e n years. A uniform r a t e of i n t e r e s t of 7.5 p.c. i s charged on loans 
i n f o r e i g n currency w h i l e varying i n t e r e s t rates between 7 and 
, .8 p.c, are charged on rupee loans. I n t e r e s t and loans are 
repayable i n s u i t a b l e instalments. As regards f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the 
exchange r a t e the Government undertakes the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o 
(7) See footnote (15) on page 9, 
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cover a l l such r i s k s . The borrowers are, however, required to pay 
only 0.25 p.c. a d d i t i o n a l r a t e of i n t e r e s t on f o r e i g n currency 
(8) 
loans, as premium t o cover the r i s k . 
The Bank accepts the f o l l o w i n g forms of s e c u r i t i e s and 
c o n d i t i o n s , i n one and/or the other, depending on the merit of the 
i n d i v i d u a l cases: 
( i ) mortgage of the borrower's e x i s t i n g assets or prospective 
assets, 
( i i ) guarantee from a f i r s t class scheduled bank redeemable 
on the c r e a t i o n of f i x e d assets and t h e i r mortgage to 
the Bank, and 
( i i i ) personal guarantees of d i r e c t o r s of other concerns. 
I n a d d i t i o n , the Bank keeps a c e r t a i n percentage of 
the loans granted t o borrowing concerns as cash s e c u r i t y . This means, 
f o r example, t h a t i f Rs 1 m i l l i o n i s sanctioned as loan t o a 
concern, roughly 5 p.c. or so of t h i s i s retained as cash s e c u r i t y 
against the whole amount of loan, the r e s t being covered by other 
forms of assets as mentioned above. Moreover, the Bank i n s i s t s 
t h a t the assets which may be pledged as s e c u r i t y should be f u l l y 
insured. 
(8) M i n i s t r y of Finance, Government-sponsored Corporations, (Government 
of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, 1965), p.10. 
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The maximum amount of loan t h a t the Bank could 
provide t o any i n d i v i d u a l e n t e r p r i s e was Rs 2.5 m i l l i o n of which 
f o r e i g n exchange component should not exceed Rs 1.5 m i l l i o n . 
There i s no minimum c e i l i n g on the I.D.B.P. loan but small loans 
are generally channelled, through the East and West Pakistan Small 
I n d u s t r i e s Corporations. The upper l i m i t , however, i s not 
app l i c a b l e t o the j u t e and cotton t e x t i l e i n d u s t r i e s , i n l a n d 
t r a n s p o r t and t o such other i n d u s t r i e s as the Government may 
(9) 
s p e c i f y . 
3. Review of A c t i v i t i e s of I n d u s t r i a l Development Bank of 
Pakistan. 
(a) Lending Operations; 
Table 6.1. in d i c a t e s the amount of loans sanctioned 
and disbursed by the I.D.B.P. from 1961/62 t o 1965/66. I t would 
appear from the t a b l e t h a t the t o t a l loans sanctioned by the Bank 
up t o June 1966 amounted t o Rs 1125 m i l l i o n of which Rs 781 
m i l l i o n (69 p.c.) were i n f o r e i g n currency. The higher pro p o r t i o n 
of loan sanctioned i n f o r e i g n currency reveals two major aspects of 
i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c i n g . F i r s t l y , c a p i t a l i n f o r e i g n currency i s 
r e l a t i v e l y a scarce f a c t o r and the i n d u s t r i a l entrepreneurs l a r g e l y 
depend on developmental banks f o r the f o r e i g n exchange part of the 
investment. Secondly, the requirement of a rupee component c a p i t a l 
(9) I b i d , p.6. 
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i s expected t o be met from equity c a p i t a l . However, i t may be 
observed from the study t h a t the demand f o r loans i n l o c a l 
currency i s q u i t e high. The amount of loans sanctioned i n l o c a l 
currency by the Bank has exceeded the amount of rupee resources 
a v a i l a b l e f o r disposal over the period under review. This i s 
not a strange phenomenon i n a developing country l i k e Pakistan 
where f o r e i g n exchange i s the r e a l l i m i t i n g f a c t o r ; once t h i s i s 
a v a i l a b l e the demand f o r rupee loans would also tend t o increase. 
With the exception of 1965-"66 the rupee loans sanctioned by the 
Bank have shown a gradual increase. 
Table 6.1. Loans Sanctioned and Disbursed by the 
I.D.B.P., 1961/62 - 1965/66. 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Period Loans Sanctioned Loans Disbursed 
Local Foreign T o t a l Local Foreign Total 
1961-62 55.7 113.2 168.9 29.9 130.0 159.9 
1962-63 55.8 124.0 179.8 72,6 112.2 184.8 
1963-64 83.1 260.6 343.7 49.9 519.4 569.3 
1964-65 104.7 130.9 235.6 44.5 87.0 131.5 
1965-66 44,7 151.9 196.6 30.0 98.6 128.6 
T o t a l 344.0 780.6 1124.6 226.9 947.2 1174.1 
Source: Six Years of I.D.B.P. - A brochure by the Bank. 
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The amount of loans sanctioned i n 1963-64 was almost double the 
amount of loans sanctioned i n 1961-62. Foreign currency loans 
have shown an increasing tr e n d since the Bank s t a r t e d operation 
i n August 1961. However, the growth does not i n d i c a t e a uniform 
r i s e i n the operation. 
As much as 70 p.c. of the loans were advanced f o r 
the establishment of new i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s and the balance f o r 
modernisation, r e o r g a n i s a t i o n and extensions of the e x i s t i n g u n i t s . 
I n the period up t o the end of June 1966,the I.D.B.P, 
has disbursed Rs 227 m i l l i o n against a sanctioned amount of 
Rs 344 m i l l i o n . The net rupee resources a v a i l a b l e at the Bank's 
disposal by t h a t date were Rs ft© m i l l i o n . This indicates t h a t 
the resources of the Bank f e l l short of the sanctioned amount of 
loans by Rs 34 m i l l i o n . The f o r e i g n currency loans sanctioned by 
the Bank amounted t o Rs 781 m i l l i o n whereas resources a v a i l a b l e 
were Rs 698 m i l l i o n . However, the Bank i n h e r i t e d Rs 410 m i l l i o n 
from the former the P.I.F.CO. and thus i t was possible t o 
d i s t r i b u t e Rs 947 m i l l i o n during the period under review. ^'''^^ 
Besides sanctioning loans,'the Bank i s authorised t o 
administer and guarantee f o r e i g n and l o c a l currency loans on 
behalf of the Government. During the period 1961-66, the Bank 
administered and guaranteed on hehalt of the Government 23 cases, 
(10) Six Years of I.D.B.P. 
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i n v o l v i n g Rs 363.3 m i l l i o n . ^ ^ I.D.B.P. has also p a r t i c i p a t e d i n 
the e q u i t y of two i n d u s t r i a l concerns and subscribed t o the share 
c a p i t a l of two f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , namely, the Investment 
Corporation of Pakistan and the National Investment Trust Ltd. The 
eq u i t y p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Bank so f a r amounts t o Rs 5.4 
(12) 
m i l l i o n . Thus the t o t a l assistance provided by the Bank comes 
t o about Rs lr4S3,3 m i l l i o n over the period under review, 
(b) Size of Loans Sanctioned: 
Table 6.2. shows the d i s t r i b u t i o n of loans by size 
sanctioned by the Bank during 1961-^66. 
Table 6.2, I.D.B.P. Loans Sanctioned By Size. 
Size of Loan Number of Cases Loans Sanctioned 
Number % Amount i n 
m i l l i o n 
rupees 
% 
Up t o Rs 0.50 
m i l l i o n . 2239 82 252 22 
Over Rs 0.50 t o 
Rs 1,00 m i l l i o n . 269 10 192 18 
Over Rs 1.00 
m i l l i o n . 210 8 680 60 
T o t a l 2718 100 1124 100 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 19^ 6^ -6,7,, B,148. 
(11) Meenai, S.A, o p . c i t . , p.71. 
(12) Six Years of I.D.B.P,, o p . c i t . , p.11. 
- 203 -
The d i s t r i b u t i o n of loans by s i z e in d i c a t e s the Bank's 
preference t o accommodate large-sized loans. I t can be observed 
from the t a b l e above t h a t as much as 60 p.c. of the sanctioned 
loans comprises loans over Rs 1 m i l l i o n , w h i l e only 22 p.c. has 
been advanced as small loans i.e., up t o Rs 0.5 m i l l i o n . The 
r e c i p i e n t s of la r g e - s i z e d loans c o n s t i t u t e only 8 p.c. of the t o t a l 
number of successful applicants up t o 30th June 1966. Thus, i t 
appears t h a t the operations of the Bank i n terms of number of loans 
granted have been i n accordance w i t h the recommendations of the 
Credit Enquiry Commission, but nevertheless, i n monetary terms the 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the Bank's assistance are s t i l l the b i g 
entrepreneurs. This t r e n d , which characterised the previous period, 
was sought t o be removed by the reorganisation proposal by the 
Credit Enquiry Commission. From what one can observe, i t seems 
t h a t nothing much has i n p r a c t i c e been achieved t o reverse the trend. 
The reasons f o r t h i s are very common « the l a r g e r the f i r m , the 
greater the confidence i t commands. 
The other reasons are that the siz e of loan depends on 
the s e c u r i t y o f f e r e d t o the Bank by the borrowers. The value of the 
assets declared by the applicants i s usually over-estimated and the 
I.D.B.P. has t o adjust f o r t h i s over-estimation before assessing the 
r e a l value of assets o f f e r e d as s e c u r i t y . Apart from securing the 
borrower's e n t i r e physical p l a n t , and a f t e r having r i g h t s of 
a c q u i s i t i o n of prospective assets as s e c u r i t y , the I.D.B.P. i n s i s t s 
- 204 -
on a guarantee by a f i r s t class bank, redeemable on the creation 
of new assets and personal guarantees of d i r e c t o r s of other 
concerns. These requirements can hardly be s a t i s f i e d by the 
small and medium i n v e s t o r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y by those who are 
e n t e r i n g i n t o the i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d f o r the f i r s t time. As a 
matter of f a c t , the a t t i t u d e of the I.D.B.P. i n respect of 
s e c u r i t y requirements has not changed to any marked degree as 
compared w i t h i t s predecessor, P.I.F.C.O. The scheduled bank 
u s u a l l y provides guarantee t o t h e i r c l i e n t s having greater f i n a n c i a l 
s t a b i l i t y than t o the ordinary medium group i n v e s t o r s . Therefore, 
i t may be concluded t h a t the medium-sized concerns are s t i l l 
being neglected. 
(c) C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Loans by I n d u s t r i e s . 
The t a b l e below gives the economic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of loans. 
Table 6.3. i n d i c a t e s the group of i n d u s t r i e s assisted 
by the I.D.B.P, and i t may be taken as revealing w i t h i n the 
r e l e v a n t conditions and p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s the l i n e s of the 
Bank's choice and preference i n the granting of loans t o i n d u s t r i e s . 
I t appears from the t a b l e t h a t the t e x t i l e i n d u s t r i e s ( i n c l u d i n g 
j u t e manufacturers) alone have claimed 50 p.c. of the t o t a l loans 
advanced by the Bank whereas the remaining i n d u s t r i e s (except 
n a t u r a l gas) have not claimed any s u b s t a n t i a l amount. Despite the 
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Table 6.3, I.D.B.P. Loans Sanctioned by Industry, 
1961/62 " 1965/66. 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
I n d u s t r i e s 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 Tota l % 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. T e x t i l e s 
other than 92,0 55.0 1Q5.3 40.1 82,4 374.8 33.3 
j u t e . 
2, Jute 6.5 41.9 97.3 47.6 1,9 195.2 17,4 
manufacturers, 
3. Food 11.9 18.3 23.9 20,4 23,3 97.8 8,7 
Products. 
4. Engineering. 2.8 13.1 25.8 11,7 10.0 63,4 5,6 
5. Natural Gas, 0.5 0.2 50,5 • 51.2 4,6 
6. Chemicals. 1.7 10.3 4,3 4.0 8,8 29.1 2,6 
7. Non-metalic 
Minerals. 2.4 4.7 12.3 9,6 8.8 37.8 3,4 
8. Paper and 
P r i n t i n g , 2.3 8.3 10,6 8.3 9.8 39,3 3,5 
9, O i l storage 14.3 2,5 „ 16.8 1,5 
& d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
10. E l e c t r i c a l 
Equipment. 0.7 3.6 2.7 1.4 4.9 13.3 1,2 
11, Wood Products . 0.8 2.1 3.8 1.6 4.1 12.4 1,1 
12, Miscellaneous . 33.0 22.5 57.5 37.9 42.6 193.5 17.2 
T o t a l 168.9 179.8 343.7 235.6 196.6 
i 
1124.6 100 
Source: Six Years of I,D.B,P., p.22. 
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f a c t t h a t the t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y already enjoyed b e t t e r c a p i t a l 
market f a c i l i t i e s and various other sources, as w e l l , f o r 
f i n a n c i n g , the I.D.B.P, a c t u a l l y could not do much t o develop the 
other r e l a t i v e l y neglected i n d u s t r i e s which were not less 
important i n so f a r as they were designed t o s u b s t i t u t e f o r 
imports. 
(d) Regional D i s t r i b u t i o n of Loans: 
A study of the regio n a l brak-up of loans as shown 
i n Table 6.4. below reveals t h a t East Pakistan has received 
comparatively less c r e d i t from the Bank than West Pakistan during 
the past f i v e years of i t s operation. The growth of the 
i n d u s t r i a l sector i n West Pakistan i s r e l a t i v e l y greater than i n 
East Pakistan, This i s l a r g e l y due to the f a c t t h a t f a c i l i t i e s of 
an organised c a p i t a l market, the l e v e l of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and other 
f a c t o r s are adequately a v a i l a b l e i n the western part of the 
country. I n East Pakistan, c a p i t a l i s shy due t o the low l e v e l of 
c a p i t a l formation, lack of organisation and t e c h n i c a l know-how. 
Moreover, i n East Pakistan i n d u s t r i e s are r e l a t i v e l y more narrowly 
based w i t h respect t o dispe r s i o n of t h e i r shares and i t w i l l take a 
long time t o widen the base i n the manner we f i n d i n West Pakistan. 
I t i s only during the Second Plan period t h a t d i s p a r i t y i n 
n a t i o n a l income has been narrowed down and the necessary 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e has been b u i l t up so as t o accelerate i n d u s t r i a l 
growth. 
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The average size of loans sanctioned per annum i n 
the case of East Pakistan comes t o Rs 105 m i l l i o n as against Rs 
120 m i l l i o n i n West Pakistan. I t may be observed from the above 
t a b l e t h a t out of a t o t a l amount of loans of Rs 1124 m i l l i o n 
sanctioned by the Bank up t o June 1966, Rs 526 m i l l i o n or 47 p.c. 
have been sanctioned f o r East Pakistan. The sanction of a lower 
amount to East Pakistan c o n f l i c t s w i t h the Bank's objectives to 
remove economic d i s p a r i t y between the two wings by g r a n t i n g more 
loans t o the eastern region of the country. I n 1965-66, the Bank 
sanctioned Rs 181 m i l l i o n or 37 p.c. of the t o t a l loans sanctioned 
f o r the period. The Bank has explained the s t a t e of a f f a i r s by 
saying t h a t the a p p l i c a t i o n s from East Pakistan were not received 
i n time, w h i l e a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r loans duly approved by the West 
Pakistan Government were received i n time and therefore granted 
accordingly. This however, does not seem t o be a convincing 
enough ground because, under the Central Government d i r e c t i v e s , 
whatever funds were a v a i l a b l e should have been a l l o c a t e d on more or 
less equal basis between the two provinces. The explanation 
o f f e r e d by the Bank appears t o mean as i f i t has i t s own form of 
p r i o r i t i e s which are d i s t i n c t from those l a i d down by the c e n t r a l 
a u t h o r i t y . I f t h i s i s t r u e , an outsider may be j u s t i f i e d i n 
questioning the procedure i n view of t h i s f a c t , t h a t the Bank, a f t e r 
a l l , i s an instrument t o promote c l e a r l y defined o b j e c t i v e s . And, 
as can be v e r i f i e d from the document mentioned at the f o o t , equal 
(13) 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources i s one of these. 
(13) c f . The C o n s t i t u t i o n of Pakistan, A r t i c l e s 145, Clause 3. 
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4, Sources and kinds of Resources of I.D.B.P. 
(a) Rupee Resources: 
As mentioned e a r l i e r , the Bank discharges i t s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i t h i n the framework of Government p o l i c y t o provide 
c r e d i t - f a c i l i t i e s t o the p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l sector f o r the development 
of i n d u s t r i e s as l a i d down i n the I n d u s t r i a l Investment Schedule. To 
achieve these o b j e c t i v e s , the Bank requires f i n a n c i a l resources i n 
both l o c a l and f o r e i g n currencies, which means t h a t i t s resources f a l l 
i n t o two categories, namely, rupee resources and f o r e i g n currency 
resources. Table 6,5, below i n d i c a t e s the sources of rupee resources 
of the Bank. 
Table 6.5. : Sources of Rupee Resources of I.D.B.P. as on 
30th June, 1966. 
Resources Rupees i n 
m i l l i o n 
% 
Paid-up C a p i t a l . 30.0 1 10.0 
Reserves ( i n c l u d i n g Dev.Assistance Fund). 23.1 7.0 
Cre d i t l i n e s from Central Government. 57.4 18.5 
Counter Finance f o r advance t o P.W.S.R. @ 
3J p.c. per annum. 9.3 3.0 
C r e d i t l i n e s from the State Bank, 123,2 40.0 
Deposits etc. 66.8 21.5 
T o t a l Rupee Resources 309.8 ,100,0 
Less outstanding advances and investments. 251.3 81.1 
T o t a l Net Resources a v a i l a b l e 58.5 18.9 
Outstanding Loans 142.0 
S h o r t f a l l 83.5 
Source: Same as Table 6.4. 
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The Bank's rupee resources consist of i t s paid-up 
c a p i t a l , reserve fund, loans from the Central Government, c r e d i t 
l i n e s from the State Bank of Pakistan, o v e r d r a f t f a c i l i t i e s w i t h 
(14) 
the National Bank of Pakistan, proceeds from re-discounting 
b i l l s and deposits from the general p u b l i c . Apart from these 
resources, the Bank i s authorised t o supplement i t s resources 
through the issue and sale of bonds i n the c a p i t a l market. 
The paid-up c a p i t a l of the Bank i s Rs 30 m i l l i o n of 
which 51 p.c. has been subscribed by the Government and the re s t 
by the p u b l i c . The paid-up c a p i t a l and the general reserve 
(15) 
i n c l u d i n g s p e c i a l development assistance funds account f o r 10 
and 7 p.c. r e s p e c t i v e l y of the Bank's rupee resources. The 
reserve funds increased t o Rs 23,1 m i l l i o n i n 1965-66 from Rs 3.2 
m i l l i o n i n 1961-62. I t appears from the trend of reserve c r e a t i o n 
t h a t the I.D.B.P. has i n t e n t i o n t o enhance i t s f i n a n c i a l resources 
by s e t t i n g aside a p a r t of the revenue p r o f i t s each year. However, 
the development of a huge reserve fund would take a long time. 
By f a r the l a r g e s t amount of funds i s secured by borrowings from 
the Central Government and the State Bank of Pakistan. Such amounts 
(14) Loans from the National Bank of Pakistan are guaranteed by 
the Government of Pakistan. 
(15) The development Assistance Fund has been created w i t h the 
dividend and i n t e r e s t payable to the Government. I n order t o 
strengthen the Bank's resources the Government has authorised 
t h i s . 
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c o n s t i t u t e d 18,5 and 40 p.c, r e s p e c t i v e l y of the t o t a l funds at 
the end of June 1966. The loans from the Central Government carry 
rates of i n t e r e s t varying from 2 t o 5.5 pjC.^"*"^^ At the same 
time, |deposits including other accounts amounted to Rs 
(17) 
66.8 m i l l i o n or 22 p.c, of the t o t a l rupee resources. 
By June 1966, t o t a l rupee resources a v a i l a b l e to the 
Bank amounted t o Rs 309.8 m i l l i o n as against t o t a l outstanding 
advances and investments of Rs 251.3 m i l l i o n . A look at the above 
t a b l e reveals t h a t the Bank's resources are not adequate t o meet 
i t s outstanding commitments of loans. During the period 1965-66 
outstanding commitments of loans amounted t o Rs 142 m i l l i o n compared 
w i t h t o t a l net resources of Rs 58.5 m i l l i o n a v a i l a b l e f o r 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . This l e f t a s h o r t f a l l of Rs 83.5 m i l l i o n which i t 
was proposed should be met out of a f u t u r e grant made by the 
Government t o the Bank. 
(16) Out of a t o t a l loan of Rs 57,4 m i l l i o n , Rs 19 m i l l i o n bears no 
i n t e r e s t . The f o l l o w i n g are the rates of i n t e r e s t : 
(@) 2 p.c, per annum Rs 17.5 m i l l i o n , 
(@) 4,5 p.c. per annum Rs 4.9 m i l l i o n , 
(@) 4.5 p.c, per annum Rs 6.0 m i l l i o n . 
(@) 5.5 p.c. per annum Rs 10.0 m i l l i o n 
(17) I n order to increase rupee resources, the Board of Directors 
of the Bank decided on 5th. August, 19^5 to introduce Deposit 
Banking at a l l i t s Regional and Accounting Offices commencing 
from 1st. October 1965» But this decision could not be 
implemented on account of Indo-PaJcistan War i n September, 
1965* The Deposit Banking has, however, been introduced with 
effect from 1st. July 1966. 
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Evidently,the Bank i s heavily dependent on the 
Government and the State Bank of Pakistan f o r i t s loan operation 
a c t i v i t i e s and t h i s dependence lends a c e r t a i n amount of 
u n c e r t a i n t y t o the a v a i l a b i l i t y of resources. Moreover, such 
loans are tended t o be i n f l a t i o n a r y . The e f f e c t of inadequate 
resources seems to be serious i n the sense th a t unnecessary delay 
i s i n v o l ved i n d i s t r i b u t i n g the loans t o the borrowers: and 
l o a n - r e c e i v i n g enterprises might f a i l t o s t a r t operation on 
schedule due t o n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y of funds from the Bank. I t also 
suggests t h a t although there i s a large demand f o r loans, the 
Bank pannot e n t e r t a i n a l l such demands owing t o lack of resources. 
The Bank i s authorised to supplement i t s resources 
by accepting deposits from the p u b l i c or through the issue and 
sale of bonds and debentures i n the c a p i t a l market. But the 
borrowing powers of the I.D.B.P, by means of accepting deposits 
or by the issue and sale of bonds and debentures together w i t h 
contingent l i a b i l i t i e s by way of guarantees and underwriting 
(18) 
agreements cannot exceed f i v e times i t s paid-up c a p i t a l and reserves. 
This sets an upper l i m i t of the borrowing capacity of the Bank, 
The Bank's paid-up c a p i t a l has already been rais e d t o the l e v e l of 
the authorised c a p i t a l and there i s no f u r t h e r scope f o r increasing 
(18) Andrus and Mohammed., Trade, Finance and Development i n 
Pakistan, o p . c i t . , p.182. 
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c a p i t a l unless the Bank's authorised c a p i t a l i s r a i s e d through 
amendments of i t s c h a r t e r . An increase i n the paid-up c a p i t a l 
w i l l improve the base of equity thereby increasing borrowing 
capacity of the Bank. -
Inadequacy of resources might impair the lending 
operations of the Bank t o a considerable extent and as such i t 
i s d e s i r a b l e t o explore the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of securing funds 
through various devices open t o the Bank, The Bank so f a r , 
has not yet had recourse t o bond financing mainly owing t o the 
absence of a bond market i n the country. However, w i t h the 
passage of time, a few i n s t i t u t i o n a l investors have emerged i n 
the country and they are i n c l i n e d t o invest i n f i x e d y i e l d 
accruing s e c u r i t i e s . The I.D.B.P, may make an attempt t o 
supplement i t s resources by i s s u i n g bonds i n the c a p i t a l market. 
(b) Foreign Exchange Resources: 
The f o r e i g n exchange resources of the Bank consist 
of a l l o c a t i o n s made by the Government out of loans secured from 
f o r e i g n countries and i n t e r n a t i o n a l lending agencies. The 
Government negotiates w i t h f o r e i g n countries and agencies t o arrange 
f o r e i g n currency loans f o r the p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l sector and places 
the amount at the Bank's d i s p o s a l . Table 6.6. below shows the 
p o s i t i o n of f o r e i g n currency resources of the Bank since i t s 
i n c e p t i o n u n t i l 30th June 1966. 
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Table 6.6, : Foreign Exchange Resources P o s i t i o n of 
I,D,B.P. as on 30th June 1966. 
Rs m i l l i o n % 
1. Conventional Sources 763.7 79.6 
2. Non-conventional Sources 192.2 20,4 
T o t a l 955.9 100,0 
Less: 
Loans and Guarantees Outstanding 
661.0+ 
L e t t e r s of Credit Outstanding 
86.4+ 747.4 78.2 
Net Resources a v a i l a b l e (1965/66) 208.5 21.8 
Outstanding Commitments 251.2 
S h o r t f a l l 42.7 
Source: I.D.B.P. Annual Report f o r 1965-66. 
I t can be seen from Table 6.6. t h a t a sum of Rs 208.5 
m i l l i o n was a v a i l a b l e t o the Bank f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n during the 
period 1965-66 as against outstanding : committed loans of 
Rs 251,2 m i l l i o n , i n d i c a t i n g a s h o r t f a l l of resources t o the extent 
of Rs 42.7 m i l l i o n . The shortage of f o r e i g n exchange resources 
thus poses a d i f f i c u l t problem f o r the successful operation of the 
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Bank's lending a c t i v i t i e s . 
The f o r e i g n exchange resources are generally received 
from various developed countries e i t h e r through consortia or 
arranged b i l a t e r a l l y . Such loans made a v a i l a b l e t o the Bank can 
be e i t h e r t i e d or u n t i e d . The t i e d loans u s u a l l y carry c e r t a i n 
pre-conditions which must be f u l f i l l e d t o q u a l i f y f o r the b e n e f i t s . 
I t i s u s u a l l y l a i d down as a c o n d i t i o n t h a t the p l a n t and machinery 
should be purchased from the lending country and should be used 
i n some instances f o r s p e c i f i c i n d u s t r i e s . This poses problems of 
t h e i r proper u t i l i s a t i o n . 
The conditions r e l a t i n g to t i e d loans reduce t h e i r 
u t i l i t y t o a considerable extent. The p r i c e of imported c a p i t a l 
goods charged by the s u p p l i e r appears t o be higher than the normal 
p r i c e s : t h i s tends t o lead t o o v e r - c a p i t a l i s a t i o n of the p r o j e c t . 
The e f f e c t of o v e r - c a p i t a l i s a t i o n i s more pronounced i n the case 
of medium-sized e n t e r p r i s e s . However, having no a l t e r n a t i v e , the 
borrowers have t o accept these loans, u l t i m a t e l y at a higher cost. 
The impact of t h i s o v e r - c a p i t a l i s a t i o n i s q u i t e evident on the cost 
of production, and subsequently reduces the margin of p r o f i t . The 
c o n d i t i o n a l nature of loans has r e s t r i c t e d the I.D.B.P.'s freedom 
t o a l l o c a t e funds t o the i n d u s t r y which may appear t o i t as most 
s u i t a b l e . These d i f f i c u l t i e s have been brought t o the notice of 
l o a n - g i v i n g countries time and time again but apparently t o no 
a v a i l . 
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The Bank has been experiencing considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n operating f o r e i g n exchange loans. Loans obtained from 
conventional sources l i k e the U.K., Germany, Japan and the U.S.A. are 
i n greater demand than the loans received from non-conventional 
sources such as the U.S.S.R., China, I t a l y , Poland, Yugoslavia and 
Switzerland. Despite the s c a r c i t y of f o r e i g n exchange resources 
i n v e s t o r s do not seem t o be ready t o accept loans from non-
conventional c o u n t r i e s . These c r e d i t l i n e s , which were made 
a v a i l a b l e t o the Bank f o r the f i r s t time i n 1965-66, were new t o the 
P a k i s t a n i entrepreneurs. However, the I.D.B.P. has been making 
p e r s i s t e n t e f f o r t s t o create a proper awareness of the usefulness 
o f these c r e d i t s and as a r e s u l t the demand f o r t h i s type of loan 
appears t o be encouraging. 
Another aspect of the operation of the Bank i s th a t 
i t cannot negotiate w i t h f o r e i g n investors d i r e c t l y so t h a t f o r e i g n 
i n v e s t o r s are a t t r a c t e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the equity of i n d u s t r i e s 
a s s i s t e d by the I.D.B.P. B a s i c a l l y , the Bank's e f f o r t s are mainly 
(18) I t may be noted t h a t because of strong commercial r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
countries l i k e the U.K., West Germany, Japan and the U.S.A. loans 
obtained from these countries are most s u i t a b l e f o r proper 
u t i l i z a t i o n . The funds from these sources seem to be c a l l e d i n 
Pakistan 'Conventional Sources'. I n con t r a s t , loans received from 
other c o u n t r i e s , o f t e n c a l l e d non-conventional source, create a 
complex problem i n securing the r i g h t type of machinery and i t s 
proper use. The d i f f e r e n c e of language also becomes a greater 
problem f o r the instaJilatien and operation of the p l a n t and 
machinery through technicians of the loan-giving countries. I n 
a d d i t i o n , standards of manufacture being d i f f e r e n t , d i f f i c u l t y of 
feeding machinery of one o r i g i n w i t h spares or raw materials of 
another o r i g i n i s not uncommon. 
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concentrated on the development of medium and small-sized 
i n d u s t r i e s where f o r e i g n investors are less i n t e r e s t e d t o provide 
assistance. 
The p r o v i s i o n of long term c r e d i t at a low i n t e r e s t 
r a t e does not represent the r e a l cost of the c a p i t a l . The Bank 
charges a r a t e of i n t e r e s t which varies from 7 t o 8 p.c. 
( p r e v i o u s l y 6,5 t o 7.5 p.c.) on rupee loans and a uniform r a t e of 
7.5 p.c. f o r f o r e i g n exchange loans per annum. These varying 
rates of i n t e r e s t have created unnecessary d i f f i c u l t y f o r the Bank 
i n e x p l a i n i n g the reasons thereof t o i t s customers. 
I n view of the shortage of c a p i t a l , the r a t e of 
i n t e r e s t which the Bank charges would appear t o be unduly low i n 
the sense t h a t the o p p o r t u n i t y cost of c a p i t a l i s very high i n the 
newly established i n d u s t r i e s of Pakistan. However, t h i s may be 
j u s t i f i e d i n those cases where r i s k s are comparatively low. But i n 
those cases where r i s k s are high or i n which demand i s greater i n 
view of prospects f o r higher r e t u r n , charging of higher rates would 
help the process of s e l e c t i o n of marginal borrowers. The Bank 
j u s t i f i e s the subsidised r a t e of i n t e r e s t on the ground th a t there 
would be an i n s u f f i c i e n t demand f o r Bank's loans from the p r i v a t e 
sector. This assumption has no sound basis as the demand f o r loans 
does not seem t o have been low at any period since i t s i n c e p t i o n . 
Moreover, the demand f o r f o r e i g n exchange loan i s very high i n 
Pakistan so much so t h a t i t i s s o l d at a much higher r a t e i n the open 
market. 
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Despite c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s and short-comings the 
I.D.B.P. has rendered valuable services t o the development of the 
manufacturing sector i n Pakistan. When f o r e i g n exchange i s such a 
necessary requirement f o r the purchase of c a p i t a l goods and s e t t i n g 
up i n d u s t r y , the lack of i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements f o r providing 
long-term f o r e i g n exchange c r e d i t would c e r t a i n l y have handicapped 
the progress of i n d u s t r i a l growth e s p e c i a l l y a t t h i s stage of 
development i f i t were not provided. The I.D.B.P. has been 
instrumental i n inducing investment i n the country i n the measure of 
the loans advanced by them,. This can be seen from the r a t i o of 
I.D.B.P, loans t o t o t a l p r i v a t e investment made i n the assisted 
e n t e r p r i s e which was 1 : 2.4 and t h i s gives an impression of the 
r o l e of the Bank i n d i r e c t i n g investment i n t o the i n d u s t r i a l sector 
and thus a tendency t o cause considerable income generation f o r the 
economy as a whole.^^^^ I t may also be added t h a t the c a p i t a l 
output r a t i o of the Bank's assisted i n d u s t r i e s i s estimated a t 1.3 
as against a r a t i o of 1.5 f o r the p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l sector as a 
whole (excluding small scale i n d u s t r i e s ) . The low c a p i t a l output 
r a t i o i s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the emphasis given by the Bank i n 
(21) 
s e l e c t i n g p r o j e c t s w i t h low c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y . 
(20) Pakistan Economic gurvey 1966-67, o p . c i t . , p.149. 
(21) I b i d . 
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B, The Pakistan I n d u s t r i a l Credit and Investment Corporation 
L t d . ( P . I . e . I . e . ) . 
1. O r i g i n ; 
During the m i d - f i f t i e s when the F i r s t Plan 
was launched the demand f o r i n d u s t r i a l c r e d i t i n the country 
rose considerably. The P.I.F.C.O, which was then f u n c t i o n i n g , 
was unable t o meet t h i s demand, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n respect of 
f o r e i g n exchange. I t was because of t h i s t h a t a f e e l i n g grew 
t h a t a second f i n a n c i a l intermediary should be set up, w i t h 
wider scope, t o increase the long and medium-'term i n d u s t r i a l 
c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s f o r the p r i v a t e sector. With t h i s end i n 
view, the Pakistan I n d u s t r i a l Credit.and Investment Corporation 
was e s t a b l i s h e d , i n October 1957, as a p r i v a t e l y owned 
cor p o r a t i o n w i t h l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y , r e g i s t e r e d under the Companies 
Act of 1913, The main purposes of the Corporation were to 
provide loans i n both domestic and f o r e i g n currencies, t o 
promote i n d u s t r i e s by e q u i t y p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and encourage the 
flow of f o r e i g n loan funds i n t o the country. 
The Corporation i s a lending-cum-investment 
c o r p o r a t i o n . The ownership of t h i s Corporation l i e s w i t h l o c a l 
and f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s . Of i t s t o t a l paid-up c a p i t a l , 60 p,c, 
has been subscribed by the l o c a l i n v e s t o r s , the remaining 40 p,c. 
by the f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s . The management of the Corporation i s 
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vested on a Board of D i r e c t o r s c o n s i s t i n g of 21 members, 17 of 
whom are elected by the l o c a l and f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a n t s and 3 
are appointed by the Government representing the Central and 
(22) 
P r o v i n c i a l Governments. The Managing D i r e c t o r , Chief 
Executive of the Corporation, i s appointed by the Government. 
The Managing D i r e c t o r runs the Corporation i n accordance w i t h 
the p o l i c y and d i r e c t i o n s o u t l i n e d by the Board of D i r e c t o r s , 
He i s assisted by deputy managing d i r e c t o r s at Karachi, Dacca 
and Lahore. I n a d d i t i o n t o i t s head o f f i c e at Karachi and one 
l i a s o n o f f i c e a t Rawalpindi, the Corporation has two r e g i o n a l 
o f f i c e s at Dacca and Lahore each under the superintendence of 
a deputy managing d i r e c t o r . 
2. Objectives and Functions, C r i t e r i a and P r i o r i t i e s i n Lending 
o f the Corporation, 
Objectives and Functions; 
The main objectives of the P.I.C.I.C. are:-
( i ) t o a s s i s t the p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l sector by p r o v i d i n g 
long and mediiim^term c r e d i t i n both l o c a l and f o r e i g n 
currencies, p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n equity c a p i t a l or by 
(2.8) As the Government holds the i n t e r e s t i n the Corporation by 
way of loan amounting t o Rs 70 m i l l i o n . 
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subscribing t o debentures, 
( i i ) t o underwrite the p u b l i c issue of shares and debentures 
and provide guarantee and counter guarantee f o r loans 
and o b l i g a t i o n s , 
( i i i ) t o make arrangements f o r the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of l o c a l and 
f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s i n i n d u s t r i e s , 
( i v ) t o provide t e c h n i c a l advice and managerial services t o 
the p r i v a t e sector, and 
( v ) t o f a c i l i t a t e the c r e a t i o n , issue or conversion of c a p i t a l 
i n any form and t o act as a t r u s t e e i n connections 
t h e r e w i t h . 
C r i t e r i a and Priorita;es i n Lending; 
I n order t o achieve these objectives the 
Corporation f o l l o w s c e r t a i n basic p r i n c i p l e s i n i t s operations 
which may be described as f o l l o w s : -
( i ) I t s e l e c t s only those undertakings which are l i s t e d i n 
the I n d u s t r i a l Investment Schedule f o r the p r i v a t e 
sector prepared by the Government. I t seeks to assure 
i t s e l f of the t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y , f i n a n c i a l and 
economic soundness, and product m a r k e t a b i l i t y of the 
p r o j e c t before g r a n t i n g any f i n a n c i a l assistance and 
f o r t h i s purpose i t has a nucleus of t e c h n i c a l 
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(23) s t a f f . Even though the Corporation has freedom t o 
choose any i n d u s t r y w i t h i n the framework of the I n d u s t r i a l 
Investment Schedule, preference i s given i n p r a c t i c e t o 
i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i n g , export o r i e n t a t e d i n d u s t r i e s based on 
indigenous raw m a t e r i a l s , 
( i i ) The Corporation as a matter of p o l i c y , intends t o a s s i s t 
the undertakings i n underdeveloped areas provided these 
are economically sound and t e c h n i c a l l y f e a s i b l e . This 
p o l i c y i s pursued to d i v e r s i f y the i n d u s t r i a l development 
of the country. 
( i i i ) The Corporation r e t a i n s an i n t e r e s t i n the management only 
when i t f e e l s i t t o be necessary t o pro t e c t i t s i n t e r e s t . 
I t leaves the management i n the hands of the owners of the 
company unless the s a f e t y of the loan i s involved, 
( i v ) I t i s one of the declared p o l i c i e s of the Corporation not 
t o finance working c a p i t a l f o r any p r o j e c t and so 
compete w i t h commercial banks. 
As regards s e c u r i t y , the P.I.C.I.C. accepts 
both the e x i s t i n g assets and pr,o3;pective assets t o be created by i t s 
loan. Generally loans from the P.I.C.I.C. are the f i r s t charge on 
(23) A team of s p e c i a l i s t s c o n s i s t i n g of f i n a n c i a l a n a l y s t s , i n d u s t r i a l 
engineers and market s p e c i a l i s t s i n v e s t i g a t e s the c r e d i t 
worthiness of the p r o j e c t . For the preparation of f e a s i b i l i t y 
r e ports applicants are advised t o f u r n i s h necessary information 
before a loan a p p l i c a t i o n i s accepted. 
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the assets of the borrowing e n t e r p r i s e . I n exceptional cases, 
P.I . e .I . e . demands a commercial banks guarantee. I n the case 
of a p r i v a t e l i m i t e d company i t i s a declared p o l i c y of the 
Corporation t o demand a personal guarantee of the d i r e c t o r s . 
The Corporation charges i n t e r e s t at 8 p.c. 
(24) 
per annum w i t h m a t u r i t i e s of about 10 t o 15 years. Loans 
are expected t o be repaid w i t h i n the m a t u r i t y - p e r i o d i n equal 
semi-annual instalments. The f i r s t instalment of repayment 
begins s i x months t o a year a f t e r the p r o j e c t has gone i n t o 
production. 
The minimum l i m i t of a loan t o any 
prospective borrower i s Rs 1.5 m i l l i o n i n f o r e i g n currency and 
(25) 
Rs 2.5 m i l l i o n i n l o c a l currency. However, under a special 
arrangement made by the Government of Pakistan w i t h the World 
Bank, P.I.C.I.C. has been allowed to reduce i t s lending l i m i t 
f o r any one loan t o Rs 0.25 m i l l i o n f o r balancing, modernisation 
and replacement requirements of small and medium-sized i n d u s t r i a l 
u n i t s . 
(24) Previously the Corporation used t o charge 6.5 p.c. on rupee 
loans and 7.5 p.c. on f o r e i g n currency loans, 
(25) Government-sponsored Corporations, o p . c i t . , p.25. 
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3. Review of A c t i v i t i e s of Pakistan I n d u s t r i a l Credit and 
Investment Corporation. 
(a) Lending operation and assistance provided; 
Table 6.7. below shows the amount of loans 
sanctioned and disbursed and other assistance provided by P.I.C.I.C. 
from 1958 t o 1966. The Corporation has sanctioned loans amounting 
t o Rs 1186 m i l l i o n t o a wide range of enterprises comprising 
512 p r o j e c t s - Rs 1148 m i l l i o n (97 p.c.) i n f o r e i g n currencies and 
Rs 38 m i l l i o n i n l o c a l currency. This c l e a r l y i ndicates the 
i n t e n s i t y of demand f o r f o r e i g n currencies i n the country. The 
Corporation has p e r s i s t e n t l y concentrated i t s a c t i v i t i e s on the 
p r o v i s i o n of f o r e i g n currency loans w i t h the expectation t h a t the 
rupee funds r e q u i r e d f o r s e t t i n g up an e n t e r p r i s e would be 
provided by i t s promoters or sponsors. I t w i l l be seen from the 
t a b l e t h a t the Corporation's operational a c t i v i t i e s have increased 
progressively since i t s i n c e p t i o n i n 1957. However, f o r several 
reasons, the amount of loans sanctioned declined i n 1965. This 
was because, f i r s t l y , an emergency s i t u a t i o n had p r e v a i l e d i n 
the country during the second h a l f of the year because of war 
between Pakistan and I n d i a ; secondly, the a i d - g i v i n g countries 
suspended the supply of a i d f o l l o w i n g the war. These s i t u a t i o n s , 
however, were s h o r t - l i v e d and Corporation a c t i v i t y showed again 
an upward trend. The average loans sanctioned per annum worked 
out t o be Rs 132 m i l l i o n over the l a s t 9 years of i t s operation. 
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Column 5 of Table 6.7. indicates the loans 
disbursed during the r e l e v a n t periods, w h i l e column 8 shows the 
p r o p o r t i o n of loan disbursed out of the sanctioned loans. The 
proportions of disbursements do not show any uniform trend. The 
highest amount of u t i l i z a t i o n was recorded (90 p.c.) i n 1965, 
A study of the Corporation's resources p o s i t i o n suggests t h a t 
the low r a t i o of disbursement was not i n f a c t due t o inadequate 
funds but r a t h e r t o n o n - f i n a n c i a l reasons. 
F i r s t l y , there i s a time-lag between loan 
sanctioning and loan disbursement. Although a loan i s sanctioned 
by the P.I.C.I.C. i t i s not committed unless a loan agreement i s 
signed between the s u p p l i e r of c r e d i t and the borrower, A 
considerable time may be taken t o complete the relevant 
f o r m a l i t i e s before such an agreement i s made. Meanwhile, the 
borrowers may change t h e i r mind or may not be i n a p o s i t i o n t o 
arrange the required rupee counterpart. For these reasons, there 
remains a gap between loans committed and loans disbursed. I t has 
been observed t h a t only 55 p.c. of the sanctioned loan was 
disbursed over the period under study. However, ta k i n g i n t o 
c onsideration other assistance the r a t i o comes t o about 66 p.c. 
An attempt t o increase the disbursement r a t i o might increase the 
Corporation's o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y . 
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Secondly, other f a c t o r s l i k e delay i n the a c q u i s i t i o n 
of land f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g f a c t o r y b u i l d i n g ; n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
raw materials and power; delay i n completing procedural a c t i v i t i e s , 
are, also, p a r t l y responsible f o r the low r a t i o of disbursement. 
The Corporation, however, makes an e f f o r t f o r an e a r l y i n s t a l l a t i o n 
of the p l a n t and machinery imported w i t h the help of i t s c r e d i t 
so t h a t the p r o j e c t can go i n t o production as soon as possible. 
For example, a l e t t e r of c r e d i t i s not issued by the Corporation i n 
favour of the borrower unless the construction of f a c t o r y b u i l d i n g 
i s completed. 
Apart from p r o v i d i n g long and medium-term loans t o 
i n d u s t r i e s , the Corporation has provided assistance f o r the 
promotion of i n d u s t r y i n various other forms. From January 1958 
t o December 1966, P.I.C.I.C, has sponsored 20 j o i n t ventures i n 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h l o c a l and f o r e i g n p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s . I t i s 
expected t h a t t h i s w i l l r e s u l t i n an i n f l o w of Rs 57,88 m i l l i o n 
worth of f o r e i g n c a p i t a l , besides, t e c h n i c a l know-how and 
managerial s k i l l s . 
The Corporation has so f a r made an equity investment 
of Rs 15.02 m i l l i o n i n 16 p r o j e c t s and has underwritten 11 p u b l i c 
issues f o r Rs 50.08 m i l l i o n . As an investment i n s t i t u t i o n i t 
intends t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the equity of l a r g e r p r o j e c t s . I t 
p a r t i c i p a t e s i n the e q u i t y e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or through c o n v e r t i b l e 
debentures or through the a c q u i s i t i o n of underwriting commitments. 
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Up t o 1966, the un d e r w r i t i n g absorption of the Corporation amounted 
to Rs 5,48 m i l l i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , i t has arranged a sum of 
Rs 237.11 m i l l i o n from abroad f o r 11 large p r o j e c t s . Thus, t o t a l 
assistance provided or arranged by the Corporation amounted to 
(26) 
Rs 1555 m i l l i o n by the year ending December 1966. 
P,I,C,I.C, has the option t o convert at par any of 
the debentures held by i t s e l f i n t o f u l l y paid shares of the 
company up t o 20 p.c. of the nominal amount of debentures issued. 
By a l l o w i n g an o p t i o n t o convert loan stock i n t o ordinary shares, 
the borrowing concern intends t o a t t r a c t the a t t e n t i o n of the 
lending agencies. T h i s ^ r i g h t allows the lenders to exercise t h e i r 
o p t i o n t o t h e i r best advantage. For example, debenture holders 
having a p r i o r claim on the company's earnings and assets may be 
turned i n t o e q u i t y holders when the earnings of the borrowing 
concern have increased s u b s t a n t i a l l y . 
This r i g h t of P.I.C.I,C. produces c e r t a i n e f f e c t s upon 
the owners of the e x i s t i n g e q u i t y . To some extent the c a p i t a l 
s t r u c t u r e of the borrowing company remains subject t o unce r t a i n t y 
i n the sense t h a t the s t r u c t u r e may take a d i f f e r e n t shape i f 
P.I.C,I .e . exercises i t s r i g h t of option. I n a d d i t i o n , i t creates 
some problems t o the management of the company, since i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o v i s u a l i s e how much of the loan (of 20 p.c.) w i l l be 
(26) P.I.C.I.C.'s Annual Report ~ 1966. 
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converted i n t o shares and how much w i l l be paid o f f on m a t u r i t y . I t 
seems t h a t the c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e of the company t o t h i s extent i s at 
the mercy of the market and not under the complete c o n t r o l of the 
(27) 
d i r e c t o r s . On the other hand, the Company may not be i n a 
p o s i t i o n t o r a i s e c a p i t a l through new issues. I t may be argued t h a t 
s p e c i a l i s e d i n s t i t u t i o n s are loan-giving agencies and t h e i r 
assistance to any i n d u s t r i a l concern must have a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
the equity invested by the borrowers. The consideration of debt/equity 
r a t i o i s most v i t a l f o r the lending i n s t i t u t i o n because the equity i n 
the form of assets i s pledged against loans and as such P.I.C.I.C. 
should not p a r t i c i p a t e i n e q u i t y . These arguments are j u s t i f i e d , 
and i t may be thought, i f we consider the problem from a t h e o r e t i c a l 
p o i n t of view. But l o o k i n g i n t o the problems from another angle, 
the r e s t r i c t e d use of the r i g h t of option by P,I,C,I.C. may be 
thought to be j u s t i f i e d , P,I,C,I,C. has adopted a more dynamic 
and f l e x i b l e mode of f i n a n c i n g which includes an admixture of loan 
and e q u i t y f i n a n c i n g , i n v o l v i n g f o r example, debentures c o n v e r t i b l e 
i n t o ordinary shares, income notes carrying no f i x e d r a t e of i n t e r e s t 
and so on. On the other hand, the borrowing concerns are i n a 
p o s i t i o n t o pay o f f a p a r t of the loan i n shares. Considering the 
circumstances e x i s t i n g i n Pakistan t h i s type of approach t o the 
p r o v i s i o n of assistance may w e l l be thought t o be a move i n the r i g h t 
d i r e c t i o n . 
(27) Moor, Ronald W., o p . c i t . , p.175. 
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(b) Size of Loans; 
The t a b l e below shows the loan concentration according 
t o s i z e . I t w i l l be seen from the table t h a t loans amounting t o 
Table 6.8. P,I.C.I,C, Loans Sanctioned by Size up t o 
31st December, 1964. 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Size of Loans No.of Projects Amount Per Cent 
Loans up t o Rs 0.5 m i l l i o n 126 40 5 
Loans over Rs 0.5 t o 1.0 
m i l l i o n . 84 65 8 
Loans over Rs 1.0 t o Rs 2.5 
m i l l i o n . 118 201 26 
Loans over Rs 2.5 m i l l i o n . 77 469 61 
T o t a l 405 775 100 
* The data r e l a t i n g t o loans by size are not a v a i l a b l e a f t e r 
1964. 
Source: P.I.C,I,C, at Work - O f f i c i a l Brochure, 
Rs 2.5 m i l l i o n and over account f o r 61 p,c. of the loans 
sanctioned by the Corporation whereas small-sized loans ranging 
from Rs 0,5 m i l l i o n t o Rs 1,0 m i l l i o n account f o r only 13 p.c, of 
the t o t a l loans. This c l e a r l y i ndicates the Corporation's 
preference f o r accommodating large-sized loans instead of small ones, 
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(C) C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Loans and A s s i s t a n c e by I n d u s t r i e s . 
The P.I . e .I . e . has freedom to choose any i n d u s t r y f o r 
a s s i s t a n c e provided i t i s l i s t e d i n the I n d u s t r i a l Investment 
Schedule. The f o l l o w i n g t a b l e gives the break-down of loans and 
a s s i s t a n c e provided by the eorporation to d i f f e r e n t groups of 
i n d u s t r i e s . 
I t would appear from Table 6.9. t h a t the major part 
of the loans sanctioned by P.I . e .I.C. has gone to the t e x t i l e 
i n d u s t r y : i t accounts f o r 43 p.c. of the t o t a l loans sanctioned 
during the period under review. Actual amount of disbursement 
however, estimated to be Rs 279 m i l l i o n as a g a i n s t sanctioned 
loansof Rs 503 m i l l i o n . I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s , the eorporation has 
a l s o arranged another Rs 31 m i l l i o n for investment i n the t e x t i l e 
i n d u s t r y i n the form of equity p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and f o r e i g n p r i v a t e 
( 28 ) 
investment. Thus the t o t a l e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e provided by 
the Corporation to t h i s i n d u s t r y amounted to Rs 310 m i l l i o n , or 
30 p.c, of the t o t a l a s s i s t a n c e . Sugar and a l l i e d i n d u s t r i e s have 
claimed 19 p.c. of the sanctioned loan but r e c e i v e d 13 p.c. of the 
t o t a l e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e . The other r e c i p i e n t s of loans were 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, engineering, e l e c t r i c a l and metal 
i n d u s t r i e s , o i l r e f i n i n g and gas d i s t r i b u t i o n , cement and paper 
i n d u s t r i e s . 
(28) By e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e we mean the a c t u a l amount disbursed and 
the amount r e c e i v e d by i n d u s t r y i n other forms. 
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Out of a t o t a l sanctioned loansof Rs 1186 m i l l i o n , 
the new i n d u s t r i e s have accounted for Rs 875 m i l l i o n i . e . , 74 p.c. 
w h i l e the remaining 26 p.c. has gone to e x i s t i n g i n d u s t r i e s . 
Amongst the new i n d u s t r i e s , j u t e manufacturing i s the l a r g e s t 
r e c i p i e n t followed by sugar. Among the e x i s t i n g i n d u s t r i e s , 
c otton t e x t i l e s a re the l e a d e r , accounting f o r 49 p.c. of the 
t o t a l sanctioned l o a n s ^ ^ ^ ^ The cotton t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y being 
the o l d e s t i n d u s t r y r e q u i r e d finance mostly f o r balancing, 
modernisation or expansion of e x i s t i n g u n i t s . The cotton t e x t i l e 
i n d u s t r y being o l d and having always enjoyed the c r e d i t 
f a c i l i t i e s i n the country should have been able to finance a 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n programme out of i t s own r e s o u r c e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
from bonus e a r n i n g s . However, the P.I.C.I.C.'s a t t i t u d e of 
i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c i n g has been much i n l i n e w i t h the general 
i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y of the Government and planner's aim i n 
developing the import s u b s t i t u t i n g i n d u s t r i e s . 
(d) Regional D i s t r i b u t i o n of Loans; 
The r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of loans sanctioned i s 
given i n Table 6.10. 
(29) P.I.C.I.C.'s Annual Report.1966. 
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Table 6.10. : Regional D i s t r i b u t i o n of Loans Sanctioned 
by P.I .e .I .e . . 1958-66. 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Year ending 
December 
Ea s t 
P a k i s t a n 
West 
P a k i s t a n 
T o t a l 2 as p.c. 
of 4. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Up to 1963 163 405 568 29 
1964 21 186 207 10 
1965 0 158 158 0 
1966 149 104 253 59 
T o t a l 333 853 1186 28 
Source:" 
( i ) F i n a n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n s - National and I n t e r n a t i o n a l , p.42. 
( i i ) P a k i s t a n Economic Survey 1964-65, p.139. 
( i i i ) P.I.C.I.e.'s Annual Report for 1966. 
Given the Government o b j e c t i v e i n r e s p e c t of 
r e g i o n a l development, the d i s t r i b u t i o n of loans, does not appear to 
be r a t i o n a l i n the sense t h a t 72 p.c. of the t o t a l loan was 
sa n c t i o n e d to West P a k i s t a n compared with only 28 p.c. i n E a s t 
P a k i s t a n . But t h i s s i t u a t i o n has emerged due to the f a c t that under 
the s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s of the eorporation i t s minimum lending 
l i m i t i s Rs 2,5 m i l l i o n ; E a s t Pakistan's absorption c a p a c i t y being 
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low f o r reasons d i s c u s s e d on page; 206 , the 
demand f o r P.I.C.1,0, loans tended to remain r a t h e r low. Moreover, 
p r o j e c t s submitted by the entrepreneurs i n E a s t P a k i s t a n i n the 
past o f t e n l a c k e d t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y . Unless the i n d u s t r i a l 
p r o j e c t formulation i n E a s t P a k i s t a n i s improved through some 
advi s o r y s e r v i c e s t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s l i k e l y to p e r s i s t i n that 
r e g i o n . At t h i s stage one f e e l s that the I.D.B.P. can play a more 
e f f e c t i v e r o l e i n E a s t P a k i s t a n by advancing loans of r e l a t i v e l y 
s m a l l e r s i z e than the P.I,C,I,C, 
B e s i d e s , loan a p p l i c a t i o n from Ea s t P a k i s t a n may be 
considered on the b a s i s of i t s needs r a t h e r than comparing i t s 
s u i t a b i l i t y on the l i n e s of West Paki s t a n , I t i s now a w e l l 
e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t t h a t development of both wings i s e q u a l l y important 
f o r the o v e r a l l economic development of the country. For t h i s , 
the P,I , e.I , e . may do a l o t by pursuing a separate c r e d i t p o l i c y 
w i t h l i b e r a l lending c r i t e r i a f o r the new entrants i n t o the 
i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d i n East. P a k i s t a n . 
4. Sources and Resources of the Corporation. 
Table 6,11. shows the resources p o s i t i o n of P.I.C.I . e . 
up to December, 1966. 
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Ta b l e 6.11. Resources P o s i t i o n of P.I . e . I . C . as on 
31st December, 1966. 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Amount Per' Cent 
Share C a p i t a l 40 3.6 
Reserves and Surplus 27 2.4 
Government Loan 70 6.2 
AID Loan 30 2.9 
Rupee Resources 167 14.9 
F o r e i g n Currency Loans 955 85.1 
T o t a l Resources 1122 100 ,0 
Les s :-
Outstanding Advances 
(excluding repayments) 
473 42,2 
Other Investments 64 5.7 
Net Resources A v a i l a b l e 585 52.1 
Source;- P.I.C.I.C.'s Annual Report f o r 1966. 
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(a ) Rupee Resources; 
As can be seen from Table 6.11. the rupee resources 
c o n s i s t mainly of i t s paid-up c a p i t a l , unappropriated p r o f i t s and 
loans from the C e n t r a l Government. The i n i t i a l share c a p i t a l of the 
Corporation was Rs 20 m i l l i o n which was subsequently r a i s e d to 
Rs 40 m i l l i o n i n 1963 as a g a i n s t the authorised c a p i t a l of Rs 150 
m i l l i o n . S i x t y per cent of the share c a p i t a l was subscribed by l o c a l 
shareholders and the remaining 40 p.c. by fo r e i g n p r i v a t e 
(30) 
i n v e s t o r s . To i n c r e a s e i t s resources the Corporation has 
p r o g r e s s i v e l y b u i l t up a s u b s t a n t i a l r e s e r v e fund which represented 
2.4 p.c. of t o t a l r e s o u r c e s by 31st December 1966. 
Rupee borrowings from the Government of P a k i s t a n 
c o n s t i t u t e d an important p a r t of the Corporation's r e s o u r c e s . From 
the s t a r t the P. I . e . I . C. r e c e i v e d a long-term i n t e r e s t f r e e loan 
of Rs 30 m i l l i o n from the Government. The Government granted a 
second loan of Rs 30 m i l l i o n c a r r y i n g an i n t e r e s t r a t e of 4 p.c. 
per annum i n 1961. Another loan of Rs 10 m i l l i o n was made a v a i l a b l e 
to P.I . e .I . e . a t 5.5 p.c. i n t e r e s t per annum i n 1965. I n a d d i t i o n , 
(31) 
the eorporation has r e c e i v e d a loan of Rs 30 m i l l i o n bearing 
(30) Of the 40 p.c. share c a p i t a l , the shares were d i s t r i b u t e d i n the 
fo l l o w i n g p r o p o r t i o n s ; - I.F.C, (5 p . c , ) , p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s i n 
the U.S.A. (11 p . c , ) , the U.K. and Canadian shareholders (10.7 
P.C.), Japan (7.3 p.c.) and West Germany (6 p . c . ) . 
(31) T h i s loan was given out of PL 480 counterpart funds. 
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i n t e r e s t at 5.5 p.c, per annum from the United S t a t e s Agency fo r 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development (A.I.D.) i n 1966. The outstanding 
amounts of these loans are subordinated to shareholders•^ equity. 
Thus borrowings from the Government and A.I.D. aggregated to 
Rs 100 m i l l i o n which c o n s t i t u t e d a part of the equity base f o r 
purposes of f o r e i g n currency l o a n s . I t means that f o r determining 
the debt/equity r a t i o these loans are to be considered as equity. 
(b) Foreign Exchange Resources. 
The Corporation's foreign exchange requirements are 
g e n e r a l l y met from loans provided by the World Bank, i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e the I.F.C., and c r e d i t given by the 
f r i e n d l y c o u n t r i e s . The Government a l l o c a t e s f o r e i g n exchange 
c r e d i t to the Corporation out of funds obtained by the Government 
from d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s . The t a b l e below shows the break-down 
of f o r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s resources r e c e i v e d by the Corporation up to 
31st December 1966. 
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Table 6.12. Foreig n Currency Resources P o s i t i o n of 
P.I . e .I . e . as on 31st December 1966. 
(Rs M i l l i o n ) . 
Country/Agency 
L i n e s of Cr e d i t 
Percentage 
For e i g n Currency 
i n $ 
Rupee 
Equiv a l e n t 
IeB«R*D• 108.86 518.42 54.3 
K.F.W. (W.Germany) 27.50 130.95 13.7 
U.S.A. (A.I.D.) 21.60 102.87 10.8 
Japan. 15.46 73.65 7.7 
U.K. 10.34 49.24 5.2 
Poland. 2.94 14.00 1.5 
F r a n c e . 7.72 36.74 3.8 
Czechoslovakia. 2.94 14.00 1.5 
I t a l y 3.10 14.76 1.5 
T o t a l 200.46 954.63 100.0 
Source:- P.I . e .I . e . 's Annual Report, 196§. 
As can be seen from the t a b l e , the bulk of the f o r e i g n 
exchange fund, (Rs 518 m i l l i o n or 54 p . c ) , has come from the 
I.B.R.D. which i s followed i n importance by the K.F.W., tjie JJ^S.A,, 
(A . I . D . ) , Japan and the U.K. The loans r e c e i v e d from non-
conventional sources namely F r a n c e , Poland, Czechoslovakia and I t a l y 
c o n s t i t u t e only 8,3 p.c. of the Corporation's f o r e i g n exchange 
r e s o u r c e s . Because of the newness of these loans and other f a c t o r s 
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d i s c u s s e d on page 216 , the i n v e s t o r s i n P a k i s t a n are r e l u c t a n t 
to accept them. 
Fo r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s made a v a i l a b l e to the P.I . e .I,C. 
(32) 
i n c l u d e both t i e d and un t i e d loans. The I.B.R.D. loans 
a r e most convenient f o r the purpose as they are not t i e d . These 
loans a r e op e r a t i v e i n any member country of the World Bank. 
N a t u r a l l y , the demand f o r I.B.R.D. loans i s very high. The I.B.R.D, 
loans and c r e d i t s have been d i r e c t l y obtained by P.I , e,I,C. 
These loans could not be made a v a i l a b l e d i r e c t l y to p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e , because of the l i k e l y misuse of loans i n the absence of 
s u p e r v i s i o n by a f i n a n c i a l intermediary. Other i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
f i n a n c i a l lending agencies too would be r e l u c t a n t to provide loans 
d i r e c t l y to the p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . The Corporation, thus, has 
rendered v a l u a b l e s e r v i c e s i n obtaining c r e d i t from i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
From the above d i s c u s s i o n , i t w i l l appear t h a t , by and 
l a r g e , the o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y of the Corporation depends l a r g e l y 
on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of f o r e i g n exchange resources a t i t s d i s p o s a l . 
The rupee component does not seem to be a problem to the i n v e s t o r s 
approaching P . I . C . I . C . f o r a s s i s t a n c e i n the sense that the 
r e q u i r e d rupee c a p i t a l i s expected to be provided by the sponsors 
of the company themselves. Therefore, the main concerns of the 
Corporation i s to i n c r e a s e i t s f o r e i g n currency r e s o u r c e s . 
(32) See page 215 
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P . I . e . I . C , i s au t h o r i s e d to make borrowings up to Rs 600 m i l l i o n 
(33) 
outstanding a t any time. The World Bank however, has r u l e d 
t h a t the P.I.C.I . e.'s borrowings should not exceed four times 
the v a l u e of share c a p i t a l , r e s e r v e s and subordinated l o a n s . 
The outstanding borrowings i n f o r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s amounted to 
Rs 428 m i l l i o n up to 31st December 1966, which i s w e l l below the 
Corporation's a b i l i t y to borrow (four times would come to about 
Rs 668 m i l l i o n ) . However, i n view of the i n c r e a s i n g demand f o r 
loans i n f o r e i g n Currencies; i t i s feared t h a t i n f u t u r e the 
Corporation might run s h o r t of the funds to meet i t s commitments. 
The r i s i n g demand f o r loans may be seen from the f a c t s t h a t 
during the years 1965 and 1966, 99 p.c. of the loans sanctioned 
(34) 
by P.I . e .I . e . were i n f o r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s , 
5. E v a l u a t i o n : 
From the d i s c u s s i o n on the oper a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s of 
P.I.C.I . e . over the l a s t 9 years ending December 1966, i t appears that 
the lending operations of the Corporation were comprehensive and 
cover a wide range of i n d u s t r i e s . I t seems t h a t the P.I.C, I . C . has the 
(33) P a k i s t a n i s among the 21 co u n t r i e s of the world with which the 
World Bank Group has been a s s o c i a t e d f o r encouraging the 
establishment and expansion of development fi n a n c e companies. 
P . I . C . I . C . has the support of the World Bank and i t s a f f i l i a t e s 
and as such the World Bank has a c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t on 
P.I.C.I . e . 
(34) P . I . C . I . C ' s Annual Reports, 1965 and 1966, 
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comparatively easy a c c e s s to various sources of f o r e i g n exchange 
reso u r c e s compared w i t h the I.D.B.P. The Corporation, being a 
p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e , enjoys a g r e a t e r degree of freedom i n 
o p e r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s than the I.D.B.P. T h i s has made i t p o s s i b l e 
f o r the Corporation to adopt a f l e x i b l e c r e d i t p o l i c y i n the 
p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . The ways and means through which an 
e n t e r p r i s e i s a s s i s t e d by P . I . C . I . C . a r e not so r e s t r i c t e d as i n 
the case of I.D.B.P. 
P.I.C.I.C.'s a s s i s t a n c e has been mainly concentrated 
on l a r g e - s i z e d l o a n s . Going back to Table 6.8. on page 230 
one can see t h a t 61 p.c. of the t o t a l loans was granted to a s i z e 
over Rs 2.5 m i l l i o n , the average amount of loan given to any one 
company being Rs 6 m i l l i o n . T h i s was p a r t l y due to the 
(35) 
Corporation's minimum lending l i m i t of Rs 2.5 m i l l i o n without 
t h e r e being an upper l i m i t , and p a r t l y due to the Corporation's 
r e l u c t a n c e to e n t e r t a i n s m a l l - s i z e d loans, even over the lower 
l i m i t . The Gorporation's demand f o r bank guarantees extending over 
the f u l l p e riod of the maturity of loans i s something which 
medium-sized entrepreneurs seldom f i n d p o s s i b l e . On the other hand, 
a s i m i l a r i n s t i t u t i o n , the I.D.B.P. i s f u n c t i o n i n g to accommodate 
medium-sized l o a n s . Consequently, b i g e n t e r p r i s e s enjoy the c r e d i t 
f a c i l i t i e s of the Corporation; to a g r e a t e r extent. 
(35) See page 223, 
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Apparently, the Corporation's problems are the 
absence of well-planned p r o j e c t s and the t i e d nature of foreign 
exchange c r e d i t s . F or removing the f i r s t o b s t a c l e the Corporation 
provides necessary a s s i s t a n c e to the sponsors of a company i n the 
prepmSrtion of a s u i t a b l e p r o j e c t . As f a r as t i e d conditions 
of loans are concerned the Corporation can do l i t t l e except to 
request the lending agencies to r e l a x these c o n d i t i o n s . 
There i s another problem which hinders an e f f i c i e n t 
working of the i n s t i t u t i o n namely, that the time-lag between the 
r e c e i p t of loan a p p l i c a t i o n and the s a n c t i o n i n g of the loan i s 
c o n s i d e r a b l e : u s u a l l y a loan a p p l i c a t i o n takes 6 to 9 months to 
f i n a l i s e , and undue delay tends to be b u i l t up i n disbursement 
because of various f o r m a l i t i e s which have to be observed before 
a l o a n i s f i n a l l y advanced. Delay i s a l s o caused by inadequate 
co-operation between the d i f f e r e n t departments or agencies concerned 
i n the granting of the necessary approval. To improve the 
o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y of the Corporation e f f e c t i v e co-ordination 
between departments concerned i s e s s e n t i a l . The n e c e s s i t y of 
co - o r d i n a t i o n between various departments i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
important when i t i s a new in d u s t r y that i s being e s t a b l i s h e d . 
I f an e f f e c t i v e c o - o r d i n a t i o n could be maintained between the 
departments such ag the Investment Promotion Bureau, C a p i t a l 
I s s u e s Committee and f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , i t would save c o n s i d e r a b l e 
time and money i n e s t a b l i s h i n g an industry. 
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Apart from the Corporation's d i r e c t a s s i s t a n c e i n 
the promotion of i n d u s t r i a l development, i t has exerted a. 
s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the economy of P a k i s t a n i n g e n e r a l . The 
Corporation's a s s i s t a n c e has mobilised p r i v a t e investment of 
Rs 2343 m i l l i o n and the r e l e v a n t c a p i t a l - r a t i o comes to 'uO tl,4,^^^^ 
The annual estimated value added to manufacture by P.I.C.I.C. 
a s s i s t e d i n d u s t r i e s i s Rs 990 m i l l i o n w h i l e annual f o r e i g n 
exchange earnings/savings are estimated at Rs 480 m i l l i o n . I t 
has generated employment opp o r t u n i t i e s f o r 83,000 workers, the 
average output per worker being Rs 11,900. The Corporation has 
so f a r brought 76 new entrepreneurs i n t o the i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d 
f o r the f i r s t time. F i n a l l y , i t s f i n a n c i n g has been instrumental 
i n i n c o r p o r a t i n g 76 p u b l i c l i m i t e d companies i n the corporate 
s e c t o r . As an underwriter the Corporation has a l s o helped i n 
promoting the formation and growth of a c a p i t a l musket i n 
P a k i s t a n . 
(36) S t a t i s t i c s i n t h i s page r e l a t e to the period ending June 
1967, they a r e taken from Investment and Marketing, 
P . I . C . I . C . s p e c i a l number. 
CHAPTER SEVEN. 
THE TECHNIQUE OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
FINANCING. 
Up to now we have been concerned w i t h the ways i n 
which f i n a n c e i s made a v a i l a b l e to the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . I n t h i s 
Chapter we s h a l l d i s c u s s how i n d u s t r i a l undertakings are financed 
i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r . The two agencies through which i n d u s t r i a l 
development i s c a r r i e d out i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r of P a k i s t a n are 
the E a s t P a k i s t a n I n d u s t r i a l Development Corporation and i t s 
counterpart i n the West. I n d i s c u s s i n g the problem of f i n a n c i n g 
the p u b l i c s e c t o r p r o j e c t s , we s h a l l , t h e r e f o r e , d i s c u s s the 
f i n a n c i n g operation i n these two i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
1. A Short H i s t o r i c a l Background; 
P a k i s t a n having been predominantly an a g r i c u l t u r a l 
country, has had to s t r u g g l e hard i n converting i t s economy i n t o 
a s e m i - i n d u s t r i a l one. S i n c e independence, an i n s u f f i c i e n t supply 
of c a p i t a l and a l a c k of entrepreneurship have been two main 
l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s h i n d e r i n g the i n d u s t r i a l development of the 
country. P r i v a t e c a p i t a l was e i t h e r shy or was not forthcoming i n 
the d i r e c t i o n considered necessary for i n d u s t r i a l development. 
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P r i v a t e investment tended to take an i n t e r e s t i n e s t a b l i s h i n g only 
those i n d u s t r i e s , i n which there was low c a p i t a l requirement and 
the prospect of earning quick p r o f i t . As a r e s u l t , the i n d u s t r i e s 
w i t h high c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y and complicated processes remained 
n e g l e c t e d by the p r i v a t e s e c t o r during the i n i t i a l years of 
independence. Faced w i t h t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the Government had to 
s t e p i n , i n order to a c c e l e r a t e the pace of i n d u s t r i a l development 
i n the d e s i r e d d i r e c t i o n . The f i r s t step was made i n 1950 with 
the establishment of the P a k i s t a n I n d u s t r i a l Development Corporation 
( P . I . D . C ) , The Corporation began operations i n January 1952 and 
functioned u n t i l the end of June 1962 when i t was b i f u r c a t e d i n t o 
two separate Corporations, one each for each of the two provinces 
of E a s t and West P a k i s t a n . The establishment of the E a s t P a k i s t a n 
I n d u s t r i a l Development Corporation (E.P.-I .D.C.) and the West 
P a k i s t a n I n d u s t r i a l Development Corporation (W.P.I.D.C,) i n J u l y 
1962 was i n pursuance of the p o l i c y of d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n adopted 
by the Government of P a k i s t a n . 
2. O b j e c t i v e s and F u n c t i o n s ; 
The main purpose of the P,I,D.C. was to promote and 
develop i n d u s t r i e s i n which p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s did not show much 
i n t e r e s t due to the l a c k of e i t h e r an adequate or f o r s e e a b l e 
r e t u r n over an acceptable period. The Corporation was intended 
to supplement i n d u s t r i a l growth, functioning alongside the p r i v a t e 
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e n t e r p r i s e r a t h e r t h a n d i s p l a c i n g i t . I t was t h e C o r p o r a t i o n ' s 
p o l i c y t h a t i f p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s d i d n o t come f o r w a r d i n t h e 
i n i t i a l s t a g e , t h e p r o j e c t would be c a r r i e d o u t by t h e 
C o r p o r a t i o n ; and on c o m p l e t i o n , t h e p r o j e c t would be s o l d e i t h e r 
t o t h e p r i v a t e p a r t y o r be c o n v e r t e d i n t o a p u b l i c l i m i t e d 
company. T h i s meant t h a t t h r o u g h t h e process o f d i s i n v e s t m e n t 
t h e C o r p o r a t i o n w o u l d r e p l e n i s h i t s e l f w i t h more funds and thus 
p u t i t s e l f i n t o a p o s i t i o n t o develop y e t ano t h e r i n d u s t r y . 
The p r o v i n c i a l C o r p o r a t i o n s have assumed t h e same 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as p r e v i o u s l y devolved on t h e former P.I.D.C. The 
Boards o f D i r e c t o r s o f t h e C o r p o r a t i o n s are designed t o be guided 
by t h e r e s p e c t i v e p r o v i n c i a l Governments i n m a t t e r s o f p o l i c y 
r e l a t i n g t o n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t , and i n a l l o t h e r m a t t e r s t h e y a re 
r e q u i r e d t o o p e r a t e as commercial o r g a n i s a t i o n s . 
B o t h t h e E,P.I.D.C. and t h e W.P.I.D.C. were e n t r u s t e d 
w i t h t h e development o f f o u r t e e n s e l e c t e d i n d u s t r i e s . ^ ''"^  These 
i n d u s t r i e s ( e x c e p t i n g some w h i c h a r e s m a l l - s c a l e ) a r e m a i n l y b a s i c 
ones r e q u i r i n g heavy i n v e s t m e n t s , l o n g e r p e r i o d s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n 
w i t h c o m p l i c a t e d processes i n v o l v i n g a h i g h l e v e l o f t e c h n i c a l 
knowledge and o p e r a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e . 
( 1 ) - ( 1 ) J u t e , ( 2 ) Papers, Board and N e w s p r i n t , ( 3 ) Heavy E n g i n e e r i n g 
i n c l u d i n g I r o n and S t e e l b u t e x c l u d i n g S h i p b u i l d i n g . ( 4 ) S h i p -
b u i l d i n g , ( 5 ) Heavy chemicals o t h e r t h a n f e r t i l i z e r s , 
( 6 ) F e r t i l i z e r s , ( 7 ) Sugar, ( 8 ) Cement, ( 9 ) T e x t i l e s , 
( 10) Chemicals, p h a r m a c e u t i c a l s and d y e s t u f f s , (11) Coal and p e a t , 
(12) E x p l o i t a t i o n o f Marine F i s h e r i e s except f i s h e r i e s o u t s i d e 
t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s , ( 13) I n d u s t r i e s based on f o r e s t p r o d u c t s , 
( 1 4 ) C o t t a g e and s m a l l s c a l e i n d u s t r i e s . 
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F u n c t i o n s ; 
( 2 ) The C o r p o r a t i o n s a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
( i ) p l a n n i n g , p r o m o t i n g , o r g a n i s i n g , i m p l e m e n t i n g programmes f o r 
s e t t i n g up i n d u s t r i e s l i s t e d i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e schedules; 
( i i ) t h e e x p l o r a t i o n , e x p l o i t a t i o n and development o f m i n e r a l s 
and mines; 
( i i i ) t h e e x p l o r a t i o n and development o f any raw m a t e r i a l , w h i c h 
t h e C e n t r a l Government may e n t r u s t s u b j e c t t o such c o n d i t i o n s 
as t h e C e n t r a l Government may s p e c i f y ; 
( i v ) u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e d i r e c t e d by t h e Governments, a c t i n g as 
managing agents f o r t h e companies and may, w i t h t h e p r i o r 
consent o f t h e Governments, r e l i n q u i s h t h e managing agency 
i n f a v o u r o f any p e r s on; 
( v ) i s s u i n g t h e c a p i t a l r e q u i r e d f o r t h e a f o r e s a i d companies o r 
p u b l i c s u b s c r i p t i o n and, i f any p o r t i o n t h e r e o f remains 
u n s u b s c r i b e d a f t e r t h e e x p i r y o f t h e c l o s i n g d a t e f o r p u b l i c 
o f f e r , s u b s c r i b e on b e h a l f o f t h e Governments t h a t p o r t i o n ; 
( v i ) u n d e r w r i t i n g t h e whole o f the c a p i t a l i s s u e d f o r t h e 
a f o r e s a i d companies, and 
( v i i ) t h e s a l e o r t r a n s f e r o f t h e shares s u b s c r i b e d f o r t h e 
company o f whom t h e y c o n s i d e r t h e t i m e o p p o r t u n e . 
( 2 ) F i n a n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n s " N a t i o n a l and I n t e r n a t i o n a l , o p . c i t . , 
pp.73-89. ' 
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The C o r p o r a t i o n s a r e autonomous o r g a n i s a t i o n s and 
p e r f o r m t h e above mentioned a c t i v i t i e s a i m i n g a t t h e pr o m o t i o n 
o f i n d u s t r i e s r a t h e r t h a n a t ownership. The Governments p r o v i d e 
t h e necessary f i n a n c e t o t h e C o r p o r a t i o n s t h r o u g h annual 
b u d g e t a r y g r a n t s . 
3. Review o f In v e s t m e n t A c t i v i t i e s . 
( a ) P.I.D.C.'s Inves t m e n t s (1952-62); 
D u r i n g t h e t e n y e a r s , from 1952 t o 1962 t h e P.I.D.C. 
( 3 ) 
i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e completed 54 p r o j e c t s , 
i n v o l v i n g an i n v e s t m e n t o f Rs 1360 m i l l i o n . Of t h i s , t h e P.I.D.C.'s 
( 4 ) 
own share was Rs 891 m i l l i o n o r 65.5 p.c. o f t h e t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t . 
The r e s t o f t h e i n v e s t m e n t amounting t o Rs 469 m i l l i o n was 
p r o v i d e d by t h e p r i v a t e p a r t i c i p a n t s . Besides t h i s , t h e r e was 
a n o t h e r Rs 320 m i l l i o n i n v e s t e d i n p r o j e c t s under c o n s t r u c t i o n . I n 
a d d i t i o n , t h e P.I.D.C. a l s o i n v e s t e d Rs 40 m i l l i o n i n s m a l l - s c a l e 
i n d u s t r i e s i n West P a k i s t a n . Thus, t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t i n P.I.D.C. 
sponsored p r o j e c t s amounted t o Rs 1720 m i l l i o n . T a b l e 7.1. shows 
t h e break-down o f P.I.D.C.'s in v e s t m e n t i n b o t h East and West P a k i s t a n , 
( 3 ) These p r o j e c t s i n c l u d e d 12 j u t e m i l l s , 4 paper, board and n e w s p r i n t 
m i l l s , 2 cement f a c t o r i e s , 3 f e r t i l i z e r f a c t o r i e s , 4 chemical p l a n t s , 
1 p e n i c i l l i n f a c t o r y , 1 d y e s t u f f p l a n t , 3 w o o l l e n m i l l s , 2 c o t t o n 
t e x t i l e m i l l s , 3 gas t r a n s m i s s i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n companies, 5 sugar 
m i l l s , 3 s h i p y a r d and e n g i n e e r i n g works, 6 c o t t o n g i n n i n g f a c t o r i e s , 
2 c o l l i e r i e s and 3 m i s c e l l a n e o u s p r o j e c t s . 
( 4 ) The P.I.D.C.'s share has been shown i n terms o f paid-up c a p i t a l 
c o s t . 
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( b ) E.P.I.D.C.'s I n v e s t m e n t s (1962-66); 
The f o r m e r P.I.D.C. completed 21 p r o j e c t s i n East 
P a k i s t a n a t a t o t a l c o s t o f Rs 832 m i l l i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , Rs 29 
m i l l i o n was i n v e s t e d i n 19 on-going p r o j e c t s . The E.P.I.D.C. 
t o o k o v e r t h e a s s e t s amounting t o Rs 558 m i l l i o n o u t o f t h e 
t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t o f Rs 8 6 1 m i l l i o n . The t o t a l a s s e t s t a k e n over 
c o m p r i s e d t h e i n v e s t m e n t s i n completed p r o j e c t s and companies 
a g g r e g a t i n g Rs 482 m i l l i o n ; Rs 29 m i l l i o n i n p r o j e c t s under way, 
s u r v e y and i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and t h e remainder o f Rs 4 7 m i l l i o n was 
i n t h e f o r m o f advances t o t h e companies and p r o j e c t s sponsored 
by t h e E.P.I.D.C. 
Since i t s e s t a b l i s h m e n t , t h e E.P.I.D.C, has completed 
26 p r o j e c t s i n v o l v i n g a t o t a l c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e o f Rs 400 
m i l l i o n d u r i n g t h e f o u r y e a r s o f i t s o p e r a t i o n f r o m 1962 t o 1966. 
Thus t h e t o t a l number o f p r o j e c t s completed i n East P a k i s t a n comes 
t o 47 and t h e t o t a l e s t i m a t e d c o s t of these p r o j e c t s has amounted 
t o Rs 1232 m i l l i o n . On t h e o t h e r hand, i n v e s t m e n t i n p r o j e c t s 
under way has been i n t h e neighbourhood o f Rs 439 m i l l i o n . T a b l e 
7.2. g i v e s a break-down o f t h e investment p o s i t i o n on t h e 3 0 t h 
June 1966. 
I t w o u l d appear f r o m the t a b l e t h a t t h e t o t a l 
i n v e s t m e n t c o s t o f t h e p r o j e c t s which have a l r e a d y been formed i n t o 
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p u b l i c l i m i t e d companies has amounted t o Rs 1232 m i l l i o n . The 
p a i d - u p c a p i t a l o f t h e s e companies amounts t o Rs 612 m i l l i o n , 
o f w h i c h E.P.I.D.C.'s c o n t r i b u t i o n i s Rs 427 m i l l i o n o r 70 p.c. 
( 5 ) 
o f t h e t o t a l p a i d - u p c a p i t a l i n these p r o j e c t s . The balance o f 
Rs 185 m i l l i o n , o r 30 p.c. has been c o n t r i b u t e d by p r i v a t e 
i n v e s t o r s . The t a b l e a l s o shows t h e p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r ^ ; ' apparent 
l a c k o f i n t e r e s t i n i n v e s t m e n t i n c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i e s 
such as f e r t i l i z e r s , paper, n e w s p r i n t and paper b o a r d , 
s h i p b u i l d i n g , sugar and c o t t o n y a r n . The c o n t r i b u t i o n o f p r i v a t e 
i n v e s t o r s has been s i g n i f i c a n t o n l y i n t h e case o f t h e j u t e 
i n d u s t r y where p r i v a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n has c o n t r i b u t e d 66 p.c. o f 
t h e p a i d - u p c a p i t a l . I n d u s t r i e s such as n e w s p r i n t and 
f e r t i l i z e r s have n o t been a b l e t o a t t r a c t any p r i v a t e c a p i t a l a t 
a l l . Even t h e sugar and c o t t o n y a r n i n d u s t r i e s , w h i c h a r e 
c o n s i d e r e d r e a s o n a b l y a t t r a c t i v e t o p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s i n West 
P a k i s t a n have n o t a t t r a c t e d p r i v a t e c a p i t a l i n East P a k i s t a n . There 
a r e v a r i o u s reasons f o r t h i s shyness o f p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t i n East 
P a k i s t a n . We s h a l l d i s c u s s these l a t e r i n t h i s Chapter. 
I n v e s t m e n t a c t i v i t y has, however i n c r e a s e d i n East 
P a k i s t a n s i n c e t h e b i f u r c a t i o n . Prom an annual i n v e s t m e n t o f 
( 5 ) The paid-up c a p i t a l does n o t i n c l u d e K a r n a p h u l i Paper M i l l s L t d . , 
w h i c h had p a i d - u p c a p i t a l o f Rs 46 m i l l i o n . As a measure o f 
d i s i n v e s t m e n t p o l i c y , t h e E.P.I.D.C. has d i v e s t e d i t s e l f e n t i r e l y 
o f i t s h o l d i n g s . 
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Rs 55.81 m i l l i o n d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d under t h e f o r m e r P.I.D.C. i t 
has r i s e n t o an annual average o f Rs 172.71 m i l l i o n i n t h e l a s t 
4 y e a r s . D u r i n g t h e Second P l a n , p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r t h e 
b i f u r c a t i o n , i n v e s t m e n t a c t i v i t y i n East P a k i s t a n has i n c r e a s e d 
c o n s i d e r a b l y . The i n v e s t m e n t o f E.P.I.D.C. s i n c e i t s i n c e p t i o n 
has i n c r e a s e d f r o m Rs 49 m i l l i o n i n 1960-61 t o about Rs 200 
m i l l i o n i n 1965-66 i n d i c a t i n g an average i n c r e a s e o f 60 p.c, per 
( 6 ) 
annum. 
( c ) W.P.I.D.C.'s Inve s t m e n t (1962-66); 
The W.P.I.D.C. i n h e r i t e d 32 completed p r o j e c t s f r o m 
t h e f o r m e r P.I.D.C. w i t h a c a p i t a l i nvestment o f Rs 528 m i l l i o n 
o f w h i c h t h e share o f t h e C o r p o r a t i o n was Rs 408 m i l l i o n (77 p . c . ) . 
The b a l a n c e o f Rs 120 m i l l i o n (23 p,c.) was c o n t r i b u t e d by 
p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s . I n a d d i t i o n , i t r e c e i v e d a sum o f Rs 291 
m i l l i o n f o r i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e p r o j e c t s under c o n s t r u c t i o n . Of t h e 
t o t a l 32 completed p r o j e c t s sponsored by t h e P.I.D.C., 21 were 
l i m i t e d companies w h i l e t h e r e m a i n i n g 11 were i n t h e fo r m o f 
(7) 
c o m p l e t e d p r o j e c t s i n p r o d u c t i o n . 
( 6 ) E.P,I,D.C. Annual R e p o r t , 1965-66. 
( 7 ) W.P.I.D.C. a l s o i n h e r i t e d 27 completed and 31 under way s m a l l 
i n d u s t r i e s p r o j e c t s w i t h a t o t a l c a p i t a l o u t l a y o f Rs 41 
m i l l i o n * 
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Since b i f u r c a t i o n , t h e W.P.I.D.C. has completed up 
t o 3 0 t h June 1966, 11 p r o j e c t s and thus t h e number o f completed 
p r o j e c t s has i n c r e a s e d t o 43. The t o t a l amount o f inv e s t m e n t made 
i n C o r p o r a t i o n - s p o n s o r e d p r o j e c t s has amounted t o Rs 876 m i l l i o n 
o f w h i c h p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t has accounted f o r Rs 203 m i l l i o n or 
23 p.c. o f t h e t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t . I n a d d i t i o n , i n v e s t m e n t i n p r o j e c t s 
under c o n s t r u c t i o n amounted t o Rs 101 m i l l i o n up t o June 1966. I t 
i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t t h e e x t e n t o f p r i v a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
E.P.I.D.C. sponsored p r o j e c t s i s h i g h e r (30 p.c.) compared w i t h t h e 
p o s i t i o n o f t h e W.P.I.D.C. p r o j e c t s . The d e t a i l s o f invest m e n t a r e 
g i v e n i n T a b l e 7.3. below. 
T a b l e 7.3. I n d u s t r y - w i s e Investment o f W.P.I.D.C. as 
on 3 0 t h June 1966. /M-TT T, ^ — : ( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
I n d u s t r y No o f T o t a l W,P,I,D,C. P r i v a t e 5 as p r o j e c t s i n v e s t m e n t p.c. 
o f 3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
F e r t i l i z e r s 3 332 331 1 — 
Gas 4 223 117 106 46 
S h i p b u i l d i n g 1 79 79 - -Sugar 4 67 31 36 54 
Cement 2 63 53 10 16 
Paper/Board 2 30 = 30 100 
T e x t i l e 10 24 12 12 50 
Chemicals 6 23 15 8 35 
C o a l / S a l t 7 20 20 - -Survey 4 15 15 - -
T o t a l 43 876 673 203 23 
Source: W.P.I.D,C, Annual Report f o r 1965 -66., p j l O . 
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The break-down g i v e n i n T a b l e 7.3. i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
t h e f e r t i l i z e r i n d u s t r y has been by f a r t h e l a r g e s t r e c i p i e n t o f 
W.P.I.D.C.*s f u n d s , i . e . , 49 p.c. o f t h e C o r p o r a t i o n ' s 
i n v e s t m e n t i n completed p r o j e c t s . This i n d u s t r y i s v i t a l l y 
i m p o r t a n t f o r t h e c o u n t r y , as i t p r o v i d e s a g r i c u l t u r a l i n p u t s . 
The a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r b e i n g t h e l a r g e s t , has been t h o u g h t w o r t h y 
o f b e i n g p r o v i d e d w i t h f e r t i l i z e r s a t a s u b s i d i s e d r a t e . T h i s 
i n d u s t r y has n o t , so f a r , been a t t r a c t i v e t o p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s , 
l a r g e l y because o f t h e s i z e o f investment r e q u i r e d and t h e low 
m a r g i n o f p r @ f i t . The second h i g h e s t l e v e l o f i n v e s t m e n t (41.7 
p.c.) has been made i n n a t u r a l gas f o l l o w e d by s h i p b u i l d i n g , cement 
and sugar. There i s no p r i v a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i e s such 
as f e r t i l i z e r s and s h i p b u i l d i n g , w h i l e i n d u s t r i e s l i k e gas 
(46 p . c . ) , sugar (54 p . c . ) , t e x t i l e s (50 p . c . ) , chemicals (35 p . c . ) , 
and cement (16 p.c.) have a s u b s t a n t i a l amount o f p r i v a t e 
i n v e s t m e n t . The paper concern has, however,been handed over t o 
p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . 
Of t h e t o t a l 43 p r o j e c t s , 25 have been formed i n t o 
l i m i t e d j o i n t - s t o c k companies. Amongst these companies 13 a r e 
under t h e C o r p o r a t i o n ' s own management w h i l e t h e r e s t a r e under 
p r i v a t e management. Out o f a t o t a l 18 p r o j e c t s , 12 a r e under t h e 
management o f t h e C o r p o r a t i o n . 
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By June 1966, t h e t o t a l amount o f i n v e s t m e n t s made 
by t h e I n d u s t r i a l Development C o r p o r a t i o n s i n b o t h t h e Wings, 
amounted t o Rs 1694 m i l l i o n ; and t h i s accounts f o r 15 p.c. o f 
t h e t o t a l i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . 
4. Returns on In v e s t m e n t s I n C o r p o r a t i o n s ' Managed U n d e r t a k i n g s . 
T a b l e 7.4, below g i v e s t h e complete p i c t u r e w i t h 
r e g a r d t o i n v e s t m e n t and r e t u r n t h e r e o n i n completed p r o j e c t s 
and companies managed by t h e E.P.I.D.C. and W.P.I.D.C. d u r i n g 
t h e p e r i o d 1962-66. 
( a ) E.P.I.D.C. Managed U n d e r t a k i n g s ; 
I n o r d e r t o assess whether E.P.IoD.C- managed 
companies and p r o j e c t s a r e op e r a t e d e f f i c i e n t l y o r n o t , one needs 
t o d i s c u s s t h e w o r k i n g r e s u l t s o f these u n d e r t a k i n g s . I t can be 
seen f r o m t h e t a b l e t h a t t h e r e t u r n on invest m e n t i s v e r y low 
compared w i t h i n d u s t r i a l u n d e r t a k i n g s managed by p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . 
The average annual r a t e o f r e t u r n was o n l y 3.59 p.c. d u r i n g t h e 
f o u r y ears o f i t s o p e r a t i o n i n comparison w i t h t h e average annual 
r a t e o f 16.4 p.c. f o r 70 s e l e c t e d l i s t e d companies as mentioned 
i n Chapter Three. The r a t e o f r e t u r n was however, improved 
compared w i t h t h e f o r m e r P.I.D.C. I n t h e i n i t i a l year o f i t s 
o p e r a t i o n t h e E.P.I.D.C, was a b l e t o ear n Rs 35.41 m i l l i o n a f t e r 
t h e d e d u c t i o n o f Rs 10 m i l l i o n l o s s i n h e r i t e d f r o m t h e P.I.D.C. 
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The C o r p o r a t i o n ' s w o r k i n g r e s u l t s show a c o m p a r a t i v e l y b e t t e r 
t r e n d d u r i n g t h e f i r s t two years than t h e l a s t two years i n 
t h e t a b l e . I n 1963-64 t h e r a t e o f r e t u r n was 4.79 p . c , t h e 
h i g h e s t i n 4 y e a r s . The r a t e o f r e t u r n reached i t s l o w e s t ebb, 
2.62 p . c , i n 1964-65. However, t h e r a t e o f r e t u r n was s l i g h t l y 
b e t t e r i n 1965-66 when i t worked out a t 2.99 p.c. 
From t h i s i n d i c a t i o n , one cannot draw a f i r m 
c o n c l u s i o n about t h e e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e C o r p o r a t i o n . To e s t a b l i s h 
such a c o n c l u s i o n , i t i s necessary t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e causes 
f o r such low p r o f i t a b i l i t y . There are v a r i o u s reasons f o r t h i s 
s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e E.P.I.D.C. undertakes 
o n l y t h o s e i n d u s t r i e s i n w h i c h p r i v a t e c a p i t a l does n o t come 
f o r w a r d due t o h i g h i n i t i a l i n v e s t m e n t , l o n g e r g e s t a t i o n p e r i o d 
and low p r o f i t a b i l i t y . I n d u s t r i e s such as s h i p b u i l d i n g and 
f e r t i l i z e r s a r e n o t v e r y r e w a r d i n g as f a r as p r o f i t i s concerned. 
A s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t o f t h e C o r p o r a t i o n ' s f u n d i s i n v e s t e d i n 
t h e s e i n d u s t r i e s . These i n d u s t r i e s have been e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
P a k i s t a n w i t h i n t h e framework o f l o n g - t e r m p l a n n i n g o b j e c t i v e s 
r a t h e r t h a n i n terms o f s h o r t - t e r m g a i n s . T h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o 
t h e economy i s measured m o s t l y i n terras o f f o r e i g n exchange 
s a v i n g s r a t h e r t h a n i n terms o f immediate p r o f i t w h i c h , however, 
i s t h e essence o f t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r ' s c r i t e r i o n . 
The E.P.I.D.C. has a major i n v e s t m e n t i n paper, board 
and n e w s p r i n t ( 3 1 p . c ) , j u t e (16 p . c ) , sugar (29 p.c.) and 
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c o t t o n t e x t i l e s (5 p.c.) as shown i n Tab l e 7.2. N o r m a l l y these 
u n d e r t a k i n g s s h o u l d earn a r e a s o n a b l e p r o f i t i f o r g a n i s e d on 
s t r i c t commercial p r i n c i p l e s . The Khulna Newsprint M i l l s L t d . , 
w i t h a p a i d - u p c a p i t a l o f Rs 168 m i l l i o n has been r u n n i n g a t a 
s u s t a i n e d l o s s s i n c e i t s i n c e p t i o n , i t s c u m u l a t i v e l o s s b e i n g 
Rs 7.94 m i l l i o n on 3 0 t h June 1966, S i m i l a r l y , t h e M u s l i n Cotton 
M i l l s L t d . , accumulated a l o s s o f Rs 2.10 m i l l i o n up t o June 
( 8 ) 
1966. The l o s s e s i n c u r r e d by t h e Newsprint M i l l s i n 
c o n s e c u t i v e y e a r s , a r e m a i n l y due t o o v e r - c a p i t a l i s a t i o n o f t h e 
p r o j e c t , p r o d u c t i o n below c a p a c i t y and i n s u f f i c i e n t demand f o r 
t h e p r o d u c t s o f t h e M i l l s . There has been a drop i n p r o d u c t i o n 
and s a l e s , b o t h i n t h e home and f o r e i g n markets, f o l l o w i n g t h e 
September war i n 1965, The M i l l had t o slow down i t s p r o d u c t i o n 
due t o t h e p i l i n g up o f huge s t o c k s o f f i n i s h e d goods. 
Two j u t e m i l l s under t h e management o f t h e C o r p o r a t i o n 
have earned r e a s o n a b l e p r o f i t s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d s 1964-65 and 
1965-66, a l t h o u g h t h e r a t e o f r e t u r n seems t o be lower t h a n t h a t 
( 9 ) 
o f t h e companies managed by p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e . However, t h e 
f a l l i n t h e p r o f i t i n 1964-65 has been due more t o l a b o u r u n r e s t , 
( 8 ) E.P.I.D.C. Annual Report - 1965-66. pp.29-31. 
( 9 ) For example, t h e r a t e o f p r o f i t on paid-up c a p i t a l has been 
37 p.c. i n t h e case o f W.Rahman J u t e M i l l s and 30 p.c. o f 
Quami J u t e M i l l s whereas t h e same has been 42 p.c, i n 
Bawany J u t e M i l l s and 50 p.c. i n U n i t e d J u t e M i l l s managed 
by p r i v a t e p a r t i e s . (E.P.I.D.C. Annual Report. 1965-66, 
pp.40-41). 
- 261 -
The j u t e i n d u s t r y p a r t i c u l a r l y has s u f f e r e d a s e t back from 
l a b o u r u n r e s t o r s t r i k e - c u l m i n a t i n g i n t h e c l o s u r e o f t h e 
p l a n t s f o r some l e n g t h o f t i m e . 
The E.P,I.D.C.'s o p e r a t i n g r e s u l t s have been 
g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h e heavy l o s s e s i n c u r r e d i n t h e sugar 
i n d u s t r y over t h e l a s t few y e a r s . T h i s i n d u s t r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y , 
has s u f f e r e d f r o m ( i ) an inadequate s u p p o r t i n g i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , 
( i i ) h i g h e r p r i c e s f o r f a c t o r i n p u t s , and ( i i i ) o v e r -
c a p i t a l i s a t i o n o f p r o j e c t s , i n t h e sense t h a t t h e e n t e r p r i s e s 
e s t a b l i s h e d had t o r u n below c a p a c i t y . The sugar i n d u s t r y 
o p e r a t e s o n l y f o r s i x months o r so f o r want o f raw m a t e r i a l s , 
w h i l e t h e overhead c o s t remains more or l e s s c o n s t a n t . Over 
and above t h i s , t h e p r i c i n g p o l i c y i n r e s p e c t o f r e f i n e d sugar 
has n o t been s u f f i c i e n t l y r e a l i s t i c i n t h e sense t h a t t h e p r i c e 
o f sugar was k e p t a t a low l e v e l i n d i s r e g a r d o f c o s t o f 
p r o d u c t i o n . B e s i d e s , i n pursuance o f t h e Government's p o l i c y 
r e l a t i n g t o r e g i o n a l development, some o f these u n d e r t a k i n g s 
have been s e t up w i t h o u t g i v i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y 
o f raw m a t e r i a l s and means o f communications. Undue p o l i t i c a l 
p r e s s u r e has been a l s o p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e bad l o c a t i o n 
o f t h e s e u n i t s . 
A lmost a l l t h e sugar f a c t o r i e s i n East P a k i s t a n 
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a r e f o u n d t o o p e r a t e below capacity^''"'^^ owing t o t h e s h o r t 
s u p p l y o f sugar cane, t h e poor q u a l i t y o f cane, inadequate 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s and o t h e r s i m i l a r causes. Some 
o f t h e s e concerns have r e c e n t l y launched a massive cane 
development programme t o improve the q u a l i t y o f sugar cane 
p r o d u c t i o n and have i n v e s t e d s e v e r a l m i l l i o n s i n sugar 
f a r m i n g ; t h i s has a l s o r e s u l t e d i n a c o n s i d e r a b l e l o s s . I n 
a d d i t i o n , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a 'gur'^'''•'"^manufacturing community 
near t h e m i l l s i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the s h o r t s u p p l y o f cane. 
The gur m a n u f a c t u r e r s , u s u a l l y make f o r w a r d purchases o f sugar 
cane by advancing funds t o t h e growers a g a i n s t t h e s t a n d i n g 
c r o p : t h e y t h e r e b y l i f t t h e b u l k o f t h e sugar cane o f 
p a r t i c u l a r a r e a s . The performance of t h e sugar i n d u s t r y i n 
t a c k l i n g these d i f f i c u l t i e s has been poor. I t a l s o appears t h a t 
t h e C o r p o r a t i o n , f o r one reason o r a n o t h e r , has n o t g i v e n much 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e l o c a l i s a t i o n 
o f e n t e r p r i s e s . Moreover, t h e f e a s i b i l i t y s t u d y made b e f o r e 
s e t t i n g up t h i s i n d u s t r y , was n o t s a t i s f a c t o r y . I t may appear 
odd, t h a t t h e expansion programme of t h e sugar i n d u s t r y i s 
g o i n g on when t h e e x i s t i n g u n i t s are o p e r a t i n g below c a p a c i t y . 
(10 ) For i n s t a n c e . Z e a l Pak Sugar M i l l s worked 37 p.c. below i t s 
normal c a p a c i t y and 25 p.c. below t h e budgeted t a r g e t i n 
1965-66. (E.P.I.D.C. Annual Report 1965-66). 
(1 1 ) Unprocessed^^ raw sugar. 
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One would have thought i t t o be a more useful and wiser p o l i c y 
i f these are made t o f u n c t i o n at f u l l capacity, by t a k i n g 
appropriate measures, rat h e r than s e t t i n g up new u n i t s . This 
would have helped t o reduce the cost of production, improve 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y and achieve a b e t t e r u t i l i z a t i o n of the scarce 
c a p i t a l . 
While considering the operational e f f i c i e n c y , i t 
i s necessary t o mention one other f a c t o r t h a t seems to have 
in f l u e n c e d the Corporation's e f f i c i e n c y . This i s the high 
p r o p o r t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e cost. Generally, the a f f a i r s of 
the Corporation are managed by a group of persons who lack 
necessary business experience. The Corporation i s i t s e l f 
managed by a board of bureaucrats who have had no business or 
i n d u s t r i a l experience i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of modern gi a n t 
e n t e r p r i s e s . Moreover, they are not accountable t o any higher 
a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . I n such a s i t u a t i o n , i t i s not 
s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the a f f a i r s of the Corporation are administered 
i n an i n e f f i c i e n t manner. The Corporation i s a Government body 
and discharges i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i t h p u b l i c funds, but i t s 
operations are not subject t o questions i n the Parliament. 
There have been many c r i t i c i s m s of the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
Corporation but no attempt has yet been made to i n v e s t i g a t e the 
causes of the operational i n e f f i c i e n c y . Many E.P.I.D.C. 
enterp r i s e s are o v e r s t a f f e d and thus a d m i n i s t r a t i v e cost i s much 
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(12) higher than the concerns managed by p r i v a t e entrepreneurs. 
(b) W.P.I.D.C. Managed Undertakings; 
As w i t h the E.P.IoD.C, the operational e f f i c i e n c y 
of the W.PoI.D.C. managed undertakings has not been s a t i s f a c t o r y 
compared w i t h the undertakings i n the p r i v a t e sector. The 
reasons f o r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n are almost i d e n t i c a l as i n the case 
of the E.PoIeD.C. The operational e f f i c i e n c y however, has shown 
improvement during four years' of i t s operation. I t can be seen 
from Table 7.4. above t h a t the r e t u r n on investment has increased 
progressively from 1,24 p,c. i n 1962-63 t o 5.29 p.c. i n 1964-65. 
Howeverj the r a t e of r e t u r n declined t o 4.72 p.c. i n 1965-66. 
The decline i n the net r e t u r n during 1965-66 as compared w i t h 
the previous year, was due t o the Indo-Pakistan war of September 
1965, which had unfavourable e f f e c t s on production and sales 
and pushed up the prices of some of the raw materials, e s p e c i a l l y 
(13) 
the packing ma t e r i a l s used by cement and f e r t i l i z e r f a c t o r i e s . 
The average annual r a t e of r e t u r n has been worked out at 3.50 p.c. 
which may be compared w i t h the p r o f i t r a t e of 3.59 p.c. made by 
the E.P.I.D.C. i n the same period. For the W.P.I.D.C. such 
r a t e of r e t u r n does not seem s i g n i f i c a n t i n the sense th a t the 
(12) The Dawood Group when ', took over the Karnaphuli Paper M i l l s 
from the P.I.D.G., found the enterprise s u b s t a n t i a l l y over-
s t a f f e d p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e v e l . 
(13) .Jf.P.I.D.C. Annual Report. 1965-66. p.13. 
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i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and communication systems are comparatively 
b e t t e r i n West than i n East Pakistan. Moreover, West Pakistan 
being i n d u s t r i a l l y more advanced, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t 
the W.P.I.D.C. should have enjoyed economies of scale r e l a t i v e 
t o the E.P.I.D.C. 
5. Financing of Public Sector Projects. 
(a) E.P.I.D.C. Sponsored Projects; 
Having discussed the a c t i v i t i e s of the E.P.I.D.C., 
we s h a l l now analyse the f i n a n c i n g aspect of the Corporation 
sponsored undertakings. The Corporation has no resources of i t s 
own excepting i t s share c a p i t a l of Rs 45 m i l l i o n and a small 
amount of reserve fund t h a t i t has been able t o accumulate 
from i t s income. I t s reserve fund amounted t o Rs 2.2 m i l l i o n 
on 30th June 1966. The share c a p i t a l however, i s never 
considered t o be a major source of finance f o r purposes of 
c a r r y i n g out i t s tasks. 
As mentioned e a r l i e r , the Corporation i s not a 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n but an agency f o r the promotion of 
i n d u s t r i e s through which the Government makes an investment i n 
the i n d u s t r i a l sector. The i n t e n t i o n of the Government i s not 
the ownership of i n d u s t r i a l e n terprises, taut t o get back the 
fund i t invested through the disinvestment p o l i c y . The 
implementation of the approved projects of the Corporation i s 
- 266 -
o r d i n a r i l y financed by the annual budgetary grants of the 
(14) 
Government of East Pakistan. The Corporation i s however, 
authorised t o supplement i t s resources by t a k i n g p r i v a t e 
c a p i t a l i n the form of equ i t y or loans i n both l o c a l and 
f o r e i g n currencies. As f a r as working c a p i t a l i s concerned, 
the Corporation obtains i t from commercial banks on the usual 
terms. A considerable amount of Government grant i s made i n 
f o r e i g n currency. The Government may also provide other means 
of assistance t o increase the Corporation's resources. 
The t o t a l loan of Rs 1106 m i l l i o n granted by the 
Government of East Pakistan up t o June 30th 1966 i s d i v i d e d 
i n t o i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g and non-interest bearing loans as 
shown i n Table 7.5. 
The f i g u r e s i n the table show t h a t the E.P.I.D.C. 
i n h e r i t e d a debt of Rs 578 m i l l i o n from the former P.I.D.C. at 
the time of b i f u r c a t i o n . Of t h i s sum,Rs 253 m i l l i o n was 
(14) The E.P.I.D.C. i s provided w i t h a r e v o l v i n g fund t o carry 
out p r e l i m i n a r y surveys on the proposed p r o j e c t s . On 
completion of a survey, i t submits a re p o r t containing 
r e l e v a n t t e c h n i c a l , economic and f i n a n c i a l data t o the 
Government f o r approval. When a p r o j e c t i s approved f o r 
implementation, the Corporation makes an e f f o r t t o associate 
p r i v a t e c a p i t a l at the very beginning. I f p r i v a t e c a p i t a l i s 
not forthcoming the p r o j e c t i s c a r r i e d out w i t h the funds 
provided by the Government. A f t e r the completion of the 
p r o j e c t another attempt i s made t o dispose of the p r o j e c t t o 
p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s . I f t h i s attempt i s unsuccessful, the 
p r o j e c t i s converted i n t o a j o i n t stock company, the shares 
being placed i n the market w i t h the managing agency vested 
i n the Corporation. 
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i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g w h i l e Rs 325 m i l l i o n was non-interest bearing. 
The non-interest bearing loans are generally granted f o r 
investment i n the form of share c a p i t a l i n the pr o j e c t s t o be 
converted i n t o j o i n t stock companies, the companies being 
managed by e i t h e r E.P.I.D.C. or p r i v a t e entrepreneurs. Dividends 
earned from these companies are payable t o the Government. The 
Corporation however, r e t a i n s 1 p.c. of the dividend c o l l e c t e d , as 
commission. The i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g loans are used f o r investment 
i n completed p r o j e c t s which are not yet formed i n t o companies, 
on-going p r o j e c t s , and f o r surveys and i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . Such loans 
amounted t o Rs 253 m i l l i o n at the time of b i f u r c a t i o n . 
Formerly, the Government fund a l l o c a t e d t o the 
P.I.D.C. d i d not bear any i n t e r e s t . On b i f u r c a t i o n , the Government 
of East Pakistan began t o charge a nominal r a t e of i n t e r e s t 
against the loan granted t o the E.P.I.D.C. I t can be seen from 
Table 7.5. t h a t loans received from the Government during the 
period 1962-66 were a l l interest-shearing except t h a t a f r e e loan 
of Rs 11 m i l l i o n was granted i n 1962-63.^"''^^ The im p l i c a t i o n s of 
feteres't (jnloans are t h a t they would enable the Government t o earn 
a t l e a s t some income from the fund provided t o the E.P.I.D.C. 
which was not possible i n the case of the former P.I.D.C. The 
(15) Non-interest bearing loans were Rs 1 m i l l i o n during 
1964-65 and 1965-66 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
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P,I,D,C. during i t s ten years of operation could pay p r a c t i c a l l y 
no r e t u r n on Government funds. On the other hand, i t incurred 
a heavy loss from the companies and projects which i t 
sponsored. By charging i n t e r e s t on loans granted t o the E.P.I.D.C, 
the Government assumed t h a t i t would help t o r a i s e the 
op e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y of the Corporation-managed undertakings 
because the management of the e n t e r p r i s e concerned would pay 
more a t t e n t i o n t o operational e f f i c i e n c y so t h a t i t could make 
payments o f i n t e r e s t on the c a p i t a l . 
The t o t a l amount of developmental loans, so c a l l e d 
by the Corporation because they are f o r i n i t i a t i n g new p r o j e c t s , 
came t o Rs 876 m i l l i o n on 30th June 1966, besides the f o r e i g n 
currency loans of Rs 230 m i l l i o n . Out of t o t a l rupee loans of 
Rs 876 m i l l i o n , the i n t e r e s t and non-interest bearing loans 
consisted of Rs 538 m i l l i o n and Rs 339 m i l l i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y . By 
30th June 1966, Rs 19 and Rs 21 r e s p e c t i v e l y had been refunded 
t o the Government, out of the disinvestment proceeds. Thus t o t a l 
net Government funds amounted t o Rs 836 m i l l i o n , of which 
i n t e r e s t and non-interest bearing loans were Rs 519 (62 p.c.) 
and Rs 317 (38 p.c.) m i l l i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y . Further, the 
E.P.I.D.C. also refunded Rs 5 m i l l i o n against f o r e i g n currency 
loans. Thus i t seems t h a t the t o t a l development loan stood at 
Rs 1061 m i l l i o n on 30th June, 1966. 
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The i n t e r e s t payable to the Government has also been 
a source of funds t o the Corporation. The t o t a l amount of i n t e r e s t 
payable t o the Government, on account of i t s loans t o the 
Corporation, worked out at Rs 70 m i l l i o n on 30th June 1966. Out 
of t h i s amount, a sum of Rs 22 m i l l i o n was paid t o the Government 
i n the period ending i n June 1965 and a sum of Rs 27 m i l l i o n was 
u t i l i s e d during the year 1964-65 i n order to finance the Annual 
Development Programme. The balance of Rs 21 m i l l i o n was due to 
the Government on the 30th June 1966. Another Rs 22 m i l l i o n 
was accumulated i n the hands of the Corporation t o be paid t o the 
Government on account of c a p i t a l and other l i a b i l i t i e s as stated 
i n foot:note ( 1 6 ) . 
(16) Other l i a b i l i t i e s payable t o the Government: ( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
1, Accrued i n t e r e s t on loan 20.88 
2. Add increase i n fund due t o ; 
i ) r e v a l u a t i o n of c e r t a i n p r o j e c t s 7.31 
i i ) c a p i t a l p r o f i t 1.63 
i i i ) net p r o f i t i n p r o j e c t s converted 
1 1 ft 
i n t o companies j-.-i-o 
i v ) i n t e r e s t on f o r e i g n currency 
loans ^^ •'^ ^ 
22.85 
T o t a l 43.73 
Less; Net loss i n pro j e c t s converted i n t o 
companies. Loss on amounts w r i t t e n 1.08 
o f f and i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
Net l i a b i l i t i e s payable to the Government: 
' Rs 42.65 
Source: E.P.I.D.C. Annual Report, 1965-66, p.58. 
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(b) W.P.D.I.C. Sponsored P r o j e c t s ; 
Table 7.6. shows the break-down of the developmental 
loans provided by both West Pakistan and Central.Governments t o 
the W.P.I.D.C. up t o 30th June 1966. 
Table 7.6. ; Summarised Statement of Development Loans 
From West Pakistan Government and Central 
Government t o W.P.I.D.C. up t o 30th June 
1966. ( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Period Rupee Loans /Loans i n / ^  . * To t a l 
W.Pak.Govt. / Foreign Central T o t a l Exchange 
Govt. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Assumed on 
b i f u r c a t i o n 1st 543 129 672 672 
J u l y , 1962. 
1962-63 66 5 71 71 1963-64 34 34 » 34 
1964-65 32 - 32 50 82 
1965-^66 19 - 19 10 29 
T o t a l 694 134 828 60 888 
Deduct Refunds 54 20 74 74 
Net funds 640 114 754 814 
Add Free Loans 10 2 12 12 
Miscellaneous 
income 1 10 11 11 
Outstanding funds 651 126 777 60 837 
* Rupee equivalent. 
Sources: W.P.I.D.C. Annual Reports, 1962-^1963, 1963-64, 1964-65, 
1965-66. 
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The general p r i n c i p l e s of f i n a n c i n g of the 
W.P.I.D.Co sponsored p r o j e c t s are fundamentally the same as those 
of the E.P.IoD.C. The W.P.I.D.C. receives i t s required funds 
from the Government of West Pakistan through annual budgetary 
grants. However, the funds t h a t the W.P.I.D.C, received from the 
West Pakistan Government up t o 1964-65 were t r e a t e d as investment 
and not as a loan funds. The Corporation has managed these 
investments on behalf of the Government and any returns accruing 
thereon were t o be paid back t o the Government Treasury. 
Following a recent decision, the Government now 
charges a nominal r a t e of i n t e r e s t on i t s funds provided to the 
W.Pol.D.C. This has been made e f f e c t i v e from the beginning of the 
f i n a n c i a l year 1965-66. The r a t e of i n t e r e s t w i l l be rais e d 
prog r e s s i v e l y from 2 p.c. i n 1965-66, and w i l l increase by 1 p.c. 
each year u n t i l i t becomes equal to the r a t e charged by the 
(17) 
Central Government on development loans. On the other hand, 
any income earned from investment w i l l be r e t a i n e d by the 
Corporation. Since the establishment of the W.P.I.D.C., i t has 
not been required t o pay any p r i c e f o r the c a p i t a l u n t i l the end 
of June 1965, w h i l e i t s counterpart, the E.P.I.D.C. has t o pay 
i n t e r e s t on the fund provided by the East Pakistan Government. 
(17) W.P.I.D.C. Annual Report. 1964-65. 
(18) Fund invested i n companies bear i n t e r e s t w h i l e dividend 
received from the companies would be paid t o the Government. 
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There might be several i m p l i c a t i o n s on the 
performance of an undertaking i f c a p i t a l i s supplied f r e e of 
cost. F i r s t l y , the management of the relevant company may 
not worry about the success of the e n t e r p r i s e because i t need 
not pay even a nominal cost of the c a p i t a l . Secondly, an 
undertaking having no outside c r e d i t o r s and shareholders may 
si n k i n t o i n e f f i c i e n c y i n respect of i t s operation. Most of 
the Corporations' managed undertakings have no outside 
c r e d i t o r s and shareholders who might have taken a c t i v e i n t e r e s t 
by keeping constant v i g i l a n c e over the a f f a i r s of the 
undertakings. Therefore, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a nominal r a t e 
of i n t e r e s t on Government funds, might be viewed as a welcome 
decis i o n i n the sense th a t i t may help t o improve the 
op e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y of the Corporations' managed 
undertakings. 
As can be seen from Table 7.6. the W.P.I.D.C. has 
received a r e l a t i v e l y smaller t o t a l of funds from the Government 
since i t s i n c e p t i o n . During i t s four years of operation from 
1962-66, i t has received only Rs 216 m i l l i o n ( i n c l u d i n g Rs 60 
m i l l i o n f o r e i g n currency loan) compared w i t h Rs 528 m i l l i o n by 
the E.P.I.D.C. I n 1965-66, Government funds of Rs 631 m i l l i o n 
were converted i n t o a development loan which would carry 2 p.c. 
i n t e r e s t per annum. I n t e r e s t f r e e loans stood at Rs 10 m i l l i o n 
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by t h a t time. Meanwhile, the Corporation refunded Rs 54 m i l l i o n 
t o the Government. Therefore, a f t e r necessary adjustments i n 
respect of i n t e r e s t and dividend accruing t o Government loans the 
t o t a l outstanding Government loans from West Pakistan Government 
amounted t o Rs 711 m i l l i o n , i n c l u d i n g Rs 60 m i l l i o n i n f o r e i g n 
currency loans. 
The W.P.I.D.C. assumed the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the 
former P.I.D.C. i n managing the gas undertakings on behalf of 
the Central Government, The Corporation received Rs 129 m i l l i o n 
as a counterpart fund invested i n gas undertakings at the time of 
b i f u r c a t i o n . I n the i n i t i a l year of the Corporation's operation 
i t received a f u r t h e r sum of Rs 5 m i l l i o n from the Central 
Government. By the end of June 1966,the funds provided by the Central 
Government amounted t o Rs 134 m i l l i o n . A sum of Rs 20 m i l l i o n 
was however, refunded t o the Central Government by tha t time. By 
June 1966, the outstanding fund provided by the Central Government 
stood a t Rs 126 m i l l i o n i n c l u d i n g Rs 10 m i l l i o n as miscellaneous 
income and Rs 2 m i l l i o n as free loan added t o the fund, 
6, Disinvestment Polic^y^i. of the I n d u s t r i a l Development 
Corporations. 
We now t u r n t o the discussion of the u l t i m a t e goals of 
the Corporations i . e . , the disinvestment of successful enterprises. 
The main o b j e c t i v e of the P.I,D.C. and i t s successors the E.P.I.D.C. 
- 275 " 
and the W.P.I.D.C. i s t o supplement i n d u s t r i a l development and 
not t o supplant i t . I t was c l e a r l y o u t l i n e d i n the p o l i c y 
statement of the Corporations t h a t s u c c e s s f u l l y completed 
enterprises would be sol d out t o p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s , or groups, 
w i t h a view t o r e l e a s i n g funds invested i n the p r o j e c t s concerned, 
and so p r o v i d i n g a flow out of which f u r t h e r i n d u s t r i e s could be 
set up. I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g to examine how f a r the 
Corporations' disinvestment p o l i c y has; been successful during 
the l a s t 14 years of t h e i r operations. 
I t would appear from the t a b l e below t h a t as against 
the t o t a l funds made a v a i l a b l e by the Governments the disinvestment 
made by the two r e g i o n a l Corporations amounted t o Rs 56 m i l l i o n . 
Before the b i f u r c a t i o n , the P.I.D.C. disinvested up t o 30th June 
(19) 
1961 t o the extent of Rs 168 m i l l i o n . Thus disinvestment 
up t o 30th June 1966 amounted t o Rs 219.2 m i l l i o n . I t means tha t 
out of an investment of Rs 1817 m i l l i o n , t o t a l refund on account 
of disinvestment amounted t o Rs 219.2 m i l l i o n or 12 p.c. of the 
t o t a l . ^ ^ ^ ^ The funds advanced by the Central Government and l a t e r 
by p r o v i n c i a l Governments are spread over 14 years. So the 
average amount of disinvestment works out at Rs 16 m i l l i o n per 
annum. The r a t i o of disinvestment w i l l seem low by any standard, 
a f a c t which i s i n d i c a t i v e of the Corporations' f a i l u r e i n achieving 
one of t h e i r primary o b j e c t i v e s . 
(19) P.I.D.C. Annual Report. 1960-61, p.55. 
(20) Rs 5 m i l l i o n was r e p a i d against the f o r e i g n currency loan. 
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Table 7.7. : Government Funds Advanced t o , and Repayments 
by the E.P.I.D.C. and the W.P.I.D.G. yfe t o 
:. 30th June 1966. 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
EAST PAKISTAN WEST PAKISTAN T o t a l 
A. 
B. 
Government Fund advanced; 
a) Rupee loan 
b) Foreign loan 
a + b ; 
Repayment t o the Government 
on account o f ; 
a) Disinvestment 
b) Foreign loan 
a + b : 
877.5 
228.9 
1106.4 
651.2 
59.7 
710.9 
40.0 
5.0 
45.0 
11,2 
11.2 
1528.7 
288.6 
1817.3 
51.2 
5.0 
56,2 
Fund outstanding 
A - B : 1061.4 699.7 1761.1 
Sources: ( i ) g.I.D.C. Annual Report f o r 1961-62. 
( i i ) E..P,I.D,C. Annual Report f o r 1965-66. 
( i i i ) W.P.I.D.C. Annual Report f o r 1965-66. 
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The disinvestment p o l i c y , of the Corporations 
involves c e r t a i n economic and s o c i a l problems which are more or 
less responsible f o r the low pr o p o r t i o n of disinvestment. The 
Corporations can d i s i n v e s t e i t h e r by s e l l i n g the p r o j e c t s to 
p r i v a t e p a r t i e s , or by converting them i n t o p u b l i c l i m i t e d 
companies and o f f e r i n g the shares to the general p u b l i c . I n 
both cases disinvestment i s r e l a t e d t o the p r i c e of p r o j e c t s . 
There are three p r i c e s which need t o be considered, namely, 
( i ) market p r i c e , ( i i ) cost p r i c e , and, ( i i i ) sale at concession 
p r i c e . According t o the charters, the Corporations are not 
e n t i t l e d t o t r a n s f e r t h e i r shares to another party below the 
market value, or the par value, of the shares at the time of 
t r a n s f e r w i t h o u t the p r i o r sanction of the respective Governments. 
The E.P.I.D.C. and the W.P.I.D.C. have disinvested only a part 
of t h e i r holdings i n companies managed by private-entrepreneurs; 
disinvestment has been made on the evidence of p r o f i t . For 
example, the E.P.I.D.C. has earned about 18 p.c. premium by 
(21) 
d i s i n v e s t i n g shares worth of Rs 25.99 m i l l i o n during 1965-66. 
S i m i l a r l y , the W.P.I.D.C. has disinvested holdings i n p r i v a t e l y 
(22) 
managed undertakings at a margin of p r o f i t . However, the 
Corporations* major d i f f i c u l t i e s l i e w i t h the disinvestment of the 
companies and p r o j e c t s managed by themselves. For a v a r i e t y of 
(21) E.P.I.D.C. Annual Report 1965-66. pp.48-49. 
(22) Akram, M., 'Disinvestment Policy of the W.P.I.D.C.' Trade and 
Ind u s t r y . Vol, X, No.l, Januaryji 1966. P-^? 
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reasons there i s a dearth of p o t e n t i a l buyers of these p r o j e c t s . 
For instance, i t i s st a t e d t h a t the most of the p u b l i c 
enterprises are o v e r - c a p i t a l i s e d . The c a p i t a l goods are l a r g e l y 
imported under f o r e i g n aid/loan or c r e d i t , mostly t i e d , i n the 
sense t h a t they had t o be imported from the loa n - g i v i n g 
(23) 
c o u n t r i e s . The p r i c e a t which the c a p i t a l goods were imported 
was not competitive arid as such i t led t o o v e r - c a p i t a l i s a t i o n of 
p r o j e c t s . The overhead cost of projects has been high. The 
plan t s have been run below capacity and are badly located. 
Therefore, most of the p r o j e c t s are operated e i t h e r at low r e t u r n 
or a t a loss; e i t h e r the cost of production per u n i t i s high Or 
i t i s not competitive. I t i s t h i s t h a t has r e s u l t e d i n a slow 
r a t e of disinvestment. 
I t i s alleged t h a t the disinvested undertakings of 
the Corporations cannot be managed by p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e as t h i s 
would mean a complete overhaul and d r a s t i c change i n the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , leading p o s s i b l y to unemployment of many people 
(24) 
a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s , thus causing s o c i a l problems. Government 
p o l i c y of widening the base of equity ownership does not encourage 
t r a n s f e r of p r o j e c t s t o b i g i n d u s t r i a l houses, but p r i v a t e 
e n t e r p r i s e i s r e l u c t a n t i n any case t o take over these pr o j e c t s i n 
(23) c f . Chapter 6 ,R215. 
(24) See pages 263 and 264. 
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view of the problems which i t i s thought w i l l have to be faced 
a f t e r w a r d s . 
As pointed out i n Chapter Three, the p r e v a i l i n g 
share-market c o n d i t i o n s are not conducive to disposing of shares 
through p u b l i c i s s u e s . I n v e s t o r s i n general would not show 
much response to i s s u e s of u n p r o f i t a b l e or l e s s p r o f i t a b l e 
concerns. E v e n t u a l l y , disinvestment through p u b l i c i s s u e s does 
not appear to be f e a s i b l e under the present investment atmosphere 
i n the country. I n t h i s r e s p e c t the W.P.I.D.C. i s i n a 
comparatively b e t t e r p o s i t i o n i n the sense that the people i n 
West P a k i s t a n are more investment-conscious than t h e i r 
compatriots i n E a s t P a k i s t a n . 
The other reasons a r e s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i n nature 
r a t h e r than economic. For example, under the Government's 
present p o l i c y the Corporations are not i n a p o s i t i o n to o f f e r 
l a r g e r shares to b i g i n d u s t r i a l magnates, as t h i s would go 
a g a i n s t the Government p o l i c y of d i f f u s i n g ownership of i n d u s t r i a l 
undertakings. 
Apart from the problems mentioned above, the 
EoP.I.D.C. has i t s own problems r e l a t i n g to disinvestment p o l i c y : 
f o r example, from the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l points of view, the 
E a s t P a k i s t a n Government does not subscribe to the view that a 
completed p r o j e c t should be handed over to an entrepreneur of 
West P a k i s t a n : t h i s i s r e a l l y a problem p e c u l i a r to the 
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E.P.I.D.C, as f a r as disinvestment i s concerned. P r i v a t e c a p i t a l 
i s shy i n E a s t P a k i s t a n and accordingly c a p i t a l formation i s low. 
I n such a s i t u a t i o n , the E.P.I.D.C. i s i n a l e s s advantageous 
p o s i t i o n to d i s i n v e s t the p r o j e c t s to E a s t P a k i s t a n when s u i t a b l e 
buyers are not a v a i l a b l e . I t thus seems that the c r u c i a l problem 
f o r the E.P.I.D.C. i s to de v i s e a s u i t a b l e mechanism through which 
i t can operate i t s disinvestment p o l i c y e f f e c t i v e l y . 
I n c o n s i d e r i n g what mechanism might s u i t the purpose of 
the E.P.I.D.C. and the W.P.I.D.C, i t may be u s e f u l to begin by 
examining the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to the Corporations. I n the f i r s t 
p l a c e , the o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y of the e n t e r p r i s e s needs to be 
brought i n l i n e w i t h the operational e f f i c i e n c y of s i m i l a r e n t e r p r i s e s 
managed by p r i v a t e entrepreneurs. With the exception of some b a s i c 
i n d u s t r i e s such as i r o n and s t e e l , machine t o o l s and f e r t i l i z e r s , the 
working r e s u l t s can be improved by applying c o s t c o n t r o l techniques, 
u t i l i s i n g the p l a n t to i t s maximum c a p a c i t y , reducing the burden of 
overhead c o s t , and r a i s i n g the managerial standards. 
That there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y of improvement i s 
i n d i c a t e d by the f a c t t h a t the r a t e of r e t u r n on c a p i t a l under 
the Corporations' managed undertakings, i s r e l a t i v e l y low as 
compared w i t h t h a t of undertakings managed by p r i v a t e p a r t i e s . 
On the evidence a t hand, there has not been much improvement i n 
the e f f i c i e n c y of the managerial s t a f f , s i n c e most of the top 
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managerial posts a r e f i l l e d from the c i v i l s e r v i c e of Pak i s t a n . 
The members of t h i s s e r v i c e a r e r e c r u i t e d on the b a s i s of 
competitive examinations h e l d on the l i n e s of the c i v i l s e r v i c e 
i n England, p r i m a r i l y f o r di s c h a r g i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d u t i e s 
(25) 
such as law and order. 
With the growing a c t i v i t i e s of the E.P.I.D.C. and 
the W.P.I.D.C. they have now become the l a r g e s t s i n g l e 
i n d u s t r i a l entrepreneurs i n the country. T h i s i s more true i n 
the case of the E.P.I.D.C. because i t s s i z e of investment i s 
g r e a t e r than i n West P a k i s t a n . The Boards of D i r e c t o r s appointed 
by the Governments, are composed of bureaucrats who have l i t t l e 
i n d u s t r i a l experience. The Boards are re s p o n s i b l e f o r organising 
heterogeneous groups of e n t e r p r i s e s of which they l a c k 
experience. T h i s r e s u l t s i n decision-making l a r g e l y on the 
b a s i s of impressions and i n t u i t i o n r a t h e r than d e t a i l e d knowledge 
of the i n d i v i d u a l i n d u s t r y . 
As a major step towards the promotion of e f f i c i e n c y 
which must s e r v e as a magnet f o r disinvestment, one would 
r e c a l l t h a t the Corporations should be divided i n t o a number of 
s m a l l e r c o r p o r a t i o n s , each s p e c i a l i s i n g i n one or more r e l a t e d 
i n d u s t r i e s . For example a l l u n i t s of production owned by the 
(25) Thus, s i n c e the establishment, the head of the E.P.I.D.C. has 
been from C i v i l S e r v i c e and P o l i c e S e r v i c e of P a k i s t a n . I n 
a d d i t i o n , many of the important managerial posts have been 
f i l l e d i n by the members of the Armed Forces e i t h e r on 
retirement or on secondment. 
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Corporations which a re connected with t e x t i l e s should form the 
c o n s t i t u e n t s of a P u b l i c T e x t i l e Corporation. I f t h i s were 
done, i t would not only be p o s s i b l e to e n t r u s t the running of 
t h i s Corporation to s p e c i a l i s t s , but a l s o , by i n s i s t i n g on 
cpmpetition among the s m a l l e r corporations i n respect of p r o f i t , 
i t would tend to promote e f f i c i e n c y . Such a step might lead to 
an improvement i n t h e , o p e r a t i o n a l , e f f i c i e n c y i n the p u b l i c 
s e c t o r , which could be e m p i r i c a l l y v e r i f i e d by comparing the 
records of the two r e g i o n a l Corporations i n t o which the former 
monolithic Corporation was d i v i d e d as shown i n Table 7.4. 
As an a l t e r n a t i v e the management of the completed 
p r o j e c t s might be separated from the h i e r a r c h y of the present 
s e t up of the Corporations' management. The executives i n 
charge of the concern, should be given w e l l defined 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r which they should be accountable to the 
Corporations. I n order to provide s t i m u l i to the management 
the remuneration to the executives r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an i n d i v i d u a l 
e n t e r p r i s e should be l i n k e d with the ope r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y of 
that p a r t i c u l a r concern. For example, an executive would be 
given a f i x e d s a l a r y , say Rs 1000 per month and a c e r t a i n 
percentage of net p r o f i t when earned by the e n t e r p r i s e concerned, 
T h i s technique of management might improve the operational 
e f f i c i e n c y of the e n t e r p r i s e s managed by the Corporations. 
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An a l t e r n a t i v e method may a l s o be given c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
Considering the p r e v a i l i n g s t o c k market con d i t i o n s i n the 
country and the Government's o b j e c t i v e s f o r wider d i f f u s i o n of 
i n d u s t r i a l ownership, the shares of l i m i t e d companies could be 
s o l d to the p u b l i c a t a guaranteed minimum r a t e of dividend. Here 
a l s o the management of the concern should be handed over to a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l management group with the above mentioned conditions 
to improve o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y . However, a new technique 
should be evolved i n order to operate t h i s scheme e f f e c t i v e l y . 
For example, the e f f o r t s of the I . C P . f o r promoting equity 
investment among the middle c l a s s i n v e s t o r s through the operation 
(26) 
of Closed End Mutual Funds seem to be an encouraging s i g n i n 
t h i s d i r e c t i o n . S i m i l a r techniques might be adopted to r e a l i s e 
the p o l i c y of disinvestment. 
Mutual Fund companies may be formed under Government 
sponsorship and c e r t i f i c a t e s can be s o l d to the p u b l i c with a 
promise of paying a minimum r a t e of dividend, say 10 p.c, per 
annum. Thus the funds c o l l e c t e d from the s a l e of Mutual Fund 
c e r t i f i c a t e s might be i n v e s t e d i n the stocks of d i s i n v e s t e d 
companies. The s e l e c t i o n of the companies would need to be 
made c a r e f u l l y , based on economic a n a l y s i s . I t has been observed 
t h a t the o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c i e s of some of the managed 
(26) See for d e t a i l s Chapter 4 -^ .^1164 ' 
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companies can be improved during the i n i t i a l year of take; ovw 
by i n c r e a s i n g the standard of management. 
However, i t could be a q u i t e reasonable 
presumption t h a t the companies taken over would not be i n a 
p o s i t i o n to pay the guaranteed dividend from thei»r own earnings 
at l e a s t i n the i n i t i a l s t a g e s . The d i f f e r e n c e between 
earnings and guaranteed dividend might be wider during the 
i n i t i a l y e a r s , say 3 p.c. i n the f i r s t year and 2 p.c. i n the 
second year or so. I n that case the Governments should be ready 
to s u b s i d i s e the d i f f e r e n t i a l amount during the i n i t i a l y e ars. 
I t may be argued t h a t the Governments should not undertake such 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the sense that i t would i n c r e a s e the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s income. But i t i s a l s o t r u e that i n s p i t e of 
i n c u r r i n g l o s s year by year due to i n e f f i c i e n c y , i t might be more 
u s e f u l to encourage m o b i l i s a t i o n of small i n v e s t o r s ' s a v i n g s i n t o 
corporate shares even at a c o s t for a few y e a r s . Moreover, t h i s 
p o l i c y could g r e a t l y enhance the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e a l i s i n g 
the Governments' o b j e c t i v e s towards wider d i f f u s i o n of i n d u s t r i a l 
share ownership. 
F u r t h e r , the E.P.I.D.C. could form a consortium of 
l o c a l s m a l l i n v e s t o r s , f o r each of i t s e n t e r p r i s e s and appoint 
an e x e c u t i v e who would be p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the 
management of t h a t e n t e r p r i s e . The executive would be an 
employee of the e n t e r p r i s e and he should have freedom of a c t i o n . 
- 285 -
His e f f i c i e n c y and performance should toe judged on the b a s i s of 
the working r e s u l t s of the company. By strengthening the 
management of the company concerned, the growers of j u t e and 
sugar, p r o f e s s i o n a l people, p r o f e s s i o n a l clubs and organisations 
and f r i e n d l y s o c i e t i e s , could be encouraged to buy s h a r e s . 
Such attempts have al r e a d y been made by the E.P.I.D.C. and found 
s a t i s f a c t o r y . T h i s kind of attempt should be extended f u r t h e r . 
S i m i l a r l y , workers might be asked to work e x t r a hours f o r which 
payment might be made i n shares r a t h e r than i n cash. 
D e spite shortcomings and l i m i t a t i o n s , i t may be 
noted that a l a r g e number of i n d u s t r i e s s e r v i n g the n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t has been e s t a b l i s h e d i n both E a s t and West P a k i s t a n 
under the d i r e c t i n i t i a t i v e of the I n d u s t r i a l Development 
Corporations, Many of these i n d u s t r i e s could not have been 
developed i n the country, without the d i r e c t entrepreneurship of 
the Government or a t l e a s t would not be e s t a b l i s h e d so e a r l y 
by the p r i v a t e entrepreneurs. E v i d e n t l y , the c o n t r i b u t i o n of 
the E.P.I.D.C, and the W.P.I.D.C. i n quickening the pace of 
i n d u s t r i a l growth has been q u i t e s i g n i f i c a n t . I n so f a r as t h i s 
view can be accepted as v a l i d , one may claim j u s t i f i c a t i o n for 
the operations of these Corporations even though, they have 
shown f o r one reason or another, a degree of operational 
i n e f f i c i e n c y . 
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I n e f f e c t , these Corporations have f a i l e d to some 
extent to attract p r i v a t e investment i n t h e i r sponsored p r o j e c t s 
e i t h e r a t the time of c o n s t r u c t i o n or a f t e r completion. The 
reasons are g e n e r a l l y the operationalIneffioienoy of the 
e n t e r p r i s e s managed by the Corporations , i The low r a t e of r e t u r n 
on c a p i t a l i n the Corporations' managed concerns i s mostly due 
to t h e i r l a r g e r overhead c o s t and o v e r - c a p i t a l i s a t i o n . The 
undertakings run by them are over s t a f f e d f o r one reason or 
another and work below c a p a c i t y . This i s equivalent to the 
Corporations' paying a premium for each f a c t o r input, which i s 
more than the p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e does. The i n e v i t a b l e 
consequence has been the inoperation of the Corporations' 
disinvestment p o l i c y , which i s the main essence of p u b l i c p o l i c y . 
The Corporations, as the main instruments f o r c h a n n e l l i n g p u b l i c 
funds i n t o i n d u s t r y have not been able to use these funds with 
f u l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y e f f e c t so as p r o d u c t i v i t y i s concerned. 
As an a l t e r n a t i v e to such p u b l i c investment, the 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r could have been provided w i t h adequate c r e d i t s 
through the r e l e v a n t f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s to s e t up those 
i n d u s t r i e s which have been u n p r o f i t a b l e under p u b l i c ownership. 
The e v a l u a t i o n of the Corporations' a c t i v i t i a s supports the hard 
surmise that under p r i v a t e management, these i n d u s t r i e s with 
s m a l l e r overhead c o s t s might have a t t a i n e d the d e s i r e d 
o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y and y i e l d e d a higher r a t e of r e t u r n on 
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c a p i t a l . So, from the s t r i c t commercial point of view, the 
investment made by the p u b l i c s e c t o r through the 
Corporations seems to have a very dubious j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
CHAPTER EIGHT. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
The main purpose of the present study has been to 
i d e n t i f y and examine the nature and problems of i n d u s t r i a l 
f i n a n c i n g i n P a k i s t a n i n the context of a Government p o l i c y of 
i n d u s t r i a l development and a r e l a t i v e l y underdeveloped c a p i t a l 
market. I n the course of the study an attempt has been made to 
a n a l y s e s t r u c t u r a l changes i n i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c i n g and the 
ev o l u t i o n a r y process warranting such changes. I t i s evident t h a t 
the process has been a slow one. I n p a r t , t h i s has been due to 
the low r a t e of c a p i t a l formation, an underdeveloped c a p i t a l 
market, and, i n p a r t , to the l a c k of a well-coordinated p o l i c y 
w i t h regard to the development of the c a p i t a l market. 
I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n Paki s t a n began w i t h the 
development of consumer goods i n d u s t r i e s mainly i n the p r i v a t e 
s e c t o r . T h i s r e s u l t e d i n a complete n e g l e c t of b a s i c i n d u s t r i e s 
r e q u i r i n g very l a r g e investment, a longer g e s t a t i o n period, and 
i n v o l v i n g complex technology. Having r e a l i s e d t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the 
Government, i n order to impart balance i n the i n d u s t r i a l growth 
took the i n i t i a t i v e to develop those i n d u s t r i e s where p r i v a t e 
c a p i t a l was not forthcoming. The Paki s t a n I n d u s t r i a l Development 
Corporation, s e t up i n 1950, and subsequently, two Pruavincial 
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I n d u s t r i a l Development Corporations, operating from 1962, have 
sponsored the p r o j e c t s i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r . Thus w i t h the 
c o n s i s t e n t e f f o r t s of both p r i v a t e and p u b l i c s e c t o r s , n e a r l y 
an average annual growth r a t e of 13 p.c. has been achieved over 
the l a s t decade and a h a l f . 
The development of i n d u s t r i e s has been accompanied 
by a change i n the c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e of i n d u s t r i a l undertakings 
as w e l l as of the c a p i t a l market. A f e a t u r e of the c a p i t a l 
s t r u c t u r e i s the r i s i n g proportion of long-term loans and d e c l i n e 
i n the proportion of share c a p i t a l . The proportion of preference 
s h a r e s i n the share c a p i t a l has been i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y s m a l l . 
Absence of f i x e d dividend shares has r e s t r i c t e d the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
i n v e s t o r s such as insurance companies from making investments i n 
i n d u s t r i a l s t o c k s . 
There has been a tendency f o r the proportion of 
r e t a i n e d earnings to be high. The high proportion of r e t a i n e d 
earnings may be taken as evidence of higher p r o f i t a b i l i t y of 
i n d u s t r i a l undertakings and d e s i r e on the pa r t of those concerned 
t o r e t a i n c o n t r o l of e n t e r p r i s e s which they were f i n d i n g 
p r o f i t a b l e . As a r e s u l t , t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n to the equity of an 
e n t e r p r i s e of sponsors w i t h a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d i n d u s t r i a l 
connections does not seem to be a problem because e x i s t i n g 
entrepreneurs seem disposed to make finance a v a i l a b l e through 
r e t a i n e d earnings from e x i s t i n g p r o j e c t s . T h i s may meet the needs 
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of e n t e r p r i s e s a l r e a d y i n being but, c l e a r l y , i t does l i t t l e or 
nothing to meet the f i n a n c i a l needs of new e n t e r p r i s e s which are 
seekin g to e s t a b l i s h themselves. 
The r i s e i n the proportion of long-term loans may 
be explained by the r i s e i n the cos t of c a p i t a l goods and be t t e r 
c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s i n the country. Nevertheless, the r a i s i n g of 
funds by i s s u i n g debentures i n the market i s found only seldom. 
I f the p r a c t i c e of r a i s i n g c a p i t a l by i s s u i n g debentures was 
used more e x t e n s i v e l y then i t i s p o s s i b l e that t h i s would a t t r a c t 
a stronger i n t e r e s t on the part of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n v e s t o r s . 
I t would, of course, have to be applied w i t h caution f o r 
debenture i s s u e s add to the cos t which the e n t e r p r i s e must meet 
w h i l e e q u i t i e s do not. 
There has been a change i n the c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e of 
almost a l l groups of i n d u s t r i e s (except f u e l and power). The 
r a t i o of share c a p i t a l to t o t a l c a p i t a l has d e c l i n e d q u i t e 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y . I t i s n o t i c e a b l e that t h i s change i s more a 
f e a t u r e of medium and l a r g e concerns than small ones. 
Si n c e the c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e i s s t i l l l a r g e l y equity 
based, however, the main problem i n r a i s i n g c a p i t a l through new 
i s s u e s i n the market i s the l a c k of the development of the 
c a p i t a l market i t s e l f . With the s h i f t i n g of emphasis from the 
development of consiimer to c a p i t a l goods i n d u s t r i e s the need f o r 
c a p i t a l has r i s e n and the problem i s t h e r e f o r e , that of f i n d i n g 
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c a p i t a l f o r the l a r g e r and t e c h n i c a l l y more advanced p r o j e c t s . 
The problem of r a i s i n g c a p i t a l has been thus i n t e n s i f i e d . 
I t might have been expected t h a t the Karachi Stock 
Exchange would have provided a s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem. I t i s 
ev i d e n t , however, th a t i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n has been l i m i t e d and that, 
s i n c e 1963, i t s a c t i v i t y has been p e r s i s t e n t l y s l i g h t . I n part, 
the smallness of the c o n t r i b u t i o n by the K.S.E. may be 
exp l a i n e d by the c o n t i n u a l l y v a r y i n g f i s c a l and o f f i c i a l c o n t r o l s , 
the l a c k of share-consciousness among small and medium savers 
i n the country, and inadequacy of resources of i n s t i t u t i o n s engaged 
i n underwriting a c t i v i t y . The tendency of the market towards 
s l u g g i s h a c t i v i t y was aggravated, i n p a r t i c u l a r , by the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of a new d e f i n i t i o n of "public company" f o r income 
tax purposes. I n v e s t o r s , moreover, seem to have been shy of 
investment i n companies. 
There has been no strong p r o f e s s i o n a l c l a s s making 
a business of investment a c t i v i t y i n s h a r e s . I n such circumstances, 
managing agents, a powerful group i n the i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d , who 
supported the market during i t s l e a n period, have not l o s t any of 
t h e i r former importance. As a strong p r o f e s s i o n a l i n v e s t i n g c l a s s 
has yet to be developed i n P a k i s t a n , the a b o l i t i o n of the managing 
agency system would be premature and unwise. O f f i c i a l p o l i c y 
has c r e a t e d u n c e r t a i n t y about the l i k e l i h o o d of the continuing 
e x i s t e n c e of t h i s system and has served no good purpose. Therefore, 
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i t should be the aim of the Government i n the e x i s t i n g 
circumstances to consider ways i n which the damage so cr e a t e d can 
be remedied and, more p o s i t i v e l y , how p u b l i c confidence i n the 
s t o c k market can be b u i l t up. An important s t e p would be to 
c o n s i d e r s u i t a b l e ways of b r i n g i n g about a d i f f u s i o n of i n d u s t r i a l 
ownership. Such measures, however, would, by t h e i r nature, tend 
to be slow and they would not be l i k e l y to bring w i t h them a 
s o l u t i o n to the problem of how to provide the massive q u a n t i t i e s 
of c a p i t a l which tend to be r e q u i r e d by the more advanced types 
of p r o j e c t s w i t h modern techniques. Considering the l a c k of 
share-consciousness of the p u b l i c , the i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements 
f o r m o b i l i s i n g small savings i n t o the corporate s e c t o r should be 
streng-tkened. 
I t might have been thought t h a t insurance companies 
might have been a stronger source of finance though, a g a i n s t 
t h i s , i t has always to be borne i n mind, t h a t insurance companies, 
because of the nature of t h e i r l i a b i l i t i e s , must always pay c l o s e 
a t t e n t i o n to the i n t e g r i t y of t h e i r investments and avoid the 
more s p e c u l a t i v e s o r t s of entanglement. Many of the i n d u s t r i a l 
s t o c k s d e a l t on the K.S.E. do. not provide such i n t e g r i t y . A l l 
the same, i t i s not unreasonable to think that they might have 
done more than, i n f a c t , they seem to have been w i l l i n g to do. 
Neither have i n s t i t u t i o n a l forms such as the 
N a t i o n a l Investment T r u s t and the Investment Corporation of P a k i s t a n 
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been the s t r e n g t h t h a t perhaps was hoped. I n p a r t , the problem 
would seem to be th a t the N.I.T. has i t s e l f not been a t t r a c t i v e 
to i n v e s t o r s g e n e r a l l y and has not been able to obtain the 
volume of funds they might have done. The N.I.T. which performed 
an underwriting f u n c t i o n by s u b s c r i b i n g i t s option of 20 p.c. 
for every new i s s u e has v i r t u a l l y become i n o p e r a t i v e i n t h i s 
f i e l d : , t h i s i s because of i t s anxiety to earn a reasonable r e t u r n 
f o r i t s u n i t holders f a i r l y immediately and new p r o j e c t s do not 
hold out the promise of t h i s f o r some years to come. 
I . C P . i s performing an underwriting f u n c t i o n as i t s 
main f u n c t i o n but i t s a b i l i t y to meet the equity gap i s dependent 
on i t s own funds. The Corporation's f i n a n c i a l resources a r e 
a l r e a d y under s t r a i n as i t had to absorb 80 to 90 p.c, of the 
underwriting commitments during i t s f i r s t year of operation. 
T h e r e f o r e , the suc c e s s of the Corporation depends on the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s . Perhaps a s o l u t i o n here may 
be f o r the Government to a l l o c a t e funds to the I . C P . through 
budgetary grants i n order to enable the Corporation to make the 
needed investment i n i n d u s t r y . 
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a l l seem to point i n one 
d i r e c t i o n namely, the need to i n s p i r e g r e a t e r confidence i n 
i n d u s t r i a l investment and f o r some agencies to be the source of 
such i n s p i r a t i o n . To say that the Government should aim to be that 
agency and to provide the necessary i n s p i r a t i o n i s easy; perhaps 
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too easy; i t i s a l l too often the u n c r i t i c a l l y accepted formula; 
but i t seems to be the l o g i c a l outcome of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
which have been presented. 
Fo r e i g n p r i v a t e investment has been an important 
source of funds and i t would be wrong not to recognise i t s 
importance. But i t i s evident that f o r e i g n p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s -
not u n n a t u r a l l y , perhaps, have tended to p a r t i c i p a t e only i n those 
i n d u s t r i e s which have h e l d out the promise of high p r o f i t . 
P o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y , f e a r of n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of a s s e t s , and the 
l i k e , may have discouraged the flow of such p r i v a t e investment 
and l a t t e r l y , of course, t h i s has aggravated the problem of 
c a p i t a l shortage. I t has been mitigated however, to some extent, 
by assurances which the Government has been g i v i n g over the l a s t 
t e n y ears or so, but not wholly. I t seems that i n s p i t e of the 
c o n s i s t e n t e f f o r t s by the Government for a t t r a c t i n g f o r e i g n 
p r i v a t e investment, the progpect of such investment does not seem 
as b r i g h t , as p o s s i b l y the Government may have wished. 
With regard to the p r o v i s i o n of long term c r e d i t 
through s p e c i a l i s e d c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e the I n d u s t r i a l 
Devi^lopment Bank of P a k i s t a n and the P a k i s t a n I n d u s t r i a l C r e d i t 
and Investment Corporation, i t would seem that they have met the 
demand fo r long-term c r e d i t of l a r g e - s c a l e i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e 
to a s a t i s f a c t o r y degree. But here too, there are problems. They 
a r e the common problems such as tend to confront any development 
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bank i n a developing economy, The la c k of sound p r o j e c t s , absence 
of c o o r d i n a t i o n among va r i o u s departments of the Government and 
i n d u s t r i a l i n e xperience of the borrowers have p a r t i c u l a r l y 
d i s t u r b e d the a c t i v i t i e s of these i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n some i n s t a n c e s , 
the shortage of f o r e i g n exchange resources and the t i e d nature of 
f o r e i g n c r e d i t have e s p e c i a l l y hindered the o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y 
of the i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
I n the p u b l i c s e c t o r , the former P a k i s t a n I n d u s t r i a l 
Development Corporation and subsequently the E a s t and West 
P a k i s t a n I n d u s t r i a l Development Corporations have mobilised a l a r g e 
volume of p u b l i c funds i n t o the i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d and t h e i r r o l e s 
i n i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n are very s i g n i f i c a n t . But the c o n t r i b u t i o n 
of the Corporations has been damaged by t h e i r f a i l u r e to run the 
e n t e r p r i s e s w i t h which they became involved on c o n s i s t e n t 
commercial l i n e s . I t was intended that the i n d u s t r i e s promoted i n 
the p u b l i c s e c t o r , should, as opportunity occurred, be d i s i n v e s t e d . 
But t h i s i n t e n t i o n has not been c a r r i e d out to the extent that the 
e a r l i e r statement of i n t e n t i o n s would seem to r e q u i r e , 
Th©' s i t u a t i o n i s complex and no easy s o l u t i o n i s 
p o s s i b l e . Since the Corporations' managed undertakings are not 
o p e r a t i o n a l l y e f f i c i e n t , mainly due to over c a p i t a l i s a t i o n , heavy 
overhead c o s t , and i n e f f i c i e n t management, p r i v a t e entrepreneurs 
show l i t t l e enthusiasm to buy these undertakings. As a major 
s t e p to implement the disinvestment p o l i c y of the Corporations, i t 
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may be suggested t h a t the o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y of the 
e n t e r p r i s e s under Corporations' management should be improved so 
as to match the undertakings managed by p r i v a t e entrepreneurs. 
T h i s may be p o s s i b l e , a t l e a s t i n some ca s e s , by reducing the 
overhead c o s t and improving the management. For t h i s purpose, 
the management of the i n d i v i d u a l undertaking should be c l e a r l y 
s eparated from the management of the Corporations themselves. 
The e x e c u t i v e s of the companies concerned should be given w e l l 
d e f i n e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and made l i a b l e to the higher a u t h o r i t y 
f o r the o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y of the u n i t . To provide s t i m u l i , 
the remuneration- to be paid to the management might be l i n k e d with 
the p r o f i t - e a r n i n g of the r e l e v a n t concern. 
An a l t e r n a t i v e method might a l s o be given 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Mutual Funds Undertakings can be sponsored by the 
Government and Fund C e r t i f i c a t e s can be i s s u e d to the p u b l i c on 
the b a s i s of a guaranteed minimum r a t e of dividend. The 
c e r t i f i c a t e sale-proceeds could be used i n d i s i n v e s t e d undertakings. 
For the more e f f i c i e n t operation of the d i s i n v e s t e d u n i t , the 
management could be handed over to a p r o f e s s i o n a l group of managers, 
Over and above these, the P r o v i n c i a l Corporations 
have now become s i n g l e g i a n t i n d u s t r i a l o r ganisations d e a l i n g 
w i t h heterogenous groups of i n d u s t r i e s . I t i s r e a l l y a d i f f i c u l t 
job to manage such undertakings without being acquainted 'with 
the modern techniques of management. I n such a s i t u a t i o n one i s 
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prompted to urge the d e s i r a b i l i t y of d i v i d i n g the Corporations 
i n t o s m a l l e r corporations each d e a l i n g w i t h a more homogeneous 
group of i n d u s t r i e s . 
I t i s however, easy to say such a thing - as 
indeed, i t has been easy to say various other things by way of 
remedy i n e a r l i e r p a r t s of t h i s concluding chapter. I t w i l l be 
extremely d i f f i c u l t i n accomplishment and may w e l l take more 
time than people w i l l have patience f o r . Yet patience may be 
one of the most important r e q u i s i t i e s f o r eventual success i n 
the attempt to strengthen the processes of i n d u s t r i a l f inance 
and development. 
APPENDICES. 
APPENDIX - A. 
Notes on P r i c e F a c t o r s ; 
For many purposes i t i s d e s i r a b l e to estimate 
investment i n the l a r g e - s c a l e s e c t o r i n constant p r i c e s . To 
c o n s t r u c t a s u i t a b l e p r i c e index i s d i f f i c u l t i n a country 
l i k e P a k i s t a n where adequate information and records a r e not 
a v a i l a b l e . P r i c e s of investment goods can move q u i t e 
d i f f e r e n t l y from other p r i c e s and a general wholesale p r i c e 
index, f o r i n s t a n c e , would not be s u i t a b l e to d e f l a t e 
investment i n c o n s t a n t p r i c e s . 
An i d e a l index would include the p r i c e s of major 
items of investment s u i t a b l y weighted. I n 1958, according to 
a survey of t o t a l c a p i t a l stock, s l i g h t l y over a t h i r d i s 
machinery, about one quarter i s stocks and roughly one s i x t h 
each i s b u i l d i n g s and other working c a p i t a l . On the assumption 
t h a t roughly the same proportions held true over the whole 
pe r i o d , i n d i c e s can be constructed for s e v e r a l components. 
No index e x i s t s f o r machinery used i n P a k i s t a n ' s 
i n d u s t r y , most of which i s imported. The nearest index i s one 
prepared by GATT f o r the U.K. and West Germany machinery exports. 
The C.S.O. index f o r imported manufactures suggests that i t may 
be reasonable to assume th a t u n t i l 1950 there were only small 
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changes i n the p r i c e s of imported goods. A f t e r 1959/60, the 
C.S.O, wholesale p r i c e index f o r machinery shows p r a c t i c a l l y 
no change. No change has t h e r e f o r e been assumed here a l s o . 
For the st o c k s of domestic goods and other 
working c a p i t a l , the p r i c e index for manufactures i s q u i t e 
s u i t a b l e . A good p a r t of the stocks c o n s i s t s of f i n i s h e d and 
s e m i - f i n i s h e d manufactures, held for p r o c e s s i n g and s a l e . 
Another t h i r d i s imported raw m a t e r i a l s and the 
m a t e r i a l s component of b u i l d i n g s . An index f o r cement, i r o n 
and s t e e l prepared by W, Tims i s used f o r t h i s component. 
Unfo r t u n a t e l y , none of the i n d i c e s goes back beyond 
1950, and e x t r a p o l a t i o n had to be used f o r e a r l i e r y e a r s . 
The index which comes ne a r e s t to f u l f i l l i n g these conditions i s 
that constructed by G.F. Papanek and i t i s h i s . i n d e x which 
has been a p p l i e d . 
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Index of Investment Outlay 1947/65 
i n Constant P r i c e s . 
(1959-60 = 100). 
1947- 48 
1948- 49 
1949- 50 
1950- 51 
1951- 52 
1952- 53 
1953- 54 
1954- 55 
1955- 56 
1956- 57 
1957- 58 
1958- 59 
1959- 60 
1960- 61 
1961- 62 
1962- 63 
1963- 64 
1964- 65 
75 
75 
76 
77 
78 
81 
81 
77 
85 
90 
93 
95 
100 
103 
104 
108 
108 
108 
APPENDIX " B» 
A L i s t of 70 Companies and 10 Background Tables; 
Appendix B contains a l i s t of 70 l i s t e d companies 
inc l u d e d i n the study and 10 background t a b l e s f o r use i n 
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the t a b l e s i n Chapter Two. Some of the data 
are presented i n the form of a 3 year average f o r each of the 
periods chosen : other data are f o r a p a r t i c u l a r year. A l l 
data a r e drawn from summarised balance sheets of s e l e c t e d 
l i s t e d companies. 
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Name of the Companies included i n the 
study f o r the Period 1961-66. 
1. Ahmed Bawany T e x t i l e M i l l s L t d . 
2. Bawany V i o l i n 
3. Burewala " " " 
4. The (Colony) Sarhad T e x t i l e M i l l s Ltd, 
5. The Colony T e x t i l e M i l l s L t d . 
6. Dawood Cotton " 
7. F.P. 
8. Gulbarg 
. 9. Habib 
10. Hafiz 
11. Husein I n d u s t r i e s L t d . 
12. Nishat M i l l s L t d . 
13. Olympia T e x t i l e M i l l s L t d . 
14. V a l i k a T e x t i l e M i l l s L t d . 
15. H.M. S i l k M i l l s L t d . 
16. Karium S i l k M i l l s L t d . 
17. Kohinoor Rayon Lim i t e d . 
18. National S i l k and Rayon M i l l s Ltd. 
19. Harnai Woollen M i l l s L t d . 
20. Lawrencepur Woollen and T e x t i l e M i l l s Ltd, 
21. V a l i k a Woollen M i l l s L t d . 
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Jute 
22. Adamjee Jute M i l l s L t d . 
23. Amin Jute M i l l s L t d . 
24. Bawa Jute M i l l s L t d , 
25. Crescent Jute M i l l s L t d . 
26. Karim Jute M i l l s L t d . 
27. L a l i f Bawany J u t e M i l l s L t d . 
28. Pak Jute M i l l s L t d . 
Food Products. 
29. A s s o c i a t e d I n d u s t r i e s L t d , 
30. Burma O i l M i l l s L t d . 
31. Maqbool Company L t d . 
32. Wazir A l i I n d u s t r i e s L t d , 
33. Brooke Bond ( P a k i s t a n ) L t d . 
34. Li p t o n ( P a k i s t a n ) L t d . 
35. P a k i s t a n Tobacco Company Limited. 
36. Premier Tobacco Company Limited. 
37. Souvenir Tobacco Company Limited. 
Sugar and A l l i e d . 
38. Charsadda Sugar M i l l s L t d . 
39. Crescent Sugar M i l l s and D i s t i l l e r y Ltd. 
40. Hyesons Sugar M i l l s L t d . 
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42. The Thai I n d u s t r i e s Corporation L t d . 
43. Zeal-Pak Sugar M i l l s L t d . 
Engineering and Construction." 
44. The B a t a l a Engineering Company (Pakistan) Ltd. 
45. Gammon ( E a s t P a k i s t a n ) L i m i t e d . 
46. Ghandhara I n d u s t r i e s L i m i t e d . 
47. S t e e l Corporation of P a k i s t a n Ltd. 
Cement. 
48. Asbestors Cement I n d u s t r i e s Ltd. 
49. V a l i k a Cement L t d . 
50. Zeal-Pak Cement F a c t o r y L t d . 
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals. 
51. Ferozsons L a b o r a t o r i e s L t d . 
52. Glaxo L a b o r a t o r i e s ( P a k i s t a n ) Ltd. 
53. I . C . I . P a k i s t a n Manufactures Ltd. 
54. Sandoz ( P a k i s t a n ) L i m i t e d . 
55. P a k i s t a n Oxygen L t d . 
F u e l and Power. 
56. The Attock O i l Company L t d . 
57. K a r a c h i Gas Company L t d . 
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58. P a k i s t a n R e f i n e r y L t d . 
59. S u i Gas Transmission Company Ltd. 
Miscellaneous. 
60. Adamjee I n d u s t r i e s L t d . 
61. E a s t Pak Cold Storages L t d . 
62. EBCO Cold Storages and A l l i e d I n d u s t r i e s L t d . 
63. H a j i Dossa and Sons L t d . 
64. H i l a l T anneries L t d . 
65. Kohinoor I n d u s t r i e s L t d . 
66. P a k i s t a n Rope Works L t d . 
67. P a k i s t a n S e r v i c e s L t d . 
68. Spencer and Company ( P a k i s t a n ) Ltd. 
69. Usmania G l a s s Sheet F a c t o r y Ltd. 
70. Karnaphuli Paper M i l l s L t d . 
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TABLE B 1 Summarised Statement of A s s e t s and L x a b x l i t x e s of 
46 S e l e c t e d L i s t e d Companies, 1961-63 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Items T e x t i l e s E x c l u d i n g J u t e J u t e 
Food Products 
e x c l u d i n g sugar 
Sugar and 
A l l i e d 
E n g i n e e r i n g 
& C o n s t r u c t i o n 
Chemical & 
P h a r m a c u e t i c a l 
F u e l & 
Power Misce-l l a n e o u s 
T o t a l 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Number of Companies 19 4 6 3 5 2 4 3 46 
F i x e d A s s e t s at Cost 324 67 96 70 115 33 261 306 1272" 
L e s s Accumulated D e p r e c i a t i o n 138 22 33 32 46 9 101 136 517 
Net F i x e d A s s e t s 186 45 63 38 69 1 24 160 170 755 
Investments 43 25 - - 4 76 
C u r r e n t A s s e t s 260 4^ 125 43 134 30 137 196 97'l3 
L e s s C u r r e n t L i a b i l i t i e s 167 33 45 39 84 15 74 166 623 
Net Working C a p i t a l 93 13 80 4 50 1 15 63 30 34^ 
T o t a l A s s e t s 322 62 168 42 119 39 227 200 1 1 * ^ 
Paid-up C a p i t a l 172 42 96 38 84 25 128 132 717 
R e t a i n e d E a r n i n g s 129 11 65 3 28 14 28 58 336 
T o t a l E q u i t y 301 53 161 41 112 39 156 190 1053 
* 
Long-term Loans 21 9 7 1 7 - 71 10 126 
T o t a l L i a b i l i t i e s 322 62 168 42 119 39 227 200 1179 
* I n c l u d e s debentures to the e x t e n t of Rs 11 m i l l i o n 
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TABLE B,2. Summarised Statement of A s s e t s and L i a b i l i t i e s of 70 S e l e c t e d L i s t e d 
Companies, 1964-66. ( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Items T e x t i l e s excluding 
J u t e , 
J u t e . 
Food Products 
excluding 
sugar, 
Sugar 
and 
A l l i e d . 
E ngineering 
and 
C o n s t r u c t i o n . 
Chemical 
and 
Pharmaceutical. 
Fuel 
and 
Power. 
Miscellaneous T o t a l 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Number of Companies 21 7 9 6 7 5 4 11 70 
F i x e d A s s e t s a t Cost 622 369 145 187 232 99 342 535 2531 
L e s s Accumulated 
D e p r e c i a t i o n 209 135 57 44 66 22 143 190 866 
Net F i x e d A s s e t s 413 234 88 143 166 77 199 345 1665 
Investments 56 5 30 1 1 - 11 11 115 
Current A s s e t s 388 275 214 111 212 65 191 310 1766 
Les s Current L i a b i l i t i e s 256 189 95 68 141 40 148 317 1254 
Net Working C a p i t a l 132 86 119 43 71 25 43 - 7 512 
T o t a l A s s e t s 601 325 237 187 238 102 253 349 2292 
'Eaidfeiupi^iGajiiifeai J " 
c a p i t a l . 
Retained E a r n i n g s . 
253 
186 
163 
93 
132 
94 
99 
40 
118 
59 
50 
39 
146 
41 
199 
78 
1160 
630 
E q u i t y 439 256 226 139 177 89 187 277 1790 
* 
Long term Loans 162 69 11 48 61 13 66 72 502 
T o t a l L i a b i l i t i e s 601 325 237 1S7 238 102 253 349 2292 
* I n c l u d e s debentures to the extent of Rs 13 m i l l i o n . 
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TABLE B.3. Summarised A s s e t s and L i a b i l i t i e s of Companies by S i z e i n 1964. 
( F i x e d A s s e t s l e s s than 10 m i l l i o n r u p e e s ) . 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Items T e x t i l e s Food Engineering Chemicals excluding Products and and Miscellaneous T o t a l 
J u t e . excluding sugar. C o n s t r u c t i o n . Pharmaceuticals. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of Companies 4 5 1 1 6 17 
F i x e d A s s e t s a t Cost 17.5 26.2 3.2 4.4 28.8 80.1 
L e s s Accumulated D e p r e c i a t i o n 6.6 6.0 1.5 Q V 6 1,9 16.6 
Net F i x e d A s s e t s 10.9 20,2 1.7 3.8 26.9 63,5 
Investments 1.1 - - - 2.0 3.1 
Current A s s e t s 23.3 63.8 9.1 9.4 23.0 128.6 
L e s s Current L i a b i l i t i e s 16.1 41.9 5.7 7.7 26.7 98.1 
Net Working C a p i t a l 7.2 21.9 3.4 1,7 --3.7 30.5 
* 
T o t a l A s s e t s 19.2 42.1 5ol 5.5 25.2 97.1 
Paid-up C a p i t a l 14.5 24.6 4.0 3.0 17,3 63i-4 
Retained Earnings 4.0 12.8 1,1 1,2 1.4 20.5 
Long-term Loans lQ.9 4.7 - 1.5 6.4 13.5 
T o t a l L i a b i l i t i e s * 19.4 42.1 5.1 5.7 25.1 97.4 
* S l i g h t d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t o t a l a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s are due to rounding o f f . 
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TABLE Bo4. Summarised A s s e t s and L i a b i l i t i e s of Companies by S i z e i n 1964, 
( F i x e d A s s e t s between Rs 10 m i l l i o n but l e s s than Rs 30 m i l l i o n ) 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Items T e x t i l e s excluding 
J u t e 
Jute 
Food Products 
e x c l u d i n g 
sugar. 
Sugar 
Engineering 
and 
C o n s t r u c t i o n 
Chemicals 
and 
Pharmaceuticals. 
Miscellaneous T o t a l 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Number of Companies 9 2 3 1 2 2 1 20 
F i x e d A s s e t s a t Cost 157,0 29.7 29.7 14,6 20.8 36.5 8.2 296.5 
L e s s Accumulated D e p r e c i a t i o n 55.1 7.0 7,4 6.4 5.9 10,3 iQ.8 92.9 
Net F i x e d A s s e t s 101.9 22,7 22,3 8.2 14.9 26.2 .7.4 203.6 
Investments 5,5 2,3 - - - - 7.8 
Current A s s e t s 130,1 13.8 48,6 15.1 56.9 22,3 5.9 292.7 
L e s s Current L i a b i l i t i e s 104,2 10.7 36,8 9.4 25.6 12.3 8,5 207.5 
Net Working C a p i t a l 
a. 
25,9 3.1 11.8 5.7 31.3 10.0 —2.6 85.2 
T o t a l A s s e t s 133.3 25.8 36,4 13.9 46.2 36.2 4.8 296.6 
Paid-up C a p i t a l 73,3 13,5 25.0 10.0 17.1 15.1 4,0 158.0 
Retained Earnings 45.8 7,0 8,6 CO. 9 3,5 21.2 (0.7 87.7 
Long-term Loans 14.2 5.4 2.6 3.0 25.5 - - 50.7 
T o t a l L i a b i l i t i e s * 133.3 25,9 36,2 13.9 46.1 36.3 4.7 296.4 
* S l i g h t d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t o t a l a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s a r e due to rounding o f f . 
311 -
TABLE B.5. Sununarised A s s e t s and L i a b i l i t i e s o f Companies by S i z e i n 1964. 
( F i x e d A s s e t s o f Rs 30 m i l l i o n and o v e r ) . 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Items T e x t i l e s e x c l u d i n g 
J u t e 
J u t e 
Food Products 
e x c l u d i n g 
sugar 
Sugar & 
A l l i e d 
E n g i n e e r i n g 
and 
C o n s t r u c t i o n 
Chemicals 
and Pharm 
- a c e u t i c a l s 
Fuel 
and 
Power 
M i s c e l l -
aneous T o t a l 
1 2 3 4 5 '6 7 8 9 10 
Number o f Companies 8 5 1 5 4 2 4 4 33 
F i x e d Assets a t Cost 375.0 291.8 77.4 143.5 153.0 31.6 327.8 431.9 1832.0 
Less Accumulated D e p r e c i a t i o n 121.0 117.3 36.0 32.6 45.8 6.9 127.3 169.0 655.9 
Net F i x e d A s s e t s 254.0 174.5 41,4 110.9 107.2 24.7 200,5 262.9 1176,1 
I n v e s t m e n t s 45.1 5.6 25.0 0.6 0.4 0.2 4.4 3,1 91,4 
C u r r e n t A s s e t s 215.3 234.7 88.1 78.3 141.7 35,6 156.3 259.2 12Q9.2 
Less C u r r e n t L i a b i l i t i e s 121.4 168.3 20.7 33.6 57.9 15.4 123.4 248.8 789.5 Net Working C a p i t a l 
T o t a l A s s e t s * 
93.9 
393.0 
66.4 
246.5 
67.4 
133.8 
44.7. 
156.2 
83.8 
191.4 
20.2 
45.1 
32.9 
244.8 
10.4 
276.4 
419.7 
1687,2 
Paid-up C a p i t a l , 170.0 147.5 70,0 83.2 '93.1 30.1 146.0 163.1 903.0 
R e t a i n e d Earnings 129.3 69.9 63.7 37.9 40.6 15.0 44.9 91.0 492.3 
Long-term Loans 93.7 29.2 35.5 57.7 - 53.7 21.5 291.3 
* 
T o t a l L i a b i l i t i e s 393.0 246f6 133.7 156.6 191.4 45.1 ! 244.6 275.6 1686.6 
* S l i g h t d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t o t a l a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s a r e due t o r o u n d i n g o f f . 
TABLE B.6. 
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Summarised Assets and L i a b i l i t i e s o f Companies by S i z e i n 1966. 
( F i x e d A s s e t s l e s s t h a n 10 m i l l i o n r u p e e s ) . 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Items T e x t i l e e x c l u d i n g 
J u t e . 
1 Food 
Pr o d u c t s 
e x c l u d i n g Sugar, 
E n g i n e e r i n g 
and 
C o n s t r u c t i o n . 
Chemical 
and 
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l . 
M i s c e l l a n e o u s T o t a l 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number o f Companies 4 5 1 1 6 1 7 
F i x e d A s s e t s a t Cost . 19.8 25.6 4.4 5.4 30.8 86,0 
Less Accumulated D e p r e c i a t i o n 8.5 8.1 2.0 0.9 2.7 22.2 
Net F i x e d A s s e t s 11,3 17.5 2.4 4.5 28.1 63.8 
I n v e s t m e n t s 2.2 - 2.0 4,2 
C u r r e n t Asjeets 30.8 78.4 7,4 11,9 30.7 159,2 
Less C u r r e n t L i a b i l i t i e s 23.4 40.8 4,4 10.0 32.4 111.0 
Net Working C a p i t a l 7.4 37.6 3.0 1,9 -^1,7 48,2 
T o t a l A s s e t s * 20.9 55.1 5.4 6.4 28.4 116,2 
Paid-up C a p i t a l 13.0 28.1 4.0 3.0 18.0 66.1 
R e t a i n e d E a r n i n g s 7.3 19.0 1,4 2.4 4.3 34.4 
T o t a l E q u i t y 20.3 47.1 5.4 5.4 22.3 100.5 
Long-term Loans 0 .6 8.1 - 1.0 6,1 15.8 
* 
T o t a l L i a b i l i t i e s 20.9 55.2 5.4 6.4 28.4 116.3 
* S l i g h t d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t o t a l a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s due to- r o u n d i n g o f f . 
- 313 -
TABLE B 7 Summarised A s s e t s and L i a b i l i t i e s o f Companies by S i z e i n 1966 
F i x e d A s s e t s between 10 m i l l i o n b u t l e s s t h a n 30 m i l l i o n 
rupees 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
T e x t i l e 
e x c l u d i n g 
J u t e 
Food P r o d u c t s 
e x c l u d i n g 
sugar 
Items E n g i n e e r i n g 
and 
C o n s t r u c t i o n 
Chemical 
and 
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l 
J u t e Sugar ^ 
A l l i e d M i s c e l l a n e o u s T o t a l 
Number o f Companies 
F i x e d a s s e t s a t Cost 
Less a c c u m u l a t e d D e p r e c i a t i o n 
185 7 44 5 37 7 16 4 30 0 47 1 10 4 371 8 67 5 12 4 13 9 121 0 Net F i x e d A s s e t s 
I n v e s t m e n t s 
C u r r e n t A s s e t s 
Less C u r r e n t L i a b i l i t i e s 
118 2 35 9 25 3 20 8 33 2 250 8 
143 7 30 6 75 3 22 9 72 7 19 5 370 5 116 6 26 1 54 6 16 8 46 3 13 5 10 5 284 4 Net W o r k i n g C a p i t a l 27 1 20 7 26 4 T o t a l A s s e t s y 
Pai d - u p C a p i t a l 
R e t a i n e d E a r n i n g s 
86 1 149 3 40 5 50 5 14 8 47 2 39 0 345 4 72 8 16 8 26 6 10 O 18 6 19 6 168 4 53 0 12 8 21 1 19 4 118 5 T o t a l E q u i t y 
Long Term Loans 
125 8 29 6 47 7 11 8 28 3 39 0 286 9 23 0 10 8 18 9 
58 5 T o t a l L i a b i l i t i e s 148 8 50 5 14 8 47 2 39 0 345 4 
* S l i g h t d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t o t a l a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s a r e due t o r o u n d i n g o f f 
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TABLE B 8 Summarised A s s e t s and L i a b i l i t i e s o f i>ampanies by S i z e m 1966 
( F i x e d A s s e t s o f 30 m i l l i o n rupees and o v e r ) 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
It e m s T e x t i l e e x c l u d i n g 
j u t e 
J u t e Food P r o d u c t s ex 
e l u d i n g suga 
Sugar & 
k- A l l i e d 
E n g i n e e r i n g 
and 
C o n s t r u c t i o n 
Chemicalgt 
Pharmaceut 
i c a l 
F u e l I 
and 
Power 
M i s c e l l a n e o u s T o t a l 
8 10 
Number o f Companies 
F i x e d A s s e t s a t Cost 
Less A c c u m u l a t e d D e p r e c i a t i o n 
8 
494 0 
167 0 
5 
361 O 
138 2 
1 
96 6 
46 O 
5 
211 6 
50 4 
4 
257 3 
66 9 
2 
83 1 
10 4 
4 
361 7 
158 4 
4 
564 4 
204 2 
31 
2429 7 
841 5 
Net i F i x e d f A s s e t s ^ 
I n v e s t m e n t s 
C u r r e n t A s s e t s 
Less C u r r e n t L i a b i l i t i e s 
327 0 
49 9 
245 5 
124 5 
222 8 
4 4 
316 6 
170 7 
50 6 
26 6 
107 7 
22 2 
161 2 
111 1 
73 0 
190 4 
& 6 
120 2 
75 7 
72 7 
CP 2 
32 5 
23 7 
203 3 
11 3 
204 1 
167 8 
360 3 
18 8 
269 9 
251 0 
1588 2 
111 8 
1407 6 
9«8 6 
Net W o r k i n g C a p i t a l 
T o t a l A s s e t s 
121 O 
497 9 
145 9 
373 1 
85 5 
162 7 
38 1 
199 3 
44 5 
235 5 
8 8 
82 O 
36 3 
251 0 
18 9 
398 0 
P a i d - u p C a p i t a l 
R e t a i n e d E a r n i n g s 
176 2 
136 5 
150 0 
99 3 
88 0 
68 7 
100 7 
54 3 
97 5 
63 O 
32 0 
2« O 
146 0 
57 O 
186 3 
75 4 
499 0 
2199 5 
976 7 
574 2 
E q u i t y 
L o n g - t e r m l o a n s 
312 7 
185 1 
249 3 
123 8 
156 7 
6 0 
155 0 
44 3 
160 5 
75 0 
52 0 
30 0 
203 0 261 7 
13§ 3 
1550 9 
648 6 
f & t a l i L i a b i a i t i e s * 497 8 373 1 162 7 199 3 235 5 82 0 251 0 398 0 2199 5 
* S l i g h t d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t o t a l a s s e t s and l i a b i l i t i e s a r e due to r o u n d i n g o f f 
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B a s i c Data on 70 S e l e c t e d L i s t e d Companies, 1964-66 
( M i l l i o n Rupees) 
Year F i x e d 
A s s e t s 
a t 
Cost 
A c c u m u l a t e d 
D e p r e c i a t i o n 
Net 
F i x e d 
A s s e t s 
( 2 - 3 ) 
I n v e s t 
ments. 
C u r r e n t 
A s s e t s 
C u r r e n t 
l i a b i l -
i t i e s . 
Net 
W o r k i n g 
C a p i t a l 
( 6 - 7 ) 
T o t a l 
A s s e t s 
(4+5+8) 
P a i d -
up 
C a p i -
t a l 
Reserve 
and 
S u r p l u s . 
* 
Net 
w o r t h 
(10+11) 
Long-
t e r m 
l o a n s 
1 
T o t a l 
l i a b -
i l i t i e s 
P r e -
Tax 
P r o f i t 
P r o v i s i o n 
f o r 
T a x a t i o n 
Net 
P r o f i t 
f o r t h e 
y e a r 
( 1 5 - 1 6 ) 
D i v i d e n d 
P a i d 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1964 2208 765 1443 102 1624 1095 529 2074 1116 601 1717 357 2074 330 144 186 79 
1965 2496 853 1643 103 1726 1266 460 2206 1152 616 1768 438 2206 279 109 170 98 
1966 2888 982 1906 123 1917 1287 630 2659 1213 728 1941 718 2659 322 109 213 112 
A v e r - 2531 867 1664 109 1756 1216 540 2313 1160 648 180 9« 1-5041 2313i 310 121 190 96 
age 
* The n e t w o r t h i s o b t a i n e d by a d d i n g t h e c a p i t a l and re^ejry®^, o n l y 
[ a s s e t s / 
as t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f f i c t i t i o u s ^ i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 
S l i g h t d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t h e t a b l e a r e due t o r o u n d i n g o f f . 
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1 
TABLE B.IO F i n a n c i a l R a t i o s and Rate o f R e t u r n o f 70 S e l e c t e d Companies, 
Year 
Long Term 
Debt t o 
Net w o r t h 
Long Term 
Debt t o 
T o t a l \Assets 
C u r r e n t A s s e t s 
t o C u r r e n t 
L i a b i l i t i e s 
P r e - t a x 
P r o f i t t o 
Paid-up C a p i t a l 
Net P r o f i t 
t o Paid-up 
C a p i t a l 
D i v i d e n d 
t o p a i d -
up c a p i t a l 
D e p r e c i a t i o n 
t o Gross 
F i x e d A s s e t s 
Reserve 
& s u r p l u s 
[ ^ T o t a l ^ 
cCgO> c a p i t a l 
% 
Long-'term 
Loan t o 
e q u i t y o r 
Ge a r i n g 
R a t i o % 
9 10 
1964 
1965 
1966 
20.79 
2.4.77 
36.99' 
17.[21] 
19.85 
27.00 
1.48 
1.36 
1149 
29 . 5 7 
24 . 2 2 
2 6 . 5 5 ' 
16.67 
14.76 
17.56 
• 7.08 
8.51 
9.23 
34.65 
34.17 
34.00 
28.98 
27 , (92 ] 
27 J38 J 
20.79 
24.77 
::36.99^ 
Average 27.52 21.[35_ 1.44 26.75 16.33 8.27 34.27 28.log ] 127.52 
Source T a b l e B.9. 
APPENDIX - C, 
The Managing Agency System; 
The managing agency system, a unique o r g a n i s i o n a l 
p a t t e r n , has been c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e i n d u s t r i a l development 
o f I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . The managing agency i s g e n e r a l l y a w e l l -
e s t a b l i s h e d f i r m , u n d e r t a k i n g t h e management f u n c t i o n o f an 
e n t e r p r i s e . I n r e t u r n , t h e managing agent r e c e i v e s commission from 
t h e owners o f t h e company. I t s p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n i s the, day t o day 
management o f a company, y e t i t s r o l e as f i n a n c i e r i s a l s o v e r y 
s i g n i f i c a n t . 
I n 1834 t h e monopoly o f East I n d i a Company was 
a b o l i s h e d and i n i t s p l a c e e v o l v e d t h e managing agency system, ^'''^  
The B r i t i s h i n v e s t o r s adopted t h i s d e v i c e t o o r g a n i s e and manage 
i n d u s t r i a l u n d e r t a k i n g s i n I n d i a w i t h o u t i n v o l v i n g themselves i n t h e 
a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n o f t h e concerns. Through t h i s system, they were 
s u c c e s s f u l i n a c h i e v i n g business o b j e c t i v e s . F o l l o w i n g t h e success 
o f B r i t i s h i n v e s t o r s i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d , l o c a l businessmen 
e n t e r e d t h e i n d u s t r i a l f i e l d a t t h e end o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y 
( 2 ) 
and adopted t h e managing agency system i n r u n n i n g t h e i r u n d e r t a k i n g s . 
( 1 ) Prasad, B a d > r i . , The Development o f t h e I n d i a n C a p i t a l - w i t h 
s p e c i a l r e f e r e n c e t o t h e Managing Agency System, 
u n p u b l i s h e d Ph.D, T h e s i s , ( U n i v e r s i t y o f London, 
1962), pp.164 and 170. 
( 2 ) Rosen, George., o p , c i t , , p.7. 
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G r a d u a l l y , t h i s system has been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l 
development o f I n d i a . 
The g r o w t h o f t h e managing agency system i n P a k i s t a n 
i s a post-independence phenomenon. A l a r g e - s c a l e exodus o f 
non'-Muslim t r a d e r s engaged i n t r a d e , f i n a n c e and i n d u s t r y i n t h e 
areas c o n s t i t u t i n g P a k i s t a n c r e a t e d a v o i d i n t h e economic s t r u c t u r e 
o f t h e c o u n t r y . The v o i d was, however, f i l l e d i n t o some e x t e n t , by 
t h e m i g r a t i o n o f t h e t r a d i n g and i n d u s t r i a l community o f Muslims across 
t h e b o r d e r , who g a i n f u l l y employed t h e i r funds i n t h e r u d i m e n t a r y 
i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y o f P a k i s t a n . W i t h a v e r y l i m i t e d i n d u s t r i a l 
c a p a c i t y i n t h e c o u n t r y , t h e domestic demand f o r manufactures had 
t o be met t h r o u g h i m p o r t s . As a r e s u l t , these m i g r a n t s , m o s t l y 
b e l o n g i n g t o f a m i l y groups, earned s u b s t a n t i a l p r o f i t s from t h e 
t r a d e s e c t o r . F o l l o w i n g t h e end of t h e Korean war i n t h e e a r l y 
f i f t i e s t h e i m p o r t p o l i c y o f t h e c o u n t r y had t o be r e s t r i c t e d i n 
view o f f o r e i g n exchange s t r i n g e n c y . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e 
development o f i n d u s t r i e s based on i n d i g e n o u s raw m a t e r i a l s was 
encouraged t h r o u g h t h e p r o v i s i o n of v a r i o u s i n c e n t i v e s . Moreover, 
i n d u s t r y promised a h i g h p r o f i t on account o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a 
v a s t s h e l t e r e d d o mestic market. C o n s i d e r i n g t h e p r o s p e c t o f h i g h 
p r o f i t f r o m i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y and v i s u a l i s i n g t h e d e c l i n i n g p r o f i t 
p r o s p e c t f r o m t r a d e , t h e members o f t h e f a m i l y groups s h i f t e d a 
p a r t o f t h e i r r e s o u r c e s i n t o i n d u s t r y . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , p r o f i t s Were 
r e i n v e s t e d t o g a i n c o n t r o l over a number o f i n d u s t r i e s and t o earn 
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more p r o f i t . The managing agency system on a pre-independence 
p a t t e r n , was acc e p t e d as an i n s t r u m e n t t o manage i n d u s t r i a l 
u n d e r t a k i n g s . Thus, a new e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l c l a s s emerged i n 
P a k i s t a n d o m i n a t i n g t h e c a p i t a l i s t s e c t o r o f t h e economy. I n 
t h e process o f i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , they gained e x p e r i e n c e and 
f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d themselves i n the p r o m o t i o n , f i n a n c i n g and 
managing o f companies. 
S i n c e most o f t h e p r o f i t o c c u r r e d t o t h e members o f 
t h e f a m i l y groups, t h e y f u r t h e r entrenched themselves f i r m l y by 
s e t t i n g up banks and i n s u r a n c e companies. T h i s p o l a r i s a t i o n o f 
economic power and c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f w e a l t h made i t p o s s i b l e t o 
s u p p l y t h e c a p i t a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f i n d u s t r i e s t o some e x t e n t from 
t h e i r own r e s o u r c e s . 
The managing agency system i n P a k i s t a n has performed 
a number o f u s e f u l f u n c t i o n s i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l development o f 
P a k i s t a n o f w h i c h t h e p r o m o t i o n , f i n a n c i n g and managing o f t h e 
(3) 
companies a r e t h e most i m p o r t a n t . W h i l e p r o m o t i n g new i n d u s t r i e s , 
t h e y have s u p p l i e d i n i t i a l c a p i t a l and undertaken a g r e a t amount 
o f r i s k a s s o c i a t e d w i t h new i n v e s t m e n t . They have shown t h e i r 
e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l a c t i v i t y by o r g a n i s i n g new i n d u s t r i e s and o p e r a t i n g 
them q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l l y . By r e i n v e s t i n g i n d u s t r i a l p r o f i t s t h e y 
have augmented c a p i t a l and quickened t h e pace o f i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . 
( 3 ) Dawood I n d u s t r i e s L t d . , a managing agency f i r m i s r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r p l a n n i n g , p r o m o t i n g , implementing and managing i n d u s t r i a l 
e n t e r p r i s e s o f t h e Dawood Group. 
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I t has been a common p r a c t i c e i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t o demand guarantees o f t h e managing 
agent o r d i r e c t o r s i n a d d i t i o n t o c o l l a t e r a l b e f o r e g r a n t i n g a 
l o a n . I n such s i t u a t i o n s , t h e managing agent o f t h e company has 
o f t e n p r o v i d e d necessary s u p p o r t . 
The u n d e r w r i t e r s , t o o impose pre«conditions i n 
some i n s t a n c e s , b e f o r e making any u n d e r w r i t i n g commitments f o r a 
new i s s u e . For example, t h e I.CP., an u n d e r w r i t e r , secured an 
u n d e r t a k i n g f r o m t h e managing agent o f t h e Hussain Sugar M i l l s L t d . , 
t h a t t h e managing agent s h o u l d p r o v i d e unsecured l o a n s f r o m t i m e 
t o t i m e t o t h e company t o meet any o v e r - r u n s b e f o r e u n d e r w r i t i n g 
( 4 ) 
was g r a n t e d . T h i s i s an i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e importance o f t h e 
managing agents i n t h e f i n a n c i n g aspect o f t h e c o r p o r a t e s e c t o r . 
As a p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n , t h e managing agent has 
p r o v i d e d management s e r v i c e s t o the c o r p o r a t e s e c t o r w i t h o u t w h i c h 
i n d u s t r i a l development c o u l d have been hampered. I n d u s t r i a l 
development i n P a k i s t a n has been d i v e r s i f i e d due t o t h e presence 
o f t h e managing agency system. I n o r d e r t o meet t h e re q u i r e m e n t s 
o r t o use t h e waste o f an e n t e r p r i s e a s i s t e r concern has been 
developed, such as c o t t o n g i n n i n g f o r c o t t o n t e x t i l e , or t h e l i k e . 
They have done so w i t h a view t o s p r e a d i n g t h e r i s k over d i f f e r e n t 
t y p e s o f i n d u s t r i e s on t h e one hand, and t o earn more commission. 
( 4 ) The Prospectus o f t h e Husain Sugar M i l l s L t d . , ( P u b l i s h e d i n 
t h e 'Dawn' on t h e 1 0 t h March, 1967). 
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C o nsequently, i n d u s t r i a l development g a i n e d momentum i n t h e c o u n t r y . 
Thus i t i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o i s o l a t e one a c t i v i t y o f managing 
agent f r o m t h e o t h e r . 
D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e managing agency system has 
p l a y e d an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h e process o f i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n 
P a k i s t a n , y e t c e r t a i n abuses a r e thought t o have c r e p t i n t o t h e 
system. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e abuses d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter 3, t h e 
f o l l o w i n g d e m e r i t s o f t h e system have been a cause o f c r i t i c i s m , 
i . The p r e v a l e n c e of t h i s system has enabled a 
r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l number o f f a m i l i e s t o command 
v a s t w e a l t h . The l a r g e - s c a l e i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r 
has been m a i n l y c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e i r hands 
r e s u l t i n g i n d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h e way o f new 
(5) 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s s e e k i n g t o e n t e r i n t o i n d u s t r y . 
The degree o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n i s so deep r o o t e d t h a t 
any a t t e m p t by the Government t o d i f f u s e e q u i t y 
ownership has been proved i n o p e r a t i v e , as i s 
d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter 3, 
i i . T h i s system has r e s t r i c t e d t h e development o f an 
independent management c l a s s s i n c e t h e managerial 
p o s t s a r e n o r m a l l y f i l l e d by members o f t h e f a m i l y 
( 5 ) For example, Adamjee Sons L t d . , a managing agent i s i n c o n t r o l 
o f s e v e r a l i n d u s t r i e s namely, Adamjee J u t e M i l l s L t d . , Adamjee 
T e x t i l e M i l l s L t d . , Adamjee Paper and Board, Adamjee Insur a n c e 
Company and so. 
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groups. As a r e s u l t , graduates o f business 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f i n d i t h a r d t o g a i n a p l a c e i n 
c o r p o r a t e management, 
i i i . The i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r i s c o n t r o l l e d by t h e few 
f a m i l y groups, and i t has been a l l e g e d t h a t t h e y 
have n o t g i v e n much a t t e n t i o n t o t h e q u a l i t y o f 
p r o d u c t s . Moreover, consumers have n o t b e n e f i t e d 
f r o m i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n as much as p o s s i b l y they 
m i g h t have been because t h e p r i c e s o f p r o d u c t s have 
been m a i n t a i n e d a t h i g h l e v e l s . 
However, a l l t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d i t seems t h a t t h e r o l e 
o f t h e managing agency system has had some measure o f u s e f u l n e s s i n 
making p o s s i b l e a q u i t e i m p r e s s i v e i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h i n P a k i s t a n . 
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